CARLOS S. ROSALES, CHARLIE LIM AND ARIEL SATO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. EDGAR MANILAG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 33 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BUTUAN CITY, A…
LOPEZ, J.:
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On November 25, 2008, private respondent Marvin Aqua Resources, Inc. a corporation duly organized under Philippine laws, as represented by its president Luis Reyes, instituted a Complaint[8] for “Enforcement of Easement Right of Way under Article 652,[9] Civil Code; Damages and Attorney’s Fees with Prayers for TRO[10] or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.” The Complaint was filed against the defendants Heirs of Teofilo M. Santos, Jr. as represented by their attorney-in-fact Carlos S. Rosales; the City of Butuan as represented by the City Mayor; Wilfredo D. Sagusay in his capacity as Building Official; Richard Young as represented by Hermes Montilla; Charlie Lim; and Ariel Sato. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5843 and heard before public respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Butuan City.
Private respondent alleged in its Complaint that it is the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land known as Lot 2-A covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT for brevity) No. RT-31561[11] with an area of 3,528 square meters situated at Butuan City. Private respondent acquired said land from the Development Bank of the Philippines which, in turn foreclosed the same as unredeemed collateral for a loan of a certain Alejandro Silaga. The latter acquired the land from a certain Teodoro Y. Tan who, in turn bought the same from the late Teofilo M. Santos, Jr., whose heirs are one of the defendants in the case below.[12] Private respondent constructed a two-storey commercial building in Lot 2-A known as “Lynzees”.[13] Fronting the building (southwestern[14] part) is the disputed land which consists of 53.69[15] square meters allegedly used as a sidewalk and to be used in a proposed road widening for J. Rosales Avenue.[16]
Without notice to private respondent however, defendant Heirs of Teofilo M. Santos, Jr., the owners of the other parcels of land surrounding private respondent’s land, entered into several lease contracts with co-defendant Richard Young and petitioners Charlie Lim and Ariel Sato to use the disputed land. Defendant Richard Young had already acquired a building permit from defendant City of Butuan to build a perspective “Mister Donut” restaurant while petitioners Charlie Lim and Ariel Sato already have their respective building permits for the building of “D’ Agusan Lechon Manok” and “Park N’ Heaven”, respectively. This being the case, the entire frontage of private respondent’s land along J. Rosales Avenue is blocked by the structures to be built and already built by defendant Richard Young on one hand and petitioners Charlie Lim and Ariel Sato on the other.[17]
According to private respondent, since defendants Heirs of Teofilo M. Santos, Jr. is the servient estate, in addition to the fact that their predecessor-in-interest is the vendor who sold Lot 2-A to Teodoro Y. Tan, they are therefore bound to provide an easement of right of way to it under Article 652[18] of the Civil Code.[19]
In their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim,[20] petitioners claimed that they are the owners of the disputed land, thus they have the authority to lease out their land. Moreover, there are two existing passageways to and from the private respondent’s land to a public highway, hence, it can no longer claim additional easement of right of way.
On December 8, 2008, public respondent set a summary hearing to determine the propriety of the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO for brevity). After evaluating the arguments of the parties, public respondent issued a TRO on the next day or on December 9, 2008.[21]
On December 17, 2008, the case was set for hearing to resolve the issue on whether or not a Writ of Preliminary Injunction should be issued.[22]
On December 22, 2008, public respondent issued the first assailed Order[23] which granted private respondent’s prayer for the issuance of a Writ, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining all the defendants, their lawyers, agents, representatives or all other persons acting for and in their behalf, to cease and desist from putting erecting or building any structure on that 53.69 meters stretch of Lot 3 fronting MARVIN’S Lynzees building and to remove any and all such structures not authorized by MARVIN, upon putting up a bond in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS duly approved by the court, which bond shall be executed by the plaintiff in favor of the defendants to answer for the damages arising from or in connection with the issuances of the writ in the event that the court will finally declare that the plaintiff is, after all not entitled to the writ.
SO ORDERED.”[24]
After the payment of the required bond[25] on the following day, public respondent issued the assailed Writ of Preliminary Injunction.[26]
On May 8, 2009, petitioners sought reconsideration and dissolution of the Writ.[27] On July 9, 2009 however, public respondent denied petitioners’ motion. The latter no longer challenged the assailed two issuances to this Court.[28]
On February 2, 2010, private respondent filed a Motion to Fully Implement Injunctive Writ. Private respondent averred that on January 5, 2009, Sheriff Archibald Verga, submitted a Return of Service which stated that a copy of the Order dated December 22, 2008 and Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated December 23, 2008 were served upon defendants Heirs of Teofilo M. Santos, Jr. It appears however that Sheriff Verga merely treated the same as service of summons. Since private respondent has a pending case against Sheriff Verga docketed as OCA IPA No. 099-3159-P, the former prayed that if its Motion be granted, a sheriff from another branch of the court be designated to fully implement the Writ by removing any and all structures in the disputed land that it did not authorize.[29]
On March 25, 2010, public respondent issued its other assailed Order[30] which stated that since Sheriff Verga was not able to fully implement the Writ, the same should be given full force and effect by removing all structures in the disputed land not authorized by private respondent. The decretal portion of Order provides:
“WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby GRANTED. Sheriff George E. Viajar, the Branch Sheriff of RTC-4 of this court, is hereby designated to fully implement the subject writ of preliminary injunction by removing any and all structures not authorized by plaintiff Marvin, specifically “Park n’ Heaven and D’ Agusan Lechon Manok”, and any other structures of the defendants on the said 53.69 square meters stretch of Lot 3 fronting plaintiff’s property, provided that proper clearance from the Clerk of Court as Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff and the Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 4 to which sala Sheriff Viajar is assigned as Sheriff, shall have been properly obtained.
SO ORDERED.”[31]
On May 6, 2010, petitioners instituted the present “Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Mandamus with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction.”[32] In their Memorandum,33 petitioners raised the following issues:
“WHETHER RESPONDENT JUDGE MAY LAWFULLY ESTABLISH AN EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY THROUGH A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WHEN TWO EASEMENTS ARE ALREADY EXISTING(;)
WHETHER RESPONDENT JUDGE MAY LAWFULLY CONSTITUTE THE ENTIRE PROPERTY OF PETITIONERS AS EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY (AND)
WHETHER IN DOING SO(,) RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISIDICTION(.)”[34]
Meanwhile on May 11, 2010, Sheriff George E. Viajar submitted a Return of Service[35] which stated that on May 6 and 7, 2010, the assailed Writ of Preliminary Injunction was fully implemented.
On September 28, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution[36] which directed the parties to inform Us whether or not the Order dated December 22, 2008 and Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated December 23, 2008 have been fully implemented.
On October 18, 2010, private respondent submitted a Compliance[37] with attached Sheriff’s Return of Service38 dated May 11, 2010 which stated that indeed the Order and Writ were fully implemented. This was corroborated by Sheriff Viajar himself who also attached a copy of his Return of Service.[39]
With the foregoing, this Court issued a Resolution[40] dated August 4, 2011 which denied petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction since the well-entrenched rule is that consummated acts can no longer be restrained by injunction.
Now, to the Petition.
At the outset, it bears to note that in the present Petition, petitioners are assailing, among others, the Order dated December 22, 2008 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated December 23, 2008. Petitioners subsequently sought reconsideration thereof which was however denied in public respondent’s Order dated July 3, 2009. Petitioners never challenged the latter Order to this Court;[41] hence, the same has already become final.
The well-entrenched rule in Our jurisdiction is that once a judgment or order has already become final, it cannot be altered not even by the highest court of the land. Certainly, the elementary rule on finality of judgment or order is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts must become final at some definite date fixed by law.[42] The case of PNB Credit Card Corporation v. Rodriguez[43] is instructive:
“In Olympia International vs. Court of Appeals, we stated, thus:
Xxx xxx xxx
The law grants an aggrieved party a period of fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the court’s decision or order disposing of the action or proceeding to appeal or move to reconsider the same.
After the lapse of the fifteen-day period, an order becomes final and executory and is beyond the power or jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further amend or revoke. A final judgment or order cannot be modified in any respect, even if the modification sought is for the purpose of correcting an erroneous conclusion by the court which rendered the same.” (Emphasis Supplied)
Also in Selga v. Brar,[44] the Supreme Court stressed:
“As we held in Ram’s Studio and Photographic Equipment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, a judgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, hence, may no longer be modified in any respect except to correct clerical errors or mistakes, all the issues between the parties being deemed resolved and laid to rest. We added in Manila Electric Company v. Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. that a final and executory judgment or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. Although judicial determinations are not infallible, judicial error should be corrected through appeals, not through repeated suits on the same claim.” (Emphasis Supplied)
What petitioners should have done therefore is to challenge the Order dated July 3, 2009 together with the Writ of Preliminary Injunction before this Court via Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 within the reglementary period provided by law. The case of United Coconut Planters Bank v. Untied Alloy Philippines Corporation[45] is explicit:
“An order granting a preliminary injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory, is interlocutory and unappealable. However, it may be challenged by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Being preliminary, such an order need not strictly follow Section 5 of Rule 51 requiring that “every decision or final resolution of the court in appealed cases shall clearly and distinctly state the findings of fact and conclusions of law on which it is based x x x.”” (Emphasis Supplied)
Regrettably for petitioners however, they failed to avail of this remedy and instead wait for the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Order dated July 3, 2009 to attain finality. This being the case, petitioners cannot now cry foul over the effect of their inaction. They only have themselves to blame.
The Order dated December 22, 2008 and Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated December 23, 2008 therefore could no longer be challenged and petitioners erred in including them as two of the assailed issuances in the present Petition.
Furthermore, We note that petitioners attempted to resuscitate, after more than one year, an otherwise final and adverse issuances against them. It may be recalled that the Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction were issued on December 22, 2008 and December 23, 2008, respectively. Petitioners’ subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in public respondent’s Order dated July 3, 2009. The latter Order was no longer challenged to this Court. On February 2, 2010, private respondent filed its Motion to Fully Implement Injunctive Writ, which public respondent granted in its Order dated March 25, 2010.
Petitioners’ present recourse of filing their Petition is not proper since the Order dated March 25, 2010 merely enforced the first two issuances of public respondent. As public respondent pointed out, the assailed Writ was not fully implemented, thus the need to grant private respondent’s Motion.[46] In other words, petitioners cannot possibly use to their advantage the Order dated March 25, 2010 to reset anew their period to challenge the already final Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued against them.
Given the foregoing, We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent in issuing the Order dated March 25, 2010 as to warrant the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Grave abuse of discretion is defined as “xxx capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility,”[47] which was not shown in the Petition to have been committed by public respondent.
With the foregoing pronouncement, We find it unnecessary to discuss the issues raised by petitioners. The parties’ respective discussions on the merit of the case which include the propriety of the issuance of the Writ cannot be considered here as it is already beyond the province of the present certiorari case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The assailed Order dated December 22, 2008, Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated December 23, 2008 and Order dated March 25, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Butuan City, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
Camello, J., Ch., and Inting, JJ., concur.
[1] See Rollo, p. 11
[2] See Rollo, p. 10
[3] See Rollo, p. 12
[4] Rollo, pp. 2-48
[5] Rollo, pp. 72-75
[6] Rollo, pp. 76-77
[7] Rollo, pp. 10-11
[8] Rollo, pp. 12-26
[9] Article 652. Whenever a piece of land acquired by sale, exchange or partition, is surrounded by other estates of the vendor, exchanger, or co-owner, he shall be obliged to grant a right of way without indemnity.
In case of a simple donation, the donor shall be indemnified by the donee for the establishment of the right of way.
[10] Temporary Restraining Order
[11] Rollo, pp. 27-28
[12] Rollo, p. 74
[13] Rollo, p. 74
[14] “Western” part in some parts of the rollo. See rollo, p. 18
[15] 53.68 in some parts of the rollo
[16] Rollo, pp. 15-16
[17] Rollo, pp. 16-18
[18] Article 652. Whenever a piece of land acquired by sale, exchange or partition, is surrounded by other estates of the vendor, exchanger, or co-owner, he shall be obliged to grant a right of way without indemnity.
In case of a simple donation, the donor shall be indemnified by the donee for the establishment of the right of way.
[19] Rollo, pp. 18-20
[20] Rollo, pp. 63-69
[21] Rollo, p. 72
[22] Rollo, p. 72
[23] Rollo, pp. 72-75
[24] Rollo, p. 75
[25] Rollo, p. 146
[26] Rollo, pp. 76-77
[27] Rollo, pp. 171; 185-193
[28] Rollo, pp. 10-11
[29] Rollo, pp. 148-149
[30] Rollo, pp. 10-11
[31] Rollo, p. 11
[32] Rollo, pp. 2-9
[33] Rollo, pp. 218-231
[34] Rollo, pp. 223-224
[35] Rollo, p. 93
[36] Rollo, pp. 82-83
[37] Rollo, pp. 89-92
[38] Rollo, p. 93
[39] Rollo, pp. 101-105
[40] Rollo, pp. 121-123
[41] Rollo, pp. 10-11
[42] Team Pacific Corporation v. Daza, G.R. No. 167732, July 11, 2012
[43] G.R. No. 156336, August 31, 2006
[44] G.R. No. 175151, September 21, 2011
[45] G.R. No. 152238, January 28, 2005
[46] Rollo, p. 11
[47] Ganaden v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 170500 & 170510-11, June 1, 2011