G.R No. L-23449. January 30, 1965
RAFAEL L. DIZON, PETITIONER, VS. HON. NICASIO YATCO, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
BENGZON, C.J.:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to seaside the order issued ex
parte by respondent judge on August 31, 1964 enjoining
preliminary petitioner from acting as auditor of the Central Bank, as well as
Auditor General Jimenez from allowing him to act in that capacity, pending
decision on the merits of the quo warranto case filed
by respondent Medrano on the ground that respondent judge has acted with grave
abuse of discretion.
On August 27, 1964, Iluminado R. Medrano filed a
quo warranto case against Rafael L. Dizon, Sr., et al. before this Court of First Instance of
Rizal claiming, inter alia,
that the appointment extended to Rafael Dizon as
auditor of the Central Bank be declared null and void, having been made without
legal sanction, and that Medrano be declared entitled to that office being the
official next higher in rank and, pending decision on the merits a writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction be issued ex parte
to enjoin Rafael Dizon, Sr. from acting as such
auditor of the Central Bank in order to maintain the status quo of Medrano’s
position as acting auditor of the Central Bank immediately before the
commencement of Dizon’s usurpation of said office.
Since the prayer relative to the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction
ex parte was granted by respondent Judge, Dizon,
interposed the present petition for certiorari. In due course, this Court issued
the preliminary injunction prayed for.
The petition for quo warranto contains several
causes of action. In substance, it is alleged that Medrano is the senior
assistant auditor of the Central Bank who, since August 11, 1964, acted as
auditor of said bank, but that on August 24, 1964 Dizon usurped the position and discharged the duties thereof
illegally to the exclusion of Medrano. And to show the illegality of the
appointment of Dizon the following facts are alleged:
Medrano was recommended on March 4,
1964 to the Auditor General to the office of auditor of the Central
Bank by Ismael Mathay before
his retirement. Medrano appealed to the Auditor General on March 30, 1964 pleading to consider his
appointment. On April 1,
1964, the officers of the Central Bank Staff Association, as well as
the representatives of its Council, sent a letter to the Auditor General
interceding for Medrano. Hilarion Beronilla, together with 97 officials and employees of the
office of the Auditor of the Central Bank, also appealed to the Auditor General
recommending the promotion of Medrano.
On May 13, 1964, Ismael Mathay retired as auditor
of the Central Bank, on which date said office became vacant. Heronilla occupied the position in a temporary capacity.
When Dizon was appointed auditor
of the Central Bank. Meantime, Beronilla, then
acting auditor, took a sick leave and Medrano was designated acting auditor
during his sick leave. On August 22,
1964, Beronilla, pursuant to an office
order of the Auditor General, resumed office as acting auditor of the Central
Bank. On August 24, 1964,
Dizon appeared in the Office of the Central Bank and
“began to intrude and usurp” the right of Medrano. On August 24, 1964, Medrano wrote to the Governor
of the Central Bank asking him not to recognize Dizon
as auditor. Medrano also issued an office memorandum to all officials and
employees of the Central Bank informing them of the void appointment of Dizon.
On the other hand, in the petition for certiorari filed by Dizon, as well as in other pleadings filed in the instant
case, the following facts are stated:
The General Auditing Office is headed by the Auditor General. Below him is
the Deputy Auditor General, and next in rank to the latter are the auditors
assigned to different government agencies or corporations, among which is Rafael
Dizon who, before his appointment as auditor of the
Central Bank, was the auditor of the Philippine Sugar Institute, or Philsugin for short. In the different government agencies or
corporations where these auditors are detailed, the latter have their respective
assistants appointed by the Auditor General, who receive less compensation than
the auditors themselves.
On March 30, 1964, anticipating the retirement of Ismael Mathay as auditor of the
Central Bank, Iluminailo Medrano wrote a letter to the
Auditor General requesting that he be appointed to said position, which request
was unheeded in spite of other letters sent by Ismael
Mathay himself and the members of the Central Bank
Staff Association endorsing Medrano’s appointment. Even before the retirement of
Mathay on May
12, 1964, Hilarion Beronilla was designated acting auditor of the Central Bank
who thenceforth discharged the functions of said office. On August 11, 1964, Beronilla went on sick leave and on the same date Medrano
was designated acting auditor until the return of Beronilla. On August 21, 1964, the Auditor General issued an order
directing the immediate return of Beronilla to the
Central Bank, and pursuant thereto the latter resumed office on August 22, 1964.
Meanwhile, an appointment was extended to Rafael L. Dizon as auditor of the Central Bank on July 10, 1964, which was approved by the
Commissioner of Civil Service, said appointment to take effect upon assumption
of duty. On August 24, 1964,
Dizon was ordered by the Auditor General to assume
office as auditor of the Central Bank, which he immediately heeded by taking his
oath of office. In the same order Beronilla was
directed to return to the Philippine National Bank, while the appointment of
Medrano as acting auditor was revoked. The Auditor General also addressed a
letter to Mr. Andres V. Castillo, Governor of the Central Bank, informing the
latter of Dizon’s appointment as auditor of said
bank.
From the foregoing recital of facts, the following stand out as decisive and
undisputed:
When Ismael Mathay
retired on May 12, 1964,
Medrano was merely a senior assistant auditor of the Central Bank. Upon Mathay’s retirement Beronilla,
auditor of the Philippine National Bank, was designated to act in his place.
Then Beronilla went on sick leave and Medrano was
designated to act in his place until his return. On August 21, 1964, the Auditor General directed Beronilla to resume office as acting auditor of Central
Bank, and in an office order issued by the Auditor General Beronilla was directed to return to the Philippine National
Bank while the appointment of Medrano as acting auditor was revoked. Meanwhile,
or on July 19, 1964, Dizon was appointed auditor of the Central Bank, his
appointment having been duly approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service. And
on August 24, 1964, upon
direction of the Auditor General, Dizon took his oath
and assumed his duties as such auditor.
It is clear, therefore, that when Medrano filed the present Petition for quo
warranto he was merely a senior assistant auditor of
the Central Bank, while Dizon was already the auditor
thereof duly appointed by the Auditor General. Dizon
was then holding and discharging the duties of that office. Verily, until proven
otherwise, Dizon is the one entitled to continue
holding that office as well as to discharge its functions and duties, pending
trial and decision on the merits of the quo warranto
case. Hence, it would appear to be a grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent judge to have issued the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction
in question without first considering the merits of said case, or without giving
the parties an opportunity to present evidence thereon. In fine, said writ was
issued without Medrano having any existing right to protect.
” ‘The existence of a right violated is a
prerequisite to the granting of an injunction. * * * A permanent injunction
should not be awarded except in a clear case and to prevent irreparable injury.’
(32 C.J., 34-36.)” ‘A court of chancery will not entertain a bill to
enforce a mere valueless abstract right, and the court will, on its own motion,
raise the point for its own protection.’ (Duznom vs. Thomsen, 58 111. App.,
390.)“None of these requisites is present in the instant case. There has been a
failure to establish either the existence of a clear and positive right of the
plaintiff specially calling for a judicial protection through an extraordinary
writ of the kind applied for, or that the defendant has committed or attempts to
commit any act which has endangered or tends to endanger the existence of said
right, or has injured or threatens to injure the same.” (North Negros Sugar Co. vs.
Hidalgo, 63 Phil., 664, 671)“Injunction, like other equitable remedies, will issue only at the instance
of a suitor who has sufficient title or interest in the right or property sought
to be protected. He must stand on the strength of his own right or title, rather
than on the weakness of that claimed by his adversary. An impending or
threatened invasion of some legal right of the complainant, and some interest in
pre” venting the wrong sought to be perpetrated must be shown. It ‘s always a ground for denying injunction that the party
seeking has not sufficient title or interest to sustain it, and no claim to the
ultimate relief sought—in other words, that he shows no equity. Want of equity
on the part of the plaintiff in attempting to use the injunctive process of the
court to enforce a mere barren right will justify the court in refusing the
relief even though the defendant has little equity on his side. The
complainant’s right or title, moreover, must be clear and unquestioned, for
equity, as a rule, will not take cognizance of disputes respecting title, and
will not lend its preventive aid by injunction where the complainant’s title or
right is doubtful or disputed.” (28 Am. Jur., p.
218)
“In judicial proceedings, no one can be heard to complain unless he can show
that he has been injured. Accordingly, one who seeks injunctive relief in a
court of equity must satisfy the court, not only that he has a clear right of a
character which equity will protect, but also that the act or acts complained of
constitute an injurious invasion of that right which will result in or threatens
actual and substantial damage.” (Idem., pp. 220-221)
It is true that Medrano claims that as senior assistant auditor of the
Central Bank he is entitled under the law to fill the vacancy by the retirement
of Ismael Mathay, but Dizon claims otherwise, and on this point he advances points
which are worthy of note. Medrano also has points in his favor which likewise
deserve to be reckoned with. He even now claims that he had been appointed
auditor of the Central Bank even if he has not adduced any pertinent documentary
proof. But all these evidentiary matters can best be considered after this case
is tried on the merits rather than in this instance bearing in mind merely the
allegations in the pleadings filed in connection with the present petition.
In view hereof, we are of the considered opinion that the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by respondent judge should be set aside without prejudice to
whatever relief that may be warranted after the quo warranto case shall have been tried and decided on the
merits.
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent judge dated August 311 1964 which
grants ex parte the writ of preliminary Prohibitory injunction is hereby set aside. Respondent court
is hereby directed to try and decide the quo warranto
case on the merits. The writ issued by this Court is dissolved. No costs.
Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Bengzon, J. P. and Zaldivar, JJ. concur.
Reyes, J. B. L., J., concurs in the result.