G.R. No. L-43663. August 17, 1983

NORENA TORTAL, PETITIONER, VS. THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND RODOLFO GAMBOA, RESPONDENTS.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions August 17, 1983 FIRST DIVISION GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
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GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:


In this petition for review, the petitioner seeks the reversal of
the Workmen’s Compensation Commission decision which affirmed the dismissal by
the labor referee of her claim for death compensation.

The petitioner’s son, Eduardo Tortal,
was a farm laborer of Hacienda Celina at E.B. Magalona,
Negros Occidental since 1972 up to the time of his
death on August 2, 1973. At
the time of his death, he was earning a daily wage of P8.00. The cause of death
is stated in the death certificate as “hypertension cerebral.”

On September 12, 1973,
the petitioner filed a notice and claim for death compensation with the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, Sub-Regional Office No. VII
at
Bacolod City.

On September 18, 1973,
the sub-regional office furnished the private respondent, by registered mail, a
copy of the notice and claim for death compensation as well as a blank form of
the employer’s report of accident or sickness for him to accomplish but these
were returned to the sender as “unclaimed.” However, on March 8, 1974, the private respondent submitted his employer’s report controverting
the cause of death as neither service incurred nor
service aggravated.

The case was set for hearing on July 16, 1974, but on the day of the hearing both parties
failed to appear.

After the parties submitted their respective memoranda, the
referee of the sub-regional office dismissed the claim for lack of merit. After
denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the referee elevated the
case to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission for review. The affirmance of the decision by the latter office prompted
the petitioner to file the present petition.

The Workmen’s Compensation Commission in affirming the dismissal
of the claim ruled that “(t)here is no dispute
that Eduardo Tortal died due to ‘Hypertension,
Cerebral’ on September 25, 1975
(should be August 2, 1973). However,
the herein claimant failed to established (sic) by substantial evidence the
causal connection between the deceased’s illness and his work as laborer of
respondent.”

The late Eduardo Tortal died in 1973. Benefits
based on his death are, therefore, governed by the former Workmen’s
Compensation Act or Act 3428 as amended. Because of the decisions interpreting
the provisions of the old law on presumption of compensability and the effects
of non-controversion, we are constrained to grant the
petition and to reverse the questioned decision. In the case of Salanguit v. Workmen’s Compensation (90 SCRA
228) we ruled that:

“x x x –
The record discloses that the illness of Juan Salanguit,
petitioner herein, supervened during his employ­ment with the Republic of the Philip­pines
(Bureau of Public Highways). Hence, there is a disputable presumption that the
claim is compensable. The claimant is relieved of the duty to prove
causation as it is then legally presumed that the illness arose out of the
employment
. To the employer is shifted the burden of proof to establish
that the illness is non-compensable.” (Balanga
v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 83 SCRA 721) [Emphasis supplied]

This rule was reiterated in the case of Enrique,
Sr. v. Republic
, (93 SCRA 836) where this Court held:

“x x x it
can be correctly said that petitioner’s hypertension supervened in the course
of his employment, and in accordance with the aforequoted
Section 44(1) in relation to Section 2. (SECTION 2. Ground for Compensation. – When an
employee suffers personal injury, or contracts tuberculo­sis or other illness
directly caused by such employment, or either aggravated by or the result of
the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums
and to the persons hereinafter specified.’
It is presumed that
petitioner’s hypertension was service-connected, and therefore compensable. This,
We have consistently held in a number of cases (Central Azucarera
Don Pedro v. Agno and WCC, 12 SCRA 178; Abana v. Quisumbing, 22 SCRA
1278; Legason v. WCC, 75 SCRA 213; Baterna v. WCC, 75 SCRA 409; Vda.
de Galang v. WCC, 75 SCRA 679; Guevara v. Republic,
77 SCRA 292; Caling v. WCC, 77 SCRA 311; Evangelista
v. WCC, 77 SCRA 497; Pillsbury Mindanao Flour Milling Co., Inc. v. Murillo, 81
SCRA 307; Lamco v. WCC, L-4375, July 31, 1978; Saril v. WCC, L-43204, July 31, 1978) and the burden of
proof is shifted to the employer to show by substantial evidence that while the
illness sub­ject of the claim supervenee in the
course of employment, it does not necessarily follow that it also arose from
such employment or was at least aggravated by it. (Lizardo
v. WEE, L-42995, March 14, 1979.
See also Justiniano v. WCC, 18 SCRA 677; Magalona v. WCC, 21 SCRA 1199; Belmonte
vs. WCC, 58 SCRA 138; Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp. v. WCC, 60 SCRA 228; Ruelan v. RP, 70 SCRA 615). x x x“

Unfortunately for the employer, the records are bereft of
evidence to overcome the presumption of compensability. The allegation that Tortal had a drinking spree the evening before his death
does not preclude his hypertension having been caused or aggravated by or
having resulted from the nature of his farm work.

The jurisprudence explaining the effect of non-controversion is similarly emphatic in favoring the
deceased worker. Under the former Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, if an
employer somehow overlooks or neglects to controvert the right to compensation
within fourteen (14) days from the death of the employee or ten (10) days from
know­ledge thereof, the employer is considered, with an effect approaching
conclusiveness, as having waived or renounced his defensed.
This was the applicable law. We are constrained to apply it. In the case of Jesalva v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission,
(95 SCRA 597) this court declared:

“x x x
Moreover, the records of the case reveal that respondent employer never
complied with its obligations under Sections 37 and 54 of the Act of reporting
to the Commission within fourteen days from occurrence of the injury or death
of its employee or within ten (10) days from knowledge thereof; which
non-compliance generates [a] the loss of the right to controvert the
claim on jurisdic­tional grounds, and the employer cannot be subsequently heard
to complain that the law was strictly construed against him (Victory Ship­ping
Lines, Inc. v. WCC, 106 Phil. 550 [1059]); [b] the renunciation of the
right to controvert the claim, barring all defenses available with­out
exception (National Development Co. v. WCC, 10 SCRA 696 [1964]), thereby
constructively admitting that is is compensable; and
[c] the waiver of the defense that the claim for compensation was not
filed within the statutory period (Vda. de Calado v. WCC, 38 SCRA 567,
575-576 [1971]; Manila Railroad Co. v. WCC, 10 SCRA 41 [1964]). Consequently,
herein respondent employer is barred from raising any defense to defeat peti­tioner’s
claim.”

xxx                xxx           xxx

Under the afore-quoted ruling, the controversion of the claim as neither service incurred nor
service aggravated filed by the private respondent only on March 8, 1974, was a sadly belated act.

Again the records are bereft of proof to support timely controversion, apart from a self-serving allegation that
the employer learned of the death only when asked to accomplish WCC Form No. 3.
The fact that Tortal died on the hacienda, that it is
in the normal course of events to immediately report such a tragedy to the
employer and that his daily wage of P8.00 must have been stricken off the
payroll and considering further the presumptions under the former law, we rule
that there was no timely and valid controversion.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission dated December 30, 1975
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private respon­dent is ordered to pay the
petitioner:

1.    The sum of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00) PESOS as death compensation;

2.    The sum of TWO HUNDRED (P200.00) PESOS for
burial expenses; and

3.    The sum of SIX HUNDRED (P600.00) PESOS as
attorney’s fees; and to pay

4.    The sum of SIXTY-ONE (P61.00) PESOS as
administrative fee to successor of the defunct commission.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Acting C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez,
and Relova, JJ., concur.