TOMAS U. SOLIVEN, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COM­MISSION AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (BUREAU OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS), RESPONDENTS.

These two cases are jointly decided as involving a common is­sue
of law.  The Court once more annuls
respondent commission’s decisions and reinstates the referees’ awards of
disability compensation and benefits on the fundamental ground of the commission’s
lack of jurisdiction and authority to set aside an award that has already
become final and executory for failure to appeal the
same and to grant petitions for relief from judgments that were filed beyond
the ultimate grace periods fixed by the Commission Rules.

In L-44763, the referee, after hearing, rendered the
decision dated September 25, 1975 granting petitioner-claimant Tomas U. Soliven the sum of P6, 000.00 as disability benefits (for
bronchial asthma and neuritis which he contracted as classroom teacher, later
as head teacher in 1947, during his employment as such from June 1, 1931 until
he was forced to apply for optional retirement on July 16, 1966 due to the
severity of his ailments) and ordering respondent Republic (Bureau of Public
Schools) to pay P300-attorney’s fees and P61-administrative fees.  Copy of the decision was admittedly received
by respondent through the office of the Solicitor General on December 19, 1975.  Respondent failed to appeal within the reglementary 15-day period “due to the volume and
heavy pressure of work.” Respondent belatedly filed only on February 3, 1976 its “Petition to
Elevate Records for Relief and Judgment,” sixteen (16) days beyond
the ultimate 30-day grace period from knowledge/notice of the decision allowed
by the Commission Rules^[1]
for the purpose.  The commission
nevertheless entertained the petition for relief and rendered its decision
dated March 5, 1976
reversing the referee’s decision and absolving respondent from all liability.

In L-45381, the referee, after hearing, rendered the
decision dated September 10, 1975
granting petitioner-claimant Eulogia Malijan the sum
of P2, 095. 74 for disability benefits (for service-connected ail­ments of myxedema, goiter and “almoranas”
[hemorrhoid] during her employment as teacher corresponding to the period of
disability from August 13, 1969 up to her reaching the compulsory retirement
age on September 13, 1970 or 56-3/7 weeks) and ordering respondent Republic
(Bureau of Public Schools) to pay P104. 70-attorney’s fees and P21.00
administrative fees.  Copy of the
decision was admittedly received by respondent through the office of the
Solicitor General on September 11,
1975 but respondent again failed to take an appeal within the reglemen­tary period “due to the pressure and volume
of work.” It was only at the earliest on December 29, 1975 (date of its
Petition to Elevate Re­cords for Relief from Judgment) or 109 days afterwards
that respondent filed such petition for relief, way beyond the ultimate 30-day
grace period from knowledge/notice of the decision and not more than 3 months
from entry of the decision, allowed by the commission Rules for the pur­pose.  The commission nevertheless entertained the
petition for relief and rendered its decision dated February 2, 1976 reversing the “decision
appealed from” and dismissing the claim “for lack of merit.”

Hence, the petitions at bar which must be granted, since res­pondent
commission’s decisions of reversal were null and void as it no longer had
authority and jurisdiction to set aside the referees’ de­cisions that had
already become final and executory for failure of res­pondent
to appeal the same and to file timely petitions for relief from judgment within
the reglementary period.

In Carreon vs. WCC and Regala vs. WCC,^[2]
we reaffirmed the settled doctrine that “(the) basic rule of finality of
judgments is applicable indiscriminately to one and all and regardless of
whether respondent employer be a public or private employer, since the rule is
grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that
at risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and award of quasi-judicial
agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by law.”^[3]

We again stressed therein that “(I)t is of course beyond
question that the perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional and
that failure to so perfect an appeal renders final and executory
the questioned decision and de­prives the appellate court of jurisdiction to
entertain the appeal.  The lapse of the
appeal period deprives the courts of jurisdiction to alter the final
judgment.”

As to the exception or “last chance” of a timely
petition for relief from judgment within the reglementary
period (within 30 days from knowledge/notice of the decision-award and within 3
months from entry thereof) first granted expressly in workmen’s compensation
cases by the 1973 Commission Rules, the Court stated in Luzon Stevedoring
Corp. vs. Reyes,^[4] prescinding from the validity or non-validity of the
justification advanced for seeking such relief, that considering the underlying
purpose of the Workmen’s Compensation Act to promote the expe­ditious
disposition of workmen’s compensation claims, the grace period granted for
seeking relief from judgment must be taken as “absolutely fixed, inextendible, never interrupted and cannot
be subjected to any condition or contingency. 
Because the period fixed is itself devised to meet a condition or
contingency, the equitable remedy is an act of grace; as it were,
designed to give the aggrieved party another and last chance” and
reaffirmed the established rule that failure to avail of such last chance
within the grace period fixed is fatal.

Respondent’s claim in L-45381 that petitioner Malijan’s
present petition was filed almost a year after she was notified of the
commission’s decision of reversal is of no moment, since as already indicated,
said decision was null and void a s the commission had no jurisdiction to set
aside the referee’s decision that had already long become final and executory. 
Petitioner (after her counsel finally succeeded in securing certified
copies of vital records needed for this petition which had to await the
organization of the Compensation Appeals and Review Staff of the Secretary of
Labor who took over the voluminous and mixed-up commission records as successor
of the defunct commission) could properly come to this Court by way of a
special civil action of certiorari within the prescriptive period (and
duly impleaded the Secretary of Labor as successor of
the defunct commission) to have the commission’s deci­sion set aside as null
and void for lack of jurisdiction to render the same.

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered setting aside the
decisions of respondent commission and reinstating the referees decisions in
favor of petitioners Tomas U. Soliven and Eulogia Malijan, with the sole modification that the attorney’s
fees are increased to Two hundred nine pesos and fifty-seven centavos (P209.
57) in L-45381 by virtue of the services rendered by counsel in this appeal.^[5]

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Muñoz
Palma, Martin, Fernandez, and Guerrero,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rule 22, section 3, WCC 1973 Revised Rules.

^[2]
L-43112 and L-43307, decided jointly on May
31, 1977.

^[3]
Citing Vitug vs. Republic, L-44890, Feb. 28, 1977 and Ramos vs.
Republic, 69 SCRA 576 (Feb. 27, 1976).

^[4]
71 SCRA 655, 663 (June 30, 1976).
See also Martinez vs. WCC,
L-43744, Sept. 30, 1976.

^[5]
No increase of the P300. – attorney’s fees is awarded petitioner Soliven’s
private counsel in L-44763, as he is represented in this appeal by public
counsel, the Citizens Legal Assis­tance Office, Department of Justice.