IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF YAN HANG TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. YAN HANG, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLEE.

Yan Hang, a subject of Nationalist China, appeals from a judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Manila (in its Civil Case No. 38806)
denying his application to be naturalized as a Filipino citizen.

The lower court’s reasons for refusing naturalization were:

(a) That petitioner’s verified application as well
as his sworn testimony in court were to the effect that he arrived in
the Philippines on September sixteen (16) 1935, contradicting his
Declaration of Intention, made under oath, which stated the date of his
arrival as September eighteen (18) 1935;

(b) That his
Declaration of Intention was not accompanied by the Certificate of
Arrival, as required by the 1939 Rules and Regulations of the
Department of Justice;

(c) The implausibility of applicant’s
claim that his first employment upon arrival was as a waiter in a
Chinese restaurant (panciteria) for several years, when he claimed that
his father was a partner in a Manila grocery store;

(d) That
according to his verified petition and Declaration of Intention,
applicant’s place of birth was simply stated as Canton, China; while in
his immigration certificate, it appears that he was born in Pun Chong,
Yin Tun, China, and there was no explanation for the discrepancy; and

(e)
That applicant claimed having resided at the Wah Nen Panciteria in
Azcarraga, Manila, where he was also employed between November, 1945
and May, 1950, but his alien certificate of residence (Exhibit E) shows
his residence to have been at 905 Misericordia, Manila, and as his
employer one Wah Nen of Olongapo, Zambales, whose business was a
“panciteria”.

Petitioner, in due time, moved for reconsideration and new trial,
averring that the discrepancy as to his true date of arrival was due to
a mistake of the notary who drew up the declaration of intention
submitted to the office of the Solicitor General, and submitted the
notary’s affidavit to that effect; that he did not submit his
Certificate of Arrival with his declaration of intention because the
Certificate had been surrendered to the immigration authorities and
replaced by his Immigrant’s Certificate of Residence and his Alien
Certificate of Registration, copies of which he had attached to the
declaration of intention; that applicant was really born at “Pun Chong,
Yin Tun, Canton/China”, as shown by a Certificate issued by the Embassy
of the Republic of China; and sought to explain the other discrepancies
noted by the court below. He also asked for a new trial for the
reception of additional evidence. The trial court, not satisfied with
the proffered explanation, denied the reconsideration and reopening.
Thereupon, applicant duly appealed to this Court, claiming errors and
abuse of discretion.

We have gone over the brief of the appellant and the records of the
case, and find that the trial court’s doubts as to the veracity of
applicant’s evidence and testimony are justified, and that the decision
below should be affirmed, Taking the discrepancy in the dates of
arrival, as set forth in the application and the declaration of
intention, together with appellant’s failure to submit copy of his
certificate of arrival, which was required by the regulations and which
would have easily shown the alleged mistake in typing the declaration
of intention; and coupling such deficiency with applicant’s failure to
specify in his petition, which was the one published in the newspapers,
the full details on the place of his birth, in lieu of the vague
reference to “Canton China” when appellant fully well knew the details
(“Pun Chong, Yin Tun, Canton, China”) which could have pinpointed the
place where he was born; these circumstances combined generate the
conviction that appellant has observed a studied evasiveness about
important details concerning his place of birth and date of arrival. It
is plain that such circumstances are of importance in determining the
personal identity of applicant, and serve to differentiate him from
others bearing the same name; his omissions, therefore, resulted in
that persons who might be in possession of derogatory information
concerning him would not come forward with it, being left in doubt as
to the true identity of this applicant. Appellant’s conduct thus
militated against the intent of the law in requiring full disclosure
about an applicant’s personal circumstances, and justifies the denial
of the naturalization sought (Cf. Yu Seco vs. Republic, 108 Phil. 807)

In addition, we find the testimony of at least one of the supporting
witnesses, Bartolome Dijangco, unreliable as to the date supplied by
him concerning this appellant, for it shows that said witness had no
opportunity to closely observe the latter. Dijangco had been a neighbor
of appellant for only five years, and could not state applicant’s
residence before that; had not known the members of applicant’s family;
had not met applicant for ten years, except when applicant came to buy
rice or when they met in the street. Hence, the assertion of this
witness concerning the conduct, habits, and qualifications of appellant
are not credible.

Naturalization being a privilege and not a right, it is incumbent
upon the applicant to fully establish his qualifications. Whether a
hearing should be reopened to enable him to supply deficiencies of
evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we
see in its denial no abuse in the present case.

We conclude that the denial of the application for naturalization should be, as it hereby is, affirmed. Costs against appellant.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.