FLAVIANA ACUÑA AND EUSEBIA DIAZ, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. FURUKAWA PLANTATION COMPANY, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

The
Furukawa Plantation Company, a Philippine corporation, is the
registered owner of a large tract of land in the Province of Davao, as
evidenced by original certificate of title No. 2768 (now transfer
certificate of title No. 276) of the land records of that province,
issued more than 30 years ago. As a result of the last war, this tract
of land was turned over to the NAFCO (National Abaca and Other Fibers
Corporation) for administration and disposition and, together with
other Japanese-owned properties in the province, distributed among war
veterans and deserving civilians, each of whom was allocated five
hectares pursuant to the directives of the President of the Philippines
and the agreement entered into between the Philippine Veterans Legion
and the NAFCO.

Among those favored with an allocation were
Flaviana Acuña and her daughter Eusebia Diaz, two homesteaders within
the area covered by the Furukawa Plantation Company’s title, who,
however, turned down their allocation, claiming that they were entitled
to the whole area occupied by them—some 31 hectares—and, on this claim
being denied, brought the present action against the company in the
Court of First Instance of Davao. The complaint sets up three causes of
action and alleges that plaintiffs are the widow and daughter,
respectively of Roman Diaz, deceased, who, as a homestead applicant,
was, on August 18, 1914, granted by the Director of Lands a provisional
permit to occupy and clear 31.79 hectares of public land in sitio
Calanitoi, municipality of Santa Cruz, Davao Province; that since then,
Roman Diaz and (after his death) plaintiffs themselves have been
cultivating and improving the said land, planting it to coconut and
other fruit trees and food crops, and building thereon two residential
houses; that, through fraud and strategy, defendant was able to include
the said land and the improvements thereon in its certificate of title,
though acknowledging plaintiffs’ right thereto under a general
annotation on the certificate which says: “Except those herein
expressly noted as belonging to other persons;” that as defendant’s
certificate of title does not give the names of those “other persons,”
it is necessary that plaintiffs “be expressly declared and (their
names) annotated” as among the persons referred to; and that defendant
and its agents have been abetting its overseer and other persons in
occupying plaintiff’s coconut plantation and committing depredations
thereon to the damage and prejudice of said plaintiffs. Plaintiffs,
therefore, pray that they be declared to be “among those persons noted
as owners of the improvements included in (defendant’s) transfer
certificate of title No. 276;” that defendant be made to cede to them
the 31.79 hectares of land on which the improvements owned by them
stand; and that defendant be made to pay damages and, together with
those acting under its authority, enjoined from “committing further
acts of dispossession and despoliation” on the homestead.

Before answering the complaint, defendant moved that it be dismissed,
and the court granted the motion on the grounds that the complaint did
not state a cause of action, that plaintiffs’ action had already
prescribed, and that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter thereof. From the order of dismissal plaintiffs appealed to the
Court of Appeals, but that court has certified the case here because of
the nature of the questions involved.

For a proper
resolution of these questions, it should be stated at the outset that
despite the allegation of “fraud and strategy” in the procurement of
defendant’s title, the validity or incontestability of that title has
already become indefeasible because of the more than 30 years that have
elapsed since the decree of registration was entered. What plaintiffs
appear to claim is that, while the land occupied by them as homestead
is embraced in defendant’s Torrens title, the improvements thereon are
expressly excluded therefrom, being among those note down in the
Torrens certificate as properties belonging to other persons. On this
hypothesis, plaintiffs are asking for three specific remedies, namely:
(1) to have their names inscribed in defendant’s certificate of title
as owners of said improvements; (2) to have defendant cede to them the
land on which the improvements stand; and (3) to have defendant pay
damages for depredations committed on plaintiffs’ coconut plantation by
persons acting under defendant’s authority and to have a writ issued to
enjoin “further acts of dispossession and despoliation.”

With respect to the first remedy, which is the subject of the first
cause of action and which plaintiffs seek to obtain through an action
for declaratory relief under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, we note
that plaintiffs are not merely asking for a determination of their
rights through a judicial interpretation of defendant’s certificate of
title. What they want is to have that certificate amended by having
their names inscribed thereon as owners of the improvements existing on
the homestead occupied by them but registered in defendant’s name. This
is a remedy that can be granted only under the Land Registration Act
and is, therefore, not within the scope and purpose of an action for
declaratory relief as contemplated in Rule 66. If plaintiff’s first
cause of action is to succeed, it must be formulated by proper petition
in the original case where the decree of registration was entered, and
with notice to all persons whose rights might be affected by the
proposed amendment to the certificate of title. It may be stated that
an amendment of that kind is not barred by the incontestability of
defendant’s Torrens title, since this contains a special reservation
with respect to improvements belonging to other persons.

The
second remedy—which is the objective of plaintiffs’ second cause of
action—is sought to be attained through an action for “specific
performance”. But it is obvious that an action of that kind will not
lie, since plaintiffs are not seeking the fulfillment of any contract.
What they ask for is that defendant be made to cede to them the land
covered by their homestead and for that they invoke article 361 of the
Old Civil Code (article 448 of the new) which gives “the owner of land
on which anything has been built, sown, or planted, in good faith,” the
right “to appropriate the thing so built, sown, or planted, upon paying
the compensation mentioned in articles 453 and 454, or to compel the
person who has built or planted to pay him the value of the land, and
the person who sowed thereon to pay the proper rent therefor.” But the
article invoked does not give plaintiffs, as owners of the
improvements, the right to compel defendant, as registered owner of the
land, to cede to them, by sale or otherwise, the land in question.
Under the article, it is the owner of the land that has the right to
choose between acquiring the improvements and selling the land. An
action predicated on the assumption that the option may be exercised by
the owner of the improvements is clearly without legal basis.

On the assumption that plaintiffs are the owners of the improvements on
the land occupied by them and that defendant’s men or those acting
under its authority are committing depredations thereon, there can be
no question that plaintiffs should be entitled to the remedy sought in
their third cause of action, that is, to have the depredations stopped
and indemnity paid for damages suffered. We note, however, that the
complaint does not identify and delimit the land on which plaintiffs’
improvements stand, the complaint being for that reason defective.

To summarize, it is our conclusion that (1) plaintiffs may not in the
present case ask for the remedy sought in their first cause of action,
for the reason that an amendment to a Torrens certificate of title may
be had only in the original case where the decree of registration was
entered; (2) plaintiffs’ second cause of action is untenable; and (3)
plaintiffs’ complaint is defective with respect to the third cause of
action because it does not give the metes and bounds of the property
sought to be protected by a writ of injunction.

Wherefore,
the order of dismissal is affirmed with respect to the first and second
causes of action, and modified as to the third in the sense that this
cause of action shall be deemed definitely dismissed if the complaint
is not properly amended within ten days from the time this decision
becomes final. Without costs.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.