JULIETA R. LAGONERA MARRIED TO HONESTO G. LAGONERA, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, VS. DANILO CONSTRUCTION AND TRADING REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGER, DANILO S. ESTRELLA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
DACUDAO, J.:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant Danilo Estrella to pay plaintiffs:
“1. the sum of P550,000.00 corresponding to the amount needed to complete the construction of the 2-storey house subject of this action;
“2. the sum of P750.00 (1/10 of 1% of P750,000.00) per calendar day from the filing of this complaint on June 1, 2003 until fully paid;
“3. the sum of P100,000.00 for moral damages;
“4. the sum of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages & corrective damages;
“5. the sum of P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
“6. to pay the costs.
“SO ORDERED.
“Manila, July 11, 2005.
“ANTONIO I. DE CASTRO
“Presiding Judge”
On June 10, 2003, a complaint for specific performance and damages, the material portions of which we find it necessary to quote hereunder verbatim, was filed by “Julieta R. Lagonera married to Honesto G. Lagonera” against the “Danilo Construction and Trading, represented by its manager, Danilo S. Estrella,” to wit:[2]
“COMPLAINT
“COMES NOW, the plaintiff, thru counsel, unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully avers the following, to wit:
“1. That plaintiff spouses are Filipino, of legal age, married and residents of 1829 Almeda St., Tondo, Manila while defendant Danilo Construction and Trading, a sole proprietorship registered with the Department of Trade and Industry, represented by its manager, Danilo S. Estrella, Filipino, of legal age, married, and whose last known address is located at 1059 E. Santos Compound, Tramo Road, Manuyo Uno, Las Pinas, Metro Manila where service of summons, notices, orders, and other Court processes may be served;
“2. That sometime on September 2001, plaintiff had a talk with the wife of the first cousin of her husband, named Dalisay E. Sintaco, and discussed offhand her plan to build a 2-storey house with an area of 120 square meters in her lot located at Lot 11, Block 61 (LRC) PSD-15-0699, Muntinlupa City to be sourced from her retirement pay she received a month ago or sometime on August 2001;
“3. That Dalisay E. Sintaco undertook to inquire from her brother, Danilo Estrella, a contractor how much would be the construction cost of the aforedescribed intended 2 storey-house project. The former thereafter relayed to her that the necessary amount for construction cost was P860,000.00 and thus, relegated the intended project aside as she does not have enough funds to sustain a very exorbitant project;
“4. That siblings Dalisay E. Sintaco thru a phone call offered the services of her brother, Danilo S. Estrella for a much lower rate than the previous quotation with an added incentive of constructing a store adjacent to the intended two storey building of the plaintiffs for free or without any extra cost. The former even told plaintiff-wife that the price given is a gift, they being relatives. Thus, plaintiff, prevailed upon by the siblings, entered into a construction agreement with defendant for the construction of a two storey house in the sum of P750,000.00 inclusive of labor materials with the expressed assurance that the construction will be completed within a period of 75 days or during Christmastime of 2001 as embodied in the Construction Agreement xxx;
“5. That plaintiff-wife and defendant agreed that the contract price shall be paid as follows:
“a. The owner shall pay fifty percent (50%) THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P375,000.00) down payment computed from the Total Contracted Amount to the Contractor upon signing of this contract.
“b. The Contractor shall agree to complete fifty percent (50%) project accomplishment and should bill another twenty five percent (25%) ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P187,500.00) computed from the total contracted amount.
“c. The Contractor agrees to complete seventy five percent (75%) project accomplishment and should bill another twenty percent (20%) one hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000.00) computed from the total contracted amount.
“d. The Contractor shall agree to complete one hundred percent (100%) project completion and the five percent (5%) thirty seven thousand five hundred pesos (P37,500.00) remaining balance shall be paid by the owner.
“6. That plaintiff-wife withdrawn (sic) the sum of P375,000.00 from Landbank, U.N. Ave., and handed the same to siblings Danilo S. Estrella and Dalisay E. Sintaco on October 4, 2001 as evidenced by a receipt issued on even date by defendant, xxx.
“7. That on the 1st week of November 2001, respondent visited plaintiff spouses home and directed plaintiff-wife to buy tiles they intend to place at the ground floor of the two storey building project as the construction of the same will be completed before Christmastime. Thus, as directed, she bought the required tiles on November 27, 2001 xxx.
“8. That on November 19, 2001, Dalisay E. Sintaco, thru a phone call, relayed to plaintiff-wife that almost 50% of the house has been completed and that defendant needed the sum of P100,000.00. Thus, on November 20, 2001, plaintiff-wife handed the sum of P100,000.00 to respondent xxx;
“9. That on the 3rd week of November 2001, plaintiffs’ son named Honesto Pio R. Lagonera, Jr. went to the construction site to inspect and found out that the roofs respondent intended to place were short in size and thus, he asked for a longer span roof. Respondent verbally acceded to the request.
“10. That plaintiff on November 30, 2001 handed the sum of P87,500.00 to defendants xxx. Thus, as of said date, plaintiff-wife has given defendant the aggregate sum of P562,500.00 representing 75% of the total cost as defendant misrepresented that the construction of the building is almost through;
“11. That due the misrepresentations of defendants that the house has been 75% completed, plaintiff-wife, believing such misrepresentations handed the sum of P150,000.00 on December 22, 2001 (sic) xxx;
“12. That upon receipt of the sum of P150,000.00, defendant reiterated to plaintiff-wife his assurance that the latter together with her family will be spending Christmas in their new home. The latter responded by telling the former that she is not inclined to transfer during Christmastime for being new in the place, her family will surely not enjoy the celebration without their old neighbors;
“13. That when plaintiff visited the site on January 5, 2002, she found out, much to her dismay, that the projected 75% completion of the two-storey house was entirely untrue. Anyone who will see the construction site would readily say that even 50% of the construction has not been completed as there was no roof yet;“14. That as plaintiff-wife was given the round-around by defendant, she sought the assistance of the Iglesia ni Cristo. When confronted, defendant acknowledged his delay and executed an addendum to the aforementioned Construction Agreement wherein he expressly sought for an extension of 60 days from the signing of the addendum on February 3, 2002 or until March 31, 2002 within which to complete the construction xxx;
“15. With the signing of the addendum, plaintiff-wife anxieties vanished for a while until she received news sometime on the last week of February 2002 that defendant Danilo Estrella abandoned the construction of the two-storey house. Hence, she again looked for defendant, who having heard of her exhaustive search of his whereabouts wrote a letter dated March 19, 2002 requesting for an extension of time 30 days or until April 30, 2002 to finish the construction xxx;
“16. As the construction was not completed on April 30, 2002, plaintiff sent a demand letter dated June 19, 2002 to defendant directing him to finish the construction of the house within a month but the same proved futile xxx;
“17. That when nothing came out the aforementioned demand letter, she personally talked with defendant for the recovery of the sum of P712, 500.00 representing the amounts received by him for the construction of plaintiff’s two storey house and P30,000.00 representing the amounts received by him for the construction of the fence.
“18. That defendant failed to return the aforestated sums of money despite his undertaking as embodied in his letter, xxx, to pay his liability the moment he has received payments from his receivables and other contracts;
“19. That plaintiff was constrained to seek an assessment from a reputable engineering firm as to the actual percentage of completion of the two storey house project and presented to said firm several pictures xxx’
“20. That plaintiff was so devastated when she learned from the aforesaid reputable engineering firm that only 40% has been completed by defendant despite having paid almost 100% of the total construction cost and that plaintiff will still be spending around P550,000.00 in order to finish the project. Xxx;
“21. That this non-completion of the construction of the two storey house has subjected plaintiff to mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock and thus must be awarded moral damages in the sum of P300,000.00
“22. That as a deterrent to people similarly minded as the defendant and to set an example for the public good, plaintiff must be awarded the sum of exemplary and corrective damages in the sum of P200,000.00; and
“23. That for acting in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy plaintiff’s plaintively valid, just and demandable claim, defendant should pay the sum of P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.“WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that a judgment be issued by the Honorable Court in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering defendant:
“1. To pay the sum of P550,000.00 representing the sum of money needed to finish the project per assessment of a reputable engineering firm;
“2. To pay the amount equivalent to one tenth (1/10) of one percent (1%) of Contract Price for every calendar day of delay;
“3. To pay the sum of P200,000.00 as damages for breach of the obligation to finish the construction of a two-storey building;
“4. To pay the sum of P300,000.00 as moral damages;
“5. To pay the sum of P200,000.00 as exemplary damages;
“6. To pay the sum of P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
“7. To pay cost. (Underscorings supplied.)
“Manila, Philippines, June 3, 2003.”
Attached to the complaint was the required verification and certification signed by the spouses Honesto G. Lagonera and Julieta R. Lagonera, who used or employed therein the term “we” (pronoun, first person, plural) in referring to themselves.[3]
Summons was issued on July 31, 2003, and the same was served on the defendant Danilo Estrella through substituted service on August 6, 2003. Per return of the process server, “efforts to serve the said summons upon defendant was made xxx but the same were ineffectual and unavailing for the reason that defendant is always out of their residence,” thus service of summons was effected upon defendant’s wife, Celia Estrella.[4]
On August 21, 2003, Rolando Sintaco, a “Representative of the Defendant” filed a motion for extension of time to file answer, thereunder praying for an extension of fifteen (15) days to file answer, for the reason that the lawyer whom the defendant hired “has not yet finished his answer.”[5] The motion was denied because it did not contain a notice of hearing.[6]
On September 4, 2003, Atty. Elmer A. Galicia entered his appearance as counsel for the defendant, and asked for an additional 15-day extension of time to file a responsive pleading, (or until September 20, 2003), thereunder claiming that his services were retained only on September 3, 2003.[7] The motion was by the court a quo granted “in the interest of justice.”[8]
On September 15, 2003, the court a quo received defendant’s motion to dismiss dated September 11, 2003. According to the defendant, the complaint was demurrable because:
“a. The complaint was filed by a wife, in contravention of Section 4, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Said provision provide as follows:
‘Sec.4. Spouses as parties.— Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law.’
“The fact that the Verification and Certification appeared to be signed by both the husband and the wife, the allegations in the pleading controls, and it appeared that it is only the wife who is filing this complaint;
“The body of the complaint likewise did not comply with the requirement of Section 4, Rule 8, on allegation of Plaintiff’s capacity to sue, which should have been done in conjunction and in compliance with aforementioned Section 4, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure;
“b. The Caption on the nature of the complaint did not jive with the prayer sought in the latter portion of the pleading, hence, the ambiguity;”
The plaintiff spouses opposed the motion to dismiss, pointing out that their names (i.e., names of the plaintiff spouses) were stated in the “above captioned case” to show compliance with Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. The plaintiff spouses moreover invoked liberality in the application of the rules; the plaintiff spouses hastened to add that, in any event, there was no ambiguity in regard to the nature of the complaint, and the cause of action pleaded therein, as the body of the pleading sets forth its designation, as well as the allegations of the party’s claims or defenses, the relief prayed for, and the date.[9]
The defendant tendered a reply, thereunder contending that the caption of the case merely described the plaintiff Julieta Lagonera “as being married”; and “considering the limited civil capacity of a married woman, this case is palpably erroneous, and must be dismissed.”[10]
Via an order dated February 27, 2004, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss on the following premise: “A scrutiny of the records represents a reasonably sufficient basis to deny the motion to dismiss. The names of plaintiff-spouses were stated in the caption of the complaint in accordance with Rule 3 Sec. 4 and Rule 8 Sec. 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion is merely dilatory because the complaint appears to be unambiguous.” The court a quo accordingly gave the defendant ten (10) days to file his answer.[11]
On March 15, 2004, the defendant filed a motion for reconsideration thereon, thereunder arguing that the motion was not a dilatory tactic, but was “based on substantial requirements provided under Article 96 and Article 124 of the Family Code which provide that the husband and the wife shall sue or be sued jointly, inasmuch as both are co-administrators of the community property under the system of absolute community of property as well as the conjugal partnership property, and in relation to Article 113 of the Civil Code.”[12]
On May 5, 2004, the plaintiff spouses filed an opposition thereto, thereunder positing that the husband was duly impleaded, as shown by the fact that his name was stated in the caption of the complaint, even as the husband also affixed his signature to the verification and certification on non-forum shopping. Citing an opinion of Justice F.D. Regalado, plaintiff spouses maintained that Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was merely a reproduction of Article 113 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, and was “an illustration of joinder of ‘pro-forma’ parties.” The plaintiff spouses also pointed out that the law generally requires the joinder of the husband, “not because he is thereby bound with his wife, but because he is the administrator of the conjugal partnership, which might be held liable in the action”; and thus, the requirement as to the needed consent in this case has been substantially complied with when the plaintiff-husband affixed his signature to the verification and certification on non-forum shopping.[13]
Via an Order dated May 17, 2004, the court a quo denied the defendant’s motion for reconsideration.
On October 22, 2004, the plaintiff spouses filed a motion to declare the defendant in default, the said plaintiff spouses having noted that to date, the defendant had failed to file his answer.
The records showed that the defendant’s counsel received the aforestated motion on October 24, 2004.[14]
On January 18, 2005, the defendant filed an opposition thereto, along with a motion to admit answer.
But in its Order of January 20, 2005, the Court a quo declared the defendant in default.
Thereafter, the plaintiff spouses presented their evidence ex parte.
On July 11, 2005, the court gave judgment for the plaintiff spouses, ratiocinating thus:[15]
“With the foregoing facts, the Court finds that plaintiffs’ evidence fully substantiate their claim against defendant herein. ‘Time and again, the Supreme Court stressed that rule that contract is the law between the parties, and courts have no choice but to enforce such contract so long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs or public policy’ (San Andres v. Rodriguez 332 SCRA 769). In the case at bar, the obligation of both parties were clearly defined. Plaintiff has the obligation to pay in full the contract price, whereas defendant is obligated to construct the 2 storey house according to the plans and specifications stipulated therein. ‘If a person obliged to do something fails to do it, the same shall be executed at his cost.’ (Art. 1167 Civil Code) hence, defendant, who acted in evident bad faith by falsely representing that the house is almost complete, to induce plaintiffs to remit the agreed contract price shall be liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages provided for under Arts. 2197 and 2201 of the Civil Code.”
Thereafter, it decretally disposed of the case in the manner elsewhere stated.
Through a new counsel, the defendant filed a notice of appeal therefrom,[16] which appeal was by the court a quo given due course in an Order dated August 17, 2005.[17]
On October 4, 2005, a notice to file appellant’s brief was served upon the defendant and his counsel.[18]
Appellant prayed for an extension to file brief per motion dated December 23, 2005,[19] pleading for a 20-day extension, up from the 45 days he was earlier given. Appellant prayed for yet another 15-day extension in a motion dated January 12, 2006. He was granted this last extension, giving him until January 27, 2006 to file his brief.[20]
On January 27, 2006, appellant pleaded yet for still another extension of five (5) days, and on February 2, 2006, filed his brief by registered mail.
In his appeal brief, the defendant-appellant now insists that the court a quo “erred in not dismissing the instant case outright for non-compliance with Sections 4 and 8 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.” We quote his entire discussion of said lone assigned error:[21]
“Section 4 of Rule 3 states:
‘Sec. 4. Spouses as parties— Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law.’
“Section 8 of Rule 3 states:
‘Sec.8. Necessary party.— A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.’
“From the pleadings filed by the parties, it is clear that the plaintiff in the court below failed to comply with the above-quoted provisions of law. Therefore the complaint should have been dismissed outright.”
This appeal is devoid of merit. We agree with the court a quo’s observation in dismissing appellant’s motion to dismiss, based on the very same error brought before us, viz., that the defendant-appellant is resorting to dilatory tactics to prevent or forestall the inevitable.
Section 4 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, heretofore quoted, must be read vis-a-vis Section 11 thereof, to wit:
“Section 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties.— Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately.”
Particularly in regard to the non-joinder of the husband, the case law teaching in Uy, Jr. v. Court of Appeals[22] is quite instructive:
“(T)he non-joinder of the husband of private respondent, Yu Hon as well as her failure to verify the complaint does not warrant dismissal of the complaint for they are mere formal requirements which could be immediately cured without prejudice to the rights of the petitioners. This Court frowns on the resort to technicalities to defeat substantial justice. Thus, the Court states that the rules of procedure are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice, and therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. (Angel v. Inopiquez, G.R. 66712, January 13, 1989). Again on another occasion where an appeal should have been dismissed for non-compliance with the Rules, the Court relaxed the rigid interpretation of the Rules holding that a straight-jacket application will do more injustice. (Pan-Am Airways v. Espiritu, 69 SCRA 45 [1976]). “
While there might have been some grammatical or typographical errors in referring to the plaintiffs in the caption or title of the basic complaint in this case, there is hardly any doubt or question that the husband Honesto G. Lagonera indeed joined cause with his wife in filing the complaint. This can be gleaned from references to the couple as “party plaintiffs,” in plural form, in the body of the complaint. What is more, the husband Honesto G. Lagonera signed the verification/certification on non-forum shopping together with his wife Julieta R. Lagonera. It goes without saying, or course, that it is the party plaintiffs themselves who sign the verification of pleadings and certifications against forum shopping. In other words, the arguments put forward by the defendant-appellant in support of his appeal are neither here nor there.
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the defendant-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Carandang and Arevalo-Zenarosa, JJ., concur.
[1] Branch 3, presided by Judge Antonio I. De Castro,
[2] Complaint dated June 3, 2003, Records, pp.1-6.
[3] Records, p.7.
[4] Server’s Return dated August 6, 2003, Records, p.31.
[5] Motion dated September 5, 2003, Records, p.33.
[6] Order dated August 26, 2003, Records, p. 34.
[7] Entry of Appearance dated September 3, 2003, Records, p.36.
[8] Order dated September 9, 2003, Records, p.38.
[9] Records, pp.45-46.
[10] Records, pp.47-48.
[11] Records, p.51.
[12] Records, p.52.
[13] Records, pp.58-59.
[14] Certification dated January 5, 2005, Records, p.66.
[15] Decision dated July 11, 2005, p.2; Records, p.10.
[16] Atty. Lucas V. Sugui, Records, p.106.
[17] Records, p.109.
[18] Rollo, p.7.
[19] Rollo, pp.8-9.
[20] Rollo, p.14.
[21] Appellant’s Brief, p.3, Rollo, p.22.
[22] G.R. No. 83897, November 9, 1990, 191 SCRA 275, 283-284, per J. E. L. Paras.