RASMIA U. TABAO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE ACMAD T. BARATAMAN, MTCC, BRANCH 1, MARAWI CITY, RESPONDENT.
Listen, read along, or open presentation mode.
Tabao versus Barataman
The Case
This is an administrative case for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion filed by Rasmia U. Tabao against Acting Presiding Judge Acmad T. Barataman of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Marawi City. The complainant was the private complainant in a criminal case for abandonment of a minor, and she charged the respondent judge with misconduct in granting bail on recognizance to the accused in that case. The case matters because it fixes two elementary rules every judge and every examinee must know: that release on recognizance under the law is a personal obligation of the accused, and that bail can never be granted before the court has acquired custody of the accused.
Procedural History
The complainant filed an affidavit-complaint against the respondent judge before the Office of the Court Administrator. On November 6, 2001, Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. submitted a memorandum finding the respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and recommending a fine of 20,000 pesos, with a warning, considering that it was his first offense. The administrative case was then resolved by the Supreme Court as an original administrative matter, and the Court agreed with the finding of the Office of the Court Administrator.
Facts
Rasmia U. Tabao was the private complainant in a criminal case for abandonment of a minor against Samsodin M. Tabao. On July 16, 1998, the respondent judge issued an order granting a motion for bail on recognizance filed by the father of the accused, purportedly pursuant to Republic Act Number 6036. The prosecution moved to cancel the bail on the ground that the accused was a certified public accountant who could afford to post a cash bond. The respondent judge denied the motion in an order dated June 30, 1999, stating that the law, in allowing bail on recognizance, does not distinguish whether an accused is rich or poor.
The complainant alleged that the motion was filed not by the accused but by his father; that the prosecutor was not furnished a copy and no hearing was conducted; that the motion lacked the sworn statement of the accused signed in the presence of two witnesses; and that the motion and its supporting affidavit were signed by the father. She also contended that the accused was not poor, being a certified public accountant who operated a transport business in Metro Manila.
In his comment, the respondent judge claimed that the crime was covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, so that bail on recognizance was not required because the court could immediately arraign and try the accused. He also claimed that the court could appoint the accused's father, a former city councilor, as custodian under the Rules of Court. It was undisputed that the accused was at large when the motion for bail was filed and granted.
Issues
- Whether or not the respondent judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law in granting bail on recognizance on the basis of a sworn statement signed not by the accused but by his father.
- Whether or not the respondent judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law in granting bail on recognizance although the accused was able to post a cash or bail bond.
- Whether or not the respondent judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law in entertaining and granting a motion for bail although the court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused, who was at large.
Applicable Provisions
Section 1 of Republic Act Number 6036 provides:
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, bail shall not be required of a person charged with violation of a criminal offense the prescribed penalty for which is not higher than six months imprisonment and/or a fine of two thousand pesos, or both.
This fixes the class of cases covered by the law, which includes the abandonment of a minor charge against the accused.
Section 2 of Republic Act Number 6036 provides:
The person charged shall be required to sign in the presence of two witnesses of good standing in the community a sworn statement binding himself, pending final decision of his case, to report to the Clerk of Court hearing his case periodically every two weeks. The Court may, in its discretion and with the consent of the person charged, require further that he be placed under the custody and subject to the authority of a responsible citizen in the community who may be willing to accept the responsibility. In such a case the affidavit herein mentioned shall include a statement of the person charged that he binds himself to accept the authority of the citizen so appointed by the Court.
This imposes on the accused personally the duty to sign the sworn statement, a duty the father cannot assume for him.
Section 15, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
The court may release a person in custody on his own recognizance or that of a responsible person.
This provision presupposes that the person seeking release is already in the custody of the law, which the accused in this case was not.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the respondent judge violated Republic Act Number 6036. The sworn statement supporting the motion was signed not by the accused but by his father. The Court stressed that the law requires the person charged to sign a sworn statement binding himself to report to the Clerk of Court, and that this is a personal obligation that cannot be assumed by the custodian or responsible citizen appointed by the court.
On the second issue, the Court rejected the respondent judge's claim that the law does not distinguish whether an accused is rich or poor. The law allows release on the accused's own recognizance only where it has been established that he is unable to post the required cash or bail bond. Since the accused was a certified public accountant engaged in the transport business, he could afford a bond, and the grant of recognizance was erroneous.
On the third issue, the Court held that bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, and cannot be granted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities through arrest or voluntary surrender. The Court put it plainly: it is incongruous to give freedom to one who is free, and it is premature to file a motion for bail for someone whose liberty has yet to be curtailed. The respondent judge knew the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused, who was still at large, yet he entertained and granted the motion. That violated a tenet of criminal procedure too basic as to constitute gross ignorance of the law. The Court also reiterated that the relative immunity of judges for erroneous orders is not a license to be negligent, abusive, or arbitrary.
Doctrine
Under Republic Act Number 6036, the sworn statement binding the accused to report to the Clerk of Court every two weeks is a personal obligation of the accused, who must sign it in the presence of two witnesses of good standing in the community; it cannot be signed or assumed by the custodian or responsible citizen. Release on the accused's own recognizance is allowed only upon a clear showing that he is unable to post the required cash or bail bond. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, and a court cannot grant provisional liberty to one who is not in custody; a motion for bail filed before arrest or voluntary surrender is premature. A judge who grants bail despite the absence of custody over the accused is guilty of gross ignorance of the law, and the relative immunity of judges for erroneous orders is not a license to be negligent, abusive, or arbitrary.
Disposition
The Court found respondent Judge Acmad T. Barataman liable for gross ignorance of the law and imposed upon him a fine of 20,000 pesos, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Remember This
Memorize the line: it is incongruous to give freedom to one who is free, so bail cannot be granted before the court acquires custody of the accused. Examiners use this case to test the requisites of release on recognizance under Republic Act Number 6036 and the rule that a motion for bail by an accused still at large is premature.