NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND LUZ AGUIRRE, RESPONDENTS.

The National Development Company, a government-owned and controlled
corporation, seeks review and reversal of a decision of the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission (WC Case No. 985) awarding compensation to
respondent Luz Aguirre.

The Compensation Commission found:

“* * * that claimant (Luz Aguirre) first began working with the
respondent on February I8, 1946 as an apprentice in its Weaving Textile
Mills, after undergoing a pre-employment physical examination; then on
April 9, 1946, she was promoted to Battery Hand, on March 26, 1947, to
Spare Weaver, and on March 5, 1951, she was made a Regular Weaver, the
position which she held up to June 30, 1953 when she was separated from
the service because of her sickness of pulmonary tuberculosis.
Claimant’s work as spare weaver consisted of operating the looms,
connecting broken threads, rolling the finished cloths, and lifting the
rolls of cloths (weighing about 40 kilos) whenever they obstruct her
place of work. In operating the looms, claimant had to stop or start
each of the 12 looms assigned to her by pushing the corresponding
handle of each, at least 15 times an hour, because the machine stops
whenever the threads break or get entangled with cotton, and when the
machine gets hot. Claimant worked frequently in the second shift (2:00
p.m.—10:00 p.m.) and the third shift (10:00 p.m.— 6:00 a.m.). It
appears that sometime during the latter part of April, 1953, claimant,
while lifting a roll of cloth to place it in its proper position, felt
chest pains, and, after a few minutes, spat blood. She went to the
Medical Department of respondent company, after reporting the matter to
the Overseer, Jose Soriano. When she reported back for work after a few
days’ rest, she was given light work for two (2) months, but was
afterwards laid off from the service.

The clinical records
of the Medical Department of the respondent show that claimant had
already felt the symptoms of the disease PTB such as chest and back
pains, slight and occasional coughs and loss of weight, as early as
June, 1950, as a result of which the fluoroscopic findings made by the
respondent’s medical department showed “suspicious density 1st rib and
1st intercostal space, left, Koch infection”. The records further show
that the claimant was X-rayed at the Quezon Institute on February 19,
1953 at the instance of the respondent, with the following findings:

Right Lung—Calcified focus at apex, fibrosis interspace 2 Enlarged and dense hilar shadow.

Left Lung.—Exudative lesion at the second interspace.

According to Dr. Pacifico D. Nazareno of the Quezon Institute, “the
lesion in the right lung is compatible with healed lesion, while the
left lung is acute and active pulmonary tuberculosis”. The records
further show that claimant had been under the treatment of Dr. Lorenzo
Yuson who certified in the Physician’s report that the claimant’s
illness of PTB was in its moderately advanced stage; and that for her
treatment by him from December, 1952 up to November, 1958, claimant had
spent the amount of P900.00.

The records also show that on
June 6, 1960, claimant filed with the Regional Office in Manila a
compensation claim for the sickness of pulmonary tuberculosis in which
she attributed to her employment with the respondent. The claim was
heard, after which the Hearing Officer awarded compensation.”

The Commission declared that the injury was compensable, being a
“result of the return of her employment” because Aguirre’s assigned
work was “not only tiresome but also taxing to the worker’s strength
and vitality”, considering that she “was frequently assigned to night
work”. The Commission, therefore, affirmed the award of the hearing
officer to the sum of P3,594.24 as compensation benefits, plus P900.00
as medical expenses, P36.00 as fees, to which said ruling body added an
award of P269.57 (being 7.5% of the main award) as attorney’s fees. It
is from this decision that the appeal is taken by writ of review, the
Company’s motion for reconsideration having been denied.

The appeal is without merit. The employer’s failure to report the
employee’s condition, leading to her dismissal, within the period
prescribed by section 45 of the Workmen’s Compensation law, imports a
renunciation of the right to controvert the claim, as correctly held by
the respondent Commission. Section 45, paragraph 2, is to the following
effect:

“In case the employer decided to controvert the right to compensation,
he shall, either on or before the fourteenth day of disability or
within ten days after he has knowledge of the alleged accident, file a
notice with the Commissioner, on a form prescribed by him, that
compensation is not being paid, giving the name of the claimant, name
of the employer, date of the accident and the reason why compensation
is not being paid. Failure on the part of the employer or the insurance carrier to comply with this requirement shall constitute a renunciation of his right to controvert the claim
unless he submits reasonable grounds for the failure to make the
necessary reports, on the basis of which grounds the Commissioner may
reinstate his right to controvert this claim.”

The law bars all defenses available to the employer, making no
exception. Hence, even the defense based on the employee’s failure to
file the claim in due time is now barred^[1].
It is well to note that while the statute speaks of “renunciation of
the right to controvert the claim”, what it actually prescribes is a statutory bar or forfeiture
of the employer’s right to defend under the conditions given, since the
loss is imposed regardless of the actual intent of the employer.
Consequently, the tolling of the rights to controvert under section 45
is not subject to the limitations of a voluntary waiver.

On
the matter of attorney’s fees, the stand of the petitioner National
Development Company is that the Workmen’s Compensation Commission had
no jurisdiction, or had abused its discretion, in allowing attorney’s
fees in favor of the respondent-earner, arguing that the company had
nothing to do with the respondent’s hiring the services of a counsel;
that the power of the Commission to approve and fix attorney’s fees
under Section 47 of Act 3428, as amended^[2] is already provided for under Section 31;^[3] and that, since the Act is not deficient, No. 8, Article 2208, of the Civil Code^[4] does not apply.

The employer’s argument is untenable, because section 31 of the
Compensation Law, which was designed to protect the employee, governs
his relations with his lawyer, and does not govern attorney’s fees
recoverable from an adverse party; therefore, the civil law supplements
the deficiency, pursuant to Article 18 of the Civil Code, which provide:

Art. 18, In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and
special laws, their deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of
this Code.”

There is a clear difference,
from the standpoint of legislative policy, between attorney’s fees to
be paid by the laborer and fees awarded by the Court to be paid by the
employer. The plain intent of the statute is that the compensation to
be received by the injured workman should not be reduced by more than
ten per cent on account of lawyer’s fees. This purpose is attained
where the fees are to be paid by the employer, since the compensation
receivable by the workman is then in no way diminished. In the latter
eventuality, all that the law requires is that the counsel fees should
be reasonable.

Wherefore, the award of attorney’s fees by
the Commission in favor of the respondent worker and against her
petitioner-employer, being just and reasonable, may not be disturbed.

The last error assigned by the petitioner is that the Commission
admitted hearsay evidence as the basis of its decision. It is needless
to belabor this point because the petitioner did not specify what part
of the Commission’s findings of fact was proved by hearsay evidence.

In view of the foregoing, the decision under review is hereby affirmed,
with costs against the petitioner, National Development Company.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

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^[1] General Shipping Co. vs. W. Comp. Comm., 109 Phil., 60; Victory Shipping Lines vs. W.C.C., 106 Phil., 550; Victorias Milling Co. vs. W.C.C., L-10533, May 13, 1957.

^[2] “Sec. 47. General powers and duties:—The Commission shall have full power and authority

* * * * * *

(b) To hear and determine all claims for compensation * * *; to approve and fix attorney’s fees * * * ;”

^[3]
“Sec. 31. Intervention of the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner.—In
case a laborer who suffers an accident or contracts an illness
comprised within the provisions of Section two of this Act or his
dependents, contracts the services of a lawyer or other persons to help
him or direct him in his claim for compensation against his employer
the fees of said lawyer or person shall not he more than five per cent
of the total sum which said injured or sick laborer or his dependent in
case of death shall receive by way of compensation; but If his services
shall take place in appealed cases, his fees shall not be in excess of
ten per centum of said sum, and any person who, in violation of this
provision, makes an excessive charge, shall be punished by a fine of
not more than two hundred pesos.”

^[4]
“Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses
of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except;

* * * * * * *

“(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability laws;”.