AMADEO GARCIA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE’S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION, ELPIDIO UNGRIA, CATALINA CAPINDING, AND BRUNO SUBDIAGA, RESPONDENTS.

The setting aside by respondent Court of Appeals of its previous
resolution of June 18, 1970 dismissing the appeal of respondents for failure of
their record on appeal to disclose on the face thereof that it was perfected on
time prompted petitioner to file this certiorari and prohibition
proceeding.  Petitioner’s motion to
dismiss appeal, at first favorably acted on by respondent Court, pointed out
that from what was stated in the record on appeal, namely the decision being
rendered on January 12, 1970 and the notice of appeal being filed on February
25, 1970 with the appeal bond and record on appeal coming three days later, it
could not be said that the record on appeal was perfected on time.  Petitioner, as plaintiff-appellee,
cited Atlas Consolidated Mining Co.  v.
Progressive Labor Association^[1]
to show that such procedural requirement was both mandatory and
jurisdictional.  Respondent Court, as
noted, was in agreement as shown by its resolution of June 18, 1970 dismissing the appeal.

Private respondents duly filed their motion for
reconsideration.  It was granted in the
assailed resolution of August 12, 1970.  Respondent Court first took note of the
certification by the clerk of the lower court that while the decision was dated
January 12, 1970, a copy was
not served on counsel until February 2,
1970 and that the notice of appeal, the cash bond, and the record
on appeal were all filed on March 30,
1970.  Then came this portion
of the resolution sought to be nullified: 
“From the foregoing proofs as submitted by the appellants, it can
readily be seen that their appeal was perfected within the reglementary
period.  Besides, the Order of the lower
court dated April 21, 1970, which states that ‘said record on appeal as well as
the corresponding appeal bond and notice of appeal have been seasonably filed’
by the appellants, which Order now forms part of the original record on file
before this Court, deserves commensurate weight which can not just be ignored,
unless of course the contrary appears, a situation which is not true in the
present case.  It therefore becomes
imperative that a liberal interpretation of our procedural rules concerning the
perfection of appeal be resorted to and not technicalities of procedure or imperfection
of form in derogation of the intent and purpose of said procedural rules so
that the real matter in dispute may be submitted to the judgment of the
court.  For it is indeed too harsh if not
malevolent to dismiss an appeal, which appears to have been perfected within
the reglementary period, just because appellant’s
counsel in the preparation of the record on appeal failed to observe the
technical procedure required, an omission which we consider as a harmless error
which does not in anyway prejudice the movant
plaintiff-appellee. 
In fact the movant never registered any
opposition to the approval of appellants’ record on appeal in the lower
court.”^[2]

Parenthetically, it may be observed that the approach taken by
the respondent Court, the opinion being rendered by the then Associate Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr., now a
member of this Court, has gained the approval of this Tribunal.  Justice Muñoz
Palma, in Krueger v. Court of Appeals,^[3]
referred to Berkenkotter v. Court of Appeals,^[4] a
1973 decision, as the first decision to reflect the current trend.  The liberal doctrine has been followed by
this Court whenever the material data rule is invoked to dismiss an appeal.^[5]

Respondents were required to answer, and  thereafter the parties filed their respective
memoranda.  Then, on May 4, 1977, petitioner filed a motion to withdraw
petition.  It alleged:  “1. 
That the petition in this case seeks to annul the questioned order of
respondent Court, reinstating the appeal of private respondents in CA-46220-R;
2.  That on September 17, 1976, respondent
Court rendered its decision in CA-46220-R, in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:  ‘[Wherefore], with the modification that
defendant-appellant PHHC is not liable for attorney’s fees and costs, the
decision appealed from is [affirmed]. 
With costs against private appellants,’ thereby rendering the petition
in this case moot and academic; * * *.”^[6]
Under the circumstances, it was understandable why no useful purpose would be
served in deciding this controversy, petitioner having won on the merits.  That was his prayer in the above motion.

WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari and
prohibition is dismissed for having become moot and academic.  No costs.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino,
and Martin, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, Jr., J., on leave.

^[1] L-27125,
September 15, 1967, 21 SCRA
110.

^[2]
Resolution of August 12, 1970,
2-3.

^[3] L-41063,
January 20, 1976, 69 SCRA
50.

^[4] L-36629,
September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA
228.

^[5] Cf. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of
Appeals, L-37362, Nov. 29, 1973, 54 SCRA 217; Alfonso v. Court of
Appeals, L-37068, July 18, 1974, 58 SCRA 43; Marcelo Steel Corp. v. Court
of Appeals, L-35851, Oct. 8, 1974, 60 SCRA 167; Pimentel v. Court of
Appeals, L-39423, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA 475; Heirs of Ceferino
Morales v. Court of Appeals, L-37229, Oct. 21, 1975, 67 SCRA 304;
Republic v. Court of Appeals, L-40495, Oct. 21, 1975, 67 SCRA 322; Luna v.
Court of Appeals, L-37123, Oct. 30, 1975, 67 SCRA 503; Villanueva v. Court
of Appeals, L-29719, Nov. 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 216; Rodriguez v. Court of
Appeals, L-37522, Nov. 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 262; Pan American World Airways v. Espiritu, L-35401, Jan. 20, 1976, 69 SCRA 36; Aggabao v. Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank, L-39833, Feb. 20, 1976, 69 SCRA 354; Diola v.
Court of Appeals, L-36455, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 511; Canturna
v. Court of Appeals, L-40934, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 563; Andaya v. Court of Appeals, L-37124, May 5, 1976, 71
SCRA 20; San Pedro v. Court of Appeals, L-38351, Aug. 31, 1976, 72 SCRA
537.

^[6]
Motion to Withdraw Petition, April 26,
1977.