RIZAL SURETY AND INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER, VS. BIENVENIDO A. TAN, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BIBIANO L. MEER, COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, GREGO…

On September 19, 1947, Judge Ambrosio Santos of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendants in civil case No. 167 of said court, entitled “Rizal Surety and
Insurance Company, Inc., plaintiff, vs. Gregorio Gutierrez, Sofronio S. Pasola,
and Benito D. Guevara, defendants,” foreclosing a real estate mortgage executed
by the defendant Gregorio Gutierrez in favor of the plaintiff. On October 9,
1947, the Collector of Internal Revenue, through an assistant provincial fiscal
of Rizal, filed in said case a “motion ot set aside judgment and allow the
Collector of Internal Revenue to intervene as party plaintiff,” alleging that
two of the defendants, namely, Sofronio S. Pasola and Benito D. Guevara, were
indebted to the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of P15,727 as
deficiency specific tax. There is no allegation in the motion that the
Government had any registered lien on the property the mortgage on which was
sought to be foreclosed by the plaindiff, it appearing from the complaint that
the mortgagor of said property was the other defendant Gregorio Gutierrez. Over
the opposition of the plaintiff, the respondent judge granted the motion of the
Collector of Internal Revenue and set aside the judgment in said case “to allow
the Collector of Internal Revenue to present a claim of the Government against
any of the parties interested in this case.”

The present petition for certiorari was filed in this court by
the Rizal Surety and Insurance company, Inc., to annul said order of the
respondent judge. Upon being required to answer the petition the collector of
Internal Revenue, through the First Assistant Solicitor General, submitted the
case for decision without filing an answer.

The petition is meritorious. No relation has been shown between
the claim of the Collector of Internal Revenue for deficiency specific tax
against two of the defendants and the cause of action of the plaintiff against
the three defendants in said case to justify the intervention of the said
Collector of Internal Revenue therein as party plaintiff. It is not explained
why the Collector of Internal Revenue could not file a separate action or pursue
an independent remedy against the alleged delinquent taxpayers. Sections 1 and 3
of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provide as follows:

“SECTION 1. When proper.—A person may, at any period of
a trial, be permitted by the court, in its discretion, to intervene in an
action, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success
of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated
as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof.”

“SEC. 3. Discretion of court.—In allowing or disallowing
a motion for intervention, the court, in the exercise of discretion, shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the
intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate
proceeding.”

The case of the Collector of Internal Revenue does not come
within the purview of the above-quoted provisions of the rule he invoked in the
lower court. The Government has not shown that it has “legal interest in the
matter in litigation,” on the one hand, and, on the other , it was apparent that
the intervention would unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights
of the original parties. Moreover, “the intervenor’s rights may be fully
protected in a separate proceeding.” Furthermore, the motion for intervention
was filed after the trial and decision of the original case and therefore out of
time.

Hence the respondent judge acted without authority of law and
in excess of his jurisdiction in granting the motion for intervention and in
setting aside the judgment rendered in said civil case No. 167.

The petition is granted and the order of the respondent judge
of November 21, 1947, is hereby set aside, without any finding as to costs. So
ordered.

Moran, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon,
Tuason, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.