G.R. No. L-56590. May 29, 1981
PERLA COMPAÑIA DE SEGUROS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. ALFREDO B. CONCEPCION AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, BRANCH IV-TAGAYTAY CITY AND MIGUEL ILAGA…
TEEHANKEE, J.:
The Court hereby sets aside the questioned orders of respondent
judge disapproving herein petitioner’s appeal bond in Civil Case No. TG-438 of
the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch IV, Tagaytay City, upon the ground that said bond “is void and unenforceable for lack of a
principal debtor or obligation,” and peremptorily declaring his judgment
under appeal as having become final and executory and
ordering execution thereof. A mere
technical defect or imperfection in the filing of an appeal bond does not
render the decision subject of the appeal immediately final and executory, for where said bond is in substantial conformity
with the provisions of the law such that its legal effect accomplishes the
objective of insuring to the appellee the payment of
the costs of appeal, the appeal should be given due course.
In an action for the enforcement of a commercial vehicle
comprehensive insurance policy with damages, judgment was rendered by
respondent judge sentencing petitioner as defendant to pay respondent-plaintiff
Ilagan “the total sum of P18,773.58 minus the
sum of P500.00 representing the deductible franchise, plus attorney’s fees in
the amount of P5,600.00 or the total sum of P23,873.58, with interest thereon
at the rate of 36% per annum from February 21, 1978 until said amount shall
have been fully satisfied; and to pay the costs.”
From said judgment, petitioner-defendant timely filed a notice of
appeal, appeal bond and a record on appeal.
But the herein private respondent, the prevailing party in the lower
court, filed therein a motion to dismiss the appeal and for the issuance of a
writ of execution, impugning the validity of petitioner’s appeal bond as having
no principal debtor and therefore void.
Despite opposition, respondent judge upheld respondent’s contention and denied due
course to the appeal and further directed the issuance of the corresponding
writ of execution a judgment, in
his questioned Order of January 28, 1981, as follows:
“No issue exists regarding the seasonable filing of the
notice, bond and record of appeal. The
issue centers on the efficacy of the appeal bond executed by Rodrigo Y. Arandia and Porfirio B. Yabut, both lawyers, as ‘sureties’, whereby they ‘jointly
and severally bind (themselves) in favor of Miguel Ilagan,
x x x for the payment of
cost x x x.’
“As correctly pointed out by the plaintiff, the disputed
appeal bond is void and unenforceable for lack of a principal debtor or obligation. Indeed, while the sureties bound themselves
to pay, jointly and severally, ‘such an undertaking presupposes that the
obligation is enforceable against someone else besides the (sureties), and the
latter could always claim that it
was never (their) intention to be the sole person obligated thereby.’ (Manila
Railroad Co., et al. vs. Alvendia, 17 SCRA 154, 156.)
“It, therefore, follows that the judgment rendered in this
case had become final and executory, because
the defendant had not filed any appeal
bond in due time.”
Reconsideration was denied
in respondent judge’s Order of March
27, 1981. Hence, this
petition for certiorari which we find to be meritorious.
Section 5 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court reads:
“Section 5. Appeal
Bond. The appeal bond shall answer
for the payment of costs. It shall be in the amount of one
hundred and twenty pesos (P120) unless the court shall fix a different
amount. If the appeal bond is not in
cash, it must be approved by the court before the transmittal of the record on
appeal to the appellate court.”
The last sentence of the above quoted section presupposes that
before elevating the record on appeal to the appellate court, the trial court has the duty to pass upon the sufficiency
of the appeal bond, and it is called upon to require the party-appellant within
a period of time to fully comply
with the requirements as to said appeal bond in case of some defect in its
execution, in the same manner it requires correction or amplification of a
deficient record on appeal. Thus, it
behooves the trial court upon opposition to the effectivity
of an appeal bond to examine it, to declare it lacking of the requirements if
it be so, and then to require and allow the appellant to complete or amend it
in accordance with instructions within a
reasonable period, so as to perfect the appeal.[1]
Indeed, as in the filing of records on appeal,[2]
the Court has invariably taken a liberal attitude in favor of the appellant
when it comes to the filing of appeal bonds in relation to perfection of
appeals.[3]
Thus, it has been held that an appeal bond is sufficient when it is in
substantial conformity with the provisions of the law as long as the legal
effect is to insure to the appellee the payment of
all costs required by law.[4]
In Javier Cruz vs. Enriquez,[5]
which is similar to the case at bar, the respondent judge therein ordered the
disapproval of the appeal bond after discovering that the same consisted merely in the
signatures of two lawyers. The Court
ruled therein as follows:
“This provision of law[6]
does not prescribe a special form for appeal bond. It only requires that the same be for the amount of sixty pesos,
(at that time) ‘conditioned for the
payment of costs which the appellate court may award against the appellant.’ The bond in question complies substantially with
the provision of law, and we see
no reason why the respondent
judge found it defective. When he
approved the record on appeal, there has been an implied approval of the
original bond, and we find no reason either why after such approval, he
had to disapprove said bond and dismiss the appeal on the allegation that the
new bond was filed out of time.
Furthermore, granting that the first bond was really defective, justice demands that herein
petitioners, as appellants in that case, be given an opportunity to cure its defect by filing, as they did, another bond. In dismissing the appeal the
respondent judge has entirely overlooked the fact that the second bond was not
a new one but merely a correction
of the original supposedly
defective bond. x x
x.
“Respondent Laserna vigorously
contends that under the inherent powers of the court to amend and control its
process and orders so as to make
them conformable to law and justice, the dismissal of the appeal on the ground
that the first bond was defective and the second one was filed out of time,
should be sustained; but under the facts obtaining in the case, this contention
is evidently untenable for the original bond, in our opinion, is not defective,
and even granting that it were, petitioners herein were diligent in curing the
supposed defect by filing a new
bond in order to protect their right to appeal.
Certainly, the respondent judge should not have been strictly technical in the application of the rules, for
in so doing he has deprived herein
petitioners of their right to appeal, or at least to perfect it within the time allowed by
law.”
There is no question in the instant case, as acknowledged in the
challenged order, that the record on appeal, notice of appeal and the appeal
bond were filed on time. However, as in
the above cited case of Cruz, the appeal bond in question was executed
by petitioner’s lawyers, Attys. Rodrigo Y. Arandia
and Porfirio B. Yabut, both
lawyers of the law firm representing herein petitioner as defendant in the main
case, as well as in the case at bar, whereby they did “hereby jointly and
severally bind ourselves in favor of Miguel Ilagan,
in the amount of One Hundred Twenty Pesos (P120.00) conditioned for the payment
of costs which the appellate court may award against appellants.” Clearly
enough, this undertaking, albeit not signed by herein petitioner as
party-appellant, effectively insures to the appellee
the payment of costs and is, therefore,
in substantial compliance with the requirement of the cited Rule, for they
certainly are estopped from denying principal liability
under the said bond, as baselessly feared by respondent judge in his Order.
One additional observation.
The authority cited by respondent judge in the questioned order, Manila
Railroad Company (MRC) vs. Alvendia,[7]
wherein the appeal bond was held void and unenforceable for lack of a principal
debtor or obligation since the MRC as co-appellant of
the Manila Port Service was not a signatory to the bond, has been superseded by
the decision of this same court in
the later case of Manila Railroad Company vs. Alvendia[8]
where we held that the Manila Port Service must be deemed part of the Manila
Railroad Company and not a separate entity in a suit against the MRC based on arrastre operations
undertaken by it through its “agents and subsidiary,” the Manila Port
Service. Similarly, in this case the
lawyers as agents and attorneys of petitioners properly executed the appeal
bond in their own name but for the benefit and on behalf of petitioner as their
client, who has in turn ratified as principal the execution of said appeal bond
with the very prosecution of this action, as evidenced by the verification of
the petition at bar by petitioner’s vice-president.[9]
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered setting aside respondent judge’s orders of
January 28, 1981 and March 27, 1981 and ordering respondent judge
to give due course to the appeal and to
transmit the records to the Court of Appeals for proper proceedings and
determination of the appeal on the merits.
With costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Guerrero, De Castro*, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
[1]
See Javier Cruz et al. vs.
Enriquez etc., et al., 103 Phil. 62.
[2]
Krueger vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 50;
Lopez vs. Lopez, 77 Phil. 133; Peralta vs. Solon, 77 Phil. 610
[3]
Contreras vs. Dinglasan, et al., 79 Phil. 42; Espartero vs. Ladaw, et
al., L-5181, February 24, 1953; Javier Cruz, et al. vs. Enriquez, etc.,
et al. supra; Vicencio et al. vs.
Tumalad, et al., 106 Phil. 1042.
[4]
Contreras vs. Dinglasan,
et al., supra.
[5]
Supra.
[6]
Referring to section 5, Rule 41; note in brackets and emphasis supplied
[7]
17 SCRA 154.
[8]
20 SCRA 210.
[9]
Rollo, at pages 11-12.
* Justice Pacifico P. de Castro was designated to sit in the First
Division vice Justice Ramon C. Fernandez who is on leave.