INTERSTATE ESTATE OF CHARLES A. MCDONOUGH, PEOPLES BANK AND TRUST CO. ADMINISTRATOR AND APPELLEE VS. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, CREDITOR AND APPELLANT.

This is a motion for reconsideration based on two grounds.

The motion based on the first ground is really a motion for
reconsideration, because the movant asks therein that the question
raised in the court below and in this Court on appeal and which was
decided against the movant, be considered anew. But it deserves no
serious consideration for the simple reason that, as we have already
shown in the decision, there was no law, ordinance or order issued by
the Japanese Military Authorities prohibiting debtors, like the late
Charles A. McDonough, to pay their obligation to the appellant
Philippine National Bank, which was not an enemy bank; contrary to the
appellee’s contention. If the Bank appellant did not chose to secure
the, approval by the Japanese Military Authorities to appellant’s
action against the deceased, it was because the bank did not deem it
necessary to do so for the debtor was solvent. It was for the latter to
have secured the approval of the Japanese Military Authorities if he
wanted to pay his obligation and avoid paying the interests thereon.

The so-called motion for reconsideration based on the second ground
is not really a motion for reconsideration, for to reconsider a
decision is to consider and decide anew a question previously raised,
submitted to and decided by the Court. The movant had never before
submitted or invited the attention of this Court to the applicability
of Republic Act No. 401 on which the so-called motion for
reconsideration is based, and for that reason we have not passed upon
that question in our decision. It is true that when said Act was
approved on June 26, 1949, the present case was already pending on
appeal in this Court, and appellee’s brief had been filed seven months
before that date; but this case was set for hearing, argued and
submitted for decision in April, 1950, and it was decided on April 26,
1951. So although the appellee was not bound to make any assignment of
error of the lower court in his brief in support of the decision
appealed from, it was incumbent upon the appellee^[*]
to point out in his brief, or amended brief if necessary, or invite the
attention of this Court to the provisions of said Republic Act No. 401
if it were applicable and favorable to the appellee. Undoubtedly, the
reason for the appellee’s failure to do so is that said Republic Act,
“which condones unpaid interests accrued from January 1, 1942, to
December 31, 1945, aside from not being applicable to the present case,
is against the theory advanced in-the appellee’s brief. If it was
necessary to enact said Act in order to condone the payment of
interests accruing during the Japanese occupation, it was because the
payment of such interests was demandable. Condonation of interest
presupposes obligation to pay it.

This Court cannot apply Republic Act No. 401. to the present case
even if the appellee had invited our attention to it, because no
evidence was produced by both parties except the promissory note and
the claim of the appellant bank against the late Charles A. McDonough
for the payment thereof together with interest. There is nothing in the
record to show that the late Charles A. McDonough “was unable to pay
his obligation which became due and demandable, or interests which
should have been paid during the period from Jan. 1st, 1943, to
December 31,st, 1945, because of the refusal of the creditor to accept
payment (a); because the debtor was prevented from doing so by
his imprisonment or detention by the enemy resulting in his inability
to pursue his normal work (b); or because of penury caused by
the ravages of the war, financial restrictions imposed by whatever
authority, or loss of his ordinary sources of income or control over
them as a result thereof (c), “as provided in Seotion 2 of Republic Act No. 401. It is obvious that is not applicable Subsection (d) of said Section 2, -which provide for condonation when the debtor was unable
to pay because the assets of the creditor were under the control of the
enemy and or administered through the so-called Enemy Alien Property
Custodian or other enemy instrumentality inasmuch as the assets of the
creditor Philippine National Bank “were not under such, control.
Besides, according to Section 1 of said Act, the purpose of the law or
the policy of the State in extending the condonation of interests
contemplated in Republic Act No. 401, is “the rehabilitation of those
“who have suffered the ravages of war * * * in order to afford
opportunities to debtors of the Government or Government-owned or
controlled corporations to rehabilitate themselves, and to enable them
to pay their pre-war obligations under the terms and conditions
beneficial to them.”

If the attorneys for the appellee believe that the late Charles A. McDonough was unable or had no money to pay or interests his obligation which
should have bean paid during the period of from January 1, 1942, to
December 31, 1945, which amounted in all to less than four thousand
(P4,000) pesos, because of penury caused by some of the causes enumerated in Section 2, Subsection (e), or beoause he could not freely pursue his normal work or law practice under Subsection (b)
of Republic Act No. 401, on which the dissenter relies, without showing
that the late McDonough had then no money or property to pay his debt
or the interest thereon to the Bank, and that the oondonation of said
obligation and interests of about nine hundred (P900) pesos accrued
during the said period of time would rehabilitate the late Charles A.
McDonough, v»ho is already dead since the year 1945, they might have
filed or may file a motion for new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence, before the Judgment of this Court has become
final, under Seotionl, Rule 55, in connection with Section 1, Rule 58,
of Rules of Court. The newly discovered evidence would be the approval
of Republic Act No. 401 of June 29, 1949, and the evidence which should
show that the present case comes under said Section 2, of Republio Act
No. 401.^[*]

In the hearing of the motion for reconsideration the attorney for
the creditor assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 401,
set up for the first time in the motion for reconsideration of the
decision of this Court on appeal, and in order that said question may
be considered and decided in connection with Act 401 by this Court, it
should be set up in the new trial if a motion for new trial is filed in
time and granted in the present case, But if the motion is denied there
would be no need for considering and passing upon that question.

Motion for reconsideration is therefore denied.

Pablo, Bengzon, Reyes and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

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^[*]
Relativo vs. Castro, et al., 43 Off. Gaz. (No.l) 106, 111 citing Lucero vs. de Guzman, 45 Phil. 652.

^[*] U. S. vs. Repollo, et al., 2 Phil., 195.