PEDRO A. BERNAS, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review of the decision of the defunct Court of
Appeals dismissing petitioner’s complaint and respondents’ counterclaim
for recovery of some parcels of land in Pilar, Capiz.

Pedro Bernas filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz an action
for recovery of possession of a parcel of land known as lot 477 of the
Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, against spouses Filomeno and Josefa
Villanueva, claiming to be the owner thereof for having bought it from a
certain Consolacion Patricio. Defendants’ answer, besides setting up
the claim of ownership of lot 477, also put up a counterclaim for the
recovery of three other lots in plaintiff’s possession (lots 317, 318
and 319 of the Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz), claiming that he
bought all four lots from a certain Fortunato Jayme who had acquired
them by inheritance from Efigenia Enriquez. To the counterclaim,
plaintiff Bernas filed an answer asserting ownership over lots 317, 318
and 319.

The trial court rendered judgment declaring Bernas owner of lots 318 and
319. With respect to lots 317 and 477, however, the trial court
adjudicated one-half of each lot to Bernas and Villanueva, thus:

a) To Pedro Bernas – Lots 317-A and 477-B

b) To the Villanuevas – Lots 317-B and 477-A.

The Villanuevas did not appeal. Only Bernas appealed to the Court of Appeals on the following assignment of errors:

1. “The lower court erred in declaring that the lot which was the
subject matter of the sale with right to repurchase between Consolacion
Patricio and Caridad Mon and iden­tified as Exhibit “A”, was and is not
Lot 477, because the lot number was not mentioned or stated in said
document.

2. “The lower court erred in not declaring that plaintiff was a
purchaser in good faith at a sheriff’s sale of all the right, title and
interest of the judgment debtor, and is entitled to the property under
the provisions of law, as against one who claims the property by virtue
of an unrecorded deed of sale executed in his favor by a third person
after the date of the sheriff’s sale.

3. “The lower court erred in not declaring that the land belonged
to a debtor that was attached by virtue of a final judgment and sold at
public auction and its sale recorded in the property registry, and no
third-party claim to its ownership has been filed, the vendee is the
absolute owner of such land thus acquired by him at the execution sale.

4. “The lower court erred in making its own subdivision of the
lands in question, when the original plan as surveyed by the cadastral
survey states only lots 317 and 477. Likewise, the lower court erred in
making the subdivision and adjudicated lots 317-A and 477-B to
plaintiff and lots 317-B and 477-A to defendants based upon plan exhibit
“X” as surveyed for the heirs of Efigenia Enriquez, the predecessors in
interest of the defendants, when the parties claimed and litigated each
lot as a whole and not a portion there­of.

5. “The lower court erred in not declaring that lots nos. 317 and
477 of Pilar, Capiz are owned exclusively by the plaintiff and entitled
to the possession thereof, and that defendants must pay damages to the
plaintiff for the products which the latter failed to receive.
Likewise, the lower court erred in not awarding costs in favor of the
plaintiff.”

Examining the evidence, the Court of Appeals found that “lots 477 and
317 were properties included among those purchased by Bernas in a public
auction” way back in 1938 after they had been “levied upon to satisfy a
judgment rendered against Consolacion Patricio” (owner) in favor of
Bernas, but the said lots (317 and 477) could not be identified as
included among the properties inherited by Fortunato Jayme before they
were allegedly sold by the latter to the Villanuevas. The Court of
Appeals therefore concluded that the portion of “the judgment appealed
from was not based on actual facts.” Strangely, however, the Court of
Appeals remanded the case to the trial court “for further proceedings,”
i.e., “the relocation of lots 477 and 317 should be made to find out
whether they can be identified among those mentioned in the project of
partition adjudicating five parcels of land to Fortunato E. Jayme; what
relation, if any, have the five parcels with lots 317 and 477 and as to
why these were subdivided. After this shall have been done, the Court a quo should render a new decision.” To quote the decision of the Court of Appeals:

“… Lots 477 and 317 were properties included among those
purchased by Bernas in a public auction held on September 29, 1938, in
the then municipality of Capiz, Capiz. One Caridad Mon filed a
third-party claim with the Sheriff regarding lot 477 but, Bernas having
readily acknowledged the third-party claimant’s interest, the sale of
the property proceeded. Mon had bought it a retro from
Consolacion Patricio and was at the time of the auction sale in
possession thereof. Later, upon payment of the redemp­tion price, she
delivered the land to Bernas, but continued in its occupancy for the new
owner until she was compelled to leave it in the year 1943, due to the
chaotic conditions prevailing then. Incidentally, it is to be noted
that lots 477 and 317 were among others which were levied upon to
satisfy a judgment rendered against Consolacion Patricio in a case where
she was a defendant, with Pedro A. Bernas as plaintiff. Mon averred
that Patricio was in possession of lot 477, at least fifteen years
before the latter sold it to her a retro. One Dioscoro Basea,
who was 39 years old when he testified on August 29, 1949, likewise
averred that he had known lot 477 since he had attained the use of
reason, with Patricio possessing it throughout.

“On the other hand, defendants’ conten­tion is that they had
bought lots 477 and 317 from one Fortunato E. Jayme on March 22, 1941,
and that Jayme, in turn, acquired said properties from Efigenia Enriquez
as inheri­tance. Examining the project of partition where Jayme
purportedly received several parcels of land indicated as parcels 5, 6,
7, 8 and 13, it can be seen that no one of them tallies with any of lots
477 and 317. It is worthwhile noticing that the new tax declaration
(Exh. 7) for lot 477 in the name of Filomeno Villanueva derives from a
tax declaration merely referred to as ‘prev. de.’, and that all previous
tax declarations for that lot appearing on record are in the name of
Consolacion Patricio (Exhs. M and W). As to lot 317, Villanueva had
never been in possession of it. Indeed, we are at a loss why the Court a quo adjudicated
lots 317-A and 477-B to Bernas and lots 477-A and 317-B to the
Villanuevas. It seems to run counter to both the pleadings of record
and the evidence given in support thereof. In fact, each party claimed
lots 317 and 477 in their entirety.

“Apparently, the trial judge relied completely for its findings on
the subdi­vision appearing in plan Exh. ‘X’ made for the heirs of
Efigenia Enriquez. No explanation, however, was given for this
subdivi­sion, nor does it appear that Pedro A. Bernas had anything to do
with it. With the view we take on the matter, we are constrained to
conclude that the judgment appealed from was not based on actual facts.

“In justice, however, to both parties, we believe that this case
should be returned to the court of origin for further proceedings.
Relocation of lots 477 and 317 should be made, to find out whether they
can be identified among those mentioned in the project of par­tition
adjudicating five parcels of land to Fortunato E. Jayme; what relation,
if any, have the five parcels with lots 317 and 477 and as to why these
were subdivided. After this shall have been done, the Court a quo should render a new decision.”

After the remand, the trial court repeatedly set the case for hearing
but no reception of evidence took place as the parties invariably asked
for postponement on account of unavailability of evidence. Finally,
after 9 years, he trial court returned the case to the Court of Appeals
without the desired evidence. Thereupon, the latter dismissed both the
complaint and counterclaim on lots 317 and 477, without prejudice. Said
the Court:

“… it appears that after a period of nine (9) years, the parties
have not been able to secure the evidence required to re­locate lots
Nos. 317 and 477, and it seems that they would not be able to do so
within the foreseeable future. The state of the evidence in this case
remains the same and consequently, the necessity to revise the
conclusion (previously) arrived at by this Court…is not called for. In
view of the above circumstances, therefore, we have no other alternative
but to order the dismissal of the complaint as well as the
counter-complaint, in so far as they refer to lots 317 and 477.” (Rollo,
p. 8.)

Bernas sought reconsideration of the dismissal and asked for
clarification of the dismissal “without prejudice,” but his motion was
denied.

Hence this petition, assigning two errors:

1. The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint when
its findings declare that pe­titioner is entitled to the possession of
the properties in litigation; and

2. The Court of Appeals erred in not resolving the motion for clarification of the words “without prejudice” in its decision.

The first assigned error must be sustained.

The Court of Appeals found that Consolacion Patricio was the owner of
lots 317 and 477 before they were levied upon to satisfy a judgment
obtained by Bernas against Consolacion Patricio, after which, a public
auction was held in 1938 at which lots 477 and 317 were bought by Bernas
together with other properties; that originally, lot 477 was in the
possession of Consolacion Patricio when she was still the owner thereof,
but she yielded its possession to Caridad Mon when the latter bought it
a retro; and that after Mon had been paid the redemption
price, she delivered possession of lot 477 to Bernas as the new owner
thereof who bought it at public auction. On the other hand, the Court
of Appeals also found that while the Villanuevas claimed to have bought
in 1941 the same lots 317 and 477 from Fortunato Jayme who allegedly
inherited them from Efigenia Enriquez, it appears that not one of the
several parcels of land inherited by Jayme tallies with either lot 477
or lot 317; that “the new tax declaration (Exh. 7) for lot 477 in the
name of Filomeno Villanueva derives from a tax declaration merely
referred to as ‘prev. de’, and that all previous tax declarations for
that lot appearing on record are in the name of Consolacion Patricio
(Vendor of Bernas)”; and that as to lot 317, Villanueva had never been
in possession of it. (Rollo, pp. 13-14.)

It would seem that the evidence, as evaluated by the Court of Appeals,
has established the interests of Bernas in lots 317 and 477, just as it
has negated the pretensions of the Villanuevas. It was therefore error
for the Court of Appeals to remand the case to the trial court for
further proceedings and subsequent­ly to dismiss the complaint of
Bernas, after the Villanuevas had failed to establish the connection
between the parcels of land inherited by Jayme (which the Villanuevas
allegedly bought) and lots 317 and 477.

When the evidence on record does not sustain the position of one of the
parties (nor the decision rendered by the trial judge), the proper step
is for the appellate court to render a decision on the basis of the
evidence on hand, sustaining the party upheld by the evidence, and not
to suspend judgment by remanding the case to the trial court for the
purpose of giving the other party a second chance to present evidence.

Moreover, based on the factual findings of the Court of Appeals,
petitioner Bernas would at the very least be entitled to ½ of lot 317
and ½ of lot 477, as awarded to him in the decision of the trial court,
from which no appeal was taken by the Villanuevas and which therefore
has become final and executory. But under the decision of the Court of
Appeals dismissing Bernas’ complaint, even this vested right would be
wiped out.

It is unnecessary to resolve the second assigned error.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the defunct Court of Appeals
dismissing the complaint is set aside. In the interest of dispatch, the
petitioner is declared the owner of lots 317 and 477 of the cadastral
survey of Pilar, Capiz in their entirety, entitled as such to the
possession thereof. The Intermediate Appellate Court is directed to
decide the issue of damages to which the petitioner may be entitled.
Costs against the respondents.
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.