MARIANO S. GONZAGA, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. AUGUSTO CE DAVID, AS REGISTRAR OF THE MOTOR VEHICLES OFFICE OF CAGAYAN, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT.

The essential antecedents of this case are not disputed. On February, 1957,
Mariano Gonzaga, as owner, registered with the Motor Vehicles Office a cargo
truck and a passenger bus, paying the first installment for registration fees
due on said vehicles for 1957. To cover the second installment for registration
fees, Gonzaga remitted to the Provincial Treasurer of Cagayan, by registered
mail, P500.00, under postal money orders Nos. 18553, 18554 and 18555, purchased
from and issued by the Post Office of Camalaniugan, Cagayan. The postal
cancellation mark on the envelope containing the remittance of Gonzaga bears the
date August 31, 1957; so does the postal cancellation mark on the face of the
money orders.

The Registrar of the Motor Vehicles Office of Cagayan ruled that pursuant to
Section 8(1), Act 3992, otherwise known as the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, the
second installment for registration fees was payable on or before the last
working day of August; that the last working day of August, 1957 was Friday,
August 30, 1957; that consequently, the, remittance of Gonzaga bearing postal
cancellation mark dated August 31, 1957 was made beyond the time fixed by law.
Accordingly, said official sought to impose a 50% delinquency penalty, or
otherwise, threatened to confiscate the certificate of registration for the two
trucks (Annexes “B” & “C”).

Gonzaga brought this action in the Court of First Instance, which, upon a
stipulation of facts, rendered judgment, the dispositive part reading—

“Por tanto, el Juzgado dicta decision declarando, como por la presente
declara, que el pago hecho con los giros postales Nos. 18553, 18554 y 18555, por
el recurrente, se ha hecho dentro del plazo fijado por ley; y, por tanto, el
reccurente no ha incurrido con morosidad en cuanto a dicho pago.

Se ordena al recurrido, sus agentes y representantes, que se abstengan de
confiscar el certificado de registro de los dos trucks del recurrente, por la
alegada morosidad del citado pago.

Sin costas.

ASI SE ORDENA.”

The only issue in this appeal, is wKether the remittance of petit
umar-appelleecovering the second installment of registration fees for 1957, made
by.registered mail with postal cancellation dated August 31, 1957, was within
the time fixed by law. .

The following are the pertinent provisions of Act 3992, as amended— –

Sec. 8(I) “* * * The registration’ fees provided in this Act for trucks may
be payable in two equal installments, the first to be paid on or before the’last
working day of February, and the second to be paid on or before the
last working day of August.” (Italics supplied)

Sec. 6(b) “The date of ca/ncellation of the postage stamps of
envelopes containing money orders, checks, or cash shall be considered as the
date of application. * * *.”

In support of its contention that August 30, and not August 31, was the last
wording day of August, 1957, respondent-appellant invokes Republic Act No. 1880,
otherwise known as the “40-Hour Week Law”, pursuant to which government offices
are to hold office from Monday to Friday only, unless one of those expressly
exempted therefrom.

As correctly held by the court below, the fact that, pursuant to Republic Aet
1880, the Motor Vehicles Office in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, had no office on
Saturday, August 31, 1957, is immaterial1 in the case. The last working day
contemplated in Sec. 8(1) of Act 3992 as amended should not necessarily mean the
last working day for the Motor Vehicle office. Under Sec. 6(b) of said Act,
providing for payment of registration fees by mail, the date of cancellation of
the postage stamps of the envelope containing the remittance is considered the
date of application. Consequently, Where the manner of payment falls under said
Section 6 (b), the law, in recognizing the date of cancellation as the
date of application, impliedly permits of a remittance or payment within that
last day of August that the Post Office may still effect cancellation; and the
remittance, in fact, bears a postal cancellation, dated August 31, 1957.
Moreover, it is not pretended by respondent appellant that the Post Office
ceased, or has ceased, to transact business and discharge its functions on
Saturdays by reason alone of Republic Act No. 1880. Clearly, therefore, the
remittance by petitioner-appellee was within the time fixed by law, as provided
in “Section 8(1), in connection with Section 6(b) of Act 3992, as amended.

The fact that August 31, 1957 was declared a special public holiday by
Proclamation No. 437 (dated August 21, 1957) of the President of the Philippines
did not have the effect of making the preceding day, August 30, the last day for
paying registration fees without penalty. On the contrary, Section 31 of the
Revised Administrative Code provides—

“Sec. 31. Pretermission of holiday.—Where the day, or the last day,
for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may
be done on the next succeeding business day.”

In Calano vs. Cruz, 91 Phil., 247, we ruled as follows:

“The complaint filed by the petitioner herein was presented in the court
a quo on November 23, 1951, exactlly on the eighth day after the
proclamation of the respondent as duly elected councilor for the municipality of
Orion, Bataan. It happens, however, that November. 22, 1951, the last day of the
seven-day period prescribed by Section 173 of the Revised Election Code, was
declared a “Special Public Holiday For National Thanksgiving” by Proclamation
No. 290, serje’s of 1951, of the President of the Philippines. The trial court
Held that the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 28 of the Rules of Court could not
be applied to the case at bar because it is an election case (Rule 132, Rules of
Court), and declared that the complaint was filed outside of the period provided
for by law. Assuming that Section 1 of Rule 28 of the Rules of Court is not
applicable, the law applicable is Section 81 of the Revised Administrative Code,
which provides that “Where the day, or the last day, for doing any act required
or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done on the next
succeeding business day.” The court a quo, therefore, committed an
error in declaring that the complaint was filed out of time.” .

The ruling is on all fours on the issue before us, and against
respondent-appellant.

The decision appealed from is affirmed. Without costs.

Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera,
Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed.