MARILYN FUSIN, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE TRADE NAME “X-TRA MARKETING”, PETITIONER, VS. HON. LORENZA R. BORDIOS-PACULDO, SPOUSES EDITHA ALCANTARA AND WILLARDO ALCANTARA, AND ARIES…
GAERLAN, S.H., J.:
dated 22 May 2010 rendered by public respondent Hon. Lorenza R.
Bordios-Paculdo, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
126 of Caloocan City, in a special civil action for certiorari, docketed
as Sp. Civil Action Case No. C-982; and the Order[3] dated 24 June 2011 denying herein petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration[4] from the first assailed Order.
FACTS
On 27 February 2008, petitioner (then complainant) Marilyn Fusin filed a Complaint[5]
for Collection of Sum of Money before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MTC) of Caloocan City against private respondents (then defendants)
Spouses Editha and Willardo Alcantara, and Aries Alcantara. The
Complainant was docketed as Civil Case No. 08-29232.
The Complaint alleged that petitioner, doing business under
the trade name “X-Tra Marketing”, is engaged in the business of buying
and selling furniture and fixtures. Private respondents, who are doing
business under the trade name “Lucky 88” and/or “Atlas Appliances
Center” were supposedly among petitioner’s customers. In the course of
the parties’ business relations, private respondents allegedly purchased
various furniture and fixtures from petitioner, amounting to
PhP321,023.55, which was covered by post-dated checks. When the check
payments to petitioner were later dishonored, petitioner filed the
collection case against private respondents jointly for the sum of
PhP321,023.55.
On 6 August 2008, the parties were referred to mediation.
Petitioner represented by Melody Quinones, on one hand, and private
respondents Editha Alcantara and Aries Alcantara, on the other hand,
executed and signed a Compromise Agreement,[6] containing the following terms:
“Without going into the merits of the case and for the purpose
of buying peace, accused offers to settle the case amicably by paying
their total obligation amounting to FIVE HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED NINETY PESOS (P510,490.00), which offer private complainant
accepts subject to the following mutually acceptable terms and
conditions:
- The accused gives today the three (3) Zambales Bank
customer’s check Nos. 0054391 dated October 25, 2008 with the amount of
P7,650.00; No. 0054392 dated November 25, 2008 with P7,650.00 and No.
0054393 with P7,650.00 dated December 25, 2008.- The accused issued another four (4) post dated checks from
Pacific Ace Savings Bank Nos. 0039611 amounting P5,000.00 dated
September 30, 2008; No. 0039612 with P5,000.00 dated October 31, 2008;
No. 0039613 with P5,000.00 dated November 30, 2008 and No. 0039614
(sic) P5,000.00 dated December 31, 2008.- On August 29, 2008 hearing, the accused promised to deliver
thirty six (36) post dated checks for the remaining balance at
P12,987.23 per check due on every end of the month that will start on
January 31, 2009 up (sic) December 31, 2011.In the event that the accused fails to make good any one of the
monthly payments and/or violates any of the terms and conditions of this
agreement, the unpaid balance shall become due and demandable and the
private complainant can now move for the issuance of a writ of execution
to enforce the terms and conditions of this compromise agreement.”
Private respondent Willardo Alcantara was not a signatory to the said Compromise Agreement.
The Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of
Caloocan City, Branch 49, referred back the Compromise Agreement to the
Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) for possible amendment. This time,
however, the mediation before the PMC was unsuccessful and “petitioner opted that the case be resolved by the court.”[7]
On 5 February 2009, petitioner filed a Motion to Approve
Partial Compromise Agreement to the Extent of the Amount Alleged in the
Complaint and Between the Signatory Parties,[8] but was denied by the the MTC of Caloocan City, Branch 49, in an Order[9] dated 8 May 2009, ratiocinating as follows:
“More importantly, as the subject Compromise Agreement also
covers and includes other alleged obligations of the defendants which
are not mentioned in the herein complaint and thus, beyond the
jurisdiction of this Court to determine, it cannot be determined with
certainty whether the WHOLE amount of the alleged obligation of the
defendants as stated in the complaint, to wit: Three Hundred Twenty One
Thousand Twenty (sic) Pesos and 55/100 (Php321,023.55) is included in
the amount of Five Hundred Ten Thousand Four Hundred Ninety Pesos
(P510,490.00) stated in the Compromise Agreement as the total obligation
of the defendants or ONLY A PORTION THEREOF, while the total balance
refers to the other alleged liabilities not alleged in the instant
complaint. In other words, doubt exits whether in the subject Compromise
Agreement, the signatory defendants, Editha and Aries Alcantara
acknowledged to pay the full amount of Three Hundred Twenty One Thousand
Twenty (sic) Pesos and 55/100 (Php321,023.55) which the plaintiff is
seeking to be partially approved or only a portion thereof. These
findings became more significant in the light of the claim of the
defendants that their obligation is less than what plaintiff is claiming
and that they have almost paid the latter.WHEREFORE, the “Motion to Approve Partial Compromise Agreement
to the Extent of the Amount Alleged in the Complaint and Between the
Signatory Parties” is hereby denied.xxx”
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration[10] was likewise denied by MTC in its Order[11] dated 25 August 2009.
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari[12] before the respondent Court, docketed as Sp. Civil Action Case No. C-982.
Acting on the petition for certiorari, public respondent issued the assailed Order[13] dated 22 May 2010, denying the said petition, for the following reasons:
“In the case at bar, there is no doubt that the obligation is
mathematically divisible up to the jurisdiction of the lower court and
as alleged in the Compliant for a sum of money in the amount of
P321,023.55 and considering that only defendants Editha and Aries
Alcantara signed the Compromise Agreement, only the two are liable but
each one is liable as a joint debtor, thus, Editha Alcantara as a joint
debtor is only liable for one half of P321,023.55 while Aries Alcantara
as a joint debtor is also liable for only one half of P321,023.55.The problem arises as to the performance of the obligation and
enforcement of the last paragraph of the Compromise Agreement, to quote:‘In the event that the accused fails to make good any one
of the monthly payments and/or violates any of the terms and conditions
of this agreement, the unpaid balance shall become due and demandable
and the private complainant can now move for the issuance of a writ of
execution to enforce the terms and conditions of this compromise
agreement.’because the obligation of defendant Editha and Aries Alcantara
is not specifically delineated/divided in the Compromise Agreement, to
quote:‘a. The accused gives today the three (3) Zambales Bank
customer’s check Nos. 0054391 dated October 25, 2008 with the amount of
P7,650.00; No. 0054392 dated November 25, 2008 with P7,650.00 and No.
0054393 with P7,650.00 dated December 25, 2008.b. The accused issued another four (4) post dated checks
from Pacific Ace Savings Bank Nos. 0039611 amounting P5,000.00 dated
September 30, 2008; No. 0039612 with P5,000.00 dated October 31, 2008;
No. 0039613 with P5,000.00 dated November 30, 2008 and No. 0039614
(sic) P5,000.00 dated December 31, 2008.c. On August 29, 2008 hearing, the accused promised to
deliver thirty six (36) post dated checks for the remaining balance at
P12,987.23 per check due on every end of the month that will start on
January 31, 2009 up (sic) December 31, 2011.’that in the event any check will bounce and will not be paid
plaintiff Marilyn Fusin can not (sic) establish who between the
defendants violate the terms and conditions of the obligation as based
on the provisions of said Compromise Agreement as the same does not
specify what are the checks issued by defendant Editha Alcantara and
what are the checks issued by Aries Alcantara.Moreover, the Compromise Agreement does not provide for a
provision that all the claims and interest of the parties against each
other are terminated after compliance with the terms and conditions of
the same Compromise Agreement, thus, it is not a settlement of a
controversy principally and this is manifested by petitioner’s
allegation in the Motion to Approve Partial Compromise Agreement to the
extent of the amount alleged in the Complaint and between the signatory
parties (February 2, 2009) par. 5, 7 to quote:‘that the compromise agreement of the signatory parties
can be approved partially to the extent of the claim P321,023.55 as it
satisfies that (sic) plaintiff’s claim as alleged in the complaint and
ends litigation covered by the claim.That the judgment, however, be without prejudice for the
plaintiff to file separate action for the balance of P189,466.45.00
(sic) or for the parties to settle them out of court.’Verily, the Compromise Agreement does not put to rest the controversy/issues in the main case. xxx”
On 24 June 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[14] of the Order date 22 May 2010, which was denied by the respondent judge in an Order[15] dated 24 June 2011.
Thus, petitioner filed this instant petition before this Court, on the following ground:[16]
GROUNDS
I.
THE HON. PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE LORENZO (SIC) R.
BORDIOS-PACULDO, WAS ACTING CONTRARY TO LAW WHEN IT MADE THE OBSERVATION
THAT THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT HAS NOT INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING TERMS AND
CONDITIONS:“the obligation of defendant Editha and Aries
Alcantara is not specifically delineated/divided in the Compromise
Agreement, t(s)o that in the even (sic) any check will bounce and will
not be paid, plaintiff Marilyn Fusin can not (sic) establish who between
the defendants violate the terms and conditions of the obligation as
based on the provisions of the Compromise Agreement as the same does not
specify what are the checks issued by defendant Editha Alcantara and
what are the checks issued by Aries Alcantara.Moreover, the Compromise agreement does not provide
for a provision that all the claims and interest of the parties against
each other are terminated after compliance with the terms and conditions
of the Compromise Agreement, xxxVerily, the compromise agreement does not put to rest the controversy/issues in the main case.”
THE COURT’S RULING
A careful review of the records brings this Court’s attention
to a serious and fatal mistake committed by petitioner in resorting to
the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
It will be recalled that the assailed Orders dated 22 May 2010 and 24
June 2011 were rendered by the respondent court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction in a special civil action for certiorari, docketed
as Sp. Civil Case No. C-982. Thus, petitioner’s remedy therefrom is an
ordinary appeal, and not another certiorari action.
Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is instructive, viz:
“Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. —
(a) Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal
with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from
and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal
shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of
multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In
such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like
manner.”
It is a well-settled rule that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive.[17]
This rule proceeds from Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which
dictates that one of the requirements for the availment of the remedy
of certiorari is precisely that there should be no appeal,[18] viz:
SECTION 1. Petition for Certiorari. — When any tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board
or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.
Thus, when the remedy of appeal is available, certiorari will not
prosper, even if the basis is grave abuse of discretion. It cannot
substitute for a lost appeal, especially if one’s own negligence or
error in one’s choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse.[19]
In this case, petitioner admittedly received the Order dated
24 June 2011 on 13 July 2011 and, under the rules, had until 28 July
2011 to file an appeal by way of a notice of appeal. Petitioner allowed
this period to lapse without filing an appeal and, instead, filed this
petition for certiorari on 5 August 2011.
In any case, even
granting that the petition can be properly filed under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, we hold that it was bound to fail.
It should be noted that as a legal recourse, certiorari is a
limited form of review. It is restricted to resolving errors of
jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion, not errors of judgment.[20]
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere
abuse of discretion is not enough.[21]
For there to be a finding of grave abuse of discretion, it must be
shown that the discretionary power was exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.[22]
In this case, this Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of respondent judge in denying the petition filed before it.
The respondent court, in ruling as it did, was obviously guided by the
rule that courts are duty-bound to exercise the required degree of care
in seeing to it that neither ambiguity nor incompleteness of details
should characterize the agreement, much less the judgment rendered on
the basis thereof.[23]
An examination of the Compromise Agreement shows that the
failure to specifically delineate or divide the obligations of Editha
and Aries Alcantara therein can create further issues between the
parties, rather than put an end to the present controversy. To recall,
the nature of the liability of private respondents is joint, such that
each of them are bound only to pay their respective proportional shares
from the claim of petitioner. However, the Compromise Agreement failed
to fix the amount due from each signatory debtor, and identify from whom
the corresponding check payments pertain. Thus, in the event that any
of the checks are eventually dishonored, it would be difficult to
ascertain against whom the breach is attributable, and against whom to
enforce the last paragraph of the Compromise Agreement.
The expressed desire of the parties to end their judicial
travails by submitting to a compromise deserves the utmost attention
from the court, and no effort should be spared in helping them to arrive
at a definite and unequivocal termination of their problems and
differences. It is high time that the matter-of-fact treatment usually
accorded by trial courts to motions to approve compromises were
abandoned in favor of the more positive activist attitude the situation
demands. In acting in such a situation, the judge should bear in mind
that the objective is to end the disagreement between the parties, not
to begin a new one. Thus, if the parties and their counsel are unable to
do it, the judge is expected to assist them in attaining precision and
accuracy of language that would more or less make it certain that any
dispute as to the matters being settled would not recur, much less give
rise to a new controversy.[24]
Parenthetically, and without bearing on this Court’s decision,
We do not agree with respondent court that the Compromise Agreement
must contain a provision that all the claims and interest of the parties
against each other are terminated after compliance with the terms and
conditions thereof. To Our mind, such statement is a mere superfluity,
as the very nature and purpose of entering into a compromise agreement
is to avoid a litigation, or as in this case, put an end to one already
commenced.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The assailed Orders dated 22 May 2010 and 24 June 2011 rendered by the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 126, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bruselas, Jr.,[*] (Acting Chairperson) and Macalino,[**] JJ., concur.
[*] Acting Chairperson, per Office Order No. 156-14-AGT, dated April 23, 2014
[**] Acting Senior Member, per Office Order No. 156-14-AGT, dated April 23, 2014
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-12.
[2] Rollo, pp. 54-63.
[3] Rollo, pp. 70-71.
[4] Rollo, pp. 64-69.
[5] Rollo, pp. 14-18.
[6] Rollo, pp. 27-28.
[7] Rollo, page 29.
[8] Rollo, pp. 30-32.
[9] Rollo, pp. 33-35.
[10] Rollo, pp. 36-39.
[11] Rollo, pp. 40-43..
[12] Rollo, pp. 44-53.
[13] Supra, footnote 2.
[14] Supra, footnote 4.
[15] Supra, footnote 3.
[16] Rollo, page 8.
[17] Isabel N. Guxman vs. Aniano N. Guzman, et al., G.R. No. 172588, 13 March 2013.
[18] Philippine Postal Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 173590, 9 December 2013.
[19] Faustino T. Chingkoe and Gloria Chingkoe vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 183608, 31 July 2013.
[20] Supra, Guzman vs. Guzman, et al.
[21] Eastern Assurance & Surety Corporation (EASCO) vs. Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board
(LTFRB), G.R. No. 149717, 7 October 2003.
[22] M.A. Jimenez Enterprises, Inc., et al. vs. The Honorable Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 155307, 6 June 2011.
[23] Romeo N. Hernandez vs. Hon. Jose C. Colayco, et al., G.R. No. L-39800, 27 June 1975.
[24] Ibid.