ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELEC­TIONS, AND THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, THE AUDITOR, AND THE DISBURSING OFFICER OF THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, RESPONDEN…

Petition for prohibition principally to re­strain the respondent
Commission on Elections “from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November
8, 1971”, at which the proposed constitutional amendment “reducing
the voting age” in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines
to eighteen years “shall be submitted” for ratification by the peo­ple
pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971,
and the subsequent imple­menting resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to
be without the force and effect of law in so far as they di­rect the holding of
such plebiscite and by also declaring the acts of the respondent Commission
(COMELEC) performed and to be done by it in obedience to the aforesaid Conven­tion
resolutions to be null and void, for being violative
of the Constitution of the Philippines.

As a preliminary step, since the petition named as respondent
only the COMELEC, the Court required that copies thereof be served on the
Solicitor General and the Constitutional Convention, through its Presi­dent,
for such action as they may deem proper to take.  In due time, respondent COMELEC filed its
answer join­ing issues with petitioner. 
To further put things in proper order, and considering that the fiscal
officers of the Convention are indispensable parties in a pro­ceeding of this
nature, since the acts sought to be en­joined involve the expenditure of funds
appropriated by law for the Convention, the Court also ordered that the
Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Convention be made respondents.  After the petition was so amended, the first
appeared thru Senator Emmanuel Pe­laez and the last
two thru Delegate Ramon Gonzales.  All
said respondents, thru counsel, resist petitioner’s ac­tion.

For reasons of orderliness and to avoid unneces­sary duplication
of arguments and even possible confu­sion, and considering that with the
principal parties being duly represented by able counsel, their interests would
be adequately protected already, the Court had to limit the number of intervenors from the ranks of the delegates to the
Convention who, more or less, have le­gal interest in the success of the
respondents, and so, only Delegates Raul S. Manglapus,
Jesus G. Barrera, Pablo S. Trillana III, Victor de la
Serna, Marcelo B. Fernan, Jose Y. Feria,
Leonardo Siguion Reyna, Victor Ortega and Juan B. Borra, all distinguished lawyers in their own right, have
been allowed to intervene jointly.  The
Court feels that with such an array of brilliant and dedicated counsel, all
interests involved should be duly and amply represented and protected.  At any rate, notwithstanding that their
corresponding motions for leave to intervene or to appear as amicus curiae^[1]
have been denied, the pleadings filed by the other dele­gates and some private
parties, the latter in represen­tation of their minor children allegedly to be
affected by the result of this case, are with the records and the Court
acknowledges that they have not been without value as materials in the
extensive study that has been undertaken in this case.

The background facts are beyond dispute.  The Cons­titutional Convention of 1971 came
into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines
approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly con­vened for the purpose of
calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution, namely,
Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on March 16, 1967
and June 17, 1969 respectively.  The
delegates to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of said
resolutions and the implementing legisla­tion thereof, Republic Act 6132.  The pertinent portions of Resolution No. 2
read as follows:

“SECTION 1.  There is
hereby called a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the
Philippines, to be composed of two elective Delegates from each representative
district who shall have the same qualifications as those required of Members of
the House of Representatives.

x        x          x          x

“SECTION 7.  The
amendments proposed by the Convention shall be valid and considered part of the
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election at
which they are submitted to the people for their ratification pursuant to
Article XV of the Constitution.”

Resolution No. 4 merely modified the
number of delegates to represent the different cities and provinces fixed
originally in Resolution No. 2.

After the election of the delegates held on Novem­ber 10, 1970, the Convention held its
inaugural session on June 1, 1971.  Its preliminary labors of election of
officers, organization of committees and other prepara­tory works over, as its
first formal proposal to amend the Constitution, in its session which began on
Septem­ber 27, 1971, or more accurately, at about 3:30 in the morning of
September 28, 1971, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 reading
thus:

“CC ORGANIC RESOLUTION NO. 1

“A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION ONE OF ARTICLE V OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18

“BE IT RESOLVED as it is hereby re­solved by the 1971 Constitutional
Con­vention:

“Section 1.  Section One
of Article V of the Constitution of the Philip­pines
is amended to read as follows:

‘Section 1.  Suffrage may be
exercised by (male) citizens of the Philippines not other­wise disqualified by
law, who are (twenty-one) EIGHTEEN years or over and are able to read and
write, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for one year and in the
munici­pality wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding
the election.’

“Section 2.  This
amendment shall be valid as part of the Constitution of the Philippines
when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to coincide with
the lo­cal elections in November 1971.

“Section 3.  This
partial amend­ment, which refers only to the age qualification for the exercise
of suffrage shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be
proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions
of the amended Section or on other portions of the entire Constitution.

“Section 4.  The
Convention here­by authorizes the use of the sum of P75,000.00 from its savings
or from its unexpended funds for the expense of the advanced plebiscite;
provided, however, that should there be no savings or unexpended sums, the De­legates
waive P250.00 each or the equivalent of 2-1/2 days per diem.”

By a letter dated September
28, 1971, President Diosdado Macapagal, called upon respondent Comelec
“to help the Convention implement (the above) resolution.” The said
letter reads:

“September 28, 1971

“The Commission on Elections

Manila

Thru the Chairman

Gentlemen:

Last night the Constitutional Con­vention passed Resolution No. 1
quoted as follows:

x        x          x          x

(see above)

Pursuant to the provision of Sec­tion 14, Republic Act No. 6132
other­wise known as the Constitutional Con­vention Act of 1971, may we call
upon you to help the Convention implement this resolution?

       Sincerely,

(Sgd.)
DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL

President”

On September 30, 1971,
COMELEC “RESOLVED to in­form the Constitutional Convention that it
will hold the plebiscite on condition that:

“(a)  The Constitutional Conven­tion will undertake
the printing of separate official ballots, election returns and tally sheets
for the use of said plebiscite at its ex­pense;

“(b)  The Constitutional Conven­tion will adopt its
own security measures for the printing and ship­ment of said ballots and
election forms; and

“(c)  Said official ballots and election forms will
be delivered to the Commission in time so that they could be distributed at the
same time that the Commission will dis­tribute its official and sample bal­lots
to be used in the elections on November
8, 1971.”

What happened afterwards may best be stated by quoting from intervenors‘ statement of the genesis of the above proposal:

“The President of the Convention also issued an order forming
an Ad Hoc Committee to implement the Reso­lution.

“This Committee issued implement­ing guidelines which were
approved by the President who then transmitted them to the Commission on Elections.

“The Committee on Plebiscite and Ratification filed a report
on the progress of the implementation of the plebiscite in the afternoon of
October 7, 1971, enclosing copies of the order, resolution and letters of
transmittal above referred to (Copy of the report is hereto attached as Annex
8- Memorandum).

“RECESS
RESOLUTION

“In its plenary session in the evening of October 7, 1971, the Convention approved a
resolution authored by Delegate Antonio Olme­do of Davao Oriental, calling for a recess of the Convention from
November 1, 1971 to November 9, 1971 to permit the
delegates to campaign for the ratification of Organic Resolution No. 1. (Copies
of the resolution and the trans­cript of debate thereon are here­to attached as
Annexes 9 and 9-A Memorandum, respectively).

“RESOLUTION
CONFIRMING IMPLEMENTATION

“On October 12, 1971,
the Con­vention passed Resolution No. 24 submitted by Delegate Jose Ozamiz confirming the authority of the President of the
Convention to implement Organic Resolution No. 1, including the creation of the
Ad Hoc Committee and ratifying all acts performed in connection with said
implementation.”

Upon these facts, the main thrust of the petition is that Organic
Resolution No. 1 and the other imple­menting resolutions thereof subsequently
approved by the Convention have no force and effect as laws in so far as they
provide for the holding of a plebiscite co­incident with the elections of eight
senators and all city, provincial and municipal officials to be held on
November 8, 1971, hence all of Comelec’s acts in obe­dience
thereof and tending to carry out the holding of the plebiscite directed by said
resolutions are null and void, on the ground that the calling and holding of
such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in
Congress, as a legislative body, and may not be exercised by the Convention,
and that, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the proposed
amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification
separately from each and all of the other amendments to be drafted and proposed
by the Convention.  On the other hand,
respondents and intervenors posit that the power to
provide for, fix the date and lay down the details of the plebiscite for the
ratification of any amendment the Convention may deem pro­per to propose is
within the authority of the Convention as a necessary consequence and part of
its power to propose amendments and that this power includes that of submitting
such amendments either individually or jointly at such time and manner as the
Convention may direct in its discretion. 
The Court’s delicate task now is to de­cide which of these two poses is
really in accord with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.

As a preliminary and prejudicial matter, the inter­venors
raise the question of jurisdiction.  They
contend that the issue before Us is a political question and that the
Convention being a legislative body of the highest order is sovereign, and as
such, its acts impugned by petitioner are beyond the control of the Congress
and the courts.  In this connection, it
is to be noted that none of the respondents has joined intervenors
in this posture.  In fact, respondents
Chief Accountant and Audi­tor of the Convention, expressly concede the
jurisdiction of this Court in their answer acknowledging that the is­sue herein
is a justifiable one.

Strangely, intervenors cite in support
of this contention portions of the decision of this Court in the case of
Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774, wherein the members
of the Court, despite their being divided in their opinions as to the other
matters therein involved, were precisely unanimous in upholding its
jurisdiction.  Obviously, dis­tinguished
counsel have either failed to grasp the full impact of the portions of Our
decision they have quoted or would misapply them by taking them out of context.

There should be no more doubt as to the position of this Court
regarding its jurisdiction vis-a-vis the cons­titutionality
of the acts of the Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, and, for that
matter, those of a constitutional convention called for the purpose of pro­posing
amendments to the Constitution, which concededly is at par with the
former.  A simple reading of Our rul­ing
in that very case of Gonzales relied upon by inter­venors
should dispel any lingering misgivings as regards that point.  Succinctly but comprehensively, Chief Just­ice
Concepcion held for the Court thus:

“As early as Angara vs. Electoral
Commission (63 Phil. 139, 157), this Court – speaking through one of the
leading members of the Constitutional Convention and a respected professor of
Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel – declared that ‘the judicial department
is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the
integral or consti­tuent units thereof.’

“It is true that in Mabanag v. Lopez
Vito (supra), this Court characterizing the issue submit­ted thereto as
a political one, declined to pass upon the ques­tion whether or not a given num­ber
of votes cast in Congress in favor of a proposed amendment to the Constitution
– which was be­ing submitted to the people for ratification – satisfied the
three-fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law.  The force of this precedent has been
weakened, however, by Suanes v. Chief Accountant of
the Senate (81 Phil. 818) Avelino v. Cuenco, (G.R. No. L-2851, March 4 & 14, 1949) Tañada v. Cuenco, (G.R. No. L-10520,
Feb. 28, 1957) and Macias
v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961) In the first, we
held that the officers and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are un­der
its supervision and control, not of that of the Senate Presi­dent, as claimed
by the latter; in the second, this Court proceed­ed to determine the number of
Senators necessary for a quorum in the Senate; in the third, we
nullified the election, by Senators belonging to the party having the largest
number of votes in said chamber, purporting to act on be­half of the party
having the se­cond largest number of votes therein, of two (2) Senators
belonging to the first party, as members, for the second party, of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth, we declared un­constitutional an act of
Congress purporting to apportion the repre­sentative districts for the House of
Representatives, upon the ground that the apportionment had not been made as
may be possible according to the number of inhabitants of each province.  Thus we rejected the theory, advanced in
these four (4) cases, that the issues therein raised were political questions
the determination of which is beyond judicial review.

“Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose
amend­ments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative powers
to Congress (Section 1, Art. VI, Constitution of the Phi­lippines)
It is part of the in­herent powers of the people – as the repository of
sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours (Section 1, Art. II,
Constitution of the Philippines)
– to make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamen­tal Law.  Congress may propose amendments to the
Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power.  (Section 1, Art. XV, Constitution of the Philip­pines)
Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and members of the
House of Represent­atives act, not as members of Con­gress, but as
component elements of a constituent assembly.  When acting as such, the members of Congress
derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when
performing the same function, (Of amending the Consti­tution) for their
authority does not emanate from the Constitution – they are the very
source of all powers of government, including the Constitution itself.

“Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments
to the Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority from the
Fundamental Law, it fol­lows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say
on whether or not their acts are within or be­yond constitutional limits.  Other­wise, they could brush aside and set
the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of
laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution.  Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that,
the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court, (And, in­ferentially,
to lower courts.) the power to declare a treaty un­constitutional, (Sec. 2(1),
Art. VIII of the Constitutional), despite the eminently political character of
treaty-making power.

“In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress –
acting as a constituent assembly – violates the Constitution is essentially
justifiable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial re­view, and, to
the extent that this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, (supra) the latter should be
deemed modified accordingly.  The Members
of the Court are unanimous on this point.”

No one can rightly claim that within the domain of its legitimate
authority, the Convention is not supreme. 
Nowhere in his petition and in his oral ar­gument and memoranda does
petitioner point otherwise.  Actually,
what respondents and intervenors are seem­ingly
reluctant to admit is that the Constitutional Convention of 1971, as any other
convention of the same nature, owes its existence and derives all its authority
and power from the existing Constitution of the Philippines.  This Convention has not been called by the
people directly as in the case of a revolution­ary convention which drafts the
first Constitution of an entirely new government born of either a war of
liberation from a mother country or of a re­volution against an existing
government or of a bloodless seizure of power a la coup d’etat.  As to
such kind of conventions, it is absolutely true that the convention is
completely without restraint and omnipotent all wise, and it is as to such
conventions that the remarks of Delegate Manuel Roxas
of the Constitutional Convention of 1934 quoted by Senator Pelaez
refer.  No amount of rationalization can
belie the fact that the current convention came into being only because it was
called by a resolution of a joint session of Congress acting as a constituent
as­sembly by authority of Section 1, Article XV of the present Constitution
which provides:

“ARTICLE XV – AMENDMENTS

“SECTION 1.  The
Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representative’s voting separately,
may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for the
purpose.  Such amendments shall be valid
as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at
an election at which the amend­ments are submitted to the people for their
ratification.”

True it is that once convened, this Convention became endowed
with extraordinary powers generally be­yond the control of any department of
the existing government, but the compass of such powers can be co­extensive
only with the purpose for which the conven­tion was called and as it is
self-evident that the amendments it may propose cannot have any effect as part
of the Constitution until the same are duly ratified by the people, it
necessarily follows that the acts of the convention, its officers and members
are not immune from attack on constitutional grounds.  The present Constitution is in full force and
effect in its entirety and in everyone of its parts, the existence of the
Convention notwithstanding, and operates even with­in the walls of that
assembly.  While it is indubitable that
in its internal operation and the performance of its task to propose amendments
to the Constitution it is not subject to any degree of restraint or control by
any other authority than itself, it is equally be­yond cavil that neither the
Convention nor any of its officers or members can rightfully deprive any person
of life, liberty or property without due process of law, deny to anyone in this
country the equal protection of the laws or the freedom of speech and of the
press in disregard of the Bill of Rights of the existing Cons­titution.  Nor, for that matter, can such Convention
validly pass any resolution providing for the taking of private property
without just compensation or for the imposition or exacting of any tax, impost
or assessment, or declare war or call the Congress to a special session,
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, pardon a convict or render
judgment in a controversy between private individuals or between such
individuals and the state, in violation of the distribution of powers in the
Constitution.

It being manifest that there are powers which the Convention may
not and cannot validly assert, much less exercise, in the light of the existing
Constitu­tion, the simple question arises, should an act of the Convention be
assailed by a citizen as being among those not granted to or inherent in it,
according to the existing Constitution, who can decide whether such a
contention is correct or not?  It is of
the very es­sence of the rule of law that somehow somewhere the power and duty
to resolve such a grave constitutional question must be lodged on some
authority, or we would have to confess that the integrated system of govern­ment
established by our founding fathers contains a wide vacuum no intelligent man
could ignore, which is naturally unworthy of their learning, experience and
craftsmanship in constitution-making.

We need not go far in search for the answer to the query
We have posed.  The very decision of
Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales, so much invoked
by in­tervenors, reiterates and re-enforces the
irrefutable logic and wealth of principle in the opinion written for a
unanimous Court by Justice Laurel in Angara
vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 134, reading:

“…. (I)n the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft
strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative
and the judicial departments of the government. 
The overlapping and interlacing of func­tions and duties between the
several de­partments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the
one leaves off and the other begins.  In
times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not en­tirely
obliterated.  In cases of conflict, the
judicial department is the only cons­titutional organ which can be called upon
to determine the proper allocation of po­wers between the several departments
and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

“As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking
per­fection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our
people, acting through their delegates to so pro­vide, that instrument which is
the expres­sion of their sovereignty however limited, has established a
republican government intended to operate and function as a harmo­nious whole,
under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limit­ations and
restrictions provided in the said instrument. 
The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions
and limitations upon govern­mental powers and agencies.  If these restrictions and limitations are
trans­cended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for
a me­chanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional
channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill
of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government
mere political apothegms.  Certainly, the
limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they
should be in any living Constitu­tion. 
In the United States
where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the
possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its
historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a pe­riod of more than one and a half cen­turies.  In our case, this moderating power is
granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of Article VIII
of our Constitution.

“The Constitution is a defini­tion of the powers or
government.  Who is to determine the
nature, scope and extent of such powers? 
The Constitu­tion itself has provided for the ins­trumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way.  And when
the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality
nullify or in­validate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn
and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Consti­tution and to establish for
the par­ties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them.  This is in truth
all that is involved in what is termed ‘judicial supremacy’ which pro­perly is
the power of judicial review under the Constitution.  Even then, this power of judicial review is
li­mited to actual cases and controver­sies to be exercised after full oppor­tunity
of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question
raised or the very lis mota
presented.  Any attempt at abstraction
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to strike
conclusions unrelated to act­ualities. 
Narrowed as its functions is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.  More than that, courts accord the presumption
of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only be­cause the
legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the
judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controver­sies must reflect
the wisdom and just­ice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.

“But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of
power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered
that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not ‘the chief
palladium of constitution­al liberty . . . the people who are authors of this
blessing must also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to
mark, their voices to pro­nounce . . . aggression on the authori­ty of their
constitution.’ In the last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our
government in the unfold­ing years to come be tested in the cru­cible of
Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers.

“In the case at bar, the National Assembly has by resolution
(No. 8) of December 3, 1935,
confirmed the election of the herein petitioner to the said body.  On the other hand, the Electoral Commission
has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day
for the filing of protests against the election, returns and quali­fications of
members of the National As­sembly; notwithstanding the previous confirmations
made by the National As­sembly as aforesaid. 
If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National
Assembly has the effect of cut­ting off the power of the Electoral Com­mission
to entertain protests against the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, submit­ted after December 3, 1935, then the
resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect.  But, if, as contend­ed by the respondents,
the Electoral Com­mission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to
the exclusion of the National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9,
1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for
filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, should be upheld.

“Here is then presented an actual con­troversy involving as it
does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly
on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other.  From the very nature of the republican
government established in our country in the light of American experience and
of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable
obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries.  The Electoral Commission, as
we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created
for a speci­fic purpose, namely, to determine all contests relating to the
election, returns and quali­fications of the members of the National
Assembly.  Although the Electoral
Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits
of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the
constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to
constitutional restriction.  The
Electoral Com­mission is not a separate department of the government, and even
if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between
departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined
by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases.  Discarding the English type and other
European types of constitutional government, the framers of our Constitution
adopted the American type where the written constitution is interpreted and
given effect by the judicial department. 
In some countries which have de­clined to follow the American example,
provi­sions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts
from exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law.  This is taken as a recognition of what other­wise
would be the rule that in the ab­sence of direct prohibition, courts are bound
to assume what is logically their function. 
For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides
that courts shall have no power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81,
Chap. IV).  The former Austrian
Constitution contained a similar declaration. 
In countries whose constitution are silent in this respect, courts have
assumed this power.  This is true in Norway,
Greece, Australia
and South Africa.  Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3,
Preliminary Law to Consti­tutional Charter of the Czechoslovak, Republic,
February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitution of the Re­public
of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon the
validity of ordinary laws.  In our case,
the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitu­tional
arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by
the Constitution.  Were we to decline to
take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict?  And if the conflict were left undecided and
unde­termined, would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system
which may in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework?  To ask these questions is to answer
them.  Natura
vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid
exhaustion in our constitu­tional system. 
Upon principle, reason, and authority, we are clearly of the opi­nion
that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction
over the Electoral Commission and the sub­ject matter of the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of
the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as ‘the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly.”

As the Chief Justice has made it clear in Gon­zales, like
Justice Laurel did in Angara, these postulates
just quoted do not apply only to conflicts of authority between the three
existing regular depart­ments of the government but to all such conflicts
between and among these departments, or, between any of them, on the one hand,
and any other constitutionally created independent body, like the electoral
tribunals in Congress, the Comelec and the
constituent assemblies constituted by the Houses of Congress, on the
other.  We see no reason of logic or
principle whatsoever, and none has been convincingly shown to Us by any of the
respondents and intervenors, why the same ruling
should not apply to the present Convention, even if it is an assembly of
delegates elected directly by the people, since at best, as already
demonstrated, it has been con­vened by authority of and under the terms of the
present Constitution.

Accordingly, We are left with no alternative but to uphold the
jurisdiction of the Court over the present case.  It goes without saying that We do this not
because the Court is superior to the Convention or that the Convention is
subject to the control of the Court, but simply because both the Convention and
the Court are subject to the Constitution and the rule of law, and “upon
principle, reason and authority,” per Justice Laurel, supra, it is
within the power, as it is the solemn duty of the Court, under the exist­ing
Constitution to resolve the issues in which peti­tioner, respondents and intervenors have joined in this case.

II

The issue of jurisdiction thus resolved, We come to the crux of
the petition.  Is it within the powers of
the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order, on its own fiat, the holding of
a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment redu­cing to
eighteen years the age for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1 of Article
V of the Constitution proposed in the Convention’s Organic Resolution No. 1 in
the manner and form provided for in said resolution and the subsequent
implementing acts and resolution of the Convention?

At the threshold, the environmental circumstances of this case
demand the most accurate and unequivocal statement of the real issue which the
Court is called upon to resolve. 
Petitioner has very clearly stated that he is not against the
constitutional extension of the right of suffrage to the eighteen-year-olds, as
a matter of fact, he has advocated or sponsored in Congress such a proposal,
and that, in truth, the herein petition is not intended by him to prevent that
the proposed amendment here involved be submitted to the people for
ratification, his only purpose in filing the petition being to comply with his
sworn duty to prevent, whenever he can, any violation of the Constitution of
the Philippines even if it is committed in the course of or in con­nection with
the most laudable undertaking.  Indeed,
as the Court sees it, the specific question raised in this case is limited
solely and only to the point of whether or not it is within the power of the
Convention to call for a plebiscite for the ratification by the people of the
constitutional amendment proposed in the abovequoted
Organic Resolution No. 1, in the manner and form provided in said resolution as
well as in the subsequent implementing actions and resolution of the Convention
and its officers, at this juncture of its proceedings, when, as it is a matter
of common knowledge and judicial notice, it is not set to adjourn sine die,
and is, in fact, still in the preliminary stages of considering other reforms
or amendments affecting other parts of the existing Constitution; and, indeed,
Organic Resolution No. 1 itself expressly provides that the amendment therein
proposed “shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be
proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions
of the amended section or on other portions of the entire Constitution.”
In other words, nothing that the Court may say or do in this case should be
understood as reflecting, in any degree or means, the indivi­dual or collective
stand of the members of the Court on the funda­mental issue of whether or not
the eighteen-year-olds should be allowed to vote, simply because that issue is
not before Us now.  There should be no
doubt in the mind of anyone that, once the Court finds it constitutionally
permissible, it will not hesitate to do its part so that the said proposed
amendment may be presented to the people for their approval or rejection.

Withal, the Court rests securely in the conviction that the fire
and enthusiasm of the youth have not blinded them to the abso­lute necessity,
under the fundamental principles of democracy to which the Filipino people is
committed, of adhering always to the rule of law.  Surely, their idealism, sincerity and purity
of pur­pose cannot permit any other line of conduct or approach in res­pect of
the problem before Us.  The
Constitutional Convention of 1971 itself was born, in a great measure, because
of the pres­sure brought to bear upon the Congress of the Philippines by var­ious
elements of the people, the youth in particular, in their in­cessant search for
a peaceful and orderly means of bringing about meaningful changes in the
structure and bases of the existing social and governmental institutions,
including the provisions of the fundamental law related to the well-being and
economic security of the under­privileged classes of our people as well as
those concerning the preservation and protection of our natural resources and
the national patrimony, as an alternative to violent and chaotic ways of
achieving such lofty ideals.  In brief,
leaving aside the excesses of enthusiasm which at times have justifiably or
unjustifiably marred the demons­trations in the streets, plazas and campuses,
the youth of the Philippines, in general, like the rest of the people, do not
want confusion and disorder, anarchy and violence; what they really want are
law and order, peace and orderliness, even in the pur­suit of what they
strongly and urgently feel must be done to change the present order of things
in this Republic of ours.  It would be
tragic and con­trary to the plain compulsion of these perspectives, if the
Court were to allow itself in deciding this case to be carried astray by considerations
other than the imperatives of the rule of law and of the applicable provisions
of the Constitution.  Need­less to say,
in a larger measure than when it binds other departments of the government or
any other official or entity, the Constitution imposes upon the Court the
sacred duty to give meaning and vigor to the Constitution, by interpreting and
constru­ing its provisions in appropriate cases with the proper parties and by
striking down any act viola­tive thereof.  Here, as in all other cases, We are resolved
to discharge that duty.

During these times when most anyone feels very strongly the
urgent need for constitutional reforms, to the point of being convinced that
meaningful change is the only alternative to a violent revolution, this Court
would be the last to put any obstruction or impediment to the work of the
Constitutional Convention.  If there are
respectable sectors opining that it has not been called to supplant the
existing Constitution in its entirety, since its enabling provision, Arti­cle
XV, from which the Convention itself draws life expressly speaks only of
amendments which shall form part of it, which opinion is not with­out
persuasive force both in principle and in logic, the seemingly prevailing view
is that only the collective judgment of its members as to what is warranted by
the present con­dition of things, as they see it, can limit the extent of the
constitutional innovations the Convention may propose, hence the com­plete
substitution of the existing consti­tution is not beyond the ambit of the
Convention’s authority.  Desirable as it
may be to resolve this grave divergence of views, the Court does not consider
this case to be properly the one in which it should discharge its constitutional
duty in such premises.  The issues raised
by petitioner, even those among them in which respondents and intervenors have joined in an apparent wish to have them
squarely passed upon by the Court do not necessarily impose upon Us the
imperative obligation to express Our views thereon.  The Court considers it to be of the utmost
impor­tance that the Convention should be untram­melled
and unrestrained in the performance of its constitutionally assigned mission in
the manner and form it may conceive best, and so the Court may step in to clear
up doubts as to the boundaries set down by the Constitution only when and to
the specific extent only that it would be ne­cessary to do so to avoid a
constitutional crisis or a clearly demonstrable violation of the existing
Charter.  Withal, it is a very familiar
principle of constitutional law that constitutional questions are to be
resolved by the Supreme Court only when there is no alternative but to do it,
and this rule is founded precisely on the principle of respect that the Court
must accord to the acts of the other co­ordinate departments of the government,
and certainly, the Constitutional Convention stands almost in a unique footing
in that regard.

In our discussion of the issue of jurisdiction, We have already
made it clear that the Convention came into being by a call of a joint session
of Congress pursuant to Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, already
quoted earlier in this opinion.  We
reiterate also that as to matters not related to its internal operation and the
per­formance of its assigned mission to propose amendments to the Constitution,
the Convention and its officers and members are all sub­ject to all the
provisions of the existing Constitution. 
Now We hold that even as to its latter task of proposing amendments to
the Constitution, it is subject to the provisions of Section 1 of Article
XV.  This must be so, because it is plain
to Us that the framers of the Constitution took care that the process of
amending the same should not be undertaken with the same ease and facility in
changing an ordinary legislation. 
Constitution making is the most valued power, second to none, of the
people in a constitutional democracy such as the one our founding fathers have
chosen for this nation, and which we of the succeeding generations generally
cherish.  And because the Constitution
affects the lives, fortunes, future and every other conceivable aspect of the
lives of all the people within the country and those subject to its
sovereignty, every degree of care is taken in preparing and drafting it.  A constitution worthy of the people for which
it is intended must not be prepared in haste without adequate deliberation and
study.  It is obvious that
correspondingly, any amendment of the Constitution is of no less importance
than the whole Constitution itself, and perforce must be conceived and pre­pared
with as much care and deliberation.  From
the very nature of things, the drafters of an original constitution, as already
observed earlier, operate without any limitations, restraints or inhibitions
save those that they may impose upon themselves.  This is not necessarily true of subsequent
conventions called to amend the original constitu­tion.  Generally, the framers of the latter see to
it that their handiwork is not lightly treated and as easily mutilated or
changed, not only for reasons purely personal but more importantly, because
written consti­tutions are supposed to be designed so as to last for some time,
if not for ages, or for, at least, as long as they can be adopted to the needs
and exigencies of the people, hence, they must be insulated against precipitate
and hasty actions motivated by more or less passing political moods or
fancies.  Thus, as a rule, the original
constitutions carry with them limitations and conditions, more or less
stringent, made so by the people themselves, in regard to the process of their
amend­ment.  And when such limitations or
conditions are so incorporated in the original constitution, it does not lie in
the delegates of any subsequent convention to claim that they may ignore and
disregard such conditions because they are as powerful and omnipotent as their
original counterparts.

Nothing of what is here said is to be understood as curtailing in
any degree the number and nature and the scope and extent of the amendments the
Convention may deem proper to propose. 
Nor does the Court propose to pass on the issue extensively and
brilliantly discussed by the parties as to whether or not the power or duty to
call a plebiscite for the ratification of the amendments to be proposed by the
Convention is exclusively legislative and as such may be exercised only by the
Congress or whether the said power can be exercised concurrently by the
Convention with the Congress.  In the
view the Court takes of the present case, it does not perceive absolute
necessity to resolve that question, grave and important as it may be.  Truth to tell, the lack of unanimity or even
of a consensus among the members of the Court in respect to this issue creates
the need for more study and deliberation, and as time is of the essence in this
case, for obvious reasons, November 8, 1971, the date set by the Convention for
the plebiscite it is calling, being nigh, We will refrain from making any
pronouncement or expressing Our views on this question until a more appropriate
case comes to Us.  After all, the basis
of this decision is as important and decisive as any can be.

The ultimate question, therefore, boils down to this:  Is there any limitation or condition in
Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitu­tion which is violated by the act of
the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in
Organic Resolution No. 1?  The Court
holds that there is, and it is the condition and limitation that all the
amendments to be proposed by the same Conven­tion must be submitted to the
people in a single “election” or plebiscite.  It being indisputable that the amendment now
proposed to be submitted to a plebiscite is only the first amendment the
Convention will propose We hold that the plebiscite being called for the
purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8,
1971 is not au­thorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence
all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec
in that direction are null and void.

We have arrived at this conclusion for the following reasons:

1.   The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is sufficiently clear.  It says distinctly that either Congress
sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose
“may propose amendments to this Constitution,” thus placing no limit
as to the number of amendments that Congress or the Convention may
propose.  The same provision also as
definitely provides that “such amendments shall be valid as part of
this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an
election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for
their ratification,” thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many
“elections” or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or
amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention,
and the provision unequivocally says “an election” which means only
one.

(2)  Very little reflection is needed for anyone to
realize the wisdom and appropriateness of this provision.  As already stated, amending the Constitution
is as serious and important an undertak­ing as constitution making itself.  Indeed, any amendment of the Constitution is
as important as the whole of it, if only because the Constitution has to be an
integrated and harmonious instrument, if it is to be viable as the framework of
the government it establishes, on the one hand, and adequately formidable and
reliable as the suc­cinct but comprehensive articulation of the rights,
liberties, ideo­logy, social ideals, and national and nationalistic policies
and aspi­rations of the people, on the other. 
It is inconceivable how a con­stitution worthy of any country or people
can have any part which is out of tune with its other parts.

A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters as­sembled
by them for the purpose.  Once the
original constitution is approved, the part that the people play in its
amendment becomes harder, for when a whole constitution is submitted to them,
more or less they can assume its harmony as an integrated whole, and they can
either accept or reject it in its entirety. 
At the very least, they can examine it before casting their vote and
determine for the selves from a study of the whole document the merits and
demerits of all or any of its parts and of the document as a whole.  And so also, when an amendment is submitted
to them that is to form part of the existing constitution, in like fashion they
can study with deli­beration the proposed amendment in relation to the whole
existing constitution and or any of its parts and thereby arrive at an
intelligent judgment as to its acceptability.

This cannot happen in the case of the amendment in question.  Prescinding already
from the fact that under Section 3 of the ques­tioned resolution, it is evident
that no fixed frame of reference is provided the voter, as to what finally will
be the concomitant quali­fications that will be required by the final draft of
the constitution to be formulated by the Convention of a voter to be able to
enjoy the right of suffrage, there are other considerations which make it
impossible to vote intelligently on the proposed amendment, although it may
already be observed that under Section 3, if a voter would favor the reduction
of the voting age to eighteen under conditions he feels are needed under the
circumstances, and he does not see those conditions in the ballot nor is there
any possible indication whether they will ever be or not, because Congress has
reserved those for future action, what kind of judgment can he render on the
proposal?

But the situation actually before Us is even worse.  No one knows what changes in the fundamental
principles of the constitu­tion the Convention will be minded to approve.  To be more speci­fic, we do not have any
means of foreseeing whether the right to vote would be of any significant value
at all.  Who can say whether or not later
on the Convention may decide to provide for varying types of voters for each level
of the political units it may divide the country into.  The root of the difficulty, in other words,
lies in that the Convention is precisely on the verge of introducing sub­stantial
changes, if not radical ones, in almost every part and aspect of the existing
social and political order enshrined in the present Constitution.  How can a voter in the proposed plebiscite
intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the
different institutions which the Convention may establish and of which
presently he is not given any idea?

We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite
for the ratification of an amendment to the Constitution may be validly held,
it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an
intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amend­ment per se as
well as its relation to the other parts of the Consti­tution with which it has
to form a harmonious whole.  In the
context of the present state of things, where the Convention has hardly started
considering the merits of hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the
existing Constitution, to present to the people any single proposal or a few of
them cannot comply with this requirement. 
We are of the opinion that the present Constitution does not contemplate
in Section 1 of Article XV a plebiscite or “election” wherein the
people are in the dark as to frame of reference they can base their judgment
on.  We reject the rationalization that
the present Constitu­tion is a possible frame of reference, for the simple
reason that intervenors themselves are stating that
the sole purpose of the pro­posed amendment is to enable the eighteen year olds
to take part in the election for the ratification of the Constitution to be
drafted by the Convention.  In brief,
under the proposed plebiscite, there can be, in the language of Justice
Sanchez, speaking for the six members of the Court in Gonzales, supra,
“no proper submission”.

III

The Court has no desire at all to hamper and hamstring the noble
work of the Constitutional Convention. 
Much less does the Court want to pass judgment on the merits of the
proposal to allow these eighteen years old to vote.  But like the Convention, the Court has its
own duties to the people under the Constitution, which is to decide in
appropriate cases with appropriate parties whether or not the mandates of the
fundamental law are being complied with. 
In the best light God has given Us, We are of the conviction that in
providing for the questioned plebiscite before it has finished, and separately
from, the whole draft of the constitution it has been called to formulate, the
Convention’s Organic Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the Convention
implementing the same violate the condition in Section 1, Article XV that there
should only be one “election” or plebiscite for the ratification of
all the amendments the Convention may propose. 
We are not denying any right of the people to vote on the proposed
amendment; We are only holding that under Section 1, Article XV of the
Constitution, the same should be submitted to them not separately from but
together with all the other amendments to be proposed by this present
Convention.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition herein is
granted.  Organic Resolution No. 1 of the
Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of
the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the
resolution of the respondent Comelec complying
therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null and void.  The respondents Comelec,
Disbursing Officer, Chief Ac­countant and Auditor of the Constitutional
Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in compliance with the
said organic resolution.  In view of the
peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision
immediately executory.  No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Teehankee,
and Villamor,
JJ., concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., Zaldivar, Castro, and Makasiar, JJ., concur in a separate opinion.

Makalintal, J., reserves his vote.

Fernando, J., concurs and
dissents separately.

^[1]
Under Section 36, Rule 138, as amended, no one may appear as amicus curiae
unless invited, or allowed, by the Court.

200

6 pt
6 pt
0
3

MicrosoftInternetExplorer4

/* Style Definitions */
table.MsoNormalTable
{mso-style-name:”Table Normal”;
mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;
mso-tstyle-colband-size:0;
mso-style-noshow:yes;
mso-style-parent:””;
mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt;
mso-para-margin:0in;
mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt;
mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:”Times New Roman”;}