G.R. No. L-29956. May 05, 1981
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, HON. TEOFILO SANTOS AND THE DISTRICT FORESTER, MR. AMBROCIO JUINIO, PETITIONERS, VS. JUDGE MARIANO V. BENEDICTO, PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH V, COURT OF …
FERNANDO, C.J.:
Reliance by the Director of Forestry[1]
on the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muñoz,[2]
in this appeal by certiorari from a decision of the then Judge Mariano
V. Benedicto, now deceased, declaring that 417 pieces
of logs in General Tinio, Nueva
Ecija, had
been legally cut by private respondent New Timberland Corporation, but
ordering it to pay to the government the amount of P711.07 still due from his
forest charges or fees, and to refrain from cutting any log in its
concession as its license had in the meanwhile been cancelled by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, is more than justified. To allow private respondent to retain
possession of the logs in question when no permission had been granted by the
then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources would be violative of the constitutional mandate as to the
nationalization and conservation of natural resources. As so clearly set forth in the opinion of
Justice Sanchez in Muñoz: “The view this Court takes of the cases
at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be followed with
respect to forest lands. Many have
written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing
need for forest preservation, conservation, protection, development, and
reforestation.”[3]
The judiciary is thus ever called upon to see to it that no dubious claim to forest products should be
recognized.
The facts are undisputed. The case arose from an action for injunction
with prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction filed by private respondent
Timberland Corporation with the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, then presided by respondent Judge.[4] The then Director of Forestry and the then
District Forester, petitioners now but then respondents, opposed the granting
of a preliminary injunction based on lack of jurisdiction and pendency of another case between the same parties.[5] They then filed their answer, raising the
special and affirmative defenses that the respondent Court had no jurisdiction
to issue a writ of injunction, whether permanent or preliminary, enforceable
outside Nueva Ecija to
control the acts of the Director of Forestry; that assuming arguendo that
the court had jurisdiction, the Timberland Corporation was without a cause of
action because its proposed license over the forest area pursuant to which the disputed logs were cut was
disapproved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and that
respondent Timberland had not exhausted all administrative remedies before
invoking judicial intervention.[6] At the hearing, it was disclosed that
without the required approval of a proposed license by the then Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, respondent Timberland Corporation took the
risk of operating in the areas formerly licensed to its incorporators, thus
enabling one of them to cut and haul about 417 pieces of logs deposited in his
log pond at General Tinio. Petitioners did stop the respondent in its
logging operations, inventoried the logs and seized the said logs in the care
of one Nicanor Aves.
Thereafter, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, on July 2,
1968, disapproved
the proposed license in favor of the New Timberland Corporation, as directed by
the President of the Philippines. His decision was duly communicated to respondent on July 10,
1968. Nonetheless, then respondent Judge rendered
the decision as above set forth, basing his decision on the proposed license of
a former Director of Forestry disregarding such lack of approval by the then
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Hence this appeal. This Court gave due course to the petition
and directed the stay of the execution of the judgment sought to be
reviewed. After the answer was filed by
respondents, petitioners filed their brief to be followed by respondents. There being no reply brief on the part of
petitioners, the case was deemed submitted for decision.
Fidelity to the Muñoz doctrine extensively relied upon by petitioners calls for a reversal. It must be noted likewise that in the recent
case of Director of Lands v. Abanzado,[7] where Muñoz likewise
provided the main support for the conclusion reached, reference was made to
cases decided even before the 1935 Constitution to demonstrate that this Court
had rigorously adhered to the principle of conserving forest resources, as a
corollary to which the alleged right to them of private individuals or entities
was meticulously inquired into and more often than not rejected.[8] We do so again.
1. Why the judgment should
be adverse to respondents is categorically asserted in the excerpt from the
brief of petitioners: “The ruling
is plainly erroneous and untenable, in law and in fact. In the first place no license was ever
issued and released to respondent Timberland, for such kind of license is not
issuable upon the sole authority of the
Director of Forestry, but is subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.”[9]
Support for such a view comes from Forestry Administrative Order No. 11,
Section 14 of which requires that for a licensee to do what was done by private
respondent, there must be an approval of the then Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources the proposed timber license involving the cutting of 1,000
cubic meters or more for a period not exceeding four years. As pointed out in the brief: “Since the license proposed to be
issued to respondent corporation was not approved by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, the same is not a license granted in accordance with the
regulations (Forestry Administrative Order No. 11, particularly Sec. 14,
thereof). It is a mere proposal
conferring no right upon the respondents to commence the conduct of logging
operations. Forestry Administrative
Order No. 11 was published in the Official Gazette; it was issued
and promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (Natural
Resources) pursuant to Sections 79(b) and 1817 of the Revised Administrative
Code, upon the recommendation of the Director of Forestry. It has the force and effect of law. While Section 1831 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides that forest products shall be cut, gathered and
removed from any forest only upon license from the Director of Forestry,
it is no less true that as a subordinate officer, the Director of Forestry is
subject to the control of the Department Head or the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources (Sec. 79(c), Rev. Adm. Code), who, therefore, may impose
reasonable regulations in the exercise of the powers of the subordinate officer.”[10]
It should not be lost sight of that Forestry Administrative Order No. 11 was
recommended by no less than the Director of Forestry himself and thereafter
approved by the then Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, the department
entrusted with such matters in 1934. As
further contended by petitioners:
“What is more, in this case, the Director of Forestry himself submitted
the proposed license to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources ‘for approval‘ thereby implying that he was not
exercising the statutory power vested in him under the Revised
Administrative Code, to issue a license.”[11]
In the absence of a valid license, therefore, the cutting of logs as was done
by private respondent was clearly unauthorized.
As they were illegally cut, private respondent had no right to the
possession of the disputed 417 pieces of logs.
2. The force of the above
contention must have been evident to counsel for private respondent for in the
eight-page brief submitted, there was hardly any attempt to dispute the
soundness of the legal proposition as above set forth. The stress was on good faith. That does not suffice, as the property
involved clearly belongs to the State.
On the facts as duly proved, the judgment certainly was without support.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is reversed and set aside
and the petition for injunction filed by private respondent against the present
petitioners dismissed. Costs against private respondent Corporation.
Barredo, Aquino,
Guerrero, and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., and Abad Santos, JJ., on leave.
[1]
The Director of Forestry was then petitioner Teofilo
Santos and the District Forester, his co-petitioner, was Ambrocio
Juinio.
[2]
L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183.
[3]
Ibid, 1214.
[4]
The New Timberland Corporation, now
private respondent, was the petitioner.
Petitioners before this Court were named respondents.
[5]
Appeal by Certiorari, par. 7.
[6]
Ibid, par. 9.
[7]
L-21814, July 15, 1975, 65 SCRA 5.
[8]
Cf. Nicolas v. Jose, 6 Phil. 589
(1906); Municipality of Luzuriaga v. Director
of Lands, 24 Phil. 193 (1913); Municipality of Hagonoy
v. Archbishop of Manila, 29 Phil. 320 (1915); Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 Phil. 602 (1915); Ramos v.
Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175 (1919); Vaño v.
Government, 41 Phil. 161 (1920); Director of Lands v. Roman Catholic
Bishop of Zamboanga, 61 Phil. 644 (1935).
[9]
Brief for the
Petitioners, 4.
[10]
Ibid, 7.
[11]
Ibid, 8-9.