VICENTE TAN, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. BELEN DE LEON, ETC., ET AL. F. A. FUENTES, AS REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR OF REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 3, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, RESPONDENTS AND APP…

This action for certiorari with preliminary injunction is now before
this Court on the appeal interposed by the respondents against the
judgment therein rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila,
granting the writ of certiorari therein prayed for and vacating and
setting aside the decision of the Regional Office No. 3 of the
Department of Labor, which ordered the payment to respondents Belen de
Leon, Edilberto de Leon, Estela de Leon and Paz Topaya, of their claims
for differential pay, terminal pay and attorney’s fee, on the ground
that said regional office has no jurisdiction to hear and determine
said claims.

The record discloses that on October 2, 1958, respondents Belen de
Leon, Edilberto de Leon, Estela de Leon and Paz Topaya filed with the
Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor against the petitioner
Vicente Tan and the Beauty Novelties and Toys Factory a complaint for
the payment of differential pay and terminal pay allegedly due them and
attorney’s fees. Vicente Tan and the Beauty Novelties and Toys Factory
resisted the claim. After trial, said regional office, on December 26,
1958, rendered a decision ordering Vicente Tan and the Beauty Novelties
and Toys Factory to pay the said respondents the total sum of P6,718.80
as unpaid overtime pay, differential pay and separation pay due them,
plus P671.88 as attorney’s fees. Notice of this decision was duly
served on Vicente Tan and the Beauty Novelties and Toys Factory. They
did not however appeal therefrom, and the said decision having become
final, on January 8, 1959, said regional office issued the
corresponding writ of execution and delivered the same to the Sheriff
of the City of Manila for enforcement. The latter executed the writ and
levied thereunder upon four sewing machines belonging to the wife of
Vicente Tan.

On February 2, 1959, Vicente Tan filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against Belen de Leon, et al. the petition for
certiorari by which this action was initiated to review, vacate and set
aside the judgment of the Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of
Labor of December 26, 1958, as well as the writ of execution issued
thereunder. The respondents opposed this petition. After trial, that
Court, on March 6, 1959, rendered judgment granting the writ of
certiorari prayed for, and vacated and set aside the decision of the
Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor of December 26, 1958,
as well as the writ of execution issued thereunder, on the ground that
said regional office was without jurisdiction to hear and decide the
claims of respondents Belen de Leon, et al. From this judgment, the
respondents appealed to this Court.

The appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting the
writ applied for in this case. It is claimed that the ground invoked
therefor, i. e., that said Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of
Labor was without authority to hear and decide the claims in question,
is without foundation, for said regional office was created under the
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, which was undertaken pursuant to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 997, as amended by Republic Act No.
1241, and it was expressly vested by said reorganization plan with
jurisdiction to hear and determine money claims of laborers.

The law on the matter, as enunciated by this Court, in previous
decisions, is that the provisions of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A,
undertaken under the provisions of Republic Act No. 997, as amended,
insofar as they confer judicial power upon the regional offices thereby
created and give said offices original and exclusive jurisdiction over
money claims of laborers other than those falling under the Workmen’s
Compensation Law, are null and void and of no effect. Corominas, et al.
vs. Labor Standards Commission, 112 Phil., 551; 59 Off. Gaz., [43] 7432, and companion cases, Miller vs. Mardo, 112 Phil., 792; 59 Off. Gaz., [14] 2307; Caltex (Phil.) Inc. vs. Villanueva, et al., 112 Phil., 890; 59 Off Gaz., [47] 8071. In the Corominas case, supra, this Court said:

“The provisions of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A,
particularly Section 25, which grants to the regional offices original
and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims of laborers, is null and
void, said grant having been made without authority by Republic Act No.
997.”

In that of Miller vs. Mardo, supra, this Court held:

“On the basis of the foregoing considerations, we
hold and declare that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, insofar as it
confers judicial power to the Regional Offices over cases other than
those falling under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, is invalid and of
no effect.”

And in the Caltex case, supra, this Court said:

“From the foregoing provisions of Law and rules, it
may be gathered that a regional office of the Department of Labor has
original jurisdiction to hear and determine claims for compensation
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. If a claim is controverted, it
shall be heard and decided only by a regularly appointed hearing
officers or any other employee duly designated by the Regional
Administrator to act as hearing office. But when the claim is
uncontroverted and there is no necessity of requiring the claimant to
present further evidence, the Regional Administrator may enter an award
or deny the claim.”

Analyzing the facts of this case in the light of the above rule, it
is clear that Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor had no
authority to hear and determine the claims at bar. As above stated, the
claims of appellants Belen de Leon, et al. are for overtime pay,
differential pay, terminal pay and attorney’s fees. It is true that it
is not disputed that said appellants were workers in the novelties and
toys factory of the petitioner Vicente Tan. But their claim is not for
compensation falling under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. (Act No.
3428, as amended by Act No. 3812, Commonwealth Act No. 210 and Republic
Acts Nos. 772 and 889.) Under the law, their claims are merely money
claims falling under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. They do
not fall under the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations,
for, although they were workers in the novelties and toys factory of
the petitioner, there is no showing that they were still in the service
of said petitioner, or that they seek reinstatement in his service, or
that there was a labor dispute between them affecting their
relationship as employer and employees, or that the controversy refers
to minimum wages under the Minimum Wage Law, or that it involved unfair
labor practice or hours of employment under the Eight Hour Labor Law.
Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 108 Phil., 134; Philippine Wood Products vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 112 Phil., 640; 61 Off. Gaz., [10] 1345; Sy Huan vs.
Bautista, et al., 112 Phil., 941; 61 Off. Gaz., [20] 2942. It is,
therefore, clear that the decision of Regional Office No. 3 in question
is null and void ab initio as rendered by a body which was
not vested with jurisdiction to hear and determine the case, and that
it is of no effect and cannot be enforced.

Wherefore, we find the judgment appealed from in accordance with
law. The same, consequently, is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement
as to costs. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.