LOUIE L. VARGAS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. AKAI PHILIPPINES, INC., DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

Louie L. Vargas filed a suit for damages against AKAI Philippines,
Inc. alleging that he was an employee of the defendant from 29 August 1979 to
15 March 1981 as Marketing Assistant for Advertising but that he voluntarily
resigned on 16 March 1981; that he was not paid his salary from March 15, 1981
amounting to P824.65, vacation leave conversion amounting to P429.82, the
proportionate 13th month pay of P426.04 or a total of P1,680.51 inspite of repeated demands; that the flimsy excuse of the
defendant is that plaintiff failed to return three (3) pieces of valuable
equipment when in truth and in fact plaintiff had returned the same so that
because of said imputation plaintiff claims moral damages in the amount of
P250,000.00 and nominal, temperate, and exemplary damages as the Court may determine, P5,000.00
for expenses of litigation, P20,000.00
for attorney’s fees plus an amount equivalent to 25% of the damages to be
awarded to plaintiff and the cost of the suit.

An answer to the complaint was
filed by the defendant traversing the same and asking in turn that plaintiff
be made to pay the defendant the value of the unreturned equivalent after
deducting plaintiff’s claim plus moral damages, attorney’s fees and cost of the
suit.

The trial of the case proceeded wherein plaintiff presented his
evidence.  After the close of plaintiff’s
case, the counsel for the defendant withdrew and another counsel entered his
appearance for the defendant.  Said new
counsel then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
Court has no jurisdiction over the action or suit as jurisdiction thereof is
vested with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).  In an Order of June 5, 1985, the court a quo
granted the motion by dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Hence the plaintiff appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate
Court docketed as CA-G.R. No. CV-07815, wherein after the parties filed their
respective briefs a Resolution was promulgated by the 5th Division on August 18, 1987 that the question of
jurisdiction raised is within the exclusive competence of this Court, so the
records of the case were transmitted to this Court.

We find no merit in this
appeal.  An examination of the complaint
and the evidence adduced show that the cause of action arose from the
employee-employer relationship of the parties. 
Under the Labor Code as amended by P.D. No. 1691 dated May 1,
1980 it is provided
as follows:

“‘The Labor Arbiter shall have the original exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all
workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:

1.     
x x x.

2.     
x x x.

3.     
All money claims of workers, including
those based on non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or
appropriate agreement, except claims for employees compensation, social
security, medicare and maternity benefits.

4.     
x x x.

5.     
All other claims arising from employer-employee
relations, unless expressly excluded by this Code.'”

Plaintiff however contends that his complaint is essentially an
action for damages arising from the imputation of the defendant that he failed
to return certain equipment after his resignation from employment and that the recovery of unpaid wages and other benefits
is just incidental to this main action. 
The Court is not persuaded.  A
reading of the complaint shows that it is an action for recovery of unpaid
wages and other benefits due him as a resigned employee of the defendant. 
The allegations of damages arose from the said employee-employer
relationship.

The “money claims of workers” provided for by law over
which the labor arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction is
comprehensive enough to include claims for moral damages of a dismissed
employee against his employer.^[1] The courts have no jurisdiction over claims
for moral and exemplary damages arising from the illegal dismissal of an
employee.^[2] Thus, the dismissal of this case for lack of
jurisdiction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) over the claims for damages
arising from the employee-employer relationship which is within the jurisdiction
of the NLRC is well taken.^[3]

Plaintiff then argues that the defendant having submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the court and participated in the trial where evidence
of plaintiff was adduced, cannot now adopt an inconsistent posture attacking the
jurisdiction of the court to which he had submitted voluntarily citing Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court.^[4] Royales is
not applicable in this case for it involves an ejectment
case where the decision had become final and executory
when the failure to avail of the barangay
conciliation process was raised and where defendant did not appear to present
his defense.

The general rule must apply in this case that lack of
jurisdiction over subject matter cannot be waived and maybe raised at anytime.^[5]

WHEREFORE, the appeal
is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa,
Cruz, and Paras,
JJ., concur.

^[1] Getz Corporation vs. CA, 160 SCRA 87; Pepsi Cola vs. Martinez, 112
SCRA 580, 587.

^[2] Agudo vs. Vellejos, 113 SCRA 69; Ebon vs. de Guzman, 113 SCRA
52.

^[3] Medina vs. Castro Bartolome, 116 SCRA 597; Getz Corporation vs. CA, supra.

^[4] 127 SCRA 470, G.R. No. 65072, Jan. 31,
1984.

^[5] Section 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court, Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23
SCRA 35-36 (1968); Crisostomo vs. Court of
Appeals, 32 SCRA 54, 58 (1970); Zulueta vs.
Pan American World Airways, 49 SCRA 1, 6 (1973).