G.R. No. L-23514. February 17, 1970

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. AVELINO MANANSALA, JR., ET AL., DEFENDANTS, AVELINO MANANSALA, JR. AND JOSE MANANSALA, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions February 17, 1970 MAKALINTAL, J.:
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MAKALINTAL, J.:


This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Albay in its Criminal Case No. 3285
convicting Avelino Manansala,
Jr. and Jose Manansala of murder and sentencing the
first to an indeterminate penalty of from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 17 years 4 months and
1 day of reclusion temporal, and the second to reclusion perpetua;
both of them to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Rodrigo Aringo in the sum of P6,000.00; and each to pay 1/3 of the
costs.

The prosecution, relying mainly on the testimony of two eyewitnesses – Celestino
Atun and Percival Amador – and of the policemen who
went to the scene of the crime upon noticing the commotion it produced, sought
to establish the following: Between 1:00 and 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of March 27, 1962,
some persons had a quarrel inside the New Bicol Carinderia, an eatery located near the Legaspi Port Market, Legaspi
City.  After a short while the
protagonists came out through the backdoor of the carinderia.  Jose Manansala had
Rodrigo in a tight embrace from
behind, with his arms under the latter’s armpits.  While Rodrigo was in that position of apparent helplessness, Avelino stabbed him with a balisong,
or Batangas knife. 
The stabbing continued while Rodrigo was led, or dragged, by Jose to a
bamboo bed (papag) nearby, and even after Rodrigo had
been forced down on it in a prone position. 
When the policemen who responded to the commotion arrived, they found Avelino still holding the fatal weapon, and Rodrigo’s limp
body, bathed in his own blood, stretched on the papag.  A taxicab was commandeered to take the
wounded man to a hospital, but he expired
even before
the vehicle could start. 
The autopsy later conducted by Dr. Antolin Lotivio, a resident physician of the Albay
Provincial Hospital, revealed
that the victim died from massive hemorrhage and shock as a result of the
multiple wounds (thirteen in all) sustained by him in the chest, abdomen, back
and the extremities.

The accused did not take the witness stand.  However, they presented two witnesses,
Domingo Daria and Salvador Petilos,
who said that they saw the whole incident. 
The substance of their testimony is as follows: Early in the afternoon
of March 27, 1962 Avelino, a small-time peddler of
textiles in the Legaspi Port Market, was eat­ing his
lunch inside one of the eateries dotting the market site, when Rodrigo Aringo alias Diego, a baggage boy in the same
market, approached him and demanded his fee for having carried Avelino’s baggage.  Avelino said he was willing to pay for the
services rendered at noon, but not
for those rendered earlier in the morning. 
He then took some money from his pocket and proffered it to
Rodrigo.  Obviously peeved at having been
thus publicly rebuffed, Rodrigo
brusquely
brushed Avelino’s hand aside and
instantly gave him a fist blow in the face. 
Avelino fell from his seat; he tried to get
up, but was given another blow, and then a third. 
As he reeled from the force of the last blow a batangas
knife he was carrying fell from his trousers pocket.  Avelino picked up
the knife, and Rodrigo, seeing that he was
armed, rushed to the
carinderia’s kitchen and returned almost immediately with
a 10-inch knife in his hand.  With it he
swung at his antagonist, but the latter evaded the blow.

Meanwhile, appellant Jose Manansala, an
uncle of Avelino,
noticed the commotion from outside the carinderia,
where he was loading baggage on a parked truck
some six meters
away.  He shouted at Rodrigo to
stop.  Rodrigo paid no heed and instead
delivered another thrust at Avelino, who again evaded
it.  At the third attempt, Jose embraced
Rodrigo from behind, and it was at that moment that Avelino
stabbed Rodrigo and inflicted the numerous wounds which proved fatal.  Jose took the kitchen knife from Rodrigo and
threw it away, and then released his limp body on the papag
nearby.  When the policemen arrived Avelino was still clutching the knife he had
used.  Both appellants were apprehended.

In its decision rendered on August 14, 1964 the
trial court sustained the prosecution’s version of the incident and found
both
accused guilty of murder.  However, the
court credited Avelino with the mitigating
circumstance of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the victim, and
imposed upon him a lesser penalty than that imposed on his uncle.

Appellants’ plea is self-defense. 
This is pre­dicated on
the theory that the deceased was himself armed with a knife with which he tried
to stab Avelino, as declared by the two witnesses for
the defense.  Several circumstances,
however, belie this claim.  First, Avelino
sustained no knife
wound at all. 
Second, although several
policemen
arrived at the scene of the incident almost immediately after
it happened, not one of them saw the knife allegedly used by Rodrigo.  Nor was it shown to them, or at least
brought to their attention, by either of the appellants.  Indeed, when Avelino surrendered to the policemen he declined to give
any statement, which in the natural
course
of things he would have done if he had acted merely to defend
himself.  A protestation of innocence or justification is the
logical and spontaneous reaction of a
man
who finds himself in such an inculpatory
predicament as that in which the policemen came upon the appellants, with Avelino still clutching the death weapon and his victim dying before him.

But while it is clear
that Avelino did not act in legitimate self-defense,
the trial court correctly held that there was sufficient provocation on the
part of the victim.  The evidence given by the witnesses for the defense
as to how and why the fight started, and as
to the fact that the deceased hit Avelino with
his fist, is not controverted by
the witnesses for the prosecution, who did not see the incident from the very
beginning.  And one fist blow at least is
confirmed by the doctor who treated Avelino for a
contusion around one eye.

On the other hand, the fact that when Avelino
stabbed the victim the latter was practically helpless and unable to put up any
defense, being in the tight embrace of Jose Manansala,
was correctly appreciated by the trial court as treachery, and qualifies the
offense as murder.

Jose Manansala
was found guilty as co-principal
on the ground that there was concert of
action between him and his nephew.  The
evidence does not justify this finding beyond reasonable doubt.  There is no showing that the killing was
agreed upon between them beforehand.  No motive for it has
been shown
other than the provocation given by the deceased; and such
motive was true only insofar as Avelino was concerned.  The circumstances indicate that if Jose
embraced Rodrigo and rendered him helpless, it was to stop him from further
hitting Avelino with his fists.  However, Jose is not entirely free from
liability, for it has been established that even after the first knife thrust
had been delivered he did not try to stop Avelino,
either by word or overt act.  Instead
Jose continued to hold Rodrigo, even forced him down on the bamboo bed with Avelino still pressing the attack.  Withal it cannot be said that Jose’s cooperation
was such that without it the offense would not have been accomplished.  But although not indispensable, it was a
contributing factor.  If Jose’s initial
intent was free from guilt, it became tainted after he saw the first knife
thrust delivered.  The thirteen wounds
must have taken an appreciable interval of time to inflict, and Jose’s
cooperation facilitated their infliction. 
He must therefore be held liable as an accomplice.

The slaying of the
deceased having been qualified by treachery, Avelino Manansala is liable for murder,
the penalty of which
is reclusion temporal maximum to death (Art. 248, Revised Penal
Code).  Appreciating in favor of Avelino the mitigating circumstance of sufficient pro­vocation
by the deceased without any generic aggravating circumstance to offset the
same, the penalty imposable upon him is the minimum period of the penalty for
murder (see par. 3, Art. 63, Revised Penal Code), which is reclusion temporal maximum (17
years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years).

Since the resulting penalty is neither death nor life
imprisonment, the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies (Sec. 2, Act No. 4103 as
amended).  Avelino
Manansala is therefore
entitled to an indeterminate sentence, the upper range of which is reclusion
temporal maximum and the lower range – which is one degree lower than the penalty prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code for murder –is anywhere
within prision mayor maximum (10 years
and 1 day) to reclusion temporal medium (17 years and 4
months).  The penalty meted out by the
trial court on Avelino Manansala,
Jr. – “from 10 years and 1 day of prision
mayor to 17 years 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal”
– is within the range allowed by law and is therefore correctly imposed.

As regards appellant Jose Manansala,
the penalty prescribed by law, he being an accomplice, is one degree lower than that prescribed for
the principal, or prision mayor maximum
to reclusion temporal medium (10 years and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months).  Applying the Indeter­minate Sentence Law, and
considering that under paragraph 1, Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code,
“(W)hen there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, (the
court) shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period,”
the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby, modified as follows:

Appellant Jose Manansala, as accomplice
to the offense of murder, is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from 4
years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion
temporal; the amount of the indemnity is raised from P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 to be paid the heirs of the
deceased by Avelino Manansala,
Jr. as principal; in case of the insolvency of the principal, Jose Manansala, as accomplice, is subsidiarily
liable for the indemnity due from said principal; and in all other respects the
judgment appealed from is affirmed.  No
costs in this instance.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
and Villamor, JJ., concur.