HATIB ABBAIN, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. TONGHAM CHUA, ET AL., RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.

The jurisdictional issue thrust upon this Court was shaped out of
background facts to be narrated.

March 12, 1958.  Respondent-appellee
Tongham Chua commence suit^[1]
for “forcible entry and illegal detainer”
against petitioner-appellant Hatib Abbain with the Justice of the Peace Court of Bongao, Sulu.  Pertinent are Tongham
Chua’s averments therein that he is ”the owner of a piece of land together
with the improvements thereon mostly coconut trees” located in Maraning, Bongao, Sulu, which contains an area of four hectares more or less;
that this land was donated to by his father, Subing
Chua, on January 16, 1952 and from that date up to the present time he has
“assumed ownership’s thereof, taken “possession of the land and paid
the corresponding taxes due the government every year”; that “on
January 16, 1952 and before this day [March 12, 1958], my tenant has
been the herein defendant, and we have been always
dividing the fruits or copra harvested therefrom on
fifty-fifty basis, that is, I shall have 50% of the sale and the herein
defendant gets 50% also”; that during the month of December, 1957, the
defendant [herein petitioner] “by means of force, strategy and stealth
unlawfully entered and still occupies the land in question after I have
repeatedly demanded of him to vacate the premises due to his
non–compliance of our agree­ment of
[his] giving share of the several harvests
he made.”

February 27,
1959.  Respondent
Justice of the Peace Mariano Managula rendered
judgment directing Hatib Abbain
to vacate the premises and place Tongham Chua in
possession of the plantation, with costs. 
This judgment was predicated upon the findings, after trial, that
sometime before World War II, petitioner Hatib Abbain, because of financial hardship, sold for P225.00 to Subing Chua the coconut plantation, subject matter of the
suit; that after the sale, Hatib Abbain
became the tenant of Subing Chua, the harvests of the
land divided on a 50-50 basis; that subsequently, on January 16, 1952, Subing Chua donated the plantation to his son, Tongham Chua, and Hatib Abbain, the same tenant of the father, continued to be the
tenant on the land; that the tenancy relation­ship was at the beginning
harmonious and cordial, but that during the month of December, 1957, the
tenant, Hatib Abbain,
“got ambitious, and wanted to assume ownership of the plantation; that the
said tenant desisted to give the share of his landlord of the harvests, hence,
the plaintiff [respondent Tongham Chua] filed the
present case on March 12, 1958.”

June 30, 1959.  Hatib Abbain filed the present petition in the Court of First Instance
of Sulu against respondent Tongham
Chua and Judge Mariano Managula.  The verified petition, with an affidavit of
merits, sought “relief from judgment of the Justice of the Peace Court of Bongao and/or annulment of its decision in Civil Case No.
21 with preliminary injunction.”^[2]
Petitioner there averred that:  (1) the
Justice of the Peace Court of Bongao did not have
jurisdiction over said Civil Case 21 which is within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations; and (2) because of
“fraud, mistake or excusable negligence,” he was deprived of a
hearing in said Civil Case 21, and prevented from taking an appeal from the
decision therein rendered.  Respondent Tongham Chua traversed the averments of the petition.

October 30,
1964.  After trial,
the Court of First Instance of Sulu issued the order
now the subject of appeal.  The court
struck down petitioner’s prayer for relief upon the finding that there was no
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which deprived defendant
(petitioner) of a hearing because he was present at the trial and given
opportunity to prepare his defense; and that neither was there evidence that
defendant was prevented from taking an appeal therefrom.  The court, moreover, noted that the petition
for relief was filed more than four months after the oral promulgation of the
decision on February 25, 1959.  On the jurisdictional issue, the court ruled that
“petitioner has not presented any proof or showing of landlord and tenant
relationship between the parties” to bring the case within the
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations, and that upon the allegations
of the complaint in Civil Case No. 21, the case is “clearly one of ejectment.”

The petition was thus dismissed without costs.  The present is a direct appeal to this Court.

The three errors assigned in appellant’s brief raise but one
issue:  Jurisdiction.

1. Appellant plants his case upon the provisions of Section 21 of
Republic Act 1199 (approved August 30,
1954), known as the “Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines”,
which reads:

“SEC. 21.  Ejectment; violation; jurisdiction. –
All cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the land­holder or by a
third party and/or the settlement and dis­position of disputes arising from the
relationship of land­holder and tenant, as well as the violation of any of the
provisions of this Act, shall be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction
of such court as may now or hereafter be authorized by law to take cognizance
of tenancy relations and disputes.”

The statutory precept just quoted is supplemented by Section 7,
Republic Act 1267, creating the first Court of Agrarian Relations, effective June 14, 1955, as amended by Republic
Act 1409 which took effect on September
9, 1955.  Said Section 7
provides:

“SEC. 7.  Jurisdiction
of the Court. – The Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate,
decide, and settle all questions, matters, controversies or disputes involving
all those relationships established by law which determine the varying rights
of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land where one of the
parties works the land:  x x x.”^[3]

As heretofore adverted to, Tongham Chua’s
complaint was filed on March 12, 1958
– long after Republic Acts 1199, 1267 and 1409 were incorporated in our statute
books.  Well to remember then is that Tongham Chua’s complaint positively avers that Hatib Abbain is his tenant on a
50-50 sharing basis of the harvest; and that he seeks ejectment
of Hatib Abbain “due
to his non-compliance of our agreement of [his] giving my share of the several
harvests he made.”  The Justice of
the Peace Court itself found, after hearing, that Hatib
Abbain con­tinued to be the tenant of Tongham Chua after the latter became, on January 16, 1952, owner of the
plantation which he acquired from his father by virtue of a donation; and that Hatib Abbain refused to give
“the share of his landlord of the harvest.”

If both the complaint and the inferior court’s judgment have any
meaning at all, it is that the Justice of the Peace Court had no juris­diction
over the case.  Right at the outset, the
complaint should have been rejected. 
Failing in this, the case should have been dismissed during the course
of the trial, when it became all the mere evident that a landlord-tenant
relationship existed.  The judge had no
power to determine the case.  Because, Tongham Chua’s suit comes within the coverage of the
statutory provision (Section 21, R.A. 1199) heretofore mentioned that [a]ll cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the
landholder,” shall be under the “original and exclusive
jurisdiction of such court as may now or hereafter be authorized by law to take
cognizance of tenancy relations and disputes” and the broad sweep of
Section 7, Republic Act 1267, which lodged wish the Court of Agrarian Relations
“original and exclusive jurisdiction x x
x to consider, in­vestigate, decide, and settle all
questions, matters, controversies or disputes involving all those relationships
established by law which determine the varying rights of persons in the
cultivation and use of agricultural land where one of the parties works the
land.”

Jurisprudence has since stabilized the jurisdiction of the Court
of Agrarian Relations over cases of this nature.^[4]
Such exclusive authority is not divested by a mere averment on the part of the
tenant that he asserts ownership over the land, “since the law does not
exclude from the jurisdiction” of the Court of Agrarian Relations
“cases in which a tenant claims ownership over the land given to his for
cultivation by the landlord.”^[5]

The judgment and proceedings of the Justice of the Peace Court
are null and void.

2. We take note of the observation of the Court of First instance
that the petition for relief from judgment must have to be ruled out because it
was filed beyond the 60-day period after appellant learned of the
judgment.  But this is beside the point.

The judgment of the Justice of the Peace Court is not merely a voidable judgment. 
It is void on its face.  It may be
attacked directly or collaterally.  Here,
the attack is direct. 
Petitioner-appellant sought to annul the judgment.  Even after the time for appeal or review had
elapsed, appellant could bring, as he brought, such an action.  More, he also sought to enjoin enforcement of
that judgment.^[6]
In varying language, this Court has expressed its reprobation for judgments
rendered by a court without jurisdiction. 
Such a judgment is held to be “‘a dead limb on the judicial tree,
which should be lopped of or wholly disregarded as the circumstances
require.”^[7]
In the language of Mr. Justice Street:^[8]
“Where a judgment or judicial order is void in this sense it may be said
to be a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or
ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.” And in Gomez vs.
Concepcion,^[9]
this Court quoted with approval, the following from Freeman on Judgments:  “A void judgment is in legal effect no
judgment.  By it no rights are
divested.  From it no rights can he
obtained.  Being worthless in itself, all
proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless.  It neither binds nor bars any one.  All acts performed under it and all claims
flowing out of it are void.  The parties
attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers.  The purchaser as a sale by virtue of its
authority finds himself without title and without redress.”

Since the judgment here on its face is void ab
initio, the limited periods for relief from
judgment in Rule 38 are inapplicable. 
That judgment is vulnerable to attack “in any way and at any time,
even when no appeal has been taken.”^[10]

Upon the view we take of this case, the appealed order of October 30, 1964 is hereby reversed
and set aside; and the decision of the Justice of the Peace Court of Bongao, Sulu, in Civil Case 21,
entitled “Tongham Chua, Plaintiff, vs. Hatib Abbain, Defendant,” is
hereby annulled.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro,
Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Civil Case No. 21, Justice of the Peace Court, Bongao,
Sulu, entitled “Tongham
Chua, Plaintiff, vs. Hatib Abbain,
Defendant.”

^[2]
Case No. 407, Court of First Instance of Sulu,
entitled “Hatib Abbain,
Petitioner, vs. Tongharn Chua and Honorable
Mariano Managula, as Justice of the Peace of Bongao, Respondents.”

^[3]
Section 154 of Republic Act 3844, otherwise known as the “Agricultural
Land Reform Code,” effective August 8,
1963, reads:

“SEC.
154.  Jurisdiction of the
Court. – The Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over:

(1)  All cases or actions involving matters,
controversies, disputes, or money claims arising from agrarian relations:  Provided, however, That all
cases still pending in the Court of Agrarian Relations, established under
Republic Act Numbered Twelve hundred and sixty-seven, at the time of the effectivity of this Code, shall be transferred to and
continued in the respective Courts of Agrarian Relations within who whose
district the sites of the cases are located; x x x.”

^[4] Bakit vs. Asperin,
L-15700, April 26, 1961; Valencia vs. Surtida,
L-17277, May 31, 1961; Gabani vs. Reas, L-14579, June 30, 1961; Ira vs. Zafra, L-17439 October 31, 1962; Tuvera
vs. De Guzman, L-20547, April 30, 1965; Casaria
vs. Rosales, L-20288, June 22, 1965. 
See also:  Mendoza
vs. Manguiat, 96 Phil. 309, 311; Santos
vs. Vivas, 96 Phil. 538, 541; Basilio vs. David, 98 Phil. 955, 958.

^[5] Mandih vs. Tablantin,
L-12795, March 30, 1960, cited
in Tuvera vs. De Guzman, supra.

^[6] Banco Español-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921, 949.

^[7]
Anuran vs. Aquino, 38 Phil. 29, 36.

^[8] Banco Español-Filipino vs.
Palanca, supra.

^[9]
47 Phil. 717, 722-723.

^[10] Lipana vs. Court of First Instance of Cavite, 70 Phil, 365, 367, citing Banco Español-Filipino vs.
Palanca, supra; and Anuran vs. Aquino, supra.