G.R. No. L-2306. October 14, 1950

PACIENCIA ANTEOJO, NESTOR VASQUEZ, ANTONIO VASQUEZ, AND JOSEFA VASQUEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS (SECOND DIVISION), ROSA VILLA, PAZ NAZARENO, EUSEBIO NAZARENO, AND …

Decisions / Signed Resolutions October 14, 1950 MONTEMAYOR, J.:


MONTEMAYOR, J.:


This is a petition for the review of a decision of the Court of
Appeals, second division, which reversed the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Cavite and dismissed the complaint filed in the
latter court.

As regards the status of the land in dispute, lot No. 1983 of the Maic Estate, the Court of Appeals found that in 1911, plaintiff
Paciencia Anteojo and her now deceased husband Simplicio Vasquez bought
from the Bureau of Lands said lot on the installment plan. Upon payment
of the last installment, the corresponding sale certificate was issued
in1928 in favor of Paciencia Anteojo presumably because Simplicio was
already dead. The Court of Appeals found further that the lot belonged
to the conjugal partnership, it having been acquired for a valuable
consideration during the marriage and at the expense of the common
fund. Under the law, we have to accept these findings of the Court of
Appeals.

On May 29, 1931, Paciencia sold the lot to the spouses Elias
Nazareno and Rosa Villa for the sum of P3,000, as evidenced by the
deed, Exhibit 7. The sale was approved by the Director of Lands. On the
same date of Exhibit 7, the vendees executed an instrument (Exhibit A)
wherein they stated that they accepted the sale in their favor; that
they knew that Paciencia, the vendor, was acting only in representation
of her children, and they expressed their readiness and willingness to
return said lot to Paciencia and to her children when the latter
reached the age of majority, upon return to them (vendees) of the sum
of P3,000.

On August 1, 1944, Paciencia and her three children Nestor, Josefa
and Antonio, commenced the present suit in the Court of First Instance
of Cavite against Rosa Villa and her children to recover the said lot
No, 1983, including the products of the land at the rate of 100 cavans
of palay net a year. The trial court regarded the Tab as the exclusive
property of Paciencia’s children, perhaps because of the statements of
the vendees in Exhibit A that in the sale of the lot to them, Paciencia
was only acting in representation of her children. The trial court
equally considered the suit as one to compel the defendants to comply
with their undertaking to return the land when the children of
Paciencia attained majority, and not an action to enforce a repurchase
of the lot under a theory of sale with pacto de retro.
Judgment was rendered ordering defendants to return the lot to the
plaintiffs upon payment by the latter of P3,000, and also to deliver to
the plaintiffs 60 cavans of palay net for every agricultural year since
August, 1944 or its equivalent in money at the rate of P25 a cavan.

On appeal by the defendants to the Court of Appeals, said court as
already stated, found and ruled that that lot No. 1983 was conjugal
property. It also found and held that the contract evidenced by
exhibits A and 7 was one of sale with right of repurchase whose maximum
period under Art. 1508 of the Civil Code cannot exceed 10 years; that
said period expired on May 29, 1941; that altho in 1931 Paciencia could
dispose of only her one-half share in the said conjugal property
because the other half belonged to her children, said children by
bringing the present action at a time when they were already of age,
ratified said transaction, and that they may not now question the
validity of the same, this, aside from the fact that the validity of
said sale was not raised in the trial court. Said appellate court also
held that altho in May, 1941 when the maximum period of repurchase
expired, two of the children of Paciencia were still minors, the saving
clause contained in Section 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure, giving
minors or persons under disability three years after said disability is
removed within which to present action, does not favor the other child
because said child under no disability is a mere co-owner and not a
joint tenant; and that even the two children who were minors when the
period for repurchase expired, are not protected for the reason that
the statute of limitations being remedial in nature, is not applicable
to the period of redemption in the case of sale with pacto de retro,
and that besides this, the provisions of Art,.1932 of the Civil Code of prescription operate on all persons, including minors.

Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs
have filed the present petition for review, making the following
assignment of errors;

I

“The respondent Court of
Appeals (second division) committed an erro of law in not declaring, on
the basis of its own statement of facts, the contract marked Exhibit 7
as null and void.

II

“The
respondent Court of Appeals (second division) erred in holding that the
validity of the sale of the land in question was not raised in the
court a quo, and that it could not consequently determine the said question.

III

“The respondent Court of Appeals (second division) committed an erro of
law in holding that the period of prescription established in article
1508 of the Civil Code may run against a minor who has no legal
guardian.

IV

“The respondent Court
of Appeals (second division) committed an error of law in not holding
that the right of action of petitioners Josefa Vasquez and Antonio
Vasquez inures to the benefit of their other co-petitioners.”

Under the view we take of the case, we find it unnecessary to
discuss the last two errors assigned. It is clear that in 1931,
Paciencia could validly dispose of only one-half of the lot in question
as her share in said conjugal property. The deed of sale, Exhibit 7,
was therefore invalid as regards the other half of the lot.

We do not agree to the theory of the Court of Appeals that by
bringing the present suit the children of Paciencia ratified the sale.
That is too technical and strict a view of the implication of bringing
the action. We are more inclined to agree with the trial court that the
purpose of plaintiffs in bringing the action was not to redeem the land
but rather to compel the vendees-defendants not only to comply with
their undertaking to reconvey the property when they (the children)
became of age, but also to return what belonged to them but which had
invalidly and unjustly been disposed of by their mother. This view of
the case is reinforced by the fact that in their complaint, plaintiffs
asked the court to order the defendants to return the lot to them and
they (plaintiffs) did not offer to return the P3,000 sales price.

With regard to the holding of the Court of Appeals that the question
of the validity of the deed of sale was not raised in the trial court,
we also disagree, It is true that in their complaint plaintiffs made
mention of the deed of sale (Exhibit 7) whereby Paciencia sold the
entire lot, and in the fifth paragraph thereof, said plaintiffs even
stated that one year before filing the complaint they tried to
repurchase the lot and recover its possession by offering the sales
price. They did not, however, say that they agreed to the sale or
ratified the act of their mother, and notwithstanding their efforts to
repurchase the land in 1943, as already stated when they brought the
action in 1944, the plaintiffs no longer wanted to repurchase the lot
but merely-sought to get it back even without returning the sales
price. Their attitude and stand when they brought the action that they
did not agree to the sale made by their mother and that they had a
right that they were trying to enforce to get the lot back, can be
gathered from their pleading without difficulty. In the prayer of their
complaint, plaintiffs asked that defendants be ordered to return the
lot, and not to resell it, to them. Their theory was that t hey were
not relying on the validity of the sale and merely seeking compliance
with the promise to resell, but they were attacking the validity of the
transaction and wanted to get their property back. Besides, as counsel
for the petitioners rightly contends, the very defendants in their
amended answer indirectly raised the question of validity of the sale
when they claimed that the children of Paciencia had confirmed the sale
and assignment made by their mother, and alleged in paragraph 5 of their
affirmative and special defenses that the plaintiffs were forever
estopped from questioning the validity of the sale and assignment made
by Paciencia, This can only mean that said plaintiffs were trying to
question the validity of the sale under Exhibti 7. We believe that the
question of the validity of the sale made by Paciencia was raised in
the trial court.

In conclusion, we find and hold that altho Paciencia Anteojo could and did sell under pacto de retro
one-half of lot No. 1983 which belonged to her, and that she failed to
repurchase said portion within the period fixed by law, the sale with
respect to the other half which belonged to her children was invalid,
and that furthermore, in bringing the present action, said children did
not ratify the illegal sale made by their mother.

The defendants are hereby ordered to return and deliver to the
plaintiffs one half (1/2) of lot No. 1983. Paciencia Anteojo on her
part will pay to said defendants the sum of P1,500. The defendants will
also deliver to the plaintiffs 30 cavans of palay net or its equivalent
in the sum of P25 per cavan, yearly, as found and ordered by the trial
court, from August, 1944 until the year 1946. This Court understands
that the price of palay after 1946 had substantially decreased and we
find that an average price of P16 per cavan of palay beginning with
1947 up to 1950 would be fair.

As above modified, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs..

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Bengzon, and Tuason, JJ., concur.


PABLO, M., Concurrente y disidente:

Estoy confonne con la conclAsi6n legal de que el lote era de la
propiedad ganancial de Simplicio Vazquez y Paciencia Anteojo. Por
ministerio de la ley de sucesion, al fallecimiento del primero, la
mitad del lote pertenece ya a Paciencia y la otra mitad a sus hijos
Nestor, Josefa y Antonio Vazquez.

Paciencia no podia legalmente vender todo el lotes solo podia
disponer de la mitad que le pertenece y su usufructo viudal. Pero no
existe el menor indicio de que lo haya dispuesto a favor de los
demandados.

Los hermanos Nestor, Josefa y Antonio tienen derecho de reivindicar
su participacion de cualquiera, y los denandados deben entregarles
inmediatamente, pues la venta hecha a su favor es absolutamente nula. Y
la entrega no debe depender del pago que hiciere Paciencia de la
cantidad de P1,500, como asi dispone la decision. Si, por algun motivo,
no estuviese en condiciones ella de hacer el pago, los hermanos Vazquez
serian privados de la posesion de la mitad del lote. Creo que eso es
injusto. Por esta razon, no estoy eonforme con la parte dispositiva de
la decision.

En mi opinion, debe ordenarse la inmediata entrega por los
demandados de la mitad del lote a los liermanos Nestor, Josefa y
Antonio, sin condici6n alguna, y que se condene a Paciencia Anteojo a
restituir a los demandados la suma de P1,500.