MELITONA GERSALINO, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for
review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission which affirmed the order of the Department of Labor
dismissing the claim of petitioner for compensation benefits under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended.

Petitioner is a public
school teacher assigned at Kabankalan, Negros Occidental since 1962.  On April 14, 1971, she filed a claim for disability
compensation benefit with the Regional Office of the Department of Labor for
rheumatoid arthritis which was allegedly caused by prolonged standing and other
physical stress arising from classroom duties.

In an order dated November
20, 1975, the
regional office of the Department of Labor dismissed petitioner’s claim on the
ground that “only those illness (sic) which affect the earning power of the
employee and deprive him of his livelihood are compensable.  In other words, as long as an employee is
able to continue working and receives his pay, he is not entitled to
compensation.” (Rollo, p. 8).  Petitioner’s claim
for reimbursement of medical expenses, being ancillary to the compensation
claim, was also dismissed.

On December 20, 1975,
petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the aforementioned Order but the same was denied.  Thereafter, the case was elevated to the
respondent Commission for review.

On January 30, 1976,
respondent Commission rendered a decision dismissing petitioner’s claim for
lack of merit.  Hence,
the present action.

On December 6, 1989,
the Court’s Second Division referred the instant case to this Division (Rollo, p. 65).

The sole issue in the case at bar is whether petitioner’s ailment
is compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended.

We rule in the affirmative. 
Rheumatoid arthritis is an occupational
disease of public school teachers normally associated with the nature and
character of their occupation (Meñez v. Employees’
Compensation Commission (97 SCRA 87 [1980];
Dimaano v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 78 SCRA
510 [1977]).  Moreover, it is not
disputed that petitioner’s illness supervened as a result of, and aggaravated
by, the nature of her employment.  Thus,
the legal presumption of compensability
arises (Sec. 44, Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended) and the burden of
proof shifts to the employer to show otherwise (Cayaba
v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 102 SCRA 346 [1981]; Guevarra
v. Republic, 77 SCRA 292 [1977]; Buyco v. Secretary of
Labor, 145 SCRA 361 [1986] and cases cited). 
In the case at bar, respondent Commission offered no evidence to
controvert the illness of petitioner as shown by the physician’s report (Rollo, p. 16) save its
bare pronouncement that rheumatoid arthritis is not compensable.

However, in view of the
factual finding of respondent Commission that in all of petitioner’s sick
leaves, petitioner was paid in full of all her salaries during the period of
her leave of absence, compensation benefits would be unavaling.  This is so because:

“Workmen’s compensation refers to liability for compensation for
loss resulting from injury, disability or death of the workingman through
industrial accident or disease.  It is
based on incapacity or disability for work, and hence on the loss or impairment
of the employee’s earning capacity in the employment at which he was engaged when
injured, the compensation payments being in lieu of wages or based on the loss
thereof and on the idea of providing means of subsistence to the employees
during the time when his earning capacity has been partially or entirely
destroyed.  In other words, as long as
the employee is able to work and receives his pay even if he is suffering from
illness, he is not entitled to compensation (Central Azucarera
Don Pedro v. de Leon, 101 Phil. 1141 [1959]); Lombo
v. Standard Cigarette Manufacturing Co., 58 SCRA 750 [1974]).

Nevertheless, inasmuch as Section 13 of Workmen’s Compensation
Act, as amended, requires the employer to defray the medical and hospital
expenses for ailments compensable under the law, petitioner is therefore entitled to reimbursement
of expenses incurred in curing his injury.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision under review is hereby
SET ASIDE and respondent Commission (now Employees’ Compensation Commission) is
hereby ordered to reimburse petitioner of her medical and hospital expenses
duly supported by receipts submitted during the hearing, with legal interest
thereon from April 14, 1971 until full payment thereof.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J., on leave.

Gutierrez, J., No part, then Acting
Solicitor General who filed Comment on the petition.