PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. NORBERTO DESALISA Y DOCA, AND DOMINADOR BARTONICO Y JAPITANA, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

On May 15, 1958, Norberto Desalisa y Doca and Dominador Bartonico y Japitana
were charged in the Municipal Court of Manila (Crim. Case No. 46383) with the
crime of “Serious Physical Injuries Thru Reckless Imprudence”, in an information
which reads as follows:

“INFORMATION

“The undersigned accuses Norberto Desalisa y Doca and Dominador Bartonico y
Japitana of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence, committed as
follows:

“That on or about the 14th day of May, 1958, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, being then the drivers and persons in charge of
Josefa Carrier Bus with plate No. TPU-5227, Philippines, and cargo truck bearing
plate No. T-33718, Philippines, respectively, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously drive, manage, and operate the same along Otis
Street, in said City, in a careless, reckless, and imprudent manner, and without
taking the necessary precaution to avoid accident to persons and damage to
property, considering the condition of traffic at said place and time, by then
and there driving their said vehicles at speeds greater than was reasonable and
proper under the circumstance, causing by such carelessness, recklessness,
imprudence, and lack of precautions the said vehicles so driven, managed, and
operated by them to collide with, as same in fact collided with each other, and
as a result of the impact, passengers of said Josefa Carrier Bus, namely,
Gertrudes Adecer, Preciosa Almario, Flavio Zalameda, Candido Aguinaldo, Jr.,
Jose Reyes, Vicenta Aguinaldo, Conrado Agerion, Rufino Agosto, and Felicitas
Sarmiento sustained physical injuries, those of said Gertrudes Adecer requiring
medical attendance for a period of more than thirty (30) days, and those of the
rest requiring medical attendance for a period of not less ‘than one (1) but not
more than nine (9) days, and which injuries incapacitated and will incapacitate
all the above-named persons from engaging in their customary labor during the
said periods of time.

“Contrary to law.”

By reason of the subsequent death of the victim Gertrudes Adecer and
ascertainment of the extent of the injuries sustained by victim Candido
Aguinaldo, Jr., the above information was amended on May 27, 1958, by dropping
therefrom the name of the deceased and adding thereto the clause “those
(physical injuries) of Candido Aguinaldo, Jr. requiring medical attendance for a
period of more than thirty (30) days”. On the same date, an information for
Homicide Thru Reckless Imprudence was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila (Crim. Case No. 44176) against the same accused, for the death of
Adecer.

The accused were arraigned in the Municipal Court (for physical injuries) on
June 20, 1958, wherein they entered a plea of not guilty; while arraignment in
the Court of First Instance (for homicide) was held on June 23, 1958, wherein
the accused also pleaded not guilty. On August 29, 1958, the case for physical
injuries of all complainants, except Vicenta Aguinaldo and Candido Aguinaldo,
Jr. was dismissed by the Municipal Court upon motion of the Special Prosecutor,
Thereafter, the trial proceeded with the Aguinaldos taking the witness stand. At
this stage, defense counsel filed a motion to quash the information, on the
ground of double jeopardy, it being alleged that the filing of separate cases
(one in the Municipal Court, and the other in the Court of First Instance) for
offenses arising out of a single act, placed them in danger of being twice
convicted and penalized for the same act.

In its order of October 3, 1958, the municipal court, granted the motion,
thus:

“ORDER

“Under consideration is a motion to quash filed by the accused Norberto
Desalisa, on the ground of double jeopardy.

“The case at bar changes both accused with the crime of serious physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence with multiple slight physical injuries arising
from the same act and embodied in one information. Both accused have pleaded not
guilty and the prosecution has presented its evidence. It is at this stage of
the proceedings that the motion to quash is filed.

“Considering that the accused Norberto Desalisa is charged with homicide thru
reckless imprudence with the Court of First Instance of Manila arising from the
same act subject of this case; that this is a clear case of a complex crime
where the accused should have been charged with homicide thru reckless
imprudence complexed with serious physical injuries contained in one information
and filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila, and another information
for multiple slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence with the
Municipal Court of Manila, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended; that with the filing of the information for
homicide thru reckless imprudence with the Court of First Instance of Manila
with the present separate information for serious physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence with multiple slight physical injuries pending in this
Court, thereby exposing said accused twice in jeopardy of being convicted and
penalized in both instances, contrary to law; the court is of the opinion and so
holds that the motion to quash is well-founded and the rights of the accused
cannot be prejudiced by the error of the state prosecution.

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the motion to quash is
hereby granted and this case dismissed with costs de oficio.

“SO ORDERED.”

The prosecution appealed the case to the Court of First Instance. In the
meantime, the accused were found guilty of homicide in Criminal Case No. 44176
originally tried in the Court of First Instance, from which decision they
appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Before arraignment in the Court of First Instance, in connection with the
physical injuries case on appeal from the Municipal Court, counsel for the
defense filed a motion praying, among others, for the quashing of the
information and the dismissal of the action, primarily on the ground of second
jeopardy, contending

(1) That under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense charged in
Criminal Case No. 46383 of the Municipal Court should have been complexed with
the homicide indictment in the Court of First Instance, and the prosecution’s
failure to do so, placed them in jeopardy of being twice convicted and penalized
for the same act; and

(2) That the appeal of the prosecution from the order of dismissal of the
Municipal Court subjects them to a second jeopardy before the Court of First
Instance.

In his order of May 9, 1959, His Honor Judge Juan P. Enriquez of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, expressed the view that even on the theory that the
two offenses, (homicide and physical injuries) constituted a complex crime under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, still the failure of the accused to timely
object to the splitting of offenses amounted to a waiver, and that the quashing
of the information, at the instance of the accused, by the Municipal Court, did
not place them in double jeopardy. However, in view of the allegedly unsettled
law on double jeopardy, the court granted the accused’s separate motions to
quash, with direction to the prosecution to appeal the matter to this Court for
final adjudication of the legal questions involved therein. Hence, the present
appeal.

(1) Section 10 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:

“SEC. 10. Failure to move to quash—effect of—exception.—If the
defendant does not move to quash the complaint or information before he pleads
thereto he shall be taken to have waived all objections which are grounds for a
motion to quash except when the complaint or information does not charge an
offense, or the court is without jurisdiction of the same. If, however, the
defendant learns after he has pleaded or has moved to quash on some
other ground that the offense with which he is now charged is an offense for
which he has been pardoned, or of which he has been convicted or acquitted or
been in jeopardy, the court may in its discretion entertain at any time before
judgment a motion to quash on the ground of such pardon, conviction or
jeopardy.” (Italics supplied.)

It is evident therefrom that, as a general rule, failure of the accused to
move to quash the complaint or information before pleading thereto constitutes a
waiver of all the grounds for a motion to dismiss available to him^* (which includes the defense of jeopardy). The
exceptions are: (1) in case the information or complaint does not charge an
offense; (2) lack of jurisdiction of the court; and (3) if after pleading, or
filing a motion to quash on another ground, the accused or defendant learns that
he had already been pardoned, convicted, or acquitted or in jeopardy for the
offense with which he is being charged. Clearly, therefore, in order that the
court may entertain a motion to quash after arraignment, it must be shown that
the accused learned or acquired knowledge of the defense being claimed
by him, after his pleading to the charge. In the case at bar, it cannot
be said that when the accused pleaded not guilty to the charges of
serious physical injuries with multiple slight physical injuries in the
Municipal Court, they were not aware of the existence of the homicide case
pending before the Court of First Instance. It appears on record that the
information for homicide was filed in the Court of First Instance on May 27,
1958, on the same day that the information in the Municipal Court was amended,
and that notice of the arraignment in the former case was received by the
accused as early as May 30, 1958, or long before they actually entered their
plea (on June 20, 1958) in the Municipal Court. Having thus failed to timely
raise the objection, and considering that the prosecution vigorously opposed the
motion to quash, the Municipal Court acted erroneously in granting the same and
dismissing the case.

For the same reason given above, neither may the accused now question the
correctness of the information filed in the Municipal Court charging them with
the crimes of serious physical injuries and multiple slight physical injuries,
both thru reckless imprudence.

(2) The second issue presented by the herein appellees is, as stated, that
the appeal of the prosecution from the order of dismissal of the municipal court
subjects them to a second jeopardy before the court of first instance.

It is the view of Judge Enriquez of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
before whom the appeal was heard, that the filing of the information for serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, separate and independent of
another information for homicide through reckless imprudence resulting from one
single act did not place the accused, in both cases, in danger of double
jeopardy because the accused did not object to the splitting of the offense
which otherwise would have constituted a complex crime under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code. Therefore, the trial court added, the dismissal upon
petition of the accused of such information for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence by the municipal court, on the erroneous assumption
of the existence of double jeopardy, is a dismissal with the express consent of
the accused. It follows that the appeal by the prosecution from such order of
dismissal did not likewise constitute a second jeopardy to the accused.
Nevertheless, Judge Enriquez dismissed the case and advised the prosecution to
take an appeal to this Court, to eaable us to clarify the alleged uncertainty of
the doctrine of double jeopardy brought about by the various pronouncements made
in cases subsequent to that of People v. Salico.^[1]

There is some point in the observation of the trial Judge that,
unfortunately, certain loose statements made in some of our decided cases tend
to lead to some confusion on the subject of doubje jeopardy. It is, therefore,
well that we re-examine these pertinent cases in an effort to crystallize the
doctrine on this point of law.

There are two cardinal principles that must first be remembered:
first, the first sentence of Rule 118, Section 2 of the Rules of Court
(now Rule 122, Amended Rules) which reads, “The People of the Philippines
cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy,”
does not import to be an absolute prohibition tor the prosecution to appeal.^[2] For, it may be pointed out, this provision
prohibiting the appeal by tne prosecution, is actually a negative statement
conditioned on defendants being thereby placed in double jeopardy. In fine, it
is only another way of saying that the prosecution can appeal except
when the defendant would, by such appeal, be placed in double jeopardy. This is
further supported by the succeeding sentence of the same provision, thus:

“in all other cases, either party (which includes the prosecution) may appeal
from a final judgment or ruling or from an order made after judgment affecting
the substantial rights of the appellant.”

Secondly, it is now the established rule that the immunity of an
accused to a second jeopardy of conviction for the same offense is a personal
privilege which the accused may waive.^[3]

Putting these doctrines together, we may state that the prosecution can
appeal from a dismissal-order of the lower court if such appeal will not place
the accused in second jeopardy, or if there is waiver by the accused of
the defense of double jeopardy. The corollary questions that necessarily come up
are: When does an appeal constitute a second jeopardy? When is there waiver by
the accused of the defense of double jeopardy?

The seeming uncertainty of the rule on this legal point started with the
ruling in the Salico case, supra. In that case, after the accused had
entered a plea of not guilty to the charge of homicide and after the
prosecution had rested but before he could have presented his evidence, the
accused filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that “the fiscal failed to prove
that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court.” The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental granted the motion, and
the prosecution appealed. Here, the issue of double jeopardy was raised by the
accused-appellee.

Overruling the contention of appellee, this Court held that there is no
double jeopardy in the appeal, because: (1) the dismissal of the case by the
court below was upon the motion of the accused; (2) the appeal by the
prosecution would not place him in second jeopardy; and (3) assuming
arguendo that the accused had thus been placed in danger of second
conviction for the same offense, defendant’s failure to set up that defense
constituted a waiver of the right. It was declared that by the action of the
accused in causing the dismissal of the case, he had waived the right to set up
the defense of double jeopardy because he thereby prevented the Court from
proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction
against him. It was held that the appeal could not have also exposed him in
danger of a second conviction, because the issue raised for the determination of
the appellate court is not the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but the
legal question of whether the offense was committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court. The dismissal of the case was, consequently,
held erroneous and the same was remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings.

The Salico case, therefore, laid down the doctrines that, an appeal
by the prosecution is not absolutely prohibited; that a motion to dismiss by the
defendant amounts to a waiver of his right to invoke the doctrine of double
jeopardy incase of an appeal by the prosecution from the dismissal-order; and
that an appeal (or properly a second case) will not constitute a second jeopardy
if the appeal is not concerned with the merits of the case, i.e., with the guilt
or innocence of the accused. Furthermore, it was ruled that the failure of the
accused to raise the defense against the appeal constitutes waiver by the
accused of his right to invoke the doctrine of double jeopardy.

In the case of People v. Bangalao, et al.,^[4] however, the appeal of the prosecution was
dismissed by this Court. The accused in that case, after pleading not guilty to
the charge, filed a motion to dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction.^[5] Although it was held that the court
actually had jurisdiction over the case and the dismissal of the case was
erroneous, this Court said:

“x x x we find the claim of the defendants-appellees that the appeal can not
prosper because it puts them in double jeopardy, must be sustained. Under
Section 2, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, the People of the Philippines can not
appeal if the accused or defendant is placed thereby in double jeopardy. As the
court below had jurisdiction to try the case upon the filing of the complaint by
the mother of tne offended party, the defendants-appeilees would be placed in
double jeopardy if the appeal is allowed.”

The pronouncement
seems to erase the qualifications made in the Salico case for the application of
the principle of double jeopardy to appeals by the prosecution.

In the case of People v. Reyes,^[6] the
information was quashed by the lower court, upon motion of the accused, before
trial could be had, because it failed to allege the element of use of violence
although the offense charged was coercion under Article 287 of the Revised Penal
Code. On appeal by the prosecution, the order of the lower court was reversed,
its jurisdiction was upheld and the case was remanded to it for further
proceedings, this Court saying:

“The contention of defendants-appellees that the present appeal would place
them in double jeopardy is unfounded. ‘Where the complaint or information is in
truth valid and sufficient, but the case is dismissed upon petition of the
accused on the ground that the complaint or information is invalid and
insufficient, such dismissal will not bar another prosecution for the same
offense and the defendant is estopped from alleging in the second prosecution
that the former dismissal was wrong because the complaint or information was
valid.’ (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. II, p.
802).”

In other words, the right of the prosecution to appeal was again upheld, the
theory of the Court, which’was also adopted (7) in the earlier case of
People v. Acierto,^[7] being that
of estoppel. A party that secures the dismissal of the information in the lower
court by assailing the jurisdiction of that court, cannot, in the appeal, change
his theory by asserting the jurisdiction of the lower court in order to support
his allegation that the appeal would place him in double Jeopardy. There
apparently was a “reversion” to the doctrine in the Salico case.

However, in the same year, the Supreme Court again declared against the
appeal of the prosecution from a dismissal order of the lower court. In the case
of People v. Ferrer,^[8] the
question raised by the prosecution was the correctness of the dismissal of the
case by the lower court at defendant’s instance, on the ground that the
territorial jurisdiction of the court had not been established.^[9] The Supreme Court declared that the
information was sufficient and the dismissal of the case was, therefore,
erroneous. Nevertheless, it said:

“Unfortunately, however, we believe that the Government however meritorious
its case cannot appeal the order of dismissal without violating the right of the
defendant not to be placed in double jeopardy. The accused herein has not filed
a brief or appeal raising this question of double jeopardy. Nevertheless, Rule
118, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides: ‘The People of the Philippines
can not appeal if the.defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and
we have to give force and effect to said rule. Here, the defendant had already
been arraigned and he had entered his plea, and the trial had begun, and the
prosecution had rested its case. We hold that the appeal of the Government from
the order of dismissal would place the accused in double
jeopardy.”

This case, far from being an abandonment of the Salico case, furnishes
instead, an application of the rulings therein established. The dismissal here
was on the merits as it was predicated on the supposed failure of the fiscal to
prove the location of the house where the offense was committed. It was
therefore a dismissal on the supposed insufficiency of evidence and hence a
dismissal on the merits amounting to an acquittal.

In the case of People v. Robles, et al.,^[10] this Court denied the appeal by the
prosecution from the order of the lower court, sustaining defendant’s plea that
the amended information filed therein constituted double jeopardy. In that case,
a first information for violation of Article 199, paragraphs (b) and (c), of the
Revised Penal Code was previously dismissed, upon motion of the fiscal, due to
non-appearance of prosecution witnesses. Two years later, a new information for
the same offense was filed. The accused were arraigned and entered not
guilty-pleas. But due to the absence of prosecution witnesses, the trial
was postponed several times. When the fiscal asked for another postponement of
the scheduled hearing, the defendants opposed, on the ground that such further
postponement would violate their right to speedy trial. Sustained by the lower
court, the case was dismissed on that ground. Three years thereafter, the fiscal
filed another information for the same offense. The defendant moved to quash the
information on the ground that it would place him in second jeopardy, as a
result of which, the case was dismissed. In affirming the appealed order, this
Court declared that the second dismissal of the case against defendants was not
merely provisional, but an acquittal on the merits, because it was brought about
by the failure of the prosecution to go to trial, thus resulting in the
violation of defendant’s right to speedy trial. However, the following
statements were also made:

“in reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked our ruling in the
case of People vs. Salico, 44 Off. Gaz., No. 4, 1765-1776, rei- terated in
People vs. Romero, G.R. Nos. L4517-20″, to the effect that a dismissal upon
defendant’s motion will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense
as said dismissal was not without the express consent of the defendant, which
ruling the prosecution now invokes in support of this appeal; but said ruling is
not now controlling, having been modified or abandoned in subsequent cases
wherein we sustained the theory of double jeopardy despite the fact that the
dismissal was secured upon motion of the accused. (People v. Bangalao, L-5610,
Feb. 17, 1954; People v. Diaz, L-6518, March 30, 1954; People v. Abafio, L-7862,
May 17, 1955; and People v. Ferrer, L-9072, Oct. 23, 1956.)”

And, in the case of People v. Labatete,^[11] wherein the appeal by the prosecution
from the order of dismissal of the case by the lower court was denied,^[12] the Supreme Court lexplained the
“abandonment” of the Salico-doctrine as follows:

“it will be noted that there are three cases where jeopardy would lie,
according to the above provision (Sec. 9, Rule 113), namely, conviction
acquittal, or dismissal or other termination of the case without the express
consent of the accused. Note that the phrase without the express consent
of the accused can not refer to conviction or acquittal because in
case of conviction after trial and without a plea of guilty, the termination is
against the express consent of the accused. The only conviction which would be
had with the express consent of the accused would be when a plea of guilty has
been entered. When the defendant is acquitted after trial, it is always upon
petition of the accused. If we were to make the said phrase (without the express
consent of the accused) applicable to acquittal, there would be no case of
jeopardy even when there is acquittal, because the acquittal will always be with
the express consent, because ordinarily granted upon motion of the accused. So
it is that the phrase with the express consent of the accused can refer
only to a dismissal or other termination, not a conviction or
acquittal.

“What, then, is a dismissal with the exppess consent of the accused, which is
not an acquittal? Such dismissal, in the first place, must not be one where the
court has no jurisdiction, or where the information is not valid or sufficient
to sustain a conviction, for in these cases no jeopardy attaches by express
provision of the rule. Also, the dismissal must be after the defendant has
pleaded, as also provided expressly in the rule. x x x.

“One case contemplated by the rule as a dismissal or termination of the case
would be where the fiscal, upon the case being called for trial and after a plea
has been entered, states that he is not ready to proceed and the accused, who is
not agreeable to a postponement, is willing to have the case dismissed
provisionally. The dismissal is provisional and there would not be any jeopardy
at all. Another is when after plea the accused asks for another investigation,
or the fiscal asks for it, and the court which does not want to have a case
pending because of the possibility that there may be no sufficient evidence
ultimately, dismisses the case. Still another is where the accused is to be used
as State witness, and is willing to act as such, so the case is dismissed. Of
course, he will still be subject to prosecution if he fails to comply with his
commitment. For the moment we cannot think of any other instance, but similar
instances may happen when the dismissal is no bar to another prosecution. It is
similar to a dismissal without prejudice in civil cases.

“We can see that none of the above possibilities existed in the case of
Salico. The judgment was not a provisional dismissal of the case entered with
a possibility of filing of a subsequent one. The judgment of the trial court was
in fact an acquittal because of failure on the part of the fiscal to
prove that the crime was committed within the jurisdiction of the court. The
judgment was in fact a final judgment of acquittal. The mere fact that the
accused asked for his acquittal after trial on the merits, is no reason for
saying that the case was ‘dismissed’ with his express consent and he may again
be subjected to another prosecution.”

According to this “explanation”, the Salico-doctrine was “abandoned”
because the dismissal of the case therein by the lower court was not merely
provisional, but actually an acquittal, caused by the failure of the fiscal to
prove that the crime was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court. The ruling in the case of Salico, that the act of the defendant in moving
for the dismissal of the case constitutes a waiver of the right to avail of the
defense of double jeopardy, insofar as it applies to dismissals which do not
amount to acquittal or dismissal of the case on the merits, cannot be considered
to have been abandoned by the subsequent decisions on the matter. This becomes
more evident when the Court, in the case of People v. Casiano, supra, stated
that Section 2 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court is not a limitation on the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to entertain appeals by the Government in
criminal case or to “right of the latter to appeal in such cases.”

From the above rulings and pronouncements of the Court, the rule on double
jeopardy may perhaps be re-stated thus:

As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of a case, by the proper
court, after arraignment and plea of the defendant to a valid information, shall
be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense, in the former complaint or
information (Sec. 9, Rule 113). However, an appeal by the prosecution from the
order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial court will not constitute
double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express
consent, of the defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or
based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case;
and (3) the question to be passsd upon by the appellate court is purely
legal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt
or innocence of the defendant.

In the present case, considering that there was waiver of the defense of
double jeopardy by the failure of the accused to object to the filing of the 2
cases in the court of first instance and in the municipal court; that the
dismissal was not based on consideration of the merits of the case; and the
question raised in the appeal was purely legal, the appeal by the prosecution
from the order of dismissal in the municipal court to the Court of First
Instance did not place them in second jeopardy.

Neither does the present appeal from the order of dismissal of the Court of
First Instance constitute a second jeopardy, because the motion to quash was
filed by the accused themselves before arraignment and before they entered their
plea to the information.

Upon these considerations, the order of dismissal appealed
from is hereby set aside. The case is remanded to the court of origin (the
Municipal Court of Manila) for further proceedings. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon,
Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Ruiz Castro,
JJ., concur.

^[1] 84 Phil. 722.

^[2] People v. Casiano, G.R. No.
L-15309, Feb. 16, 1961.

^[3] People v. Casiano,
supra.

^[4] 94 Phil. 354.

^[5] It was alleged in the motion to
dismiss that in the complaint filed by the mother of the offended party, the
allegation was that the crime (of rape) was committed through the use of force
and intimidation, whereas in the information filed by the fiscal, no such
allegation appeared and instead, it was stated therein that the offended party
was a minor and demented girl.

^[6] 98 Phil. 646.

^[7] G. R. Nos. L-2078, L-3355-60, Jan.
30, 1953.

^[8] G. R. No. L-9072, Oct. 23,
1956.

^[9] According to defendant, the
information, while alleging that the offense was committed in the house of the
offended party, failed to prove where that house was located.

^[10] G. R. No. L-12761, June 29,
1959.

^[11] G. R. No. L-2917, April 27,
1960.

^[12] The order of dismissal of the
amended information, by the lower court, was based on the finding that the
amendment was substantial, constituting the charging of acts other than those
originally contained inthe first information, and, therefore, the amendment
would prevent the accused from availing of the right to the defense of double
jeopardy.