G.R. No. L-23307. June 30, 1967
DAMASO P. PEREZ AND REPUBLIC BANK, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS, VS. MONETARY BOARD, THE SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKS, CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SECRETARY OF JUST…
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Petitioner-appellant Damaso P. Perez,
for himself and in a derivative
capacity on behalf of the Republic Bank, instituted mandamus proceedings in the
Court of First Instance of Manila on June 23, 1962, against the Monetary Board,
the Superintendent of Banks, the Central Bank and the Secretary of
Justice. His object was to compel these
respondents to prosecute, among others, Pablo Roman and several other Republic
Bank officials for violations of the General Banking Act (specifically secs. 76-78 and 83 thereof) and the Central Bank Act,
and for falsification of public or commercial documents in connection with
certain alleged anomalous loans amounting to P1,303,400.00 authorized by Roman and the other bank officials.
Respondents assailed, in their respective answers, the propriety
of mandamus. The Secretary of Justice
claimed that it was not their specific duty to prosecute the persons denounced by Perez. The Central Bank and respondent officials, on the other hand, averred that
they had already done their duty under the law by referring to the special
prosecutors of the Department of Justice for criminal investigation and prosecution those cases involving the alleged anomalous loans.[1]
On July 10, 1962, respondents moved for the dismissal of the petition for lack of
cause of action. Petitioners
opposed. The lower court denied the motion.
Subsequently, herein intervenors-appellees,
as the incumbent directors of the Board of the Republic Bank, filed a motion to
intervene in the proceedings. Petitioners
opposed the motion but the lower court approved the same.
On January 20, 1964,
the Monetary Board of the Central Bank passed Resolution No. 81 granting the
request of Republic Bank for credit accommodations to cover the unusual withdrawal of
deposits by its depositors in view of the fact that said Bank was under
investigation then by the authorities.
The grant, however, was conditioned upon the execution by the management
and controlling stockholders of the Republic Bank of a voting trust agreement
in favor of a Board of Trustees to be chosen by the latter with the approval
of the Central Bank.
Pursuant to this resolution, Pablo Roman and his family, as the
controlling stockholders of Republic Bank, executed a voting trust agreement in favor of a board of trustees composed of former Chief Justice
Ricardo Paras, Hon. Miguel Cuaderno
and Mr. Felix de la Costa. Subsequently,
or on March 13, 1964, this
agreement was superseded by another one with the Philippine National Bank as
the trustee.[2]
In view of these developments, the intervenors-appellees filed a motion to dismiss before the lower claiming that the ouster of Pablo Roman
and his family from the
management of the Republic Bank effected by the voting trust agreement rendered
the mandamus case moot and academic.
Respondents-appellees also filed a like motion to dismiss in which they again raised the impropriety of
mandamus. Acting upon the two motions
and the oppositions thereto filed by petitioners, the lower court granted the
motions and dismissed the case. Hence,
this appeal.
Appellants, contending that the ouster of Pablo Roman from
Republic Bank’s management and control has not altered or rendered moot the issues in the case, argue that the remedy of
mandamus lies[3] to compel respondents to prosecute the aforementioned Pablo Roman
and company, Addressing Ourselves directly to this issue raised on the
propriety of the petition for mandamus, We rule, that petitioners cannot seek by mandamus to compel respondents to prosecute criminally those alleged
violators of the banking laws. Although
the Central Bank and its respondent officials may have the duty under the
Central Bank Act and the General Banking Act to
cause the prosecution of those
alleged violators, yet We find nothing in said laws that imposes a clear,
specific duty on the former to do the actual prosecution of the
latter. The Central Bank is a government
corporation created principally to administer monetary and banking system of
the Republic,[4] not a prosecution agency[5] like the fiscal‘s office. Being an artificial person the Central Bank
is limited to its statutory powers and the nearest power to which prosecution
of violators of banking laws may be attributed is its power to sue and be sued.[6] But this corporate power of litigation
evidently refers to civil cases only.
The Central Bank and its respondent officials have already done
all they could, within the confines of their powers, to cause the prosecution
of those persons denounced by Perez.
Annexes 5 to 7-C CBP of
respondents’ answer and even
petitioners’ opposition to the first motion
to dismiss[7]
show that the cases
of the alleged anomalous loans had already been referred by the Central
Bank to the special prosecutors of the Department of Justice for criminal
investigation and prosecution. For respondents
to do the actual prosecuting themselves, as petitioners would have it, would be
tantamount to an ultra vires act
already.
As for the Secretary of Justice,
while he may have the power to prosecute – through the office of the Solicitor General criminal cases,
yet it is settled
rule that mandamus will not lie to compel a prosecuting officer to Prosecute a
criminal case in court.[8]
Moreover, it does not appear from the law that only the Central
Bank or its respondent officials can cause the prosecution of alleged violations of banking laws. Said violations
constitute a public offense, the prosecution of which is a matter of public
interest and hence, anyone – even private individuals – can denounce such
violations before the prosecuting authorities.
Since Perez himself could cause the filing of criminal complaints
against those allegedly involved in the anomalous loans, if any, then he has a
plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law, which makes
mandamus against respondents improper.
But petitioners-appellants would insist that the impropriety of
mandamus could no longer be raised before the lower court for the second time
since it had already
been invoked in a previous motion to dismiss which was denied. This
is untenable. The lower court was not estopped from changing its opinion while it was under its
jurisdiction to do so and on the same ground of lack of cause of action raised
before, because the former order was purely interlocutory and
thus remained constantly subject to alteration, modification or reversal by it before the rendition of final
judgment on its merits.[9]
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is, as it
is hereby, affirmed. Costs against
petitioner-appellant Perez.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and
Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.
[1]
See Annexes 5, 7 and 7-A CBP of respondents’ answer.
[2]
See Annex “A” of Petitioners-Appellants’ brief.
[3]
I.e. that in their petition, pars. 6-10 and 12 specially, a cause of action
for mandamus is stated.
[4]
Sec. 2, Republic Act 265.
[5]
See: People vs. Tan, L-9275 June 30, 1960.
[6]
Sec. 4, Republic Act 265.
[7]
See Records, p. 40.
[8]
Gonzalez vs. Court of First
Instance, 63 Phil. 846; Dimaunahan vs.
Hon. Aranas, 74 Phil. 455; People vs. Natoza, L-8917, Dec.
24, 1956.
[9]
Rule 135, Sec. 5(g), Rev. Rules of Court; Gonzales vs. Gonzales; 81
Phil. 38; 6 Moran, 1963 ed.,
180.