KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGA­GAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY CREDIT UNION, INC., PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE.

In this mandamus petition dismissed by the lower court,
petitioner-appellant would seek a reversal of such decision relying on what it
considered to be a right granted by Section 62 of Republic Act No. 2023, more
specifically the first two paragraphs thereof: “* * * (1) A member of a co-operative may, notwithstanding the
provisions of existing laws, execute an agreement in favor of the co-operative
authorizing his employer to deduct from the salary or wages payable to him by
the employer such amount as may be specified in the agreement and to pay the
amount so deducted to the co-operative in satis­faction of any debt or other
demand owing from the member to the co-operative. (2) Upon the execution of such agreement the employer shall, if
so required by the co-operative by a request in writing and so long as such
debt or other demand or any part of it remains unpaid, make the deduction in
accordance with the agreement and remit forthwith the amount so deducted to the
co-operative.”^[1]

To show that such reliance is futile, the appealed decision, as
quoted in the brief for petitioner-appellant, stated the following: “The petitioner contends that under the
above provisions of Rep. Act 2023, the loans granted by credit unions to its members
enjoy first priority in the payroll collection from the respondent’s employees’
wages and salaries. As can be clearly
seen, there is nothing in the provision of Rep. Act 2023 hereinabove quoted
which provides that obligations of laborers and employees payable to credit
unions shall enjoy first priority in the deduction from the employees’ wages
and salaries. The only effect of
Rep. Act 2023 is to compel the employer to deduct from the salaries or wages
payable to members of the employees’ cooperative credit unions the employees’
debts to the union and to pay the same to the credit union. In other words, if Rep. Act 2023 had not
been enacted, the employer could not be compelled to act as the collecting
agent of the employees’ credit union for the employees’ debt to his credit
union but to contend that the debt of a member of the employees cooperative
credit union as having first priority in the matter of deduction, is to write
something into the law which does not appear therein. In other words, the mandatory character of Rep. Act 2023 is
only to compel the employer to make the deduction of the employees’ debt
from the latter’s salary and turn this over to the employees’ credit union but
this manda­tory character does not convert the credit union’s credit into a
first priority credit. If the legislative
intent in enacting pars. 1 and 2 of Sec. 62 of Rep. Act 2023 were to give first
priority in the matter of payments to the obligations of employees in favor of
their credit unions, then, the law would have so expressly declared. Thus, the express provisions of the New
Civil Code, Arts. 2241, 2242 and 2244 show the legis­lative intent on
preference of credits.”^[2]

Such an interpretation, as could be expected, found favor with
the respondent-appellee, which, in its brief, succinctly pointed out “that
there is nothing in said pro­vision from which it could be implied that it
gives top priority to obligations of the nature of that payable to petitioner,
and that, therefore, respondent company, in issuing the documents known as
Exhibit ‘3’ and Exhibit ‘P’, which establish the order of priority of payment
out of the salaries of the employees of respondent-appellee, did not violate
the above-quoted Section 62 of Republic Act 2023. In promulgating Exhibit ‘3’, [and] Exhibit ‘P’, respondent, in
effect, implemented the said provision of law.”^[3]

This petition being one for mandamus and the provision of law
relied upon being clear on its face, it would appear that no favorable action
can be taken on this appeal. We affirm.

1. The applicable provision of Republic Act No. 2023, quoted
earlier, speaks for itself. There is no
ambiguity. As thus worded, it was so
applied. Petitioner-appellant cannot therefore
raise any valid objection. For the
lower court to view it otherwise would have been to alter the law. That cannot be done by the judiciary. That is a function that properly appertains
to the legislative branch. As was
pointed out in Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals:^[4]
“It has been repeated time and time again that where the statutory norm
speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply
it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the
scope of its operation, must be obeyed. Our decisions have consistently been to that effect.”^[5]

2. Clearly, then, mandamus does not lie. Petitioner-appellant was unable to show a clear legal right. The very law on which he would base his
action fails to supply any basis for this petition. A more rigorous analysis would have prevented him from
instituting a suit of this character. In J. R. S. Business Corporation v. Montesa,^[6]
this Court held: “Mandamus is the
proper remedy if it could be shown that there was neglect on the part of a
tribunal in the performance of an act, which specifically the law enjoins as a
duty or an unlawful exclusion of a party from the use and enjoyment of a right
to which he is entitled.”^[7]
The opinion continued in this wise: “According to former Chief Justice Moran, ‘only specific legal
rights may be enforced by mandamus if they are clear and certain. If the legal rights of the petitioner are
not well defined, clear, and certain, the petition must be dismissed. In support of the above view, Viuda de Hijos
de Crispulo Zamora v. Wright was cited. As was there categorically stated: ‘This court has held that it is fundamental that the duties to be
enforced by mandamus must be those which are clear and enjoined by law or by
reason of official station, and that petitioner must have a clear, legal right
to the thing demanded and that it must be the legal duty of the defendant to
perform the required act.’ As expressed
by the then Justice Recto in a subsequent opinion: ‘It is well established that only specific legal rights are
enforceable by mandamus, that the right sought to be enforced must be certain
and clear, and that the writ not issue in cases where the right is doubtful.’
To the same effect is the formulation of such doctrine by former Justice
Barrera: ‘Stated otherwise, the writ
never issues in doubtful cases. It
neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to
perform a duty already imposed.'”^[8]
So it has been since then.^[9]
The latest reported case, Province of Pangasinan v. Reparations Commission,^[10]
this Court speaking through Justice Concepcion Jr., reiterated such a well-settled
doctrine: “It has also been held
that it is essential to the issuance of the writ of mandamus that the plaintiff
should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and it must be the
imperative duty of the defendant to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases.”^[11]

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., did not take part.

^[1]
Section 62 of Republic Act No. 2023 (1957).

^[2]
Brief for the Petitioner-Appellant, 7-8.

^[3]
Brief for the Respondent-Appellee, 4-5.

^[4]
L-27455, June 28, 1973, 51 SCRA 381.

^[5]
Ibid, 385. The following cases
were cited: People v. Mapa,
L-22301, Aug. 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164; Pacific Oxygen & Acetylene Co. v.
Central Bank, L-21881, March 1, 1968, 22 SCRA 917; Dequito v. Lopez,
L-27757, March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 1352; Padilla v. City of Pasay,
L-24039, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1349; Garcia v. Vasquez, L-26808, March
28, 1969, 27 SCRA 505; La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory v. Capapas,
L-27948 & 28001-11, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1085; Mobil Oil Phil. Inc. v.
Dio­cares, L-26371, Sept. 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 656; Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v.
De Garcia, L-25659, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 111; Vda. de Macabenta v.
Davao Stevedore Ter­minal Co., L-27489, April 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 553; Republic
Flour Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, L-28463, May 31, 1971, 39
SCRA 269; Maritime Co. of the Phil. v. Reparations Commission, L-29203, July
26, 1971, 40 SCRA 70; Allied Brokerage Corp. v. Commissioner of Customs
L-27641, Aug 31 1971, 40 SCRA 555.

^[6]
L-23783, April 25, 1968, 23 SCRA 190.

^[7]
Ibid, 197.

^[8]
Ibid, 197-198. The citation from
former Chief Justice Moran is found in Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963
ed., at 172; the Crispulo Zamora decision is reported in 53 Phil. 613, 621
(1929); the citation from Justice Recto is found in Sanson v. Barrios,
reported in 63 Phil. 198, 202 (1936); and that from Justice Barrera, from
Alzate v. Aldana, in 118 Phil. 221, 225 (1963).

^[9]
Cf. Valdez v. Gutierrez, L-25819, May 22, 1968, 23 SCRA 661; Lemi v.
Valencia, L-20768, Nov. 29, 1968, 26 SCRA 203; Commissioner of
Immigration v. Go Tieng, L-22581, May 21, 1969, 28 SCRA 237; Vda. de
Serra v. Salas, L-27150, Nov. 28, 1969, 30 SCRA 541; Del Rosario v.
Subido, L-30091, Jan. 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 382; Yuvienco v. Canonoy,
L-23352, June 30, 1971, 39 SCRA 597; Enriquez Jr. v. Bidin, L-29620,
Oct. 12, 1972, 47 SCRA 183; Orencia v. Enrile, L-28997, Feb. 22, 1974,
55 SCRA 580; Isada v. Bocar, L-33535, Jan. 17, 1975, 62 SCRA 37; Garcia v.
Faculty Admission Committee, L-40779, Nov. 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 277; Ocampo v.
Subido, L-28344, Aug. 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.

^[10]
L-27448, November 29, 1977, 80 SCRA 376.

^[11]
Ibid, 380. Gonzales v.
Board of Pharmacy, 20 Phil. 367, was cited.