COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PETITIONER, VS. VISAYAN ELECTRIC COMPANY AND THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

In a judgment where the Tax Court absolved the taxpayer from the
payment of –

(a) P2,443.30 as deficiency income tax,
and

(b) P35,419.05 as 25% surcharge for late
payment of franchise tax, but directed the taxpayer to pay the government –

(c) additional residence tax amounting to
P3,850.00:

May the government enforce the judgment
as to the last sum of P3,850.00, where neither
government nor taxpayer questions payment thereof on ap­peal?  The Tax Court’s answer is in the
negative.  Hence, the government’s
petition for certiorari and mandamus to compel issuance of a writ of exe­cution
for the aforesaid sum of P3,850.00.

First, to the background facts.  Required by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue to pay deficiency income tax from 1953 to 1958 amounting to P2,443.30;
25% surcharge for late payment of franchise tax from 1957 to 1959, P35,419.05;
and additional residence tax from 1954 to 1959, P3,850.00, respondent Visayan Electric Company went to the Court of Tax
Appeals.  There, judgment was rendered,
as heretofore stated, rejecting the government’s claim to the sums of P2,443.30 and P35,419.05. 
The Tax Court, however, directed Visayan
Electric Company to pay additional residence tax for the period from 1954 to
1959 in the sum of P3,850.00.^[1]

The Commissioner appealed the judgment solely and exclusively
as it freed the taxpayer from the payment of the sums of P2,443.30
and P35,419.05 just adverted to.  That
case is pending before this Court.^[2]

Upon the other hand, the taxpayer did not appeal from the
decision which adjudged it liable to pay the said additional residence tax of
P3,850.00.

Pending such appeal, the Commissioner, on January 29, 1965, moved for the execution of the
judgment for P3,850.00.  By resolution of May 31, 1965, the Tax Court rejected the
motion.  And on August 13, 1965, on motion to reconsider, the Tax
Court stood its ground.

1.  Execution “is the
fruit and end of the suit, and is very aptly called the life of the law”.^[3]

A judgment becomes final and executory
by operation of law, not by judicial declaration.  Finality of judgment, in turn, becomes a fact
upon the lapse of the reglementary period for appeal,
if no appeal is perfected.^[4]
In such a situation, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a
writ of execution;^[5]
and issuance thereof is the court’s ministerial duty, compellable by mandamus.^[6]
The precepts just recited are as true in ordinary civil actions as they are in
tax cases.^[7]

2.  As we analyze the lower
court’s decision, we find that adjudica­tion was made on three (3) different
kinds of taxes: income tax, franchise tax, and residence tax.  The decision made separate findings of fact
and conclusions of law as to each one of them. 
The three sums involved are separable, one from the two others.  Indeed, one item has no bearing on any
other.  In plain words, the judgment for
the payment of P3,850.00 will remain as it is.  The taxpayer cannot escape liability therefor, whether the appeal taken results in affirmance or reversal. 
For, the correctness of the judgment for the said sum of P3,850.00 has passed out of the control of the courts.

We, accordingly, rule that where a portion of one single judgment
(1) is not the subject of appeal, (2) is separable and distinct from and will
not be affected by the appeal in other respects, (3) needs no further
proceedings and (4) has acquired finality, the same may be enforced by
execution, as a matter of right.^[8]

3.  But respondents argue
that because Section 4, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, provides that appeal
“shall stay” the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, the entire
judgment herein is stayed by the Commissioner’s ap­peal.  We do not think so.  Upon the facts, the decision which is stayed
refers to that part thereof which is the subject-matter of the appeal, and no
more.

4.  Equitable considerations
demand prompt execution of the judgment. 
For, the sum of P3,850.00, according to the
judgment, does not earn in­terest.  The
longer execution is delayed, the greater the prejudice
to the government.

Upon the view we take of this case, the petition for certiorari
and mandamus is granted; the resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals of May 31,
1965 and August 13, 1965 in CTA Case No. 1024, entitled “Visayan Electric Company, petitioner, versus Commissioner
of In­ternal Revenue, respondent'”, are revoked and set aside; the Court
of Tax Appeals is directed to grant the writ of execution prayed for by here­in
petitioner.

Costs against respondent Visayan
Electric Company.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Regala, Bengzon, Zaldivar, and Castro, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, J., took no part.

^[1]
CTA Case No. 1024, Court of Tax Appeals, entitled “Visayan
Elec­tric Company, petitioner, versus Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
respondent”.

^[2]
G.R. No. L-22611, entitled “Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, petitioner, versus Visayan
Electric Company and The Court of Tax Appeals, respondents.”

^[3]
Ipekdjian
Merchandising Co., Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-14791, May 30, 1963, citing Bank of
U.S. vs. Halstead U. S. Supreme Court
Reports, 6 Law ed., pp. 264-267, 268.

^[4]
Sawit vs.
Rodas, 73 Phil. 310, 315; Daquis
vs. Bustos, 94 Phil. 913, 917.

^[5]
Section 1, Rule 39, Rules of Court; De Fiesta vs. Llorente,
25 Phil. 554, 565; Lim vs. Singian, 37 Phil.
817, 823-824; Philippine Trust Co. vs. Santamaria,
53 Phil. 463, 467; Ebero vs. Cañizares, 79 Phil. 152, 155; Manansala
vs. Narvasa, 101 Phil. 1260-1261; De los Angeles vs. Victoriano,
G.R. No. L-13632, July 27, 1960.

^[6]
Hidalgo vs. Crossfield, 17 Phil. 466, 469-470;
Amor vs. Jugo, 77
Phil. 703, 706-707; Buenaventura vs. Garcia, 78 Phil. 759, 762.

^[7]
By Rule 16 of the Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals, promulgated pursuant to
Section 8 of the Charter of the Court of Tax Appeals, Republic Act 1125,
“[t]he provisions of the Rules of Court applicable to proceedings before
the Courts of First Instance shall, in­sofar as they may not be inconsistent
with the provisions of Repub­lic Act 1125
and of [said] rules, be applicable to cases pending” before the Court of
Tax Appeals. There are no specific provisions on executions of judgments of the
Court of Tax Appeals, either in Republic Act 1125 or in the Rules of the Court
of Tax Appeals.

At all events, this Court has pronounced that “[t]he rule of exe­cution of judgment under the rules [of court]
should govern all kinds of execution of judgment, unless it is otherwise
provided in other laws”. Sagucio vs. Bulos, G.R. No.
L-17608-09, July 31, 1962.

^[8]
Zulueta vs.
Paredes, 63 Phil. 1, 4-5; Arive
vs. Ybañez, 92 Phil. 1069, 1070; Facundo vs. Pabalan, G.R.
No. L-17746, and Ulep vs. Car­bonell, G.R. No. L–17807, jointly
decided on January 31, 1962.