TONICA BUTALAN, PETITIONER, VS. HON. EFREN M. CACATIAN, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF SANTIAGO CITY (ISABELA), BRANCH 35 AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESP…
TIJAM, J.:
The salient facts of the case are as follows:
In its April 2, 2012 Decision,[4] the RTC convicted Petitioner Tonica Butalan of the crime of estafa, penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).[5]
On June 20, 2012, Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the Decision on the ground that the RTC erred in convicting her because all the elements of estafa defined under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, were not proven.
On June 22, 2012, Petitioner filed a Petition for Bail,[6] arguing that since she does not suffer from any of the grounds for the denial or cancellation of discretionary bail as enumerated in Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,[7] she should be allowed to post bail in a reasonable amount as may be fixed by the court.
The motion and the petition, however, were both denied in the RTC’s August 2, 2012 Resolution, which reads:
“The motion for reconsideration of the accused raised no new arguments to warrant modification or reversal of the decision of the court. In fact, the same arguments were already passed upon and resolved by the Court, hence, no cogent reason to disturb the decision of this Court.
And, pursuant to the recent case of Leviste v. Court of Appeals, after conviction, the accused’s right to be presumed innocent ends; necessarily, his right to bail follows too.
SO ORDERED.”[8]
Meanwhile, on August 23, 2012, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal[9] with the RTC which is still pending approval.
On even date, Petitioner likewise moved for the reconsideration of the RTC’s August 2, 2012 Resolution. The motion, however, was denied in the RTC’s August 31, 2012 Order.
Hence, this instant Petition relying on the sole ground that:
“THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR BAIL BASED ON THE MISPLACED RATIOCINATION OR JUSTIFICATION THAT ‘AFTER CONVICTION, THE ACCUSED’S RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT ENDS; NECESSARILY, HIS RIGHT TO BAIL FOLLOWS TOO’ CITING THE CASE OF LEVISTE VS. COURT OF APPEALS WITHOUT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE CLEAR DIFFERENCE IN FACTUAL MILIEU BETWEEN THE INSTANT CASE AND THE SAID CASE OF LEVISTE.”
The Petition lacks merit .
In the instant Petition, Petitioner posits that her acquittal of the crime of estafa is likely to happen since it was clearly alleged in the Information, that she “is not authorized to collect nor receive money,” and “for which reason Topmost x x x refunded the amount of P916,000.00 to the various applicants.” Petitioner likewise insists that she has none of the disqualifications listed in Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, harping on the Prosecution’s failure to oppose her Petition for Bail, by presenting evidence to establish bail-negating circumstances against her, as provided in the said Rules.
Petitioner’s arguments fail to persuade Us.
Bail pending appeal is governed by Section 5 of Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.[10]
Under the present rule, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. The Supreme Court in the case of Qui vs. People it held:
“Indeed, pursuant to the “tough on bail pending appeal” policy, the presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited.
In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court.”[11]
Here, Petitioner was already found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and meted the penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correcional as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Since the right to bail emanates from the right to be presumed innocent,[12] Petitioner’s right to bail no longer had a basis when she was convicted of the crime of estafa.
More importantly, as reasoned out by the Supreme Court in Leviste vs. Court of Appeals,[13] the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal does not mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.[14] The Court went on to explain that the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years.[15] The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph which are not present; the second scenario, however, contemplates the existence of at least one of the said circumstances.[16] Citing the opinions of two Justices who are both authorities in Remedial Law, Justice Florenz D. Regalado and Oscar M. Herrera, the Supreme Court in Leviste, elucidated that:
“In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating[17] circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the appellate court’s denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellant’s case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice;18 on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.
On the other hand, if the appellant’s case falls within the second scenario, the appellate court’s stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach.”[19]
Instead of appreciating the fine yet substantial distinction between the two different situations that are governed by the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, Petitioner trivializes the established policy governing the grant of bail pending appeal, by simply arguing that the absence of bail-negating circumstances would automatically result in granting the Petition for Bail.
Again, this kind of theory was struck down by the High Court in Leviste; thus:
“Petitioner’s theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding body whose authority is limited to determining whether any of the five circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This unduly constricts its “discretion” into merely filling out the checklist of circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. In short, petitioner’s interpretation severely curbs the discretion of the appellate court by requiring it to determine a singular factual issue — whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances is present. x x x
to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the five situations mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is wrong. By restricting the bail-negating circumstances to those expressly mentioned, petitioner applies the expressio unius est exclusio alterius20 rule in statutory construction. However, the very language of the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 contradicts the idea that the enumeration of the five situations therein was meant to be exclusive. The provision categorically refers to “the following or other similar circumstances.” Hence, under the rules, similarly relevant situations other than those listed in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 may be considered in the allowance, denial or revocation of bail pending appeal.”[21]
Indeed, the present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown on bail pending appeal parallels the approach adopted in the United States where our original constitutional and procedural provisions on bail emanated.[22] While this is of course not to be followed blindly, it nonetheless shows that our treatment of bail pending appeal is no different from that in other democratic societies.
In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of bail pending appeal is anchored on the principle that judicial discretion — particularly with respect to extending bail — should be exercised or allowed not with leniency or laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons.[23]
Guided by these rules and principles, there is dearth of evidence to show that Petitioner, had any strong reason why she should be granted bail pending appeal. In all, the Court finds the RTC to have exercised its discretion soundly when it denied petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal.
We end this ponencia with the illuminating elucidation in Leviste:
“After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds strong support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial court’s initial determination that the accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal because long delays often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court processes.”
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The August 2, 2012 Resolution, and August 31, 2012 Order, both issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 35 of Santiago City, Isabela, in Criminal Case No. 35-5973, are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
*Cruz, R. A., and Garcia-Fernandez, M.V., JJ., concur.
*vice J. Lopez, who is on leave, per Office Order No. 83-15-ABR, dated March 17, 2015.
[1] Rollo, p. 3.
[2] Rollo, p. 16.
[3] Rollo, p. 17.
[4] Rollo, p. 18.
[5] “1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely: (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property; xxx”
[6] Rollo, p. 36.
[7] “x x x (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; (c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal. x x x”
[8] Rollo, p. 16.
[9] Rollo, p. 34.
[10] “Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances: (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; (c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.”
[11] Qui vs. People, G.R. No. 196161, September 26, 2012. [Emphasis Supplied.]
[12] People vs. Fitzgerald, G.R. No. 149723 , October 27, 2006.
[13] G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] These circumstances are herein referred to as “bail-negating” because the presence of any of them will negate the allowance of bail.
[18] Discretion implies that, in the absence of a positive law or fixed rule, the judge is to decide by his view of expediency or by the demands of equity and justice. (Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. v. Presiding Judge of RTC-Negros Occidental, Branch 52, Bacolod City , G.R. No. 179878, 24 December 2008, 575 SCRA 575 and Luna v. Arcenas, 34 Phil. 80 [1916 ] both citing Goodwin v. Prime [92 Me., 355]).
[19] Supra at Note 13. [Emphasis Supplied.]
[20] Regalado, Florenz, II Remedial Law Compendium 273 (Fifth Revised Edition [1988 ]).
[21] Supra at Note 13. [Emphasis Supplied.]
[22] In particular, in the United States, the history of bail pending appeal has been divided by one scholar on the matter into four distinct periods: (1st period) 1879 to 1934, (2nd period) 1934 to 1956, (third period) 1956 to 1984 and (post-1984 period) 1984 to present. The first period, during which the rules on the matter were just being developed, showed liberality in the grant of bail pending appeal. The second period produced a more restrictive rule, one which limited bail to defendants who could prove that their appeal would raise “a substantial question which should be determined by the appellate court.” The third period saw the enactment of the Bail Reform Act of 1966 establishing a standard wherein bail may be allowed pending appeal unless it appears that the appeal is frivolous or taken for delay. Under that standard, the court could deny bail if the defendant was a flight risk or a danger to the community. Hence, bail pending appeal was again favored. The post-1984 period is determined by the enactment and implementation of the Bail Reform Act of 1984. The law was purposely designed to make restrictive the allowance of bail pending appeal. As the Act’s legislative history explains, prior law had “a presumption in favor of bail even after conviction” and Congress wanted to “eliminate” that presumption. (Keller, supra note 5.)
[23] Supra at Note 13.