CENON MATEO, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. HON. FLORENCIO MORENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

This case, elevated to the Court of Appeals by the petitioner for
review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing his
petition for injunction, was subsequently certified to us under Section 31 of
Republic Act No. 296.

Sometime in 1959 a number of residents of Guiguinto,
Bulacan, sent a letter-complaint to the Highway
District Engineer of that province asking that the Sapang
Cabay, a public navigable stream, which had been
blocked by means of dikes and dams and converted into fishponds, be ordered
reopened and restored to its original condition.  The letter was referred to the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, who caused an investigation to be conducted
pursuant to Republic Act No. 2056. 
Acting on the report which the investigator submitted to him, the
Secretary rendered his decision on August 10, 1959, finding that the Sapang Cabay was a public
navigable stream and ordering Cenon Mateo, the herein
petitioner-appellant, who had in the meantime acquired the property inside
which the said creek is situated, to remove the dikes and dams therein
constructed within thirty days from notice; otherwise they would be removed at his expense.  Mateo moved to reconsider but was turned
down, whereupon he filed the basic petition to restrain the respondent
Secretary from enforcing his decision. 
The petition, as already stated, was dis­missed by the Court a quo.  The certification of the appeal to us was
upon motion of both parties in view of the con­stitutional question involved.

Five errors are ascribed to the decision of dismissal, to
wit:  (1) in not holding that the
respondent Secretary had no jurisdiction to conduct the investigation (of the
original complaint) and order the removal of the dikes and dams constructed in
the fishponds of the appel­lant; (2) in not holding that Republic Act No. 2056
is unconstitutional because it unduly delegates judicial power to the Secretary
and unlawfully deprives the appel­lant and others similarly situated of their
property with­out due process of law; (3) granting that Republic Act No. 2056
is constitutional, in not holding that it is
inapplicable to the instant case; (4) in finding that the Sapang Cabay is a public navigable waterway
belonging to the public domain; (5) in disregarding and failing to give legal
effect to the Torrens Certificate of title of the appellant covering the
property in question; and (6) in not issuing the writ of injunction prayed for.

The first two errors assigned are interrelated.  They pose the argument that when the question
at issue is whether or not a certain body of water is private property or
constitutes a navigable stream or river of the public domain, the same is
essentially judicial and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications to inquire into and decide; and that insofar as
Republic Act No. 2056 purports to confer that power upon him it does so in
violation of the Constitution.

The constitutionality of
the aforesaid statute has been upheld by this Court in Lovina
vs. Moreno, G. R. No. L-17821, November
29, 1963, shortly
before the present appeal was submitted for decision.  That case held, furthermore, that the absence
of any mention of a navigable stream within a property covered by a certificate of title does not:  preclude a subsequent in­vestigation and
determination of its existence nor make it private property of the title
holder; that the findings of fact made by the Secretary of Public Works and
Communi­cations should be respected in the absence of illegality, error of law,
fraud or imposition, as long as such findings are supported by substantial
evidence; and that the owner­ship of a navigable stream or of the bed thereof
is not subject to acquisitive prescription.

In the memorandum filed by the petitioner-appellant after Lovina vs. Moreno was decided, he submits that all but one
of the issues he raised have been settled by that decision, and that the only
issue which remains is the applicability of Republic Act No. 2056 in the
instant case.  He concedes the authority
of the Secretary to decide, after hearing, whether or not a river or creek is navigable
and therefore belongs to the public domain; whether or not the dikes and dams
complained against encroach upon or obstruct such navigable river or creek, or communal
fishing grounds; and whether or not the dikes and dams constitute public
nuisances or prohibited constructions. 
The plea, however, is that in the light of the facts established at the
investigation ordered by the respondent Secretary his conclusion that Sapang Cabay is a public
navigable creek constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.

We see nothing in the argument which would justify a departure in
the present case from the “substantial-evidence” rule as a limitation
upon the scope of judicial review in administrative cases.  Substantial evidence, it has been held,
“is more than a scintilla.  It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.”^[1]

Under this rule the courts are not
supposed to reassess the evidence, determine its preponderance on either side,
and substitute its own findings for those of the administrative agency.  All that the court does is to inquire from
the record if the findings are based on substantial evidence.  If so, the findings are deemed conclusive.

In the present case the evidence in support of the respondent
Secretary’s decision is more than merely substantial.  The testimony of several witnesses is
correctly summarized in the brief submitted by the Solicitor General, as
follows:

“Ocular inspection of the entire length of the creek up to Guiguinto, shows that portions of the creek are closed by
dikes (pp. 85, 92, 93 Exh. 1, Def.), that traces of
the path of the Cabay Creek within
petitioner-appellants fishpond are still visible by the nature of the mud; that
a manmade canal detours the creek from its original path (Ibid, 89); that the
widest portion of the creek is from 70 to 75 meters wide (Ibid, 91); that Juan
Bernardo, 79 years old in 1959, and resident of Guiguinto
from birth, testified (that) as a result of the closing of said creek for
fishpond purposes, it deprived the public the use of the same for fishing,
gathering fruits and fuel, and that surrounding areas are over flooded during
heavy rain as water from creek could not be drained to the river (Ibid, 95-96,
98); that in 1917, he complained to the Chief of Police, Demetrio
Bernardo, against the construction of dikes across said Cabay
Creek (Ibid, 98); that he used to go fishing on said creek before its closure
(Ibid, 98); that they usually rode on boats in entering the creek (Ibid,
98-99); that Jose Mojica, 70 years old in 1959, and a
resident of Guiguinto, testified that Petra Gatmaitan was the second claimant to said creek, the first
being Venancio Gatmaitan;
that the same was sold to Modesto Pascual, then to Encarnacion Jacobo and lastly to
present petitioner-appellant (Ibid. 107); that petitioner-appellant used a
bulldozer to elevate the dikes crossing the creek which encloses the fishpond
(Ibid, 108); that they used to fish on said creek before its closure gather nipa palms and fuel, and catch shrimps (Ibid, 109); that
they used bancas along the creek before its closure,
particularly when carrying rice seedlings to distant ricefields
for planting purposes (Ibid, 111); that during the flood season the creek is
waist-deep and even more, and surrounding ricelands
are over-flooded (Ibid, 111); that Isidra de la Cruz,
65 years old in 1959, and a resident of Guiguinto,
testified that she drafted a resolution complaining against the issuance of
title covering said creek (Ibid 117-118); that Agripino
de la Cruz testified that the creek is public property across which a tall dike
was constructed (Ibid, 118-120); that the surrounding ricelands
are flooded during heavy rains because the man-made canal is not sufficient to
contain the volume of water coming from the creek (Ibid, 121); that he knew
that Guiguinto folks made use of fish-traps for
catching fish therefrom (mid, 122); that in his
children days, he used to see bancas going thru the
creek; that although before its closure overflooding
did not usually occur even after continuous heavy rains, things have changed
now and overflooding occurs frequently (Ibid,
123-124); that Julian Manicad, 70 years old in 1959,
declared that before its closure, people fished there, gathered fuel and nipa palms, but it is different now, and the surrounding
areas are easily flooded whenever there is heavy rain (Ibid, 143); that the
people of Guiguinto once complained to the
authorities about said closure (ibid, 144); that before its closure, he and his
brother-in-law used to go fishing there, riding on a banca
(Ibid, 159-160); that Pedro Dionisio, 64 years in
1959, declared that before its closure, they used to fish, gather firewood and nipa palms on said creek; that its closure has caused the
flooding of surrounding areas, thereby resulting in poor rice harvests (Ibid,
152-154); that ocular inspection further showed that there is a man-made canal
about 5 feet deep and between 4 to 8 feet wide which diverts the water from the
main path of Cabay Creek as said canal is within the fishpond;
that the canal ends at Guiguinto River (Ibid,
185-186); that portions of Cabay Creek is within
respondent-appellant’s fishpond and the water therein is deep enough for bancas to sail over it (Ibid, 190-191).”

The documentary evidence
shows that as long ago as 1941 there were already complaints against the
closure of the Sapang Cabay
by the petitioner-appellant’s predeces­sor-in-interest, Modesto Pascual; that the municipal
council of Guiguinto passed a resolution on November
22 of the same year, requesting the Secretary of Public Works and Communi­cations
to order the removal of the obstruction; that the administrative proceedings for that purpose were interrupted
by the war, but reopened in 1948, and again in 1952, pursuant to similar
resolutions of the same municipal council; and that in 1954 the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications rendered a decision ordering Encarnacion Jacobo, who was then
the owner from whom the petitioner-appellant subsequently bought the property,
to remove the dikes she had constructed.  It is
true that Encarnacion Jacobo
was able to get her free patent application approved in 1953 and to secure the
corresponding certificate of title, but said title did not change the public
character of the Sapang Cabay,
the same being covered by one
of exceptions mentioned in Section 39 of Act No. 496.^[2]

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed,
with costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Chief Justice Hughes, in Consolidated Edison Co. vs. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S.
197; 83 Ed. 126 (1938); Ang Tibay
vs. CIR, 69 Phil. 635.

^[2]
Mercado vs. Macabebe, 59 Phil. 592.