G.R. No. L-2779. October 18, 1950
DANIEL SANCHEZ ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. HARRY LYONS CONSTRUCTION, INC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.
MORAN, C.J.:
complaint filed on March 9, 1948, by the herein appellees as
plaintiffs, against the herein appellants as defendants, for the sum of
P2,210 plus interest, which plaintiffs claimed as one month advance pay
due them. On April 28, 1948, the parties entered into a stipulation of
facts upon which said Municipal Court rendered judgment for the
plaintiffs. Upon denial of their motion for reconsideration of this
judgment, the defendants filed an appeal to the Court of First Instance
of Manila, wherein the parties submitted the case upon the same facts
agreed upon In the Municipal Court. On October 2, 1948, the Court of
First Instance of Manila rendered Its decision holding for plaintiffs,
as follows:
“Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered—
“1.
Ordering defendant Material Distributors, inc. to pay plaintiff Enrique
Ramirez the sum of P360 and plaintiff Juan Ramirez the sum of P250 with
legal interest on each of the said sums from the date of the filing of
the complaint in the Municipal Court of Manila until the date of full
payment thereof; and“2. Ordering defendant Harry Lyons
Construction, Inc. to pay plaintiff Daniel Sanchez the sum of P250, and
plaintiff Mariano Javier, Venancio Diaz, Esteban Bautista., Faustino
Aquillo, Godofredo Diamante, Marcial Lazaro, Ambrosio dela Cruz and
Marcelino Maceda the sum of P150 each, with legal interest on each of
the said sums from the date of the filing of the complaint in the
Municipal Court of Manila until the date of full payment thereof.“One-half of the costs is to be paid by Material Distributors, Inc. and the other half by Harry Lyons Construction, Inc.”
From this Judgment, defendants filed an appeal with this Court purely
upon a question of law. The stipulation of facts entered into by the
parties on April 28, 1948, is as follows:
“STIPULATION OF FACTS
“Come now the plaintiffs and the defendants, by
their respective undersigned attorneys and to this Honorable Court,
respectfully submit the following stipulation of facts:“1. That the plaintiffs were respectively employed as follows:
employment
Note.—The salary of Enrique Ramirez was later reduced to P360 per
month. This was the amount he was receiving at the time of his
dismissal.
Employed by Defendant Harry Lyons Construction, Inc.
Foremanas per contracts of employment, copies of which are attached to defendants’ answer marked Exhibits 1 to 11 inclusive.
“2. That in said contracts of employment the plaintiff agreed as follows:
‘I
accept the foregoing appointment, and in consideration thereof, I
hereby agree that such employment may be terminated at any time,
without previous notice, and I further agree that salary and wages,
shall be computed and paid at the rate specified up to the date of such
termination.‘Also in consideration of such employment I
hereby expressly waive the benefit of Article 302 of the Code of
Commerce and that of any other law, ruling, or custom which might
require notice of discharge or payment of salary or wages after date of
the termination of such employment.’“3. That the plaintiffs were dismissed by the defendants on December 31, 1947 without one months’ previous notice.
“4.
That each of the plaintiffs demanded payment of one month’s salary from
the defendants and that the latter refused to pay the same.Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that judgment on the foregoing stipulation of facts be rendered by this Honorable Court.”
The points in Issue herein are: first, whether plaintiffs, both
those paid on a monthly and daily basis, are entitled to the benefits
granted in Article 302 of the Code of Commerce; and secondly, if they
are so entitled, was their waiver of such benefits legal and valid?
Article 302 of the Code of Commerce reads as follows:
“Art. 302. In cases in which no special time is
fixed in the contracts of service, any one of the parties thereto may
cancel it, advising the other party thereof one month in advance.“The factor or shop clerk shall be entitled, in such case, to the salary due for said month.”
It is a clear doctrine, as gleaned from the provision of the law and settled jurisprudence,[1]
that in a mercantile contract of service in which no special time is
fixed, any one of the parties may cancel said contract upon the giving
of a one-month notice, called a mesada, to the other party.
The law gives an added proviso that in the case of factors or shop
clerks, these shall be entitled to salary during this one month of
standing notice. In any case, the one-month notice must be given to any
employee, whether factor, shop clerk or otherwise, so long as the two
conditions concur, namely, that no special time is fixed in the
contract of service, and that said employee is a commercial employee.
And when such notice is not given under these conditions, not only the
factor or shop clerk but any employee discharged without cause, is
entitled to indemnity which may be one month’s salary.[2]
In the Instant case, there lies no doubt that plaintiffs are
commercial employees of appellant corporations, rendering service as
warehousemen, carpenter-foreman and guards. There is likewise no doubt
as can be seen from the contracts of employment submitted as exhibits,
that no special time has been fixed in the contracts of services
between plaintiffs-appellees and defendants-appellants. The stated
computation or manner of payment, whether monthly or daily, does not
represent nor determine a special time of employment. Thus, a
commercial employee may be employed for one year and yet receive his
salary on the daily or weekly or monthly or other basis.
Appellants allege that the use of the word “temporary” in the
contracts of services of some of the plaintiffs shows that their
employment was with a term, and the term was “temporary, on a day to
day basis.” The record discloses that this conclusion is unwarranted.
The contracts simply say—”You are hereby employed as temporary guard
with a compensation at the rate of P5 a day * * *.” The word
“temporary” as used herein does not mean the special time fixed in the
contracts referred to in Article 302 of the Code of Commerce. The daily
basis therein stipulated is for the computation of pay, and is not
necessarily the period of employment. Hence, this Court holds that
plaintiffs-appellants come within the purview of article 302 of the
Code of Commerce.
Now, as to the second question, namely, the validity of plaintiffs’
waiver of the benefits given them by said Article 302. This Court holds
that such a waiver, made in advance, is void as being contrary to
public policy. Granting that the ‘mesada’ given in Article 302 of the
Code of Commerce, is for the bilateral benefit of both employer and
employee, nevertheless, this does not preclude the finding that a
waiver of such ‘mesada’ in advance by the employee is contrary to
public policy.
Public policy, with regard to Labor, is clearly stated in Article II, Section 5, of the Philippine Constitution, which reads—
“The promotion of social justice to insure the
well-being and economic security of all the people should be the
concern of the State.”
and Article XIV, section, which reads—
“The State shall afford protection to labor,
especially to working women and minors, and shall regulate the
relations between landowner and tenant, and between labor and capital
in industry and in agriculture. * * *.”
Article 302 of the Code of Commerce must be applied in consonance
with these provisions of our Constitution. In the matter of employment
bargaining, there is no doubt that the employer stands on higher
footing than the employee. First of all, there is greater supply than
demand for labor. Secondly, the need for employment by labor comes from
vital and even desperate, necessity. Consequently, the law must protect
labor, at least, to the extent of raising him to equal footing in
bargaining relations with capital and to shield him from abuses brought
about by the necessity for survival. It is safe to presume therefore,
that an employee or laborer who waives in advance any benefit granted
him by law does so, certainly not in his interest or thru generosity
but under the forceful intimidation of urgent need, and hence, he could
not have so acted freely and voluntarily.
For all the foregoing, this Court hereby affirms the decision of the lower court, with costs against appellants.
Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Pablo, Tuason, Bengzon, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
[1] Collete vs. France & Collete, Inc., G.R.No.23927, November 5, 1925; Lopez vs. Roces, et al., (S. C.), G.R.No. 47950, July 1, 1942. 1 Off. Gaz., 672.
[2] Lopez vs. Roces et al., see footnote 1.