BASILIA CABRERA AND RAMON DIOKNO, PETITIONERS, VS. FLORENCIA BELEN AND ALFONSO BUISER, RESPONDENTS.

This case originated in the Court of First Instance of Laguna as an
action for “reinvindicacion”, with the herein petitioners Basilia
Cabrera and Ramon Diokno as plaintiffs, and Florencia Belen and Alfonso
Buiser, herein respondents, as defendants. The court rendered judgment
for the plaintiffs, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

“In view of the foregoing consideration, the court
declares Atty. Ramon Diokno to be entitled to the property in question
and, therefore, declares him to be so. Hence defendants are ordered to
execute a deed of conveyance in favor of the plaintiff, Atty. Ramon
Diokno. The said plaintiff is entitled to damages of P900 per annum
from July 1943 to the date of the finality of the decision, making the
injunction issued permanent and perpetual, with costs against the
defendants.”

The respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which, on
December 8, 1951, rendered a decision affirming the judgment a quo,
with the sole modification that the amount of damages was reduced to
P600 per annum. The petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this
decision, contending (1) that the Court of Appeals could not reduce the
amount of damages because the respondents did not assign the matter of
damages as error, and (2) that it failed to award in favor of the
petitioners the interest provided for in section 6, Rule 53, of the
Rules of Court. Unsuccessful, the petitioners have come to this Court
by way of certiorari, assigning the following errors:

“I. No habiendose incluido en la relacion de errores de los
recurridos la cuestion de si estaba o no con arreglo a la prueba la
adjudicacion de P900.00 anuales a favor de uno de los recurridos, el
Honorable Tribunal de Apelaciones erro al revisar tal cuestion y
reducir por tanto la cuantia de los danos.”

“II. El Honorable Tribunal de Apelaciones erro al ignorar las disposiciones sobre adjudicacion de intereses1 a la sentencia”

While it is true that in the Court of Appeals the respondents did
not make a specific assignment of error regarding the amount of
damages, in the body of their brief they discussed at length and did
assail the correctness of the trial court’s finding on the matter. Said
discussion of course warranted the appellate court to rule upon the
point, because it substantially complied with section 5 of Rule 53,
intended merely to compel the appellant to specify the questions which
he wants to raise and be disposed of on his appeal. For a vague and
“general statement leaves the court absolutely in the dark as to
what to look for, and forces the court to struggle through the trial
and records in an effort to pick out what is intended to be urged”
(Moran’s Comment on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. I, p. 996). Upon
the other hand a clear discussion regarding an error allegedly
committed by the trial court accomplishes the purpose of a particular
assignment of error. As. said in the case of Santos vs.. Rivera (28
Phil. 515), * * * While not being set off by itself and labelled as an
assignment of error, this statement makes the point as effectually if
not as artistically,” and “* * * Although the brief of appellant is not
a literal compliance with the rules of court, nor is it a work of art
from a professional point of view, still we do not believe the
departure from the prescribed practice has been so radical as to call
for a dismissal of the case.”

Petitioners’ second assignment of error, like the first, is not well
taken. Section 6 of Rule 53, invoked by the petitioners, provides that
“When the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals is upon an
interest-bearing claim, it shall bear the same rate of interest; when
upon a non-interest-bearing claim, it shall bear the legal rate of
interest.” In our opinion, this merely authorizes the granting of
interest on the judgment of the appellate court in proper cases,
namely, in favor of a party who has appealed and claimed and
established his right to interest at the outset; certainly not in favor
of a party who, as appellee, occupies only a defensive position in
sustaining the appealed judgment. The concession of interest under
section 6 of Rule 53 cannot be considered as a penalty for appealing,
because this would attach a string to the statutory privilege to appeal
and would impose the presumption that the appellant is always acting in
bad faith. If petitioners’ contention were adopted, we shall have a
situation where the appellants (respondents) were able to reduce the
amount of damages awarded by the trial court against them (thus showing
that the judgment a quo was at least partly erroneous), and
yet they will be penalized for doing so by being ordered to pay
interest on the judgment of the appellate court. At any rate for a
frivolous appeal even treble cost may be assessed.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, and it is so ordered with costs against the petitioners.

Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.