LA MALLORCA-PAMBUSCO, PETITIONER, VS. CIRILO ISIP, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Sometime
in 1955, Cirilo Isip filed a claim for compensation with the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission against the La Mallorca-Pambusco alleging that
he has contracted tuberculosis while in its employ in his capacity as
driver. The claim having been heard, the Commission issued an order
directing the employer to pay claimant the sum of P1,302.95
representing the cost of medical, surgical and hospital services
rendered him from the date of injury to July 11, 1955; to provide the
claimant further medical, surgical and hospital services and supplies
until his sickness is cured or arrested; to pay him the sum of
P2,665.70 representing his compensation for disability from July 12 to
October 31, 1955, and to pay him the sum of P28.06 weekly beginning the
first week of November, 1955 until the sickness is arrested or cured,
the maximum not to exceed P4,000.00.

Upon receipt of this
award, the employer entered into an agreement with the employee whereby
it was stipulated that the former would pay the latter the total sum of
P5,302.95 in full settlement of the amount contained in the award, and
on February 7, 1956 the employee signed a document entitled
“Satisfaction of Award or Decision” acknowledging therein to have
received said amount, said document having been noted by the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission. As the employee continued to be sick and the
sickness needed further medical care and hospitalization, the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, upon petition of the employee, issued an order
on June 11, 1959 wherein, pursuant to its previous orders issued on the
same subject matter in accordance with the provisions of Section 13 of
the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, it declared that “claimant
upon receipt of this order is hereby directed to have himself medically
attended to, if he has not yet done so previously, and respondent to
pay all the reasonable expenses incurred in connection therewith.”

The employer moved to reconsider this order but to no avail. On
November 20, 1959, the Commission ordered the employer to pay the
employee the sum of P1,200.00 representing medical expenses incurred
from April, 1958 to February, 1959, as well as to continue furnishing
him with such medical, surgical and hospital treatment as his illness
may require. On December 28, 1959, the order last mentioned having
become final, the Commission issued a writ of execution which the
Sheriff of Manila tried to carry out by levying on a bus belonging to
the employer.

Contending that the Commission has acted in
excess of its jurisdiction in issuing both the order of November 20,
1959 and the writ of execution, the employer now comes before this
Court by way of certiorari praying that said order and writ be
nullified and declared without effect.

Petitioner contends
that the Commission acted in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing its
order of June 11, 1959 wherein it declared that the employee could
continue having himself medically treated if he has not yet been cured
of his ailment and that all the expenses that he may incur in
connection therewith should be charged and paid by his employer for the
reason that the same is contrary to the compromise agreement entered
into between the parties in relation to Section 29 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act wherein the employee has agreed to receive, as in fact
he did receive, the total amount of his claim in full satisfaction of
the award made in his favor by the Commission. Respondent, however,
contends on his part that while he in effect sighed a written
satisfaction of the award made in his favor the same does not bar him
from asking from his employer for further, medical treatment and
hospitalization, and so the order of the Commission extending to him
that benefit is proper and in accordance with law.

We are
inclined to uphold this contention of respondent. In the first place,
in the order of the Commission dated November 20, 1955 acting favorably
on the claim of respondent it was expressly stated that petitioner
should provide him “further medical, surgical and hospital services and supplies as the nature of his sickness may require until it is cured or arrested.”
Said order became final for lack of protest or appeal on the part of
petitioner. Then we have the document signed by respondent entitled
“Satisfaction of Award or Decision”, dated February 7, 1956, which
embodies the so-called compromise agreement entered into between them,
and from this document we find that while respondent received the sum
of P5,302.95 in full satisfaction of the award, the same is qualified
by the following condition: “except with respect to further hospital or
medical treatment, whenever necessary.” Finally, we have the provisions
of Section 13 of Act No. 3428, as amended (Workmen’s Compensation Act),
which postulate, among others, that “during the subsequent period of disability,
the employer shall provide the employee with such medical, surgical,
and hospital services and supplies as the nature of the injury or
sickness may require.” These provisions justify the subsequent award
made by the Commission.

It is true that under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act the amount of compensation to which an injured
employee is entitled in case of disability shall not in any case exceed
the total sum of P4,000.00, but this limitation only applies to the
compensation for disability, and not to medical attendance (Sections
12, 14, 16, 18, Act No. 3428, as amended). In fact, this subject is
governed by a different section of the law (Section 13, Idem.)

With
regard, however, to the claim that the Commission has no authority to
issue a writ of execution because it is so prohibited by Section 51 of
the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the same is correct as this Court has
recently held in Pastoral vs. The Commissioners of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et al., 112, Phil. 742.) Thus, this Court said in part:

“The
above legal provisions are clear and unequivocal, both in their
language and purpose. The interested party may file in any court of
record in the jurisdiction of which the accident occurred, a certified
copy of the referee’s or Commissioner’s final decision and the Court
will issue a judgment based upon said decision of the referee
or Commissioner, and it is this judgment of the Court than can be
enforced by a writ of execution to be issued by the said Court,
considering Sec. 8, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court.

*       *       *       *       *       *       *

“It
would appear evident, therefore, that the powers given to the W.C.C. by
the Reorganization Acts, cannot validly include the power to amend Sec.
51 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law, heretofore quoted, for to do so
would be to diminish the jurisdiction and the judicial power and
functions vested by law on the courts of record, by virtue of said
section, to issue or order a writ of execution by the promulgation ef a
judgment, which power or authority the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission never had, before the Reorganization Acts had been passed.
Where the inquiry to be made involves questions of law as well as
facts, where it affects a legal right, and where the decision may
result in the terminating or destroying that right, the powers to be
exercised and the duties to be discharged are essentially judicial (11
Am. Jur. 904); and being judicial, such powers are granted to or vested
upon a court or judicial tribunal (Rhode Island vs. Mass. 37 U.S. [12
Peters] 657, 738 L. ed. [U.S.] 1233, 1266). And there is no gainsaying
the fact, that under this concept, an order for the execution of a
decision or award of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission is
essentially a judicial power or function of the court.”

Wherefore,
the petition with regard to the annulment of the orders of the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission dated June 11, 1959 and November 20,
1959 is denied, but the petition with regard to the annulment of the
writ of execution dated December 28, 1959 is granted. No costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Paredes, and De Leon, JJ., concur.