OCA CIRCULAR NO. 64-2005, May 24, 2005

For the information and guidance of all concerned, quoted
hereunder is the Decision of the Second Division dated November 23, 2004
in Administrative Case No. 5454, entitled “Carmelina Y. Rangwani vs.
Atty. Ramon S. Dino”, to wit:

“This is an administrative complaint filed against Atty. Ramon
S. Dino by Carmelina Y. Rangwani before this Court. In her complaint,
Rangwani alleged that sometime in the years 1995 to 1996, Atty. Dino
befriended her. Owing to his status in the community as a good lawyer
and businessman, respondent was able to convince the complainant to part
with her title to a parcel of land located in Dasmarinas, Cavite, under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2791-97, Entry 5320-102. After
the lapse of five months, complainant demanded the return of her title
from respondent who promised to return the same but failed to do so.
After ten months, respondent was nowhere to be found. Complainant, with
the help of an informer, was able to locate respondent who turned out to
have transferred his residence to Makati City. Upon confrontation,
respondent retorted that he could not give back the title to the land.
Instead, he offered to buy the property. Thus, he issued the following
checks^[1] to complainant:

Check No.	Date	Amount
0062631	May 15, 1999	P50.000.00
0062632	June 15, 1999	50,000.00
0062633	July 15, 1999	50,000.00
0062634	July 30,1999	52,570.00

When deposited, all the checks bounced for the reason “closed account.”

In the year 1999, complainant filed Criminal Cases No 55666, No.
57029, No. 276070, and No. 279784 for violation of Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) Big. 22 against the respondent. Warrants for the arrest of
respondent in relation to these cases were issued.^[2]

On 29 August 2001, this Court, acting on the Complaint, issued a
resolution requiring the respondent to comment thereon on the
complaint.^[3] On 22 November
2001, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to Admit
Comment and for a Formal Hearing. In this motion, he bared that the
Court’s resolution requiring him to comment was sent to his parents’
residence. He claimed he has been living for the past two years in a
rented house at Signal Village, Taguig, Metro Manila, and has been in
the province for the last three weeks attending to business concerns. He
said he was not aware that a disbarment complaint has been filed
against him. While he admitted that there were cases previously filed by
complainant against him, said cases had already been withdrawn and the
corresponding desistance, waiver and quitclaim had been signed by her
and that complainant had in fact “received (already) the monetary claims
or their equivalent involving said case.”^[4]
Respondent was, therefore, under the belief that all those cases had
been dismissed. Hence, he said, he was unaware that warrants for his
arrest were issued. He had been a lawyer for the past twenty- three
years and this is the first and only case filed against him before the
Court and in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). He was a
working student who took various jobs at the early age of seventeen. He
took the 1977 bar exams and landed No. 13 with an average of 88.88%. He
said his title as a lawyer and his license to practice are the only
legacies he can leave to his children; hence, he prays that he be given
the chance to be heard formally to be able to air his side.

On 16 January 2002, complainant filed her counter-affidavit^[5]
disputing her alleged withdrawal of this complaint and the denial by
the respondent of the standing warrants of arrest against him arising
out of the incident in question. The same was referred to the IBP.

In a resolution dated 28 January 2002,^[6]
this Court resolved to grant respondent’s Omnibus Motion for Leave of
Court to Admit Comment on the administrative complaint and for a Formal
Hearing, and noted the comment therein. The case was referred to the IBP
for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety days from
notice.

On 02 May 2002, complainant submitted a letter ^[7]
to the IBP withdrawing the complaint she filed against respondent,
stating that “after much reflection and recall of the antecedent facts
that led to the filing of the complaint, I have finally decided to
withdraw the same as it arose purely out of misunderstanding and
miscommunication and definitely not warranting any disciplinary action
much less disbarment and apologize for whatever inconvenience the
complaint had cause[d] the office.”

In an Order dated 19 June 2002, Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala of the IBP, Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), to whom
the case was assigned for investigation, report and recommendation,
notified the parties to appear for a hearing at said office on 03 July
2002.

Per order dated 03 July 2002 of Commissioner Maala, it appears
that when the case was called for hearing, neither complainant nor
respondent appeared. It was not shown, however, whether they received
notices of the scheduled hearing, hence, the same was ordered cancelled
and reset to 17 July 2002.

In a resolution dated 05 August 2002, this Court acting on the
letter of complainant dated 02 May 2002, resolved to note the same and
referred it to the IBP.

On 07 October 2002, complainant submitted to the IBP a motion to
hold and to quash withdrawal of the administrative case expressing a
desire to actively pursue her complaint.

According to complainant, respondent begged her to dismiss the
administrative complaint she filed and promised to settle his
obligations with her. It was only for this reason that she agreed to
sign a written withdrawal of her complaint. This was, however, a mere
promise which remained unfulfilled.^[8]

Not very long after, on 25 October 2002, complainant again filed
before the IBP a Motion to Dismiss Complaint. As is usual in
desistance, complainant manifested her interest to have the complaint
dismissed after what she said was a mature reflection, realizing that
respondent had served her faithfully, honorably and well in the various
cases that he had handled for her at a time when she needed it most. She
articulated that the cases she had filed against the respondent have
long been settled between them and should have been dismissed by the
Court, but she was not aware that respondent’s presence is necessary for
the dismissal of those cases, and she could not locate respondent. She
only discovered later on that he was actually taken very ill due to
hypertension and gastro­intestinal problems. On the other hand,
respondent, in an effort to exculpate himself, averred he was under the
impression that complainant would take care and see to the dismissal of
the said cases against him. To convince the IBP that the case should be
dismissed, complainant likewise claimed that respondent had no more
obligation to her because the same had been offset by legal services
rendered by the latter after an accounting was taken.^[9]

In an Order dated 05 November 2002, issued by IBP Commissioner
Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, the parties were notified to attend a hearing
on the case which was set on 04 December 2002.^[10] This scheduled hearing was, however, reset to 12 December 2002 for failure of the complainant to appear on the earlier date.^[11]
At the hearing set on 12 December 2002, both parties appeared but
complainant moved to reset on 29 January 2003 without objection from the
respondent.^[12]

On 31 January 2003, the IBP, in Compliance^[13] with this Court’s resolution dated 20 November 2002^[14]
directing it to submit a status report on the case every first day of
the month until termination of the investigation, stated that because of
complainant’s failure to appear and affirm her Affidavit of Desistance
despite several hearings set by the Commission, it now considered the
cases submitted for report and recommendation and to be decided on the
merits thereof.

Per report of Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, respondent
Atty. Ramon S. Dino was found to have committed gross misconduct, and he
was, thus, recommended to be suspended for a period of one year from
the practice of his profession as a lawyer and member of the bar. This
was reduced to six months by the IBP Board of Governors is a resolution
dated 21 June 2003, which reads:

RESOLUTION NO. XV-2003-343

Adm. Case No. 5454

Carmelina Y. Rangwani vs

Atty. Ramon S. Diño

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and.
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex “A”; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification as
to penalty to conform to the evidence, and considering that
respondent’s issuance of checks in violation of the provisions of B.P.
22 constitutes serious misconduct and in addition respondent committed
gross misconduct when he failed to comply his promise to complainant to
settle the case, Atty. Ramon S. Dino is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.

We agree with the IBP’s finding of guilt as the same is fully
anchored on the evidence on record and on applicable laws, rules and
jurisprudence.

Quite conspicuously, despite the opportunities accorded to
respondent to refute the charges against him, he failed to do so or even
offer a valid explanation. The record is bereft of any evidence to show
that, respondent has presented any countervailing evidence to meet the
charges against him. His nonchalance does not speak well of him as it
reflects his utter lack of respect towards the public officers who were
assigned to investigate the cases.^[15] On the contrary, respondent’s comments only markedly admitted complainant’s accusations.^[16]
When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not
enough that he denies the charges against him. He must meet the issue
and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still
maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is
expected of him^[17] These, the respondent miserably failed to do.

Respondent relies, quite heavily, on the complainant’s move to
dismiss the complaint, to secure exoneration. His reliance is misplaced.
Firstly, because the same has not been confirmed and substantiated by
the complainant at all as she failed to appear in the hearings scheduled
for the purpose despite due notice. Secondly, and most importantly, we
have consistently looked with disfavor upon such desistance of
complainants because of legal and jurisprudential injunction.

Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 5. Service or dismissal.- ….

No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason
of the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of
the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same.

In Bais v. Tugaoen,^[18]
the Court frowned upon the complainant’s affidavit of desistance,
hence, in spite of it, proceeded with the complaint against the erring
judge.

In Reyes-Domingo v. Morales,^[19] we expostulated that:

The withdrawal of a complaint for lack of interest of a
complainant does not necessarily warrant the dismissal of an
administrative complaint (Dagsa-an v. Conaq 290 SCRA 12 [1998]). The
Court cannot be bound by the unilateral decision of a complainant to
desist from prosecuting a case involving the discipline of parties
subject to its administrative supervision (Zamora v Jumamoy, 238 SCRA
587 [1994]). The need to maintain the faith and confidence of our people
in the government and its agencies and instrumentalities demands that
proceedings in administrative cases against public officers and
employees should not be made to depend on the whims and caprices of
complainants who are, in a real sense, only witnesses (Sy v. Academia,
198 SCRA 705 [1991]).

The latter case of Executive Judge Pacifico S. Bulado v.
Domingo Tiu, Jr. (A.M. No. P-96-1211, 31 March 2000, pp. 4-5, 329 SCRA
308), more pointedly stated that-

While complainant in this case may have forgiven respondent,
this Court, charged as it is with enforcing discipline in the judiciary,
cannot simply close its eyes to respondent’s acts of extreme
intransigence. Withdrawal of the complaint will not free respondent from
his administrative liability (Estreller v. Manatad, Jr., 268 SCRA 608
[1997]), particularly because administrative proceedings are imbued with
public interest, public office being a public trust (Gacho v. Fuentes,
Jr., 291 SCRA 474 [1998]).

The need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in
the government, its agencies and its instrumentalities requires that
proceedings in administrative cases should not be made to depend on the
whims and caprices of the complainants who are, in a real sense, only
witnesses therein (Estreller v. Manatad, supra; Gacho v.
Fuentes, supra). The court cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a
complainant in a matter that involves its disciplinary authority over
all employees of the judiciary; otherwise, our disciplinary power may be
put to naught (Sandoval v. Manalo, 260 SCRA 611 [1996]). ‘

Finally, in Bolivar v. Simbol,^[20] the Court, citing In re Davies,^[21] ruled that the discipline of lawyers cannot be cut short by a compromise or withdrawal of charges:

It is contended on the part of the plaintiff in error that
this settlement operated as an absolution and remission of his offense!
This view of the case ignores the fact that the exercise of the power is
not for the purpose of enforcing civil remedies between parties, but to
protect the court and the public against an attorney guilty of unworthy
practices in his profession. He had acted in clear disregard of his
duty as an attorney at the bar, and without “good fidelity” to his
client. The public had rights which Mrs. Curtis could not thus settle or
destroy. The unworthy act had been fully consummated.

Respondent’s act of having borrowed the title to the land of
complainant, his presumed use of the said title for his personal gain,
his failure to return the same despite repeated demands and worse! his
issuance of three checks in exchange for the said land title which
bounced, constitute gross misconduct for which he must be disciplined.
In this connection Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
is unequivocal. It states:

Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client
unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the
case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a
client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.^[22]

In the case of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles v. Atty. Thomas Uy, Jr.,^[23] this Court held:

The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly
fiduciary; it requires a high degree of fidelity and good faith. It is
designed “to remove all such temptation and to prevent everything of
that kind from being done for the protection of the client” (Agpalo,
Legal Ethics, 1992 ed.,p. 188).

Thus, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that “a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of
his client that may come into his possession.” Furthermore, Rule 16.01
of the Code also states that “a lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client.” The Canons of
Professional Ethics is even more explicit:

The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his
personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantages of the confidence
reposed in him by his client.

Money of the client collected for the client or other trust
property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and
accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him.

This Court, in several cases,^[24]
has time and again ruled that the fiduciary duty of a lawyer and
advocate is what places the law profession in a unique position of trust
and confidence and distinguishes it from any other calling. Once this
trust and confidence is betrayed, the faith of the people not only in
the individual lawyer but also in the legal profession as a whole is
eroded. To this end, all members of the bar are strictly required to at
all times maintain the highest degree of public confidence in the
fidelity, honesty and integrity of their profession.

Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates
that a lawyer should observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with his client.^[25]

A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional
or private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an
officer of the court. Every lawyer should act and comport himself in
such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of
the legal profession.^[26]

Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all
lawyers at all times to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal
profession.^[27]

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 17. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor.-
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases as law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The question now arises as to the proper penalty to be imposed.

As to the propriety of imposing the supreme penalty of
disbarment, the rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases
of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court.^[28]While
we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will also
not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the
desired end^[29] In this case,
we find suspension to be a sufficient sanction against respondent —
suspension being primarily intended not as a punishment but as a means
to protect the public and the legal profession.^[30]

The following cases rendered by this Court and the penalties
imposed thereto where Rule 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
finds application are enlightening.

In the earlier case of Aya v. Bigornia ^[31]the
Court ruled that money collected by a lawyer in favor of his clients
must be immediately turned over to them and failure to do so merits a
penalty of suspension for six months. In Daroy v. Legaspi,^[32]
the Court held that lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or
property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do
constitutes professional misconduct warranting disbarment. Subsequently,
in the case of Obia v. Catimbang^[33]
respondent Atty. Basilio M. Catimbang was ordered indefinitely
suspended for failure to return the amount of PI 1,000 entrusted to him.
Still later, in Dumadag v. Lumaya^[34]
the Court likewise ordered the indefinite suspension of Atty. Ernesto
L. Lumaya for his receipt of and failure to deliver the amount of P4,344
to his client, complainant in the case.

In the case of Burbe v. Magulta,^[35]
this Court imposed upon Atty. Magulta the penalty of suspension for one
(1) year for his conversion into legal fees the filing fee entrusted to
him by his client.

In the case of Nunez v. Ricafort^[36]
this Court ordered the indefinite suspension of Atty. Romulo Ricafort
for his act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of an alias writ of
execution for money judgment rendered against him.

Therein, the Court held:

There is no need to stretch one’s imagination to arrive at an
inevitable conclusion that respondent gravely abused the confidence that
complainant reposed in him and committed dishonesty when he did not
turn over the proceeds of the sale of her property. Worse, with palpable
bad faith, he compelled the complainant to go to court for the recovery
of the proceeds of the sale and, in the process, to spend money, time
and energy therefore Then, despite his deliberate failure to answer the
complaint resulting in his having been declared in default he appealed
from the judgment to the Court of Appeals Again, bad faith attended such
a step because he did not pay the docket fee despite notice. Needless
to state respondent wanted to prolong the travails and agony of the
complainant and to enjoy the fruits of what rightfully belongs to the
latter. Unsatisfied with what he had already unjustly and unlawfully
done to complainant, respondent issued checks to satisfy the alias writ
of execution. But remaining unrepentant of what he had done and in
continued pursuit of a clearly malicious plan not to pay complainant of
what had been validly and lawfully adjudged by the court against him,
respondent closed the account against which the checks were drawn. There
was deceit in this. Respondent never had the intention of paying his
obligation as proved by the fact that despite the criminal cases for
violation of B.P. Big. 22, he did not pay the obligation.

While the case of Nunez v. Ricafort^[37]
holds some similarity to the present case, it is material to note that
this is the first time that a complaint of this nature has been filed
against the respondent. Likewise, unlike the Nunez case, the
criminal cases filed by the complainant have not been finally disposed
of, hence, no conviction against respondent was ever obtained. On all
fours to this case is the case of Lao v. Medel. ^[40]
Respondent Atty. Robert W. Medel, who issued four checks which were
subsequently dishonored totaling twenty-two thousand pesos (P22,000) in
payment of his outstanding obligation, was ordered suspended for one
year by this Court in line with the case of Co. v. Bernardino,^[39] Ducat, Jr. v. Villalon, Jr.,^[40] and Saburnido v. Madroño.^[41]

Finally, in the most recent case of Isidra Barrientos, et al. v. Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro,^[42]
this Court imposed upon respondent Atty. Elerizza Libiran-Meteoro the
penalty of suspension for six (6) months for having issued several
checks to the complainants in payment of a pre-existing debt without
sufficient funds —

We have held that the issuance of checks which were later
dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a
lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It shows
a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her
unworthy of public confidence. The issuance of a series of worthless
checks also shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to
the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public
order. It also manifests a lawyer’s low regard to her commitment to the
oath she has taken when she joined her peers seriously and irreparably
tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in high esteem.

This Court justified the imposition of a lighter penalty of six
months upon Atty. Libiran-Meteoro instead of one year as was imposed in
the case of Lao v. Medel 43on the ground of Atty. Libiran-Meteoro’s payment of a portion of her debt to the complainant.

In the same manner, we find that the lesser penalty of six
months cannot be imposed upon herein respondent Atty. Dino on the ground
that, just like the case of Lao v. Medel, ^[43]
there is no showing of any restitution whatsoever in this case on the
part of the respondent. Likewise, the fraudulent manner by which he was
able to entice complainant to entrust to him the title to her land
should also be taken into account.

As was so aptly stated in Cuizon v. Macalino:^[44]

Such conduct indicates the respondent’s unfitness for the
trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty
and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence
and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ramon S. Dino is found guilty of
GROSS MISCONDUCT and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be
dealt with more severely. Respondent’s suspension is effective upon his
receipt of notice of this Decision.

Let notice of this Decision be spread on respondent’s record as
an attorney in this Court, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and to the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.”

Copy of the Decision was received by the respondent on December
13, 2004 as shown by Registry Return Receipts Nos. 65418 and 65419.

__24__ May 2005.

	ZENAIDA N. ELEPAÑO
	Acting Court Administrator

^[2] Rollo, pp. 3-9.

^[3] Rollo, p. 12.

^[4] Rollo, pp. 14-17.

^[5] Rollo, p. .20.

^[6] Rollo, p. 18.

^[7] Rollo, p. 7.

^[8] Rollo, pp. 17-18.

^[9] Rollo, pp. 19-21.

^[10] Rollo, p. 23.

^[11] Rollo, p. 25.

^[12] Rollo, p. 26.

^[13] Rollo, p. 30.

^[14] Rollo, pp. 27-29.

^[15] Ong v. Unto, A.C. No. 2417, 06 February 2002 , 376 SCRA 152

^[16] Rollo, pp. 14-17

^[17] Reyes v. Gaa, A.M.
No. 1048, 14 July 1995, 246 SCRA 64, cited in Radjaie v. Alovera, A.M.
No. 4748, 04 August 2000,337 SCRA 244.

^[18] A.M. No. 1294-MJ, 23 March 1979 ,89 SCRA 101.

^[19] A.M. No. P-99-1285
04 October 2000, 342 SCRA 6, citing Orlando Lapefia v. Jovito Pamarang
A.M. No. P-00-1362, 15 February 2000 , 325 SCRA 440; Imbing v. Tiongson,
A.M. No. MTJ-91-595, 07 February 1994,229 SCRA 690.

^[20] A.C.No. 377, 29 April 1966 , 16 SCRA 623.

^[21] 39 Americal Reports, 729, cited in Punzalan v. Plata, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1310, 18 December 2001 , 372 SCRA 534.

^[22] Sevilla v. Salubre, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1336, 19 December 2000 , 348 SCRA 592.

^[23] A.C.No. 5019, 06 April 2000, 330 SCRA 6, 17-18.

^[24] Goretti
Ong v. Atty Joel M. Grijaldo, A.C. No. 4724, 30 April 2003 , 402 SCRA 1,
citing Burbe v. Magulta, A.C. NO. 5713, 10 June 2002 , 383 SCRA 276,
citing Sipin-Nabor v. Batenna, A.C. No. 4073, 18 June 2001 , 360 SCRA 6.

^[25] Junio v. Grupo, A.C. No. 5020, 18 December 2001 , 372 SCRA 525.

^[26] Ong v. Unto, supra.

^[27] Ducat, Jr. v.
Villalon, Jr., et al., A.C. No. 3910, 14 August 2000, 337 SCRA 622,
c.ted in Saburn.do – Madrono, A.C. No. 4497, 26 September 2001, 366 SCRA
1.

^[28] Tapucar v. Tapucar,
A.C. No. 4148, 30 July 1998, 293 SCRA 331; Vda de Rosales v.Ramos, A.C
No. 5645, 02 July 2002, 383 SCRA 498; Tiboli Agro-Industrial
Development, Inc. v. Solilapsi, A.C. No. 4766, 27 December 2002, 394
SCRA 269.

^[29] Montano v. IBP, A.C.
No. 4215, 21 May 2001 , 358 SCRA 1, citing Resurreccion v. Sayson, A.C.
No. 1037, 14 December 1998 300 SCRA 129; Castillo v. Taguines, A.C. No.
2024, 11 March 1996 , 254 SCRA 554; Igual v. Javier, A.C. No. CBD-174,
07 March 1996 , 254 SCRA 416; Mendoza v. Mala, A.C. No. 1129, 27 July
1992 21′ 1 SCRA 839 (all cited in Saburnido v. Madrono, supra).

^[30] Magat v. Santiago , et al’., G.R. Nos. L-43301-45665, 01 April 1980 , 97 SCRA 1.

^[31] 26 July 1932 , 57 Phil. 8.

^[32] 26 July 1932 , 57 Phil. 8.

^[33] A.C. No. 2731, 19 April 1991 , 196 SCRA 23.

^[34] A.C.No. 2614, 21 May 1991 , 197 SCRA 303.

^[35] Supra.

^[36] A.C. No. 5054, 29 May 2002 , 382 SCRA 381.

^[37] Supra

^[38] A.C. No. 5916, 01 July 2003 , 405 SCRA 227.

^[39] A.C.No. 3919, 28 January 1998 , 285 SCRA 102.

^[40] Supra.

^[41] Supra.

^[42] A.C. No. 6408, 31 August 2004 , citing Lao v. Medel, supra, and Cuizon v. Macalino, A.C. No. 4334, 07 July 2004.

^[43] Supra.

^[44] A.C. No. 4334, 07 July 2004.