EMILIA TENGCO, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND BENJAMIN CIFRA, JR., RESPONDENTS.

Review
on certiorari of the decision* rendered by the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. NO. SP-08182, entitled: 
“Emilia Tengco,
petitioner, versus Court
of First Instance of Rizal, etc., et al,
respondents,” which dismissed herein petitio­ner’s “Appeal by Way of Certiorari”
from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
in Civil Case No. C-6625 which affirmed the decision of the Municipal Court of Navotas, Metro Manila, in Civil Case No. 2092, entitled:  “Benjamin Cifra,
plaintiff, versus Emilia Tengco,
defendant,” ordering the herein petitioner (as defendant) to vacate the
premises at No. 164 Int., Gov. Pascual St., Navotas, Metro Manila, and to pay the herein private respondent (as plaintiff) the arrears in rentals
and attorney’s fees; and the Resolution denying the herein petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration of the said Court of Appeals decision.

The record of the case shows
that on 16 September 1976, the herein private respondent, Benjamin Cifra, Jr., claiming to be the owner of the premises at No.
164 Int., Gov. Pascual St., Navotas,
Metro Manila, which he had leased to the herein petitioner, Emilia
Tengco, filed an action for unlawful detainer with the Municipal Court of Navotas,
Metro Manila, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 2092, to evict the petitioner, Emilia Tengco, from the said
premises for her alleged failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the
lease contract by failing and refusing to pay the stipulated rentals despite
repeated demands.  After trial, judgment
was rendered against the petitioner.  The
decretal portion of the decision reads, as follows:

“WHEREFORE, Judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering
the defendant and any and all persons claiming rights under her to vacate the
premises occupied by her at No. 164 Int., Gov. Pascual
Street, this town and to surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff,
condemning the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY
SIX (P376.00) PESOS, as rentals in arrears and the sum of TWELVE PESOS (P12.00), a month from October, 1976 until the premises is fully vacated.  To pay the plaintiff the sum of TWO HUNDRED (P200.00) PESOS as
and for attorney’s fees and costs of suit.”

From this judgment, the
herein petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal where the appeal was docketed as Civil Case No.
C-6625.  On 18 May 1978, the Court of First Instance of Rizal
rendered judgment affirming the decision of the municipal court, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, premises
considered, judgment is hereby rendered affirming in toto
the judgment of the lower court dated September 20, 1977 without pronouncement as to costs.”

Not
satisfied, the herein petitioner filed with the respondent Court of Appeals an
“Appeal by Way of Certiorari” which was docketed as CA-G.R.
NO. SP-08182.

On
29 August 1978, the respondent Court
of Appeals promulgated a
decision, with the following disposition:

“WHEREFORE, finding that
the Decision of the lower Court is supported by substantial evidence and that
its conclusions are not clearly against the law and jurisprudence, the instant
Petition is hereby denied due course and is dismissed outright.”

The
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but her motion was denied on 16 January 1979.

Hence,
the present recourse.

The
petitioner contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in sustaining
the decisions of the appellate and trial courts which are allegedly contrary to
the evidence and applicable jurisprudence. 
The petitioner more particularly claims that (1) the private respondent
Benjamin Cifra, Jr. is not the owner of the leased
premises; (2) the lessor was guilty of mora accipiendi; (3) the petitioner’s version of the facts is more
credible than private respon­dent’s; (4) laches had
deprived the lessor of the right to eject her; and
(5) the private respondent failed to estab­lish a cause of action against the
petitioner.

We
find no merit in the petition.  The
reasons advanced by the petitioner to support her petition are the same reasons
given by her to the Court of Appeals in support of her “Appeal by Way of Certiorari”
and we find no ground to adopt a different course from that of the respondent appellate
court.  In disposing of the petitioner’s
contentions, the Court of Appeals said:

“Petitioner claims that
private respondent had failed to establish his ownership of the lot in question
for while the Certificate of Title presented by him refers to a parcel of land situated
at Bo. Almacen, Navotas,
the premises in question, on the other hand, is situated in Bo. Sipak, Navotas; that it was not
with private respondent that she entered into the lease agreement but with his
mother; that her failure to pay the rentals on the premises was due to the
refusal of the collector to accept her tender of payment; and that laches had deprived private respondent of whatever right he
had against her considering that the Complaint was filed only in September,
1976 whereas his cause of action arose sometime in February, 1974 when she
defaulted in the payment of rentals.

“We find this ‘appeal’,
which We consider as a Petition
for Review, to be without merit.

“It should be noted that
petitioner admits that she is a lessee on the premises in question and that she
had been in default in the payment of the rentals thereon since February, 1974
allegedly
because of the refusal of the collector to accept her tender of payment.  However, she claims that the lease agreement
was not with private respondent, but with his mother.  The question as to who is the real lessor of the premises is one of fact and the findings of
the lower court that it was private respondent is entitled to the highest
respect by appellate Courts barring any material evidence to the contrary.  Neither can petitioner question private
respondent’s claim of ownership of the leased premises.  The tenant is not permitted to deny the title
of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and
tenant between them.

“Petitioner’s excuse for
her non-payment of the rentals on the premises deserves scant
consideration.  If, indeed, her offer to
settle her obligation was refused by private respon­dent, she should have
resorted to the judicial deposit of the amount due in order to release her from
responsibility.

“Petitioner’s claim that
private respon­dent’s cause of action is barred by laches
is untenable.  While it is true that
petitioner’s arrearages date back to February, 1974, however, a tenant’s mere
failure to pay rent does not ipso facto make
unlawful his possession of the leased premises. 
As held by respondent Court of First Instance, it is the failure to pay
rents after
a demand therefor is made that entitles the lessor to bring an action of Unlawful Detainer.  Moreover, the lessor
has the privi­lege to waive his right to bring an action against his tenant and
give the latter credit for the payment of the rents and allow him to continue
indefinitely in the possession of the premises. 
During such period, the tenant would not be in illegal possession of the
premises and the landlord can not maintain an action until after he has taken
steps to convert the legal possession into an illegal possession.  Thus, in the case at bar, the demand on
petitioner to vacate the premises for failure to pay the rentals thereon was
made by private respondent only on August 23, 1976 and the Complaint against
petitioner was filed on September 16, 1976.

“Consequently,
petitioner’s non-payment of the rentals on the premises, notwithstanding demand
made by private respondent, and her failure to avail of the remedy provided for
in Article 1256 of the Civil Code, entitles private respondent to eject her
from the premises.”

Indeed,
the question of whether or not private respondent is the owner of the leased
premises is one of fact which is within the cognizance of the trial court whose
findings thereon will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a showing that
the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the
case.  And since the petitioner has not
presented sufficient proof that the leased premises is not the same lot
registered in the name of the private respondent, the findings of the lower
courts on the fact of ownership of the leased premises will not be disturbed.

The maps attached by the
petitioner to her Reply to the Comment of the private respondent which would
tend to show that Almacen and Sipac
are two (2) different barangays or sitios, cannot offset the findings of the trial court for
lack of proper identifications; in fact, these maps do not even indicate where
the property at No. 164 Int., Gov. Pascual Street is
located.

The petitioner’s contention
that the provisions of Section 1, Commonwealth Act No. 53, should be applied in
this case in determining the credibility of witnesses, is untenable.  The said law provides:

“Sec. 1.  Where a covenant or contract made between the owner of land and a
lessee or tenant on share thereof has not been reduced to writing or has not
been set forth in a document written in a language known to
the lessee or tenant, the testimony of such lessee or tenant shall be accepted as prima facie evidence
on the terms of a covenant
or contract.”

As can be seen, the cited
law can be invoked only when there is a dispute between the owner of the land
and the lessee or tenant on share tenancy as to the terms of an unwritten
contract or where the contract is written in a language not known to
the lessee or tenant.  In the instant
case, there is no dispute as to the terms of the contract
of lease.  Hence, the cited law cannot be
invoked to support the petitioner’s claim that the private respondent is not
the owner of the leased premises or that the petitioner’s version of the facts
of the case is more credible than that of the private respondent.

Besides,
the petitioner’s contention that the private respondent is not the owner of the
leased premises is incon­sistent with her claim that she had tendered payment
of the rentals for the month of January 1976 to the private respondent.^[1]

There
is also no merit in the petitioner’s contention that the lessor
is guilty of mora accipiendi.  The circums­tances surrounding the alleged refusal of
the lessor (private respondent) to accept the
proffered rentals, according to petitioner, are as follows:

“Sometime in 1942,
petitioner entered into a verbal
lease agreement with Lutgarda Cifra
over the premises in question which belonged to the latter.  Aside from the amount of rentals, no other condition or
term was agreed upon.  The rentals were
collected from her residence by the lessor’s
collector who went to her house to demand and collect payment from time to
time, with no fixed frequency (Cf., t.s.n. July 28,
1977, pp. 2-6).

“Sometime in 1974, the lessor’s collector stopped going to the petitioner’s
residence to collect her rentals, as she
had done in the past.  The defendant-appeallant waited for the collector to come but the latter
never showed up again in her neighborhood. 
Since no demand for payment was made upon her, the petitioner decided to
keep the money until the collector comes again to demand and collect payment.

“Sometime in May, 1976,
petitioner received a letter
(Exh.1) from Aurora C. Recto, sister of private respondent, informing the
former that the latter, was the owner of the property in question, was offering
the same for sale.

“Sometime later, or in
August 1977, petitio­ner received another letter, this time from the private
respondent, demanding the surrender of the possession of the premises in
question, also claiming to be the owner of the property.

“Upon receipt of this
letter, petitioner forthwith went to the residence of the collector, another
sister of the private respondent to whom she had been paying her rentals, and there
tendered payment but this was refused without any justification (t.s.n. July 26, 1977, p. 7).”^[2]

Under
the circumstances, the refusal to accept the proffered rentals is not without
justification.  The owner­ship of the
property had been transferred to the private respondent and the person to whom
payment was offered had no authority to accept payment.  It should be noted that the contract of lease
between the petitioner and Lutgarda Cifra, the former owner of the land, was not in writing
and, hence, unrecorded.  The Court has
held that a contract of lease executed by the vendor, unless
recorded, ceases to have effect when the property is sold, in the absence of a contrary
agreement.^[3] The petitioner cannot
claim igno­rance of the transfer of ownership of the property because, by her
own account, Aurora Recto and the private respondent, at various times, had
informed her of their respective claims to ownership of the property, occupied
by the peti­tioner.  The petitioner should have tendered
payment of the rentals to the private respondent and if that was not possible,
she should have consigned such rentals in court.

Finally, we find no merit in
the petitioner’s contention that the private respondent is guilty of laches.  As the Court
of Appeals had stated, the demand for the petitioner to vacate the premises and
to pay arrears in rentals was made on 23 August 1976 and the complaint seeking her ejectment was filed a few days thereafter, or on 16
September 1976.

For reasons aforestated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals appears
to be in accord with the evidence and the law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.  Without pronouncement as to costs.  This decision is immediately
executory.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., (Chairman), no part, Court of Appeals judgment
penned by me.

* Penned by Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera and concurred in by Justices Lorenzo Relova and Simeon M. Gopengco

^[1]
Brief for the Respondent, p. 5

^[2]
Brief for the Petitioner, pp. 1-2

^[3]
Saul vs. Hawkins, 1 Phil. 275