GERONIMO E. CAPARAS, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. DOMINGO C. GONZALES AND SANTIAGO L. LINDAYAG, AS CHIEF OF POLICE AND JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, RESPECTIVELY OF GUIGUINTO, BULACAN, …

This is an appeal on certiorari from an order dated March 15, 1961
of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, the Hon. Agustin P. Montesa,
presiding, ruling that the amended complaint in Criminal Case No. 554
of the Justice of the Peace Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, as well as the
order of the said court admitting the said amended complaint, are null
and void and are of no legal force and effect.

On September 20, 1960 , respondent Domingo C. Gonzales, Chief of
Police of Guiguinto, Bulacan, filed a complaint before the Justice of
the Peace Court of said municipality, charging Geronimo E. Caparas, the
petitioner-appellee herein, with the crime of serious physical injuries
thru reckless imprudence. The complaint reads as follows:

“The undersigned Chief of Police, after having been
duly sworn to in accordance with law accuses Geronimo E. Caparas of the
crime of Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence, committed
as follows:

“That on or about the 29th day
of August 1960 * * * the above-named accused then as driver and person
in charge of Luzon Bus Line bearing plate number TPU-5457 (Manila)
while passing along Highway No. 3 of this municipality, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously managed and operated his bug in a negligent
careless and imprudent manner * * * while said passenger Ho Mo was
standing on its running board the conductor of the said bus knocked to
the side of the bus and the driver move faster thus causing passenger
Ho Mo to fall from the said bus and was sandwiched by its rear wheel
thus causing to him serious physical injury.”

The trial started with the presentation of Dr. N. Guzman as the
first witness for the prosecution. Counsel for the defense objected to
the presentation of the witness on the ground that his testimony
regarding the treatment of the offended party would be immaterial and
irrelevant since there is no allegation in the complaint that the
injury which the offended party sustained required or will require
medical attendance. The trial was postponed and counsel for the accused
was required by respondent Justice of the Peace to submit his written
objections to the admission of the testimony of Dr. N. Guzman.

On December 18, 1960 , counsel for the accused submitted his
written objection claiming mainly that there is no allegation of
medical attendance on the offended party. It was argued that the phrase
appearing in the questioned complaint—”thus causing to him serious
physical injury” does not imply the presence of medical attendance,
because even the Revised Penal Code recognizes the existence of
physical injuries that require no medical attendance, citing Art. 236
of the Revised Penal Code. It was claimed that at most, the crime being
charged is slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and
hence, to allow the testimony of Dr. Guzman would substantially affect
the right of the accused, for the prosecution will be proving a crime
far more grievious than the one actually pleaded.

On January 6, 1961 , the trial of the case was resumed and the
respondent Justice of the Peace Court overruled the objections to the
admission of the testimony of Dr. Guzman. Thereafter, the prosecution
filed a motion for leave to amend its complaint. Over the objections of
counsel for the accused, the justice of the peace court granted the
motion. The amendment consisted in a specification of the allegation of
serious physical injuries, thus:

1.  Spinal concussion
2. Massive Hematoma whole back from level of third lumbar down to buttocks and from both hips down to middle of thighs
3. Ruptured urinary bladder with hemorrage
4. Shock, dec., which injuries will require medical attendance for a
   period of 2-3 months and will incapacitate the said Ho Mo from the
   performance of his customary labor for the same period of time.”

A motion for the reconsideration of the ruling of said respondent
judge was denied and the same respondent ordered the trial to proceed
and admitted evidence for the prosecution.

On January 9, counsel for the accused asked that the hearing of the
case be held in abeyance, pending resolution of a contemplated Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari which the accused would file before the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan. In the petition for a writ of certiorari
it is claimed that the amended complaint contains new matters of
substance not alleged in the original complaint; that the admission of
said complaint would prejudice the rights of the accused and is
contrary to the provisions of Sec. 13, Rule 106 of the Rules of Court;
that the trial of the case under such amended complaint would deprive
accused of his right under the Constitution to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Respondents argued that the allegations in the amended complaint,
which are claimed to be substantial in nature, refer to matters of form
and are not prejudicial to the rights of the defendant; that on the
contrary, it will enable the defendant to prepare his defense properly,
that the questioned allegations are details which may properly be
considered as specifications or bills of particulars and cannot
prejudice the interests of the defendants as they do not in any way
alter the nature of the crime charged in the original complaint; that
the submission of a bill of particulars is allowed in criminal cases;
that even prior to the amendment in question, petitioner could be
convicted of serious physical injuries under the original complaint;
that the original complaint as well as the amended complaint charged
the accused with one and the same crime, and that is serious physical
injuries.

The trial court issued the order now being appealed from, finding
and concluding that the amendment in question does not refer to a mere
matter of form, but to a matter of substance and affects and prejudices
the rights of the accused; that it is true that the original complaint
is based on an allegation that the offended party sustained a serious
physical injury but there are, however, several cases of serious
physical injuries and this complaint does not state under which form
the accused is charged; and that the vagueness of the complaint was
such that the accused could have been convicted only of physical
injuries that required no medical attendance or prevented offended
party from engaging in his customary labor; that therefore any attempt
to amend the complaint in order to make it appear that the injuries
sustained by the offended party were of such a nature as to fall under
the most serious physical injuries would prejudice the rights of the
accused herein; that when the accused herein entered a plea of not
guilty to the original charge, the issue was joined whether the crime
committed was serious physical injuries although the same did not
require medical attendance nor incapacitate him for labor; that he
prepared his evidence in accordance with that theory and allegations
regarding medical attendance and the incapacity from labor would upset
his theory and would be most unfair and unjust to him.

Respondents-Appellants in their brief, assigned the following errors:

I

THE
TRIAL COURT BREED IN HOLDING THAT TUB AMENDMENT IN QUESTION IN THIS
CASE DOES NOT REFER TO A MERE MATTER OF FORM BUT IS A MATTER OP
SUBSTANCE.

II

THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT UNDER THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT TFE
ACCUSED COULD HAVE BEEN CONVICTED ONLY OF PHYSICAL INJURIES THAT
REQUIRED NO MEDICAL ATTENDANCE OR PREVENTED THE OFFENDED PARTY PROM
ENGAGING IN HIS CUSTOMARY LABOR.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERKED IN HOLDING THAT THE AMENDMENT TO INCLUDE
ALLEGATIONS REGARDING MEDICAL ATTENDANCE AND INCAPACITY FROM LABOR
WOULD PREJUDICE THE BIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED, UPSET HIS THEORY AND WOULD
BE MOST UNFAIR AND UNJUST TO HIM.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE INSTANT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TO
BE WELL FOUNDED AND ‘IN DECLARING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT AND THE ORDER
ADMITTING THE SAME NULL AND VOID OF NO LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.

The appeal must be sustained. The amendment neither changed the
offense nor introduced new material facts different from those alleged
in the original complaint. By the amendment a general statement (that
offended party suffered a serious physical injury) was made more
specific by the introduction of details and particulars, this the
better to inform the accused of the facts and give him opportunity to
deny them or meet them with his evidence. These details or particulars
could have been admissible at the trial, even without the amendment.

The term grave physical injury has a well denned meaning either in
law or even in common parlance. A wound is an injury; hence any
evidence leading to prove the nature of wound received, by the very
person who healed, (the physician) falls under the term grave physical
injury. The amendment, which specifies the wounds and injuries, does
not change the facts, or the offense, or the gravity thereof. Hence no
prejudice is caused by the amendment to the accused; it is more for his
benefit than anything else because he has time to prepare the evidence
to contradict the details alleged.

The order of the court below reversing the order of the justice of
the peace allowing the amendment of the complaint is therefore reversed
and the case is remanded to the justice of the peace court for the
continuation of the proceedings in accordance herewith. Without costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.