ISIDRA FARAON AND LUCIA DE MESA, COMPLAINANTS-APPELLANTS, VS. TOMAS PRIELA, ACCUSED-APPELLEE.

From a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
acquitting defendant Tomas A. Priela of the crime of damage to property through
reckless imprudence, with which he is charged, the offended parties – namely,
Isidra Faraon and Lucia de Mesa, as owners of a “cadillac” car which
was hit by a train operated by Priela as its engineer – have interposed the
present appeal, insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned.

Appellants maintain that the lower court erred in finding that
the damage to said car was due to a “freak accident so unu­sual and so
unique as to defy all expectations”, and that, for this reason, they
should bear the “unfortunate damage to property” suffered by them.

The first question that suggests itself is whether or not
appellants may still pursue the present appeal and recover damages from Priela,
considering that he has been explicitly acquitted by the trial court, upon the
ground that “he has not been remiss in his caution nor in his presence of
mind in trying to avoid” said “freak accident”.

Pursuant to Rule III, section 3(c), of the Rules of Court:

“Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist.  In other cases, the person
entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the
manner provided by law against the person
who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for
the damage suffered.”

In the case at bar, the decision appealed from, which is final
and executory as regards its criminal phase, has not only acquitted Priela,
but, also, declared that the collision, which resulted in the destruction of
appellants’ car, had not been due to any negligence on his part.  Since appellants’ civil action is predicated
upon Priela’s alleged negligence, which does not exist, according to said final
judgment, it follows necessarily that his acquittal in the criminal action
carries with it the extinction of the civil responsibility arising therefrom.^[1]

Independently of the
foregoing, the record does not show that the lower court had erred in absolving
Priela from the charge of negligence.

Indeed, it appears that,
said car was, in the afternoon of September 10, 1960, headed for Manila, coming
from a barrio in the Municipality of Muntinlupa, Rizal; that as it was
negotiating the railroad crossing therein, the right front wheel of the car got stuck into a rut,
“right on top of the railroad tracks after passing the second rail”;
that despite the efforts of the driver, who shifted to first gear and then to
reverse, the car could not move either forward or backward; that as the
north-bound Diesel train No. 512, operated and driven by Priela, came into view, after turning a bend,
coming from the Bicol region,
Lucia de Mesa got down from the car and
signalled it to stop; and that, this notwithstanding, the train proceeded
headlong and hit the car, completely destroying the same.

The prosecution tried to
prove that the train was about 400
yards away when Lucia signaled
thereto to stop, but, the lower court gave more credence to the
testimony of Priela and his fire­man, Cecilio Pacion, to the effect that the
railroad crossing was preceded by a curve, bounded on both sides by high
earthen embankments which precluded them from seeing the car until it was about
75 meters away.  Moreover, relying upon
the expert evidence given by Cesar Poblete – an engineer who worked in the
mechanical department of the Manila Railroad since 1945, and had specialized in
Diesel locomotives, such as Train No. 512 – said court concluded that, pulling
eleven (11) coaches, at a speed of from 30 to 40 miles an hour, the train would
cover a distance of about 300 meters from the place where its air brakes were
ap­plied, and, that it could not have stopped, therefore, before reaching the
place where appellants’ car was.

Inasmuch as said expert testimony has not been contradicted, and
in the light of the attending circumstances, we are not prepared to disturb the
aforementioned findings of fact, which are partly, if not mainly, dependent
upon the credence and weight given by His Honor, the trial Judge, to the
testimonial evidence on record.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with the costs of this instance against appellants, Isidra Faraon and Lucia de
Mesa.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 91 Phil. 672; De Soriano v.
Albornoz, 98 Phil. 785.