G.R. No. L-58184. October 30, 1981
FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, AND THE PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE…
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The constitutionality of the amendment to the Article of the
Labor Code regarding strikes “affecting the national interest”[1]
is assailed in this petition which partakes of the nature of a prohibition
proceeding filed by the Free Telephone Workers Union. As amended, the Article now reads: “In labor disputes causing or likely to
cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest, such as
may occur in but not limited to public utilities, companies engaged in the
generation or distribution of energy, banks, hospitals, and those within export processing zones, the
Minister of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and
decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have
the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout. If one has already taken place at the time of
assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately
return to work and the employers shall immediately resume operations and
readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the
strike or lockout. The Minister may seek
the assistance of law
enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with
such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.”[2] It is the submission of petitioner labor
union that “Batas Pambansa Blg.
130 in so far as it amends
article 264 of the Labor Code delegating to the Honorable Minister of Labor and
Employment the power and discretion to assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory
arbitration to the National Labor Relations Commission, and in effect make or
unmake the law on free collective bargaining, is an undue delegation of
legislative powers.”[3]
There is likewise the assertion that such conferment of authority “may
also ran (sic) contrary to the assurance of the State to the workers’ right to
self-organization and collective bargaining.”[4]
On the crucial issue presented, the Court holds that petitioner
was not able to make out a case
of an undue delegation of legislative power.
There could be, however, an unconstitutional application. For while the Constitution
allows compulsory arbitration, it must be stressed that the exercise of such
competence cannot ignore the basic fundamental principle and state policy that
the state should afford protection to labor.[5]
Whenever, therefore, it is resorted to in labor disputes causing or likely to
cause strikes or lockouts affecting national interest, the State still is
required to “assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining, security of tenure, and just
and humane conditions of work.”[6]
At this stage of the litigation, however, in the absence of factual
determination by the Ministry of Labor and the National Labor Relations
Commission, this Court is not in a position to rule on whether or not there is
an unconstitutional application. There
was not even a categorical assertion to that effect by petitioner’s counsel
which was indicative of the care in his choice of words. He only assumed that the conferment of such
authority may run counter to the right of the workers to self-organization and
collective bargaining. The petition then
cannot prosper.
The facts alleged in the petition relevant for the purpose of
determining whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power
do not sustain the claim of petitioner union.
On September 14, 1981, there was a notice of strike with the Ministry of
Labor for unfair labor practices stating the following grounds: “1)
Unilateral and arbitrary implementation of a Code of Conduct, a copy of which
is attached, to the detriment of the interest of our members; 2) illegal
terminations and suspensions of our officers and members as a result of the
implementation of said Code of Conduct; and 3) Unconfirmation
(sic) of call sick leaves and its automatic treatment as Absence Without
Official Leave of Absence (AWOL) with corresponding suspensions, in violation
of our Collective Bargaining Agreement.”[7]
After which came, on September 15, 1981, the notification to
the Ministry that there was compliance with the two-thirds strike vote and
other formal requirements of the law and Implementing Rules.[8]
Several conciliation meetings called by the Ministry followed, with petitioner
manifesting its willingness to have
a revised Code of Conduct that would be fair to all concerned but with a plea
that in the meanwhile the Code of Conduct being imposed be suspended – a position
that failed to meet the approval of private respondent.[9]
Subsequently, respondent, on September
25, 1981, certified the labor dispute to the National Labor Relations
Commission for compulsory arbitration and enjoined any strike at the private
respondent’s establishment.[10]
The labor dispute was set for
hearing by respondent National Labor Relations Commission on September 28,
1981.[11]
There was in the main an admission of the above relevant facts by public respondents. Private respondent, following the lead of
petitioner labor union, explained its side on the controversy regarding the
Code of Conduct, the provisions of which as alleged in the petition were quite
harsh, resulting in what it deemed indefinite preventive suspension –
apparently the principal cause of the labor dispute. At this stage, as mentioned, it would be
premature to discuss the merits, or lack of it, of such claim, the matter being
properly for the Ministry of Labor to determine.
The very next day
after the filing of the petition, to be exact on September 29, 1981, this Court
issued the following resolution:
“Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the
arguments adduced in the petition for certiorari with prayer for a
restraining order, the Court Resolved to (a) require the respondents to file an
[answer], not a motion to
dismiss, on or before Wednesday, October 7, 1981; and (b) [Set] this case for
hearing on Thursday, October 8, 1981 at 11:00 o’clock in the morning.”[12]
After the parties were duly heard, Solicitor General Estelito
P. Mendoza[13]
appearing for the public respondents, the case was considered ripe for decision.[14]
To repeat, while the unconstitutionality of the amendatory act
has not been demonstrated, there is no ruling on the question of
unconstitutional application, especially so as to any alleged infringement in
the exercise of the power of compulsory arbitration of the specific modes
provided in the Constitution to assure compliance with the constitutional
mandate to “afford protection to labor” being at this stage
premature.
1. The allegation that there is undue delegation
of legislative powers cannot stand the test of scrutiny. The power which he would deny the Minister of
Labor by virtue of such principle is for petitioner labor union
within the competence of the President, who in its opinion can best determine
national interests, but only when a strike
is in progress.[15]
Such admission is qualified by the assumption that the President “can make
law,” an assertion which need not be passed upon in this petition. What possesses significance for the purpose
of this litigation is that it is the President who “shall have control of
the ministries.”[16]
It may happen, therefore, that a single person may occupy a dual position of
Minister and Assemblyman. To the extent,
however, that what is involved is the execution or enforcement of legislation,
the Minister is an official of the executive branch of the government. The adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary
system in the amended Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential
character. Article VII on the presidency
starts with this provision: “The
President shall be the head of state and chief executive of the Republic of the
Philippines.”[17]
Its last section is an even more
emphatic affirmation that it is a presidential system that obtains in our
government. Thus: “All powers vested in the President of
the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution and the laws of
the land which are not herein provided for or conferred upon any official shall
be deemed and are hereby vested in the President unless the Batasang
Pambansa provides otherwise.”[18] There is a provision, of
course, on the Prime Minister, but the Constitution is explicit that while he
shall be the head of the Cabinet, it is the President who nominates him from
among the members of the Batasang Pambansa,
thereafter being “elected by a majority of all the members thereof.”[19] He is primarily, therefore, a Presidential choice. He need not even come from its elected members. He is responsible, along with the Cabinet, to the Batasang Pambansa for the program of government but as “approved
by the President.”[20] His term of office as Prime Minister “shall commence from the date of
his election by the Batasang Pambansa
and shall end on the date that
the nomination of his successor is submitted by the President to the Batasang Pambansa. Any other
member of the Cabinet or the
Executive Committee may be removed at the discretion of the President.”[21] Even the duration of his term then depends
on the Presidential pleasure,
not on legislative approval or lack of it.
During his incumbency, he exercises supervision over all ministries,[22] a recognition of the important role he plays
in the implementation of the policy of the government, the legislation duly
enacted in pursuance thereof, and the decrees and orders of the President. To the Prime Minister can thus be delegated
the performance of the administrative functions of the President, who can then
devote more time and energy in the fulfillment of his exacting role as the
national leader.[23] As the only one whose constituency is
national it is the President who, by virtue of his election by the entire electorate, has an indisputable
claim to speak for the country as a whole.
Moreover, it is he who is
explicitly granted the greater power of control of such ministries. He continues to be the Executive, the
amplitude and scope of the functions entrusted to him in the formulation
of policy and its execution leading to the apt observation by Laski that there is not one aspect of which that does not
affect the lives of all. The Prime
Minister can be of valuable assistance indeed to the President in the discharge
of his awesome responsibility, but it is the latter who is vested with powers,
aptly characterized by Justice Laurel in Planas v. Gil,[24]
as “broad and extraordinary [being] expected to govern with a firm and
steady hand without vexation or embarrassing interference and much less
dictation from any source.”[25]
It may be said that Justice Laurel was referring to his powers under the 1935
Constitution. It suffices to refer anew
to the last section of the article of the present Constitution on the
presidency to the effect that all powers vested in the President of the
Philippines under the 1935 Constitution remain with him It cannot be emphasized
too strongly that under the 1935 Constitution “The Executive power shall
be vested in the President of the Philippines.”[26]
2. A later decision, Villena v. Secretary of Interior,[27]
is of greater relevance to this case.
The opinion of Justice Laurel, again the ponente,
made clear that under the presidential system, “all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by
the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed
and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.”[28]
At the time of the adoption of the present Constitution on January 17, 1973, this Court had cited with
approval the above ruling of Villena in twelve cases.[29]
It is particularly noteworthy that the first decision promulgated under the
present Constitution reiterating the above doctrine is Philippine American
Management Co. v. Philippine American Management Employees Association.[30]
For the question therein involved, as in this case, is the statutory grant of
authority to the then Secretary of Labor, now Minister of Labor, by the Minimum
Wage Law to refer to the then existing Court of Industrial Relations for
arbitration the dispute that led to a strike. It is indisputable, according to the opinion,
that in the very petition, the Secretary of Labor on January 6, 1972, pursuant to the Minimum Wage Law,
“endorsed the controversy on the precise question of whether or not
petitioner Philippine American Management Company was complying with its
mandatory terms. What was done by him,
as a department head, in the regular course of business and conformably to a
statutory provision is, according to settled jurisprudence that dates back to
an authoritative pronouncement by Justice Laurel in 1939 in Villena
v. Secretary of the Interior, presumptively the act of the President, who is
the only dignitary who could, paraphrasing the language of the decision,
disapprove or reprobate it. What other
response could be legitimately expected from respondent Court then? It could not just simply fold its hands and
refuse to pass on the dispute.”[31]
The Villena doctrine was stressed even more in
denying a motion for reconsideration by a more extensive citation from the ponencia of Justice Laurel: “Without minimizing the importance of
the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the
projection of that of the President.
Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of
the Supreme Court of the United States,
‘each head of a department is, and must be, the President’s alter ego
in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to
exercise authority.’ * * * Secretaries of departments, of course, exercise
certain powers under the law but the law
cannot impair or in any way affect the constitutional power of control
and direction of the President. As a
matter of executive policy, they may be granted departmental autonomy as to
certain matters but this is by mere concession of the executive, in the absence
of valid legislation in the particular field.
If the President, then, is the authority in the Executive Department, he
assumes the corresponding responsibility.
The head of a department is a man of his confidence; he controls and
directs his acts; he appoints him and can remove him at pleasure; he is the
executive, not any of his secretaries.
It is therefore logical that he, the President, should be answerable for
the acts of administration of the entire Executive Department before his own
conscience no less than before that undefined power of public opinion which, in
the language of Daniel Webster, is the last repository of popular
government.”[32]
So it should be in this case.
3. Even on the assumption,
indulged in solely because of the claim earnestly and vigorously pressed by
counsel for petitioner, that the authority conferred to the Minister of Labor
partakes of a legislative character, still no case of an unlawful delegation
of such power may be discerned. That is
the teaching from Edu v. Ericta.[33]
Thus: “What cannot be delegated is
the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them;
the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when
it leaves the hands of the legislature.
To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative
power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the
measure enacted. The legislature does
not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to
do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the
only way in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made
between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally
may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution
to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection
can be made. The Constitution is thus
not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of
flexibility and practicability. To avoid
the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at
the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and
lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise,
the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy,
marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances
under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative
purpose may be carried out. Thereafter,
the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above
guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or
implied. If the
former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be
spelled out specifically. It could be implied
from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. * * * This is to
adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision [Pangasinan Transportation v. Public Service Commission]
announced not-too-long after the Constitution came into force and effect that
the principle of non-delegation ‘has been made to adapt itself to the
complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain
limits, of the principle of “subordinate legislation” not only in the
United States and England but in practically all modern governments.’ He
continued: ‘Accordingly, with the
growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the
laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater
powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the
courts.’ Consistency with the conceptual
approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority
non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves
the hands of Congress being assumed. Our
later decisions speak to the same effect.
Thus from Justice J.B.L. Reyes in People v. Exconde: ‘It is well
established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a
non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless
the latter may constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for
the reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not
impossible) to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex
situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation
should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation
be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that the law
prescribes.’ “[34] Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 cannot be any clearer, the coverage being limited
to “strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interests.”
4. The strict rule on
non-delegation was enunciated by Justice Laurel in People v. Vera,[35]
which declared unconstitutional the then Probation Act.[36] Such an approach, conceded by some
constitutionalists to be both scholarly and erudite, nonetheless aroused
apprehension for being too rigid and inflexible. While no doubt appropriate in that particular
case, the institution of a new mode of treating offenders, it may pose
difficulty for social and economic legislation needed by the times. Even prior to the above-cited Pangasinan Transportation decision, Justice Laurel himself
in an earlier decision, People v. Rosenthal in 1939, promulgated less than two
years after Vera, pointed out that such doctrine of non-delegation “has
been made to adopt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving
rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of ‘subordinate
legislation’ not only in the United States and England but in practically all
modern governments. The difficulty lies
in the fixing of the limit and extent of the authority. While courts have undertaken to lay down
general principles, the safest is to decide each case according to its peculiar
environment, having in mind the wholesome legislative purpose intended to be
achieved.”[37]
After which, in came the even more explicit formulation in Pangasinan Transportation appearing in the quoted excerpt
from Edu v. Ericta. There is no question therefore that there is
a marked drift in the direction of a more liberal approach. It is partly in recognition of the
ever-increasing needs for the type of legislation allowing rule-making in
accordance with standards, explicit or implicit, discernible from a perusal of
the entire enactment that in Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing
Administration v. Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and
Offices[38]
the then Justice, now the retired Chief Justice and presently Speaker, Makalintal had occasion to refer to “the growing
complexities of society” as well as “the increasing social challenges
of the times.”[39]
It would be self-defeating in the extreme if the legislation intended to cope
with the grave social and economic problems of the present and foreseeable
future would founder on the rock of an unduly restrictive and decidedly
unrealistic meaning to be affixed to the doctrine of non-delegation. Fortunately with the retention in the amended
Constitution of some features of the 1973 Constitution as originally adopted leading
to an appreciable measure of concord and harmony between the policy-making
branches of the government, executive and legislative, the objection on the
grounds of non-delegation would be even less persuasive. It is worth repeating that the Prime Minister,
while the choice of the President, must have the approval of the majority of
all members of the Batasang Pambansa.[40]
At least a majority of the cabinet members, the Ministers
being appointed by the President, if heads of ministries, shall come from its
regional representatives.[41]
So, also, while the Prime Minister and the Cabinet are responsible to the Batasang Pambansa for the program
of government, it must be one “approved by the President.”[42]
While conceptually, there still exists a distinction
between the enactment of legislation and its execution, between formulation
and implementation, the fundamental principle of separation of powers of which
non-delegation is a logical corollary becomes even more flexible and
malleable. Even in the case of the
United States, with its adherence to the Madisonian
concept of separation of powers, President Kennedy could state that its
Constitution did not make “the Presidency and Congress rivals for power but
partners for progress [with the two branches] being trustees for the people,
custodians of their heritage.”[43]
With the closer relationship provided for by
the amended Constitution in our case, there is likely to be even more
promptitude and dispatch in framing the policies and thereafter unity and
vigor in their execution. A rigid
application of the non-delegation doctrine, therefore, would be an obstacle to
national efforts at development and progress.
There is accordingly more receptivity to laws leaving to administrative
and executive agencies the adoption of such means as may be necessary to
effectuate a valid legislative purpose.
It is worth noting that a highly-respected legal scholar, Professor
Jaffe, as early as 1947, could speak of delegation as the “dynamo of
modern government.”[44]
He then went on to state that “the occasions for delegating power to administrative offices [could be]
compassed by a single generalization.”[45] Thus:
“Power should be delegated where there is agreement that a task must
be performed and it cannot be effectively performed by the legislature without
the assistance of a delegate or without an expenditure of time so great as to
lead to the neglect of equally important business. Delegation is most commonly indicated where the
relations to be regulated are highly technical or where their regulation
requires a course of continuous decision.”[46] His perceptive study could rightfully
conclude that even in a strictly presidential system like that of the United
States, the doctrine of non-delegation reflects the American “political
philosophy that insofar as possible issues be settled [by legislative bodies],
an essentially restrictive approach” may ignore “deep currents of
social force.”[47] In plainer terms, and as applied to the Philippines
under the amended Constitution with the close ties that bind the executive and
legislative departments, certain features of parliamentarism
having been retained, it may be a deterrent factor to much-needed
legislation. The spectre
of the non-delegation concept need not haunt, therefore, party caucuses,
cabinet sessions or legislative chambers.
5. By way of summary, this
Court holds that Batas Pambansa Blg.
130 insofar as it empowers the Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction over
labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely
affecting the national interest and thereafter decide it or certify the same to
the National Labor Relations Commission is not on its face unconstitutional for
being violative of the doctrine of non-delegation of
legislative power. To repeat, there is
no ruling on the question of whether or not it has been unconstitutionally
applied in this case, for being repugnant to the regime of self-organization
and free collective bargaining, as on the facts alleged, disputed by private
respondent, the matter is not ripe for judicial determination. It must be stressed anew, however, that the
power of compulsory arbitration, while allowable under the Constitution and
quite understandable in labor disputes affected with a national interest, to be
free from the taint of unconstitutionality, must be exercised in accordance
with the constitutional mandate of protection to labor. The arbiter then is called upon to take due
care that in the decision to be reached, there is no violation of “the rights of workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of
work.”[48] It is of course manifest that there is such
unconstitutional application if a law “fair on its face and impartial in
appearance [is] applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye
and an unequal hand.”[49] It does not even have to go that far. An instance of unconstitutional application
would be discernible if what is ordained by the fundamental law, the protection
of labor, is ignored or disregarded.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of
merit. During the pendency
of the compulsory arbitration proceedings, both petitioner labor union and
private respondent are enjoined to good-faith compliance with the provisions of
Batas Pambansa
Blg. 130.
No costs.
Barredo, Makasiar,
Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Teehankee and Aquino, JJ., in the result.
[1]
Article 264, Batas Pambansa Blg. 130.
[2]
Ibid.
[3]
Petition, 3.
[4]
Ibid.
[5]
The first sentence of Article II, Sec. 9 of the Constitution reads as
follows: “The State shall afford
protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment, ensure
equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employers.”
[6]
Ibid, second sentence.
[7]
Petition, par. 9.
[8]
Ibid, par. 9, obviously a failure to number the
paragraph correctly.
[9]
Ibid, par. 10. [11].
[10]
Ibid, par. 11 [12].
[11]
Ibid, par. 12 [13].
[12]
Resolution dated September 29, 1981.
[13]
He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Reynato
S. Puno and Solicitor Jesus V. Diaz.
[14]
Subsequently in view of an ex-parte motion which was
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order by private respondent with an
opportunity granted to the petitioner to comment, this Court on October 22,
1981 issued a temporary restraining order limited to “enjoining the union,
its officers, directors, stewards and members from engaging and/or continuing to engage in the
above-described concerted activities or in any and all forms of work stoppages, slowdowns, mass
leaves, sit downs and similar or analogous concerted activities; * * *.”
[15]
Petition, Argument, IV b.
[16]
The 1973 Constitution, Article VII Sec. 8.
[17]
Ibid, Sec. 1.
[18]
Ibid, Sec. 16.
[19]
Ibid, Article
IX, second paragraph of Section 1.
[20]
Ibid, Sec. 2.
[21]
Ibid, Sec. 4.
[22]
According to Article IX, Sec. 10 of the Constitution: “The Prime Minister shall have
supervision of all ministries.”
[23]
Cf. Koenig The Chief Executive, 158–187 (1964).
It is noteworthy that while the American system of government is
indisputably Presidential, the author could speak of its President as the Chief Executive.
[24]
67 Phil. 62 (1939).
[25]
Ibid, 77.
[26]
Article VII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution.
[27]
67 Phil. 451 (1939).
[28]
Ibid, 463.
It is to be noted that even under the 1935 Constitution, the reference
was to the Chief Executive.
[29]
Cf. Donnelly and Associates v. Agregado, 95 Phil. 142 (1954); Cabansag
v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152 (1957);
Collector of Customs v. Court of Tax
Appeals, 102 Phil. 244 (1957); Commissioner of Customs v. Auyong Hian,
105 Phil. 561 (1959); People v. Jolliffe, 105 Phil. 677 (1959); Demaisip
v. Court of Appeals, 106 Phil. 237
(1959); Juat v.
Land Tenure Administration, 110 Phil. 970 (1961); Tulawie
v. Provincial Agriculturist of Sulu, 120 Phil. 595 (1964); Lacson-Magallanes
Co. v. Pano,
L-27811, Nov. 17, 1967, 21 SCRA 895; Tecson v. Salas,
L-27524, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 275; Lim Sr. v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, L-26990, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 751; Barte v. Dichoso, L-28715, Sept. 28, 1972, 47 SCRA
77.
[30]
L-35254, January
29, 1973, 49 SCRA
194.
[31]
Ibid, 205.
[32]
Philippine American Management Co. v.
Philippine American Management Employees Association, L-35254, May 25, 1973, 51 SCRA
98, 104. Cf. Roque v. Director of Lands, L-25373, July
1, 1976, 72 SCRA 1.
[33]
L-32096, October 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 481.
[34]
Ibid, 496-498.
In this case, the standard is “public safety.” It could be
“public welfare,” Mun. of
Cardona v. Binangonan,
36 Phil. 547 (1917); “necessary in the interest of law and order,” Rubi v. Prov. Board, 39 Phil. 660 (1919); “public
interest,” People v. Rosenthal,
68 Phil. 328 (1939); and “justice and equity and substantial merits of the
case,” Int. Hardwood v. Pangil Fed. of Labor, 70 Phil. 602
(1940). The Pangasinan
Transportation decision is reported in 70 Phil. 221, the excerpt being found in
229, a 1970 decision. People
v. Exconde
is reported in 101 Phil. 1125, a 1957 decision.
[35]
65 Phil. 56 (1937).
[36]
Act No. 4221 (1935).
[37]
68 Phil. 328, 343 (1939).
[38]
L-21484, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 649.
[39]
Ibid, 662.
[40]
Cf. Article IX, Sec. 1.
[41]
Cf. Ibid.
[42]
Cf. Ibid, Sec. 2.
[43]
Kennedy, The Second
State of the Union Message (1962),
in Nevins ed., The Burden and the Glory, 3 (1964).
[44]
Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power, 47
Col. Law
Review, 359 (1947).
[45]
Ibid, 361.
[46]
Ibid.
[47]
Ibid.
[48]
Article II, Section 9 of the Constitution.
[49]
Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 US 356, 372 (1886).