G.R. No. L-44364. April 27, 1979

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VICTOR GARCIA Y DALIT, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions April 27, 1979 EN BANC
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PER CURIAM:


This is an automatic review of the decision dated July 21, 1976
of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, Hon. Constante R. Ayson presiding, in Crim. Case No. 617, convicting accused Victor Garcia y Dalit of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of death, with all the accessory penalties
provided for by law; to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Imelda Cristobal, the sum of P20,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.

In an Information filed on January
6, 1975 by First Asst. Prov. Fiscal Simplicio C. Cabantac with the
Court of First Instance of Isabela, Victor Garcia y Dalit was charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide,
committed as follows:

“That on or about the 28th day of September, 1974, in the
municipality of Ilagan, province Isabela,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of
force and violence, have carnal knowledge with one Imelda Cristobal,
against the latter’s will and consent; that on the occasion of the said rape,
the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
evident premeditation and taking advantage of his superior strength and with
intent to kill, treacherously assault, attack and use personal violence upon
the said Imelda Cristobal, by then and there giving
her several fist blows on her mouth and face and submerging her into a creek,
which directly caused the death of said Imelda Cristobal,
due to chest compression and drowning.”[1]

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty.[2]
During the trial, the prosecution presented five (5) witnesses – (1) Ignacia Cristobal – mother of the
victim; (2) Rosa Lozano – aunt of the victim; (3) Wilfredo
Cristobal – brother of the victim; (4) Teodoro Cristobal – brother of
the victim; and (5) Conrado Gabriel – Municipal
Health Officer of Ilagan, Isabela
– and Exhibits “A” (Certificate of Death issued by the Local Civil
Registrar), “B” (Medico-Legal Findings), and “C”
(Certificate of Death issued by the Municipal Health Officer).

From the testimonies of the foregoing witnesses, the trial court
culled the following findings of facts:[3]

“On September 28,
1974, about six o’clock p.m.,
Ignacia Cristobal, Wilfredo Cristobal and Teodoro Cristobal were resting in
their respective houses in Gayong-gayong Norte, Ilagan, Isabela.  They had just arrived from the field where
they went to work that afternoon.  Wilfredo’s house is about fifteen meters north of the house
of Ignacia while Teodoro’s
house is about ten meters north of Wilfredo’s.

“Suddenly, Ignacia, Wilfredo and Teodoro heard
someone shouting and screaming at the top of her voice, from the creek about 80
meters east of their houses.  Wilfredo reacted first for he observed that the voice was
that of his 16-year old sister Imelda Cristobal.  He went out of his house immediately, passed
and dropped at the nearby house of his aunt Rosa Lozano, first degree cousin of
his father Vicente Cristobal, and asked her (Rosa) to
‘please go to the creek and see Imelda’. 
But Wilfredo did not wait for Rosa
anymore.  He rushed to the creek followed
in a short while by Rosa and Teodoro.

“When Wilfredo, Rosa and Teodoro reached the creek, one after the other in that
order, they found Imelda.  It was a
pitiful and shocking sight they saw. 
Imelda was lying on the ground, face upward, naked and unconscious; her
face and cheeks swollen, lower lips cut and bleeding; her arms scratched and
bruised; hematoma on different parts of her body; and
her clothes about four meters away from her. 
Rosa took the clothes and they dressed up
Imelda.  Shortly later, Imelda regained
her consciousness.  Wilfredo
asked her:  ‘Who did this to you?‘
Imelda answered:  ‘Manong
Victor, manong‘, referring to Victor Garcia, accused
herein an husband of Juanita Cristobal, older sister
of Imelda
.  Teodoro
asked what happened.  Imelda replied that
Victor abused and dishonored her.  When
Teodoro inquired how Victor did it, Imelda briefly
recounted what transpired and she said: 
‘When I was putting on my dress he held me by the neck from behind,
dragged me and upon reaching the deeper part of the creek he submerged me.  When I shouted he stuffed my mouth with
cloth.  Then he boxed face and I fell
unconscious.  When I regained my
consciousness, Victor was thumping on my chest. 
I shouted again, then manong Fred arrived
.’

“Disgraced and maltreated hard, Imelda was suffering
bitterly.  Weak she could not stand
anymore.  Teodoro,
Wilfredo and Rosa carried her in their arms and with
the assistance of Faustino Corpuz they took her home.

“Imelda was laid on a bed. 
Her mother Ignacia Cristobal
asked her who was the perpetrator. 
Imelda answered in the presence of Marciano Corpuz, Narciso Lozano, Teodoro Cristobal, Faustino Corpuz, Fortunato Cristobal, Rene Cristobal, Juanita
Cristobal and her children that Victor Garcia was the
man who maltreated, abused and dishonored her. 
Again, Imelda told and recounted briefly to her mother and their
neighbors what transpired, thus:  ‘When I
was at the creek, putting on my dress, my brother-in-law held me from behind,
submerged me in the creek several times, boxed me, sat on my chest.  I lost consciousness then I did not know what
happened
.’

“The parents, brothers and sisters of Imelda thought of
bringing her to town for immediate medical treatment but they desisted because
of the curfew hours.  They believed that
they would be overtaken by the curfew on their way.  Gayong-gayong Norte
is 17 kilometers to town.  In going to
the centro, one has to hike first to barrio San
Antonio, seven kilometers away, for about two to three
hours, and from there to town by passenger jeepneys.

“Imelda died at about nine
o’clock that night, three hours after the incident.  The following day, September 29, Teodoro went to town and reported the incident to the
police authorities.  Three policemen and
the municipal health officer, Dr. Conrado Gabriel,
proceeded to Gayong-gayong, arriving there before
high-noon.  The doctor examined the
victim.

“The findings of Dr. Gabriel as indicated in his medical and
death certificates (Exhibit B and C, pp. 4 and 6, record) and testified to by
him in Court are:

1.     
Hematoma on different
parts of the body of the victim – chest, neck and back;

2.     
Chest – soft and distended; when pressed it sunk
easily; ribs possibly broken;

3.     
Nipple, right side – removed; around it were
bruises;

4.     
Abdomen – plenty of fluid (water); abdominal
wall distended; when pressed twice, about 50 cc of water was expelled thru the
mouth; fluid in abdomen may have been caused by immersion in water or deliberately
introduced;

5.     
Hymen – fresh laceration at nine o’clock as a result of penetration; streak of blood
found in the vaginal wall; and

6.     
Cause of Death – internal hemorrhage due to
chest compression; presence of excessive fluid in the abdominal region as a secondary
factor.” (Underscoring supplied.)

Accused-appellant Victor Garcia interposed an alibi.  He testified that he could not have committed
the crime since he left Bo. Gayong-gayong Norte, Ilagan, Isabela, in the early
morning of September 28, 1974
and went to Bo. San Lorenzo of the same town of Ilagan to clear a parcel of land
by kaingin. 
He further testified that he stayed in the house of his brother’s
father-in-law, Domingo Espanto, in said Bo. San
Lorenzo for two months as he received, on September 30, 1974, a letter from his
wife, Juanita Cristobal Garcia, advising him not to
go home because he was suspected of having killed his sister-in-law, Imelda Cristobal.[4]

To corroborate the testimony of the accused, the defense
presented the following witnesses:  (1)
Domingo Espanto (father-in-law of the brother of the
accused) who testified on direct examination that the accused arrived in his
house in Bo. San Lorenzo before noon of September 28, 1974 and stayed there for
sometime;[5]
(2) Juanita Cristobal Garcia – wife of the accused,
and elder sister of the victim – who testified on direct examination that her
husband left barrio Gayong-gayong for barrio San
Lorenzo at 6:00 o’clock in the morning of September 28, 1974 and did not return
in the afternoon of that day; on cross-examination, she testified that her
husband never returned to barrio Gayong-gayong
because she wrote him a letter informing him that he was suspected to be the
author of the crime and advising him not to return to barrio Gayong-gayong;[6] and,
(3) Antonio Garcia – elder brother of the accused – who testified on direct
examination that he delivered the letter of Juanita Cristobal
Garcia to the accused in barrio San Lorenzo.[7]

The trial court rejected the alibi of the accused and, concluding
that the prosecution had proved the case for the State beyond doubt, convicted
the accused as charged and imposed upon him the supreme penalty of death.

Thus, this automatic review of the decision of the trial court.

Upon manifestation of accused-appellant Victor Garcia that he has
no lawyer to represent him in this appeal, this Court appointed Atty. Manuel B.
Tomacruz as counsel de oficio
for the aforesaid appellant.[8]
Said counsel de oficio filed the
appellant’s brief on February 28, 1977.[9]
The Acting Solicitor General, Vicente V. Mendoza[10]
filed the appellee’s brief on May 27, 1977.[11]
This case was considered submitted for decision on September 27, 1977.[12]

In seeking reversal of the judgment of conviction, defendant-appellant,
through his counsel de oficio, assigns
the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:[13]

(I)     THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S CLAIM THAT HE WAS NOT AT THE PLACE OF THE COMMISSION OF
THE OFFENSE AT THE TIME THE SAME WAS COMMITTED.

(II)    THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE HEARSAY TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION
CONSIDERING THAT WHAT THE SAID WITNESSES ALLEGEDLY HEARD FROM THE VICTIM AS TO
THE SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES OF HER DEATH FAILED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF A DYING DECLARATION.

(III)   THE LOWER COURT
FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION HAD THE
MOTIVE TO INCRIMINATE THE ACCUSED AND TO PERVERT THE TRUTH.

I.   On
the first assignment of error
. 
Insisting that the claim of defendant-appellant that he was not at the
place of the commission of the offense at the time the same was committed has
been sufficiently established by the testimony of said appellant as confirmed
by defense witness Domingo Espanto who testified that
the appellant was in his house in barrio San Lorenzo on the day of the
perpetration of the crime in barrio Gayong-gayong,
counsel de oficio contends that the
trial court committed an error in rejecting said alibi.

We cannot agree.

a.  Whether or not the alibi
has been sufficiently established by accused’s
testimony and that of his witness Domingo Espanto
depends upon the weight accorded by the trial court to said testimonies, and
this, in turn, will depend on the credibility of said witnesses and of their
testimonies.  Apparently, the trial court
entertained serious doubts on the credibility of the defense witnesses, for, as
it observed –

“The demeanor, attitude and manner of testifying, candid,
direct and forthright answers of the prosecution witnesses show that their
story and version reflected the truth of the incident.  That of the defense witnesses on the other
hand indicate that they did not truthfully tell what they know of the incident
and that there is much wanting in their honesty, verity and credibility
.”[14]
(Underscoring supplied.)

We are not inclined to dispute such observation of the trial
court, for it was said court which actually heard the witnesses themselves and
observed their deportment and demeanor during the trial.  Thus, We have held, in a long line of cases,
that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will
generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that it is
in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value
that, if considered, might affect the result of the case.[15]

Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness but must be believable in itself such as the common experience
and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.[16]  The trial court assailed the credibility not
only of the defense witnesses but that of their testimonies as well when it
held, in no uncertain terms, that the claim that the defendant went to San
Lorenzo on that fateful day of September 28, 1974 to clear a parcel of land
by kaingin is unworthy of belief
, for the reason
that “it was the end of September, rainy and wet season, not kaingin season as claimed, in the province of Isabela.”[17]
Defendant-appellant did not take exception to this holding of the trial court.

It results, therefore, that defendant-appellant has no credible
evidence upon which to anchor his defense of alibi.

b.  As correctly pointed out
by the trial court, alibi is the weakest of all defenses since it is easy to
concoct but difficult to disprove.[18]
Courts view it with caution and accept it only when proved by positive, clear
and convincing evidence, i.e., such evidence which would preclude the possibility
of the accused’s presence at the scene of the crime.[19]

In the case at bar, the only evidence presented to corroborate
defendant’s self-serving claim that he was in barrio San Lorenzo at the time of
the commission of the crime in barrio Gayong-gayong
was the testimony of defense witness Domingo Espanto,
the owner of the house in barrio San Lorenzo where defendant allegedly stayed
on September 28, 1974.  But not only does
such testimony suffer the infirmity heretofore adverted to but, more
importantly, it lacks the requisite certainty and positiveness
to prove that the defendant was indeed in the house of the defense witness in barrio
San Lorenzo on September 28, 1974.  For,
as borne out by the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing on May 13, 1976, witness Espanto was not even sure of the month and the year when
defendant Garcia arrived and stayed in his house in barrio San
Lorenzo.  Thus, on direct
examination, Domingo Espanto testified as follows –[20]

“Q.  By
the way, you said that on September
28, 1974 the accused Victor Garcia was in your house.  When did he arrive in your house?

 A.   He
arrived there on September 28, sir.

 Q.  At
what time?

COURT:

Q.   What
year?

A.    It
could be last year
during the clearing season by kaingin.

Q.   I
remind you that this year is 1976.  Will
you please refresh your memory and try to recall the actual year?

 A.   It
was the season for clearing the field as we were then opening some lots.

Q.   At
what time on September 28?

COURT:

Your last answer is not
also clear.  The question is what year of
September 28 when Victor Garcia came to your house?

A.    What
I can remember is he arrived there on the 28th but I cannot remember the
month or the year
because I did not bother to think of the date because you
know as a farmer I am occupied.” (Underscoring supplied.)

And on cross-examination, witness Espanto testified as follows –[21]

“Q.  So
when you say that Victor Garcia arrived in your house on September 28, 1974 in answer to the question of the
defense counsel, do we understand from you that that was only a calculation
or your guess
?

A.    Yes,
sir, because I do not know how to read so I just guessed.

Q.   Because
you are not sure, Victor Garcia could have arrived in your house on September 29, 1974?

ATTY. DOMINGO:

We object to the
question as argumentative and besides misleading.

COURT:

No, it is not
argumentative.  Neither is it misleading.  It is leading.

A.    Yes,
sir, he arrived because he stayed there.

Q.   Possibly
on
September 29, 1974,
that is my question.

A.    As
I have stated, I cannot remember anymore because as I said, I do not think
of them
.”  (Underscoring
supplied.)

It is clear from the foregoing testimony of defense witness
Domingo Espanto that he was uncertain of the date
when defendant Garcia arrived and stayed in his house in barrio San
Lorenzo.  Accordingly, the
requirement of a “positive, clear and convincing evidence” for an alibi
has not been complied with.  The same
must, therefore, be rejected.

c.   The trial court did not predicate its
rejection of defendant’s alibi solely on the weakness of the evidence for the
defense, but, primarily, on the strength of the evidence for the prosecution
which clearly belies defendant’s claim that he was not, and could not have
been, at the scene of the crime at the time the same was committed.  After a careful scrutiny of the prosecution’s
evidence, We accord full concurrence with the trial court’s conclusion that
defendant’s alibi deserves to be rejected.

Firstly, the defendant was seen leaving the crime scene by
prosecution witness Wilfredo Cristobal,
a brother of the victim.  Said witness
testified thus –[22]

“Q.  Now,
while you were resting in your house that particular time in the afternoon of September 28, 1974, do you know or do
you remember of anything unusual that happened?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   What
was that unusual happening?

A.    While
I was resting I heard my younger sister shouted and immediately I ran towards
the place where the shout emanated and passed by the house of my Aunt Rosa
Lozano.  Upon my arrival there, I went
ahead to where my sister shouted.  I
saw Victor who came from the place where my sister was
.

Q.   Where
did you see your sister?

A.    In
the creek
.

x          x          x

Q.   And
you stated that upon your arrival you saw Victor Garcia running away from where
you saw your sister.  When you saw your
sister, what was the condition of your sister as you saw her?

A.    She
was naked, sir
.

Q.   What
was her position at the time, was she standing, sitting or what?

A.    She
was lying with her face upward
.

Q.   Now,
you said that you saw Victor Garcia running away from where you saw your
sister, towards what direction did Victor Garcia proceed?

When you said that when
you arrived at the place where you saw your sister Imelda you saw Victor Garcia
coming from where she was, did you try to talk with Victor Garcia as you saw
him going away from where Imelda was?

A.    No,
sir, because I went immediately to help my younger sister.

Q.   Now,
how about Victor Garcia, what did he do after you saw him coming from the place
of your sister?

A.    He
ran holding a long handled bolo.” (Underscoring supplied.)

Defendant’s claim that he was in barrio San
Lorenzo at the time of the perpetration of the crime in barrio Gayong-gayong simply cannot stand in the face of the
foregoing clear and positive proof of his presence at the scene of the crime
immediately after the same was committed.

Secondly, as aptly pointed out by the trial court,
“(A)t the creek after she regained consciousness and on her deathbed in
her parents’ home, Imelda recounted to her mother, brothers and sister and
neighbors what happened to her and explicitly named Victor Garcia as the man
who abused, dishonored and mercilessly maltreated her.”[23]
Thus, Wilfredo Cristobal
testified as follows –[24]

“Q.  And
what did you do after you saw Victor Garcia running away with a tabas from where you saw your sister?

A.    I
immediately carried her on my shoulder because she was then unconscious.

Q.   And
after that, what happened?

A.    Then
after a while my sister regained consciousness and I asked her who did that to
her.  She told me that it was Victor
Garcia
.

Q.   How
did she tell you that it was Victor Garcia who did something to her?  I will reform the question.  What did Imelda, your younger sister,
actually tell you when she said it was Victor Garcia who did something to her?

A.    She
said that he (Victor) dishonored her
.

Q.   And
what else did she say, if any?

A.    It
was my elder brother who continued interrogating her because immediately after
we put on her dress and carried her to the house of my father, it was my elder
brother who continued the interrogation.

x          x          x

Q.   When
your sister was brought to the house of your parents and you laid her down, do
you remember if anybody else talked with her?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   Who?

A.    My
mother and father.  I mean my father was
not there then because he was in San Mariano.

Q.   And
how long did your mother talk to your sister?

A.    Maybe
about three (3) hours, sir.

Q.   And
you still remember what your sister Imelda told your mother if you were present
during their conversation?

A.    She
repeatedly reported what Victor Garcia did to her that she was raped by him
.”
(Underscoring supplied.)

The elder brother, Teodoro
Cristobal, testified as follows –[25]

“Q.  Now,
when you went to the creek, what did you find out?

A.    Upon
reaching the creek, I saw my sister Imelda Cristobal
being lifted by my brother Wilfredo Cristobal and I asked her what happened and she answered
me that she was abused by Victor Garcia
. 
She told me in Ilocano, niramas
nac ni Victor Garcia.

Q.   And
when you were told by your sister that . . . I withdraw.  When she told you that she was abused by
Victor Garcia, what else did you ask her, if you asked her any further
questions?

A.    And
I asked her how he did it and she answered me by saying that when I was
putting on my dress, he held me by the neck and dragged me and upon reaching
the deeper part of the creek he submerged me in the creek then I
struggled.  Then he dragged me again and
when I shouted he stuffed my mouth with a cloth.  Then he boxed my face
.  (Witness pointed to his mouth and his
cheeks.)

Q.   What
else did he tell you, if any?

A.    When
I regained consciousness, I felt that Victor was on top of my chest
thumping.  Then I shouted again.  That was the time that Manong
Fred arrived
.

x      x        x

Q.   And
what did you do after you brought her home to the house of your father?

A.    Then
we laid her on the bed, sir.

Q.   And
what transpired when you laid your sister on the bed?

A.    My
mother inquired from her who did that thing to her and she answered that it was
Manong Victor Garcia
.” (Underscoring
supplied.)

The victim’s mother, Ignacia
Cristobal, testified as follows –[26]

Q.   And
when your daughter Imelda was brought home by her brothers, were you able to
talk with Imelda?

A.    Then
I asked Imelda what happened to you my daughter and she answered I did not like
what happened to me.  Do not blame me.

Q.   Did
you come to know what she meant when she said she did not like what
happened?  I withdraw.  And what else, if any, did Imelda tell you?

A.    That
she was hurt very much when she was boxed by him.

Q.   Did
she tell you who boxed her?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   Whom
did she mention?

A.    She
said my Manong Victor
.

Q.   Who
is that Manong Victor she referred to?

A.    Her
brother-in-law.

Q.   Do
you know the full name of her brother-in-law Victor?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   Will
you please tell the court?

A.    Victor
Garcia
.

Q.   And
what else . . .

COURT:

Q.       Is
he in court now
?

A.    Yes,
sir
.

Q.   Where
is he, point at him
?

A.    That
man
.  (Witness pointed to the accused
who gave his name as Victor Garcia.)

x      x        x

COURT:

Q.   Tell
everything that your daughter told you as soon as she was carried home by her
brothers Wilfredo and Teodoro
and her Auntie Rose Lozano.  (Witness is
crying after giving her answer to the question of the court.)

A.    She
told me this, sir.  When I was in the
creek about to put on my dress, my brother-in-law came from behind but I did
not notice him.  He placed his hand on my
neck from behind and submerged me in the creek several times.  He boxed me several times and even sat on my
chest for which I lost consciousness and I did not know what he did to me
.

Q.   What
else did she tell you?

A.    Shortly
after, she died.” (Underscoring supplied.)

Rosa Lozano, the aunt of the victim who
helped Wilfredo and Teodoro
Cristobal carry the victim from the creek to the
house of her parents, likewise testified that the victim explicitly named the
defendant, Victor Garcia, as the one who raped and maltreated her.[27]

In the face of the foregoing clear and positive identification of
defendant Victor Garcia as the one who raped Imelda Cristobal
and inflicted upon her the injuries which caused her death, his defense of
alibi clearly appears as nothing but a mere concoction – a fabrication designed
to exculpate him from violating the honor and taking the life of his 16-year
old sister-in-law.  And, We have
repeatedly held, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused as the author of the crime.[28]

d. Finally, note must be taken of the fact that Atty. Simplicio Domingo, Jr., the lawyer who represented the
defendant during the trial, manifested in open court that the defendant was
willing to plead guilty if the crime charged in the Information would be
changed from Rape with Homicide to Murder.[29]
The trial court did not, however, allow the amendment of the Information for
the reason that evidence proving the commission of the crime of Rape with
Homicide had already been presented by the prosecution.[30]

In resume, appellant’s contention that the trial court erred in
rejecting his alibi is clearly without merit.

II.  On the second
assignment of error
. 
Defendant-appellant, through his counsel de oficio,
assails the admissibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses re
the circumstances surrounding the victim’s death on the ground that the same
were not of their own personal knowledge but were only narrated to them by the
victim.  Alleging that such testimonies
are hearsay, appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the
same.

We cannot agree.  It must
be noted that neither the defendant nor his counsel below objected to the
admission of the testimonies which are now being assailed as hearsay.[31]
This is fatal to defendant-appellant’s present posture since the failure to
object to hearsay evidence constitutes a waiver of the right to cross-examine
the actual witness to the occurrence, rendering the evidence admissible.[32]

Moreover, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to the
statements of the victim on the circumstances surrounding her death are
admissible in evidence as her dying declaration, pursuant to Section 31, Rule
130 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:

“SECTION 31.  DYING
DECLARATION. – The declaration of a dying person, made under a consciousness of
an impending death, may be received in a criminal case wherein his death is the
subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such
death.”

Appellant’s contention that the statements of the victim cannot
assume the character of a dying declaration, for the reason the prosecution
allegedly failed to show that the statements were given by the victim under a
consciousness of an impending death, is untenable.

We have held that “it is not necessary to the validity or
admissibility of a dying declaration that the declarant
expressly state that he has lost all hope of recovery; it is sufficient that
the circumstances are such as to lead inevitably to the conclusion that at the
time the declaration was made, the declarant did not
expect to survive the injury from which he actually died.”[33]

That the victim, Imelda Cristobal, was
under a consciousness of an impending death at the time she made the statements
identifying the defendant as the one who raped her and inflicted upon her the
injuries which caused her death can be inferred from the circumstances under
which the declaration was made.  She had
just recovered her consciousness and her physical condition bespeaks the
imminence of her death.  She was so weak
that she had to be carried by her brothers and Aunt Rosa from the creek to the
house of her parents.  Added to the
physical pain which she was then suffering by reason of the serious injuries
inflicted upon her, was the mental anguish and shock brought about by the
unmitigated violation of her honor.  With
face swollen, lower lip cut and bleeding, hematoma
all over the body, broken ribs, right nipple removed and bleeding, hymen
lacerated, with blood streaks in the vaginal wall, and abdomen filled with
water, the victim could not have entertained any hope of surviving the beastly
attack on her by her “Manong Victor”.  In fact she died barely three (3) hours after
the beastly assault.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, this assigned error is
without merit.

III.  On the last
assignment of error
.  Counsel de
oficio for defendant-appellant contends,
finally, that the prosecution witnesses had the motive to pervert the truth and
to incriminate the defendant and that the trial court consequently erred in
taking their testimony at their face value.

This contention is untenable. 
The alleged improper motive imputed by the defendant to the prosecution
witnesses does not find support in the evidence on record.  Except for Teodoro Cristobal who allegedly harbored ill-feeling against the
defendant, no evidence whatsoever was presented to prove that prosecution
witnesses Wilfredo Cristobal,
Ignacia Cristobal and Rosa
Lozano had the motive to pervert the truth and to incriminate the
defendant.  And the ill-feeling which Teodoro Cristobal allegedly had
against the defendant could not have been sufficient for the former to impute
against the latter, a brother-in-law, the heinous crime committed upon his sister
and to allow, in the process, the true culprit to escape liability.

Furthermore, contrary to the allegation of appellant’s counsel de
oficio, the trial court did not take the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses at their face value.  It did exert effort to ascertain the
credibility of the said witnesses as well as that of their testimonies.  Thus, the trial court expressly observed in
its decision that “(T)he demeanor, attitude and manner of testifying,
candid, direct and forthright answers of the prosecution witnesses show that
their story and version reflected the truth of the incident.”[34]
And as to the credibility of their testimonies, the trial court took the pains
of stating in detail the corroborating points between the ante mortem
statements of the victim, as testified to by the prosecution witnesses, and the
medical findings of the Municipal Health Officer, thus –[35]

“Imelda said the accused submerged her in the creek.  This was confirmed by the fact that her abdomen
was filled with plenty of fluid.  About
50 cc of water was expelled thru her mouth. 
Imelda said the accused boxed her face, stuffed her mouth, sat and
thumped on her chest.  This was confirmed
by the fact that her lip was cut and broken, her face swollen, her chest soft
and distended, her ribs possibly broken, her nipple removed and bleeding;
Imelda said she fought her attacker and this was confirmed by the scratches and
bruises on her arms and hematoma on many parts of her
body.  Imelda said that when she was
putting on her dress, her “manong Victor”
suddenly grabbed and held her from behind and dragged her to the water.  This was confirmed by the fact that she was
found naked.  Imelda said that Victor
dishonored her, took her womanhood.  This
was confirmed by the fresh laceration on her vagina, at nine o’clock and the streak of blood found at her vaginal
wall.  x x x“

Clearly, therefore, the last assignment of error is also without
merit.

All the foregoing considerations lead Us to the ineluctable
conclusion that the guilt of the defendant-appellant of the crime charged has
been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela dated July 21, 1976 — convicting the defendant of
the crime of Rape with Homicide, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
death, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and
ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P20,000.00 and to
pay the costs — is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Makasiar,
Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, De
Castro, and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ., concur.

Barredo, Antonio, and Aquino, JJ., concurs in a
separate opinion.

Fernando, Acting C.J., did not
take part.

Abad Santos, J., on official trip abroad to represent the Philippines in the Conference of the Law on the Sea.


[1]
Records, p. 18.

[2] Id.,
p. 19.

[3]
Decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela,
pp. 1-5 (Rollo, pp. 4-8).

[4] T.S.N.,
Victor Garcia, hearing of March 15,
1976, pp. 1-7.

[5] Id.,
Domingo Espanto, hearing of May 13, 1976, pp. 135-139.

[6] Id.,
Juanita Cristobal Garcia, hearing of February 20, 1976, pp. 104 and 114.

[7] Id.,
Antonio Garcia, hearing of May 13,
1976, p. 144.

[8]
Resolution of the Court En Banc dated November 4, 1976 (Rollo,
p. 46).

[9] Rollo, p. 60.

[10]
Assisted by Asst. Sol. Gen. Ruben E. Agpalo and Trial
Atty. Magdangal M. de Leon.

[11] Rollo, p. 65.

[12]
Resolution of the Court En Banc dated September 27, 1977 (Rollo,
p. 72).

[13] Brief
for Defendant-Appellant, pp. 1-2.

[14]
Decision, p. 11(Rollo, p. 14).

[15]
People vs. Gargoles, G.R. No. L-40885, May 18, 1978; People vs. Pascual, G.R. No. L-27569, Oct. 28, 1977, 80 SCRA 1; People vs. Ancheta, G.R. No. L- 29581-82, Oct. 30, 1974, 60 SCRA 333; People vs. Boduso, G.R. No. L-30450-51, Sept. 30, 1974, 60 SCRA 60; People vs. Cardenas,
G.R. No. L-29090, April 29, 1974,
56 SCRA 631; People vs. Carandang, G.R. No.
L-31012, Aug. 15, 1973, 52
SCRA 259; People vs. Espejo, G.R. No. L-27708,
Dec. 19, 1970, 36 SCRA
400.

[16]
People vs. Dayag, G.R. No. L-30619, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 439; Vda. de Bonifacio vs.
B.L.T. Bus Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-26810, August
31, 1970, 34 SCRA 618.

[17]
Decision, pp. 8-9 (Rollo, pp. 11-12).

[18]
People vs. Bulawin, G.R. No. L-30069, September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 710;
People vs. Cunanan, G.R. No. L-17599, April 24, 1967, 19 SCRA 769,
citing:  U.S.
vs. Olias, 36 Phil. 828, 829; People vs.
Pili, 51 Phil. 965, 966; People vs. Dizon, 76 Phil. 265, 272; People vs. Bautista,
L-17772, October 31, 1962;
People vs. Dayday, L-20806 & L-20807, August 14, 1965.

[19]
People vs. Alcantara, G.R. No. L-26867, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 813; People vs.
Casillar, G.R. No. L-28132, Nov. 25, 1969, 30 SCRA 353; People vs.
Ali, G.R. No. L-18519, Oct. 30, 1969,
29 SCRA 756; People vs. Condemena, G.R. No.
L-22426, May 29, 1968, 23
SCRA 910.

[20]
T.S.N., Domingo Espanto, hearing of May 13, 1976, pp. 136-137.

[21] Id.,
pp. 140-141.

[22] Id.,
Wilfredo Cristobal, hearing
of May 23, 1975, pp. 44-45.

[23]
Decision, p. 8 (Rollo, p.11).

[24]
T.S.N., Wilfredo Cristobal,
hearing of May 23, 1975,
pp. 45-48.

[25] Id.,
Teodoro Cristobal, hearing
of May 28, 1975, pp. 53-55.

[26] Id.,
Ignacia Cristobal, hearing
of February 10, 1975, pp.
26-28.

[27] See,
T.S.N., Rosa Lozano, hearing of April
10, 1975, p. 34.

[28]
People vs. Caoile, G.R. No. L-31104, Nov. 15, 1974, 61 SCRA 73; People vs.
Ancheta, G.R. Nos. L-29581-82, Oct. 30, 1974, 60 SCRA 333; People vs. Tumalip, G.R. No. L-28451, Oct. 28, 1974, 60 SCRA 303; People vs. Sangalang, G.R. No. L-32914, Aug. 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 737; People vs. Abletes, G.R. No. L-3304, July 31, 1974, 58 SCRA 241; People vs. Madera,
G.R. No. L-35133, May 31, 1974,
57 SCRA 349; People vs. Aquino, G.R. No.
L-27184, May 21, 1974, 57
SCRA 43; People vs. Cardenas,
G.R. No. L-29090, April 29, 1974,
56 SCRA 631; People vs. Bongo, G.R. No. L-26909, Feb. 22, 1974, 55 SCRA 547; People vs. Dorico, G.R. No. L-31568, Nov. 29, 1973, 54 SCRA 172; People vs. Carandang, G.R. No. L-31012, Aug. 15, 1973, 52 SCRA 259; People vs. Herila, G.R. No. L-32785, May 21, 1973, 51 SCRA 31; People vs. Tanjalali Gajali, G.R. No.
L-28534, July 31, 1972, 46
SCRA 130; People vs. Comelio, G.R. No. L-1289,
June 10, 1971, 39 SCRA 435;
People vs. Mercado, G.R. No. L-30298, March 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 168; People vs. Amit, G.R. No. L-30102, Feb. 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 793; People vs. Gande, G.R. No. L-28163, Jan. 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 347; People vs. Salip, G.R. No. L-21688, Nov. 28, 1967, 30 SCRA 389; People vs. Vicente,
G.R. No. L-26241, May 21, 1967,
29 SCRA 247; People vs. Bato, G.R. No.
L-23405, Dec. 29, 1967, 21
SCRA 1445; People vs. Susano, G.R. No.
L-19099, March 31, 1964, 10
SCRA 609; People vs. Regal, G.R. No. L-14753, July 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 703; People vs. Selfaison, G.R. No. L-14732, Jan. 28, 1981, 1 SCRA 235.

[29]
T.S.N., hearing of April 10, 1975,
pp. 19-20.

[30] Id.,
p. 20.

[31] Id.,
Ignacia Cristobal, hearing
of Feb. 10, 1975, pp. 26-28; Id., Teodoro
Cristobal, hearing of May 28, 1975, pp. 53-54; Id.,
Wilfredo Cristobal, hearing
of May 23, 1975, pp. 46-48; Id., Rosa Lozano, hearing of April
10, 1975, p. 34; Id., hearing of June 18, 1975 (offer of
evidence), pp. 91 & 92.

[32]
People vs. Paz, G.R. No. L-15050-53, August 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 667.

[33]
People vs. Serrano, 58 Phil. 667 (citing People vs. Ancasan, 53 Phil. 779).

[34]
Decision, p. 11 (Rollo, p. 14).

[35] Id.,
pp. 10-11 (Rollo, pp. 13-14).


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CONCURRING OPINION

ANTONIO, J.:

I concur.  The statements
of the victim, Imelda Cristobal, a sixteen-year-old
girl, to her mother, her brothers and sister, immediately after she was
sexually abused, pointing to the appellant as her aggressor, are admissible as
part of the res gestae.

According to section 36 of Rule 130, of the Rules,
“statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place
or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as a part of the res gestae.”
Statements growing out of the nervous excitement and physical condition of the declarant, the utterance of which was made spontaneously
and related to the circumstances, are admissible as part of the res gestae.[1]
The declaration made by a murder victim immediately after the stabbing incident,
which declaration appears to be natural and spontaneous and made before the
victim could contrive or devise a plan to incriminate the accused, would be
considered as part of the res gestae, and hence, constitutes an exception to the
hearsay rule.[2]

Similarly, statements of a woman as to an alleged rape committed
upon her, made promptly to the first person whom she met that she knew, after she
was seen coming swiftly from the direction of the place where the act occurred,
and while she was excited, sobbing, and exhausted, were held admissible as part
of the res gestae,
the court declaring that the time, place, and circumstances under which the
exclamations were made, made them admissible under the res
gestae
rule.[3]

The statements of a rape victim to a cafe operator shortly after
the offense were admissible, where the cafe was the first lighted building she
came to and the victim was crying.[4]

In a prosecution of her husband for rape, statements made by the
wife to a policeman on his arrival at the apartment and on being asked what had
occurred were admissible as spontaneous declarations.  The fact that the officer had asked the wife
“what happened” was insufficient to destroy the spontaneity of the
declarations.[5]

Statements of the victim of a sexual offense made immediately
after the commission thereof and under such circumstances as to indicate
spontaneity are admissible as part of the res
gestae
.[6]

It may be said that statements of the victim of a sexual offense
made immediately after the commission thereof and under such circumstances as
to indicate spontaneity are admissible as part of the res
gestae
.

In State v. Smith,[7]
statements by the victim of a rape, made immediately after the alleged occurrence
when she went to the home of a neighbor, crying and hysterical, were held
admissible as part of the res gestae, since the declarations were made under such
circumstances as to be spontaneous and unpremeditated.

In Lemons v. State,[8] a
prosecution for assault with intent to rape, testimony of a witness that he
lived about 150 feet from the residence of the victim of the alleged offense,
that he heard a disturbance at her home and had seen a man some fifteen minutes
earlier prowling around the house, that when he heard someone scream, he ran to
his door, where he met the prosecutrix, who told him
that someone had burst into her house and insulted her, and that the prosecutrix at the time was excited, frightened, and
nervous, was held admissible as res gestae, the court noting that the prosecutrix had to go only a short distance of 150 feet
after the commission of the alleged offense, and, accordingly, her declarations
were made immediately after the commission thereof.

In Frazee v. State,[9] a
prosecution for rape, there was evidence that immediately after the alleged
assault the prosecutrix ran to her neighbor’s house
and, finding her not at home, called her at her husband’s place of business and
informed her of the alleged rape.  Her
neighbor drove home at once and found the prosecutrix
at her house, barefooted, crying, and in a hysterical condition, and the prosecutrix again related the details of the offense to
her.  The court held the declarations of
the prosecutrix to the neighbor to be admissible
under the res gestae
rule, saying that the utterances of the prosecutrix
were spontaneous and created by and springing from the attack made upon her,
and made so soon after the alleged attack and in such a manner as to preclude the
idea of deliberation and falsification.

The screams and exclamations of a woman, who, immediately after a
rape was committed upon her, fled to the home of her mother-in-law, a short distance
away, were held admissible as part of the res
gestae
in People v. Anglada.[10]

In Shipp v. State,[11]
a prosecution for rape, wherein it appeared that immediately after commission
of the alleged offense, the prosecutrix ran out of
her house, barefooted and in her nightgown, and reported the occurrence to her
neighbor next door, the neighbor’s testimony as to what the prosecutrix
told him was held admissible as part of the res
gestae
.

In White v. State,[12]
a prosecution for rape, testimony by the twenty-year-old victim, who was of low
mentality, that immediately after she left the defendant’s room, she met the
defendant’s landlady and informed her of the defendant’s acts, was declared res gestae of the
main fact, the alleged rape.

Statements by a ten-year-old girl regarding a rape committed upon
her, made immediately after the alleged occurrence, when the little girl ran to
her mother, were held admissible as part of the res
gestae
in Brooks v. Commonwealth.[13]

In Snowden v. United States,[14]
declarations by a five-year-old child as to the particulars of an assault with
intent to rape committed upon her, made to her grandmother shortly after
commission of the alleged offense when the grandmother returned home and found
the child lying on the floor crying, and made in response to inquiries by the grandmother,
were held admissible as part of the res gestae.

Similarly, statements made by the victim of a rape “soon
after” commission of the offense and to the first person she met, the
victim being hysterical and disheveled at the time, were held admissible as
part of the res gestae
in Hall v. State.[15]

Statements by the victim of an alleged rape immediately upon
being taken to the home of a friend and within a short time after the
occurrence of the offense, and while the victim was crying; moaning, hysterical,
and bruised and bleeding, were held admissible as part of the res gestae in Palmer
v. State
.[16]

The admissibility of those statements are predicated upon the
common experience that utterances made under such circumstances are devoid of
self-interest, and the probability of falsehood is so remote as to be
negligible.  They are, as a matter of
fact, spontaneous and instinctive reaction, produced by a startling or unusual
occurrence.  The statements are made
under such circumstances as to show lack of forethought or deliberate design in
the formulation of their content.  Thus,
the Rule states three (3) requisites for their admissibility:  (1) the time of statement or utterance, or
its “contemporaneous” character – which must be while a startling
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto; (2) the
statements must be “spontaneous”; and (3) the subject matter of the
statement — which means that the statement must relate to the circumstances of
the startling occurrence.[17]


[1] Air
France v. Carrascoso
, L-21438, Sept. 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 155.

[2] People
v. De Gracia,
L-21419, Sept. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 197.

[3] State
v. Ingraham,
118 Minn 13, 136 NW 258.

[4] Gage
v. State
, 159 Tex Crim 336, 263 SW2d 553.

[5] People
v. Damen,
28 Ill 2d 464, 193 NE2d 25.

[6] Baber v. United States, 116 App DC 358, 324
F2d 390, cert den 376 US 972, 12 L ed 2d 86, 84 S Ct 1139; White v. State,
237 Ala 610, 188 So 388; Robinson v. States, 209 Ga 650, 75 SE2d 9, cert den 345 US 999, 97 L ed 1405, 73 S
Ct 1144; Kyle v. State (Tex Crim) 365
SW2d 168.

[7] 3
Wash 2d 543, 101 P2d 298 (1940).

[8]
59 Tex Crim
299, 128 SW 416 (1910).

[9]
79 Okla
Crim 224, 153 P2d 637 (1944).

[10]
20 Puerto Rico 11 (1914).

[11]
132 Tex Crim
274, 103 SW2d 976 (1937).

[12]
237 Ala 610, 188 So 388 (1939).

[13] 235
Ky 19, 29 SW2d 597 (1930).

[14]
2 App DC 89 (1893).

[15]
141 Tex Crim
607, 150 SW2d 404 (1941).

[16]
34 Tex Crim
390, 115 SW2d 641 (1938).

[17] People
v. Ricaplaza
, L-25856, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 374.


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CONCURRING OPINION

AQUINO, J.:

I concur.  Victor Garcia is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide, a special complex crime
punished with death in article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.

That complex crime was proven by the antemortem
declaration of the victim, who was Garcia’s sister-in-law, by the testimony of Wilfredo Cristobal that he saw
his brother-in-law, the accused Garcia, leaving the scene of the crime, and by
the indubitable evidence of the corpus delicti
or the fact of the commission of the rape with homicide.

As correctly surmised by the trial court,
Garcia, whose house was about fifty meters away from the creek, must have often
seen his sister-in-law topless or naked, taking a bath in the creek.
  He lusted after her.

To overcome her resistance, he inflicted on her blows on the
chest and other parts of the body and he tried to asphyxiate her in the
creek.  The victim died of internal
hemorrhage due to chest compression and the presence of water in the abdominal
region.

Before article 335 was amended, it was held that rape with
homicide was committed in a case where the accused, who was suffering from
gonorrhea, had sexual congress through intimidation with a fourteen-year-old girl
who died because of the venereal infection. 
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code was applied (People vs. Acosta, 60
Phil. 158).

In People vs. Matela, 58 Phil. 718, the
accused raped his sixteen-year-old niece-in-law and then killed her by
strangulation.  He was convicted of the separate
offenses
of rape and homicide since it was not decisively shown that the
two crimes were complex.

In People vs. Lopez, 107 Phil. 1039, the accused, after having
carnal knowledge with a woman by means of intimidation, stabbed her to
death.  He was found guilty of the
complex crime of rape and murder as a “one and single continuous
act”.  Same
holding in People vs. Yu, 110 Phil. 793 where the accused was convicted of the
complex crime of rape and murder.

In People vs. Obaldo, 111 Phil. 838,
the accused confessed that at seven o’clock
in the evening he saw a twelve-year-old girl on the bank of the Pasig River
near Fort McKinley,
Rizal.  As he
was sexually aroused (nalibugan), he raped the
girl who lost consciousness.  The accused
placed her in an army duffel bag which he left on the river bank.  Later, that same night, a carpenter working
at the construction of Del Pan Bridge
in Tondo, Manila
saw the duffel bag floating near the bridge. 
He opened the bag, on which was printed the name of the accused, a
Korean war veteran, and found the body of the rape
victim who was already dead.  The accused
was held to have committed the separate crimes of rape and murder but since
there was no complaint for rape, he was convicted of murder only.  Same holding in People vs. Dahino, L-2067, February 26, 1951, 88 Phil. 789.

The foregoing cases might have prompted the lawmaking body to
enact Republic Acts Nos. 2632 and 4111, which define the special complex crime
of rape with homicide, a capital offense.


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CONCURRING OPINION

BARREDO, J.:

As noted in the main opinion, the prosecution witnesses testified
as follows:

1.   Wilfredo Cristobal, brother of the deceased:

“A.   She
said that he (Victor) dishonored her
.

Q.   And
what else did she say, if any?

A.    It
was my elder brother who continued interrogating her because immediately after
we put on her dress and carried her to the house of my father,
it was my elder brother who continued the interrogation.

x      x       x

Q.   When
your sister was brought to the house of your parents and you laid her down, do
you remember if anybody else talked with her?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   Who?

A.    My
mother and father.  I mean my father was
not there then because he was in San Mariano.

Q.   And
how long did your mother talk to your sister?

A.    Maybe
about three (3) hours, sir.

“Q.  And
you still remember what your sister Imelda told your mother if you were present
during their conversation?

A.    She
repeatedly reported what Victor Garcia did to her that she was raped by him
.”
(Underscoring supplied.)

2.   Teodoro Cristobal, another brother:

“Q.  Now,
when you went to the creek, what did you find out?

A.    Upon
reaching the creek, I saw my sister Imelda Cristobal
being lifted by my brother Wilfredo Cristobal and I asked her what happened and she answered
me that she was abused by Victor Garcia
. 
She told me in Ilocano, niramas
nac ni
Victor Garcia
.

Q.   And
when you were told by your sister that . . . I withdraw.  When she told you that she was abused by
Victor Garcia, what else did you ask her, if you asked her any further
questions?

A.    And
I asked her how he did it and she answered me by saying that when I was
putting on my dress, he held me by the neck and dragged me and upon reaching
the deeper part of the creek he submerged me in the creek then I struggled.  Then he dragged me again and when I shouted
he stuffed my mouth with a cloth.  Then
he boxed my face
.  (Witness pointed
to his mouth and his cheeks.)

Q.   What
else did he tell you, if any?

A.    When
I regained consciousness, I felt that Victor was on top of my chest
thumping.  Then I shouted again.  That was the time that Manong
Fred arrived
.

x      x       x

Q.   And
what did you do after you brought her home to the house of your father?

A.    Then
we laid her on the bed, sir.

“Q.  And
what transpired when you laid your sister on the bed?

A.    My
mother inquired from her who did that thing to her and she answered that it was
Manong Victor Garcia
.” (Underscoring
supplied.)

3.   Ignacia Cristobal, the mother:

“Q.  And
when your daughter Imelda was brought home by her brothers, were you able to
talk with Imelda?

A.    Then
I asked Imelda what happened to you my daughter and she answered I did not like
what happened to me.  Do not blame me
.

Q.   Did
you come to know what she meant when she said she did not like what
happened?  I withdraw.  And what else, if any, did Imelda tell you?

A.    That
she was hurt very much when she was boxed by him.

Q.   Did
she tell you who boxed her?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   Whom
did she mention?

A.    She
said my Manong Victor
.

Q.   Who
is that Manong Victor she referred to?

A.    Her
brother-in-law.

Q.   Do
you know the full name of her brother-in-law Victor?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   Will
you please tell the court?

A.    Victor
Garcia
.

Q.   And
what else . . .

COURT:

Q.   Is
he in court now?

A.    Yes,
sir
.

Q.   Where
is he, point at him?

A.    That
man
.  (Witness pointed to the accused
who gave his name as Victor Garcia.)

x      x       x

COURT:

Q.   Tell
everything that your daughter told you as soon as she was carried home by her
brothers Wilfredo and Teodoro
and her Auntie Rose Lozano.  (Witness is
crying after giving her answer to the question of the court.)

A.    She
told me this, sir.  When I was in the
creek about to put on my dress, my brother-in-law came from behind but I did
not notice him.  He placed his hand on my
neck from behind and submerged me in the creek several times.  He boxed me several times and even sat on my
chest for which I lost consciousness and I did not know what he did to me
.”

4.  Rosa Lozano, the aunt,
likewise testified that the deceased explicitly named appellant as the one who
raped and maltreated her.

What is immediately striking in the foregoing testimonies is that
the direct quotations purportedly from the deceased do not refer at all to the
alleged rape.  References thereto are all
in the form of conclusions, such as, β€œShe said that he (Victor) dishonored her”;
β€œShe repeatedly reported what Victor Garcia did to her, that she was raped by
him,” β€œshe answered me that she was abused by Victor – in Ilocano,
niramas nac ni Victor Garcia,” β€œI did not like what happened to me.  Do not blame me.”  In other words, no particulars whatsoever of
the rape, if rape it was, were testified to have been related by the
deceased.  What is worse, the direct quotation from the deceased go no further than the
following.

“A.   She
told me this, sir.  When I was in the
creek about to put on my dress, my brother-in-law came from behind but I did
not notice him.  He placed his hand on my
neck from behind and submerged me in the creek several times.  He boxed me several times and even sat on my
chest for which I lost consciousness and I did not know what he did to me
.”

This version which makes no mention at all of rape was repeated
practically word for word or verbatim by all the witnesses.  But from said version, one would be at a loss
as to when the supposed sexual act took place, whether before or after the
deceased was maltreated.  This particular
point is not clear, considering that from what the deceased herself is alleged
to have said, the impression is given that she was naked and about to put on or
was putting on her dress when the appellant first took hold of her, not for the
purpose of having intercourse with her but only to box and maltreat her,
submerge her in the creek, stuff her mouth with a piece of cloth and sit on and
thump her chest.  In brief, I do not find
in the record sufficient direct evidence of rape.

However, I am morally convinced that the circumstantial evidence
amply proves that appellant had sexually assaulted the deceased on the same
occasion testified by the witnesses.  That
he used force on her in committing the act is to me clear enough from the
findings of Dr. Gabriel quoted in the main opinion.  Her swollen face, her lower lip cut and
bleeding, the hematoma all over her body, her broken
ribs, her right nipple removed and bleeding, and her abdomen filled with water
constitute mute but irrefutable proof of such violence.  On the other hand, the fact that the nine o’clock laceration of her hymen was still
fresh at the time the medical examination the day after, and there were streaks
of blood found in her vaginal wall prove that someone had sexual intercourse
with her.

Viewing the complaint or charge of the deceased variously
testified to by the witnesses, that she had been “abused”,
“raped”, “dishonored” and “niramas
nac ni Victor”, to be
of less evidentiary value, the same being in the nature of conclusions, there
is one particular statement made by her which to my mind is of vital
importance.  According to her mother, Ignacia Cristobal, when she asked
Imelda “what happened to you my daughter — she answered, ‘I did not like
what happened to me. 
Do not blame me.'” In other words, as I understand such testimony,
the deceased was actually saying the laceration of her hymen was against her
will; and neither her mother nor her sister, the wife of Victor, should hold it
against her, from which it follows that it could not have happened if no
violence had been used on her.

If this be inference or deduction, it is certainly inexorable and
inevitable.  And considered against the
background of the other relevant circumstances proven in the record, one cannot
entertain any reasonable doubt as to its correctness.  Indeed, in the physical and emotional state
in which Imelda was at the time the witnesses talked to her, just after the
assault upon her had happened and hardly three hours before she died, she could
not have been expected to be fully explicit in her narration of what was done
to her.  In such a situation, the duty of
the judge is to apply the standards of human experience and common sense in
deciphering what might appear as a telegraphic message of the res gestae itself,
considering the startling nature of the occurrence.

With the foregoing observations which have served to dispel my
misgivings regarding the seeming insufficiency of the evidence of rape in the
record, I join in the judgment finding appellant Victor Garcia guilty as
charged in the information and imposing upon him the extreme penalty of death.