AMPARO C. SERVANDO, CLARA UY BICO, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, VS. PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION, CO., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

This appeal, originally brought to the Court of Appeals, seeks to
set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental in Civil Cases Nos. 7354 and 7428, declaring appellant Philippine
Steam Navigation liable for damages for the loss of the appellees‘
cargoes as a result of a fire which gutted the Bureau of Customs’ warehouse in Pulupandan, Negros Occidental.

The Court of Appeals certified the case to Us
because only pure questions of law are raised therein.

The facts culled from the pleadings and the stipulations
submitted by the parties are as follows:

On November 6, 1963, appellees Clara Uy Bico and Amparo
Servando loaded on board the appellant’s vessel,
FS-176, for carriage from Manila to Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, the following cargoes, to wit:

Clara Uy Bico ?

1,528 cavans of rice valued at P40,907.50;

Amparo Servando
?

44 cartons of colored paper,

toys and general
merchan­dise valued at P1,070.50;

as evidenced by
the corresponding bills of lading issued by the appellant.^[1]

Upon arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan
in the morning of November 18, 1963,
the cargoes were discharged, complete and in good order, unto the warehouse of
the Bureau of Customs.  At about 2:00 in the afternoon of the same day, said
warehouse was razed by a fire of unknown origin, destroying appellees‘
cargoes.  Before the fire, however, appellee Uy Bico
was able to take delivery of 907 cavans of rice.^[2]
Appellees‘ claims for the value of said goods were
rejected by the appellant.

On the bases of the foregoing facts, the lower court rendered a
decision, the decretal portion of which reads as
follows:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. In case No. 7354, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the
plaintiff Amparo C. Servando
the aggregate sum of P1,070.50 with legal interest thereon from the date of the
filing of the complaint until fully paid, and to pay the costs.

2. In case No. 7428, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay to
plaintiff Clara Uy Bico the
aggregate sum of P16,625.00 with legal interest thereon from the date of the
filing of the complaint until fully paid, and to pay the costs.”

Article 1736 of the Civil Code imposes upon common carriers the
duty to observe extraordinary diligence from the moment the goods are
unconditionally placed in their possession “until the same are delivered,
actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee or to the person
who has a right to receive them, without prejudice to the provisions of Article
1738.”

The court a quo held that the delivery of the shipment
in question to the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs is not the delivery
contemplated by Article 1736; and since the burning of the warehouse occurred
before actual or constructive delivery of the goods to the appellees,
the loss is chargeable against the appellant.

It should be pointed out, however, that in the bills of lading
issued for the cargoes in question, the parties agreed to limit the respon­sibility
of the carrier for the loss or damage that may be caused to the shipment by
inserting therein the following stipulation:

“Clause 14.  Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or
damage to shipments billed ‘owner’s risk’ unless such loss or damage is due to
negligence of carrier.  Nor shall carrier
be responsible for loss or damage caused by force majeure,
dangers or accidents of the sea or other waters; war; public enemies; x x x fire x x
x.”

We sustain the validity of the above stipulation; there is
nothing therein that is contrary to law, morals or public policy.

Appellees would contend that the above
stipulation does not bind them because it was printed in fine letters on the
back of the bills of lading; and that they did not sign the same.  This argument overlooks the pronouncement of
this Court in Ong Yiu vs.
Court of Appeals, promulgated June 29,
1979^[3],
where the same issue was resolved in this wise:

“While it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane
ticket (Exh. ‘12′), he is
nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. 
‘Such provisions have been held to be
a part of the contract of carriage, and valid and
binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter’s lack of knowledge or
assent to the regulation’.  It is what is
known as a contract of ‘adhesion’, in regards which it has been said that
contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready made form of contract
on the other, as the plane ticket in the case at bar, are contracts not
entirely prohibited.  The one who adheres
to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he
gives his consent.” (Tolentino, Civil Code, Vol.
IV, 1962 Ed., p. 462, citing Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, Lawyer’s Journal, Jan.
31, 1951, p. 49).

Besides, the agreement
contained in the above quoted Clause 14 is a mere iteration of the basic principle
of law written in Article 1174 of the Civil Code:

“Article 1174.  Except in cases expressly specified by the
law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the
obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for
those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable.”

Thus, where fortuitous
event or force majeure is the immediate and proximate
cause of the loss, the obligor is exempt from liability for non-performance.  The Partidas^[4], the antecedent of Article 1174 of the Civil
Code, defines ‘caso fortuito‘
as ‘an event that takes place by accident and could not have been
foreseen.  Examples of this are
destruction of houses, unexpected fire, shipwreck, violence of robbers.’

In its dissertation of
the phrase ‘caso fortuito‘
the Enciclopedia Juridicada
Española^[5] says: 
“In a legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts,
a ‘caso fortuito‘ presents
the following essential characteristics: 
(1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the
failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the
human will; (2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which
constitutes the ‘caso fortuito‘,
or if it can be fore­seen, it must be impossible to avoid; (3) the occur­rence
must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be free from any
participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.”
In the case at bar, the burning of the customs warehouse was an extraordinary
event which happened independently of the will of the appellant.  The latter could not have foreseen the event.

There is nothing in the record to show that appellant carrier
incurred in delay in the performance of its obligation.  It appears that appellant had not only
notified appellees of the arrival of their ship­ment,
but had demanded that the same be withdrawn. 
In fact, pursuant to such demand, appellee Uy Bico had taken delivery of 907
cavans of rice before the burning of the warehouse.

Nor can the appellant or its employees be charged with
negligence.  The storage of the goods in
the Customs warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by the appellees
was undoubtedly made with their knowledge and consent.  Since the warehouse belonged to and was main­tained
by the government, it would be unfair to impute negligence to the appellant,
the latter having no control whatsoever over the same.

The lower court in its decision relied on the ruling laid down in
Yu Biao Sontua vs. Ossorio^[6],
where this Court held the defendant liable for damages arising from a fire
caused by the negligence of the defendant’s employees while loading cases of
gasoline and petroleum products.  But
unlike in the said case, there is not a shred of proof in the present case that
the cause of the fire that broke out in the Custom’s warehouse was in any way
attributable to the negligence of the appellant or its employees.  Under the circums­tances, the appellant is
plainly not responsible.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby set
aside.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad
Santos, and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., see
concurring opinion.

^[1]
Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H.

^[2]
Par. IV, Complaint; p. 23, Record on Appeal.

^[3]
91 SCRA 224.

^[4]
Law 11, Title 33, Partida 7.

^[5]
5 Enciclopedia Juridicada Española

^[6]
43 Phil. 511.

Clean
Clean

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