ROSENDO RALIA AND PABLO RALLA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. MATEO L. ALCASID, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ALBAY AND PEDRO RALLA, RESPONDENTS.

BENGZON, C.J.:

Statement.—The instant petition for certiorari seeks to
annul the orders of respondent judge appointing a receiver and refusing
a bond to dissolve the receivership.

Seeking to recover physical possession of the parcels of land
involved in the receivership, petitioners submit as alternative prayers
(a) modification of the order appointing the receiver so that the
receivership would only embrace certain parcels of land, and exclude
others; or (b) discharge of receiver upon submission of a counter-bond
of P20,000.00; or (c) increase of the receiver’s bond from P10,000.00
to P20,000.00.

Facts.—On January 5, 1960, in the Court of First Instance
of Albay, Pedro Ralla filed against his father Rosendo Ralla and his
brother Pablo Ralla, an action for partition involving 212 parcels of
land allegedly valued at P270,000.00. The complaint after making proper
allegations, also prayed for the appointment of a receiver.

Pablo Ralla, in his answer, asserted exclusive ownership over a
number of those parcels; Rosendo Ralla’s ownership of other parcels;
and ownership of the rest by the conjugal estate of Rosendo and his
deceased wife, Paz Escarilla. Rosendo Ralla equally asserted exclusive
ownership over a number of the said parcels; Pablo Ralla’s exclusive
ownership of those claimed by the latter; and conjugal ownership of the
rest of the parcels by Rosendo with his deceased wife, Paz Escarilla.

After hearing the prayer for appointment of a receiver, the
respondent court issued an order appointing a receiver of all the
parcels of land enumerated in the inventory submitted by Pedro Ralla,
except certain parcels of land. The Municipal Treasurer of Ligao,
Albay, Vicente Real, qualified as receiver with a bond of P10,000.00.

A motion for reconsideration was denied. While such motion was
pending, above petitioners presented an omnibus “Motion to be allowed
to file a bond for the discharge of the receiver and/or Motion to
resolve the motion for reconsideration of the order dated July 21, 1959
and motion to require accounting and increase of bond, if discharge of
the receiver is not allowed.”

However, respondent court entered an order denying the motion to
reconsider the appointment of a receiver, and the motion to discharge
the receivership upon the filing of a bond.

Issue.—On the principal contention that the respondent
judge exceeded his jurisdiction or abused his discretion when he
decreed the receivership and appointed a receiver in a partition
proceeding, petitioners submit the instant petition for certiorari.

Discussion.—They rest their case on the following
propositions: (1) in a partition proceeding, generally, no
administration is necessary and the appointment of a receiver is
irregular; (2) the court appoints a receiver only after full
consideration of the facts and circumstances of each particular case;
(3) the consequences and effects thereof should be well taken into
account, with a view to avoiding irreparable injustice or injury to the
other parties who are entitled to as much consideration as those
seeking it; (4) in an action involving title to real property, as in
the above case, where the appointment of a receiver to take charge of
the property has the effect of taking the property out of the
possession of the above petitioners, application therefor should only
be granted after a clear showing of the necessity thereof; (5) in this
case, however, there is no such necessity, inasmuch as the rights of
above respondent may be protected by notice of lis pendens or
by the filing of a bond by petitioners to compensate for the damage
sought to be prevented. Above petitioners had offered a counterbound of
P20,000.00—twice the bond submitted by the receiver; (6) as the
pleadings submitted in the lower court show the presence of adverse
claim of title to a greater portion of the lands in question, the
constitution of the receivership although protective of the rights of
herein respondent Pedro Ralla would, on the other hand, cause
disproportionate injury to the rights of herein petitioners.

Respondents have met the above propositions with arguments equally impressive, and these are, in brief, our conclusions:

A receiver of real or personal property, which is the subject of the
action, may be appointed by the court when it appears from the
pleadings, and/or such other proof as the judge may require, that the
party applying for such appointment has an actual interest in it and
that such property is in danger of being lost, removed or materially
injured.^[1]
The appointment is also proper whenever it appears to be the most
convenient and feasible means of preserving, or administering the
property in litigation.^[2]

The appointment of a receiver depends principally upon the sound
discretion of the court; it is not a matter of absolute right. The
facts and circumstances, of each particular case determine the
soundness of the exercise of such discretion.^[3]
Among the consequences and effects considered by the courts before
appointing a receiver are: (a) whether or not the injury resulting from
such appointment would probably be greater than the injury ensuing if
the status quo is left undisturbed^[4];
and (b) whether or not the appointment will imperil the interests of
others whose rights deserve as much a consideration from the court as
those of the person requesting for receivership.^[5]

In the case at bar, the respondent court ordered the appointment
of a receiver after hearing and presentation of evidence by both
parties. Eleven sessions were had for that purpose, numerous
documentary proofs were submitted. The facts and circumstances upon
which the order was based—which this Court is not prepared to revise at
this time—are as follows:

“(1) It was not established to the satisfaction of
the Court, with few exceptions, that the properties subject matter of
the complaint for partition are exclusive properties of the surviving
spouse, the defendant Rosendo Ralla. Most of the properties were either
acquired or titled during the marriage and in fact in the various
certificates of title Erhibits “11” to “114” the one half (1/2)
undivided portion is registered in the name of Rosendo Ralla married to
Paz Escarilla, the deceased mother of the plaintiff (Pedro Ralla).

“(2)
The defendants have been disposing, conveying and transferring
properties and converting them from the character of conjugal
properties left by the deceased Paz Escarilla to the exclusive
properties of the defendants with the avowed purpose and intention of
depriving plaintiff of his right, interest, title and participation
thereto and to the great damage and prejudice of the plaintiff, as
evidenced by the documents of conveyance executed by the defendant
Rosendo Ralla, marked Exhibits “C, “D” and “E”;

“(3) The
products, rentals, income, assets and funds collected and received by
the defendants, since the death of said late Paz Escarilla on December
27, 1957, up to the present, from the properties, are in danger of
being lost or removed;

“(4) The relations of the plaintiff
and defendants who are co- owners are strained, and no satisfactory
arrangement for administration of the property can be made and
accomplished in spite of the efforts exerted by this Court to prevail
upon the defendants toward this end on equitable basis;

“(5)
The actuation of the defendants, the majority co-owners, results in
serious prejudice to the minority, the plaintiff, and that the
plaintiff has not been given the benefit or accounting of the products
and income therefrom, and has not been given whatsoever his
corresponding and due share thereof;

“(6) The plaintiff is
being prevented by the defendants from entering the lands in question
and from even interfering and aiding in the administration thereof.”

In this atmosphere of strained relationship between the parties, of
unsatisfactory arrangement for the administration of the properties
involved, not to mention the conveyance by petitioners of some of the
conjugal properties left by the deceased spouse of Rosendo Ralla, Paz
Escarilla, it was not entirely improper to direct the appointment of a
receiver. All the circumstances found by the lower court apparently
justify the constitution of the receivership of the lands in question.
The requirements of law have been more than satisfied.^[6]
Even under petitioners’ theory that the granting therefor should only
be “after a clear showing of the necessity thereof”, the instant
appointment of a receiver appears to be proper.

The case of Leonides Chunaco, et al. vs. Hon. Perfecto Quicho, et al.,^[7]
similar in nature to the present case, was resolved by this Court along
the same lines with our conclusion in this litigation. There we held:

“While in a partition proceeding it is generally
unnecessary for the court to appoint a receiver, however, (as held in
the case of Tuason vs. Concepcion, 54 Phil., 408) where the
relations among the co-owners are strained, and no satisfactory
arrangement for administration can be accomplished, the appointment of
a receiver is not an abuse of discretion.

“This ruling has
been confirmed by Art. 492, par. 3 of the New Civil Code authorizing
the appointment of an administrator (which term would include a
receiver) in cases where the action of the majority co-owners results
in serious prejudice to the minority.

“Should there be no
majority, or should the resolution of the majority be seriously
prejudicial to those interested in the property owned in common, the
courts, at the instance of an interested party, shall order such
measures as it may deem proper, including the appointment of an
administrator.”

We likewise sustain the lower court’s order fixing the receiver’s
bond at only P10,000.00 because the records show,the gross income of
the estate under receivership-lands, can not be lost-amounted quarterly
to more or less P7,000.00 only.^[8]
Considering that the parties have been withdrawing their corresponding
share from the net income, it is easy to understand that the bond
already filed sufficiently answers for any cash remaining in the
receiver’s hands.

Judgment.—Without further discussing the other points raised by
petitioners, we find no inclination to hold that the respondent court
abused its discretion in the issuance of its questioned orders.

Petition denied with costs against petitioners.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Conception, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

^[2] Sec. 1 (e), Rule 61, Rules of Court.

^[3] 53 Corpus Juris p. 35-36.

^[4] 53 Corpus Juris p. 37.

^[5] Arcega vs. Pecson,
78 Phil., 743; 44 Off. Gaz. No. 12, p. 4884. of depriving plaintiff of
his right, interest, title and participation thereto and to the great
damage and prejudice of the plaintiff, as evidenced by the documents of
conveyance executed by the defendant Rosendo Ralla, marked Exhibits
“C”, “D” and “E”;

^[6] Sec. 1, Rule 61, Rales of Court.

^[7] L-13774, January 30, 1959.

^[8]
See Annexes, C, D and E.