CHUNG QUIAO ALIAS BINA TAN, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. ANITA ABADAY, ET AL., RESPONDENTS AND APPELLANTS.

Anita Abaday and Juanita Isoy filed each a claim for underpayment of
wage, overtime pay, and separation pay before the branch of the
Department of Labor in Cagayan de Oro City against Chung Quiao alias
Bina Tan in connection with their employment as sales girls of the
latter. The two claims were assigned to a hearing officer of the local
regional office for adjudication. The employer having failed to appear
or answer the claims wasdeclared in default, and the hearing officer
proceeded to receive the evidence of the claimants. Thereafter, the
hearing officer rendered decisions in each case sentencing the employer
to pay to Anita Abaday the sum of P2.042.30 and to Juanita Isoy the sum
of P529.00 within a period of 15 days from receipt of the decision.

The two decisions having become final and executory, the hearing
officer issued a writ for their execution which was referred to the
provincial sheriff for compliance. Whereupon, the employer filed a
petition for injunction before the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Oriental. Pending trial on the merits, the court, on motion of
petitioner, issued a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
sheriff from enforcing in the meantime the execution issued in the two
cases above referred to.

The parties submitted a stipulation of facts, and on the strength
thereof, the court a quo rendered decision declaring the two decisions
rendered by the hearing officer unenforceable and making permanent the
injunction that was preliminarily issued, with costs against
respondents. From this decision respondents took the present appeal.

The court a quo, in declaring unenforceable and ineffective the two
decisions rendered by the hearing officer of the regional office of
Cagayan de Oro City, gave the opinion that under Republic Act No. 602
the hearing officer of the Department of Labor of Misamis Oriental has
no power nor authority to render decision concerning recovery of wages
and salaries which is unforceable and binding against the parties
because such power or authority only devolves upon courts of justice,
the provision of Section 48 of the Rules of Regulations of the Labor
Standard Commission to the contrary notwithstanding. And having no such
power or authority, the decisions in question cannot have any binding
effect and much less be enforced thru the issuance of a writ of
execution, as respondent sheriff had intended to do.

But respondents disagree with this finding invoking the power given
to a hearing officer by the Labor Standard Commission under
Reorganization Plan 20-A adopted pursuant to the authority conferred by
Republic Acts No. 997 and 1241. Thus, they contend that under Section
25, Article VI of said Plan each regional office is given original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases affecting money claims arising
from violations of labor standards on working conditions including
unpaid wages, underpayment, overtime separation pav, vacation pay and
payment of medical services of domestic help, and under Section 20 of
the same Plan, once the decision of said regional officer has become
final and executory it may be enforced like a final decision of a court
of justice, which shall be carried out by the sheriff in the same
manner as a writ of execution issued by a court of justice. Respondents
likewise contend that this provision of Reorganization Plan 20-A has
the effect of superseding the provisions of Republic Act 602 such that
now the jurisdiction to act on cases involving underpayment of wages
and salaries of laborers and employees is exclusively given to the
regional office of each province.

This contention, however, cannot be entertained for the reason that
this Court has already held in several cases that Reorganization Plan
No. 20-A insofar as labor cases ape concerned is unconstitutional in
that it involves an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
On this point, we said:

“The issue raised is not new. We held in a number of
cases that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, insofar as it confers judicial
powers come under the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, is invalid,
because it involves undue delegation of legislative power not
contemplated by Republic Act 997, as amended. Nor can it be contended
that the defect in the conferment of judicial powers upon labor
officials has been cured because of the failure of Congress to
disapprove said reorganization plan upon the theory that such failure
is tantamount to an indorsement us a regular statute, for in order that
a measure may be considered as regular statute the same must be duly
passed in accordance with the procedure laid down by our constitution.
And so, in the rerent case of Miller vs. Mardo (and its companion
cases), G. R. No. L-15138, decided on July 31, 1961, this Court reached
the conclusion that said reorganization plan ‘insofar as it confers
judicial powers to the Regional Offices over cases other than those
falling under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, is invalid and of no
ellcvt.’ This case comes squarely under this ruling.” (Stoll, et al.
vs. Mardo, et al., G.R. No. L-17241, June 29, 1962; See also Davao Far
Easten Commercial C.V. Montemayor. et al., G.R. No. L-16581. June 29,
1962; Valderrama Lumber Manufacturers Co. vs. Administrator and Hearing
Officer,G.R. No. L-17783, June 30, 1962: Gapan Farmers’ Corporative
Marketing Association, Inc. vs. Parial, et al., G.R. No. L-17024. July
24, 1962; Gallardo, et al. vs. Manila Railroad Co., G.R. No.
L-10919-20, September 29, 1962):

It follows that the decisions rendered by the hearing officer of
Cagayan de Oro City are legally ineffective and as such cannot be
enforced by a writ of execution, as correctly found by the court a quo.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against respondents.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.