DANILO M. SALCEDO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. MARILOU D. RONES TAMANG, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE-DESIGNATE BRANCH 57, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA; HON. G…

Salcedo versus Rones Tamang

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari brought by Danilo Salcedo against the presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila, and against the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. Salcedo was facing three criminal cases for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, and he asked the Supreme Court to nullify the entire proceedings against him, from the preliminary investigation onward, on the theory that the criminal informations were defective because they carried no certificate against forum shopping. The case matters because it settles a question every criminal practitioner eventually meets: does the anti-forum-shopping requirement of the Rules of Court reach criminal complaints? The Court answers no, and in doing so draws a clean line between civil and criminal actions.

Procedural History

Eugene Lim filed a complaint for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in September 1999, and two more counts followed in November 1999. The prosecutor found probable cause and filed three informations before the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Branch 57. That court took cognizance of the cases and trial proceeded until the prosecution rested. In the meantime, jurisdiction to prosecute offenses committed in San Juan was restored from the Pasig City prosecutor to the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal, which then took over the prosecution.

Instead of presenting his defense evidence, Salcedo filed a motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence and jurisdiction. The trial court denied it in an order dated 29 June 2001, for the failure of counsel and the accused to appear to pursue the motion. Salcedo moved for reconsideration, and the trial court denied that too in an order dated 13 June 2002, setting the presentation of defense evidence for September 2002. Salcedo then went to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, seeking to nullify the proceedings in the prosecutor's office and in the trial court, including both orders.

Facts

Eugene Lim filed a complaint for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law against Danilo Salcedo with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City on 14 September 1999. On 17 November 1999, Lim filed two more counts of the same offense against Salcedo.

The City Prosecutor found probable cause on all three counts, and the corresponding informations were filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Branch 57. The trial court took cognizance of the cases and proceeded with trial until the prosecution rested its case. Meanwhile, jurisdiction to prosecute offenses committed in San Juan was restored from the Pasig City prosecutor to the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal, which took over the prosecution.

On 21 June 2002, instead of presenting his defense evidence, Salcedo filed a motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence and jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion on 29 June 2001 because neither counsel nor the accused appeared to pursue it. Salcedo's motion for reconsideration was denied on 13 June 2002, and the trial court directed him to present his evidence. He then filed this petition for certiorari.

Issues

• Whether or not the mandatory requirement of a certification against forum shopping under Administrative Circular Number 04-94, in relation to the Rules of Court, applies to criminal complaints, such that its non-observance would deny due process and equal protection and render all the proceedings void for lack of jurisdiction.
• Whether or not the respondents, in prosecuting the criminal cases and in issuing the assailed orders, acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
• Whether or not the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is well-founded in fact and in law.

Applicable Provisions

Administrative Circular Number 04-94, which the petitioner invoked, provides:

The complaint and the initiatory pleadings referred to and the subject of this Circular are the original civil complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.) party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention, petition, or application wherein a party asserts his claim for relief.

The Court reads this enumeration as exhaustive and confined to civil actions, so it does not reach the criminal informations filed against Salcedo.

Section 3 of Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, which supplies the distinction the Court relies on, provides:

A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong, while a criminal action is one by which the State prosecutes a person for an act or omission punishable by law.

Because the two actions are defined differently and governed by separate sets of rules, the classification excluding criminal complaints from the circular rests on a real difference.

Section 1 of Rule 65, which defines the remedy the petitioner chose, provides:

Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

Since the trial court acted within its jurisdiction, this remedy does not lie.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition is bereft of merit. Administrative Circular Number 04-94 is unambiguous and unequivocal, and it applies to original civil complaints. Any strained construction that would include criminal complaints within its purview is, in the Court's words, a shot aimed at the moon, and such out-of-this-world interpretations are frowned upon. The Court added a pointed rebuke: the role of counsel is to present the best defense for his client, not to make a mockery of the judicial process, which is what counsel was doing after actively participating in the criminal proceedings for three years without raising the objection.

The petitioner argued that, under Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the informations also served as the civil complaints for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense, and so fell within the circular. The Court rejected this. Even if the civil action is included in the criminal action, the proceeding remains criminal in nature. This, the Court explained, is precisely why the accused in a criminal case is expressly prohibited from filing a counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party complaint.

On the due process and equal protection argument, the Court held that there is no showing that excluding criminal complaints from the circular violates either guarantee. The equal protection clause mandates that all persons and things similarly situated should be treated alike, but persons or things with substantial distinctions which make for real differences may be treated differently. A classification based on valid and reasonable standards does not violate the clause. Substantial distinctions exist between a civil and a criminal action, which is why there is a separate set of rules for each, and the Court found those distinctions too basic to require further explanation.

On the second issue, the Court held that the trial court and the Provincial Prosecutor did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in prosecuting the cases and in issuing the assailed orders. It also agreed with the trial court that the petitioner's failure to raise these issues prior to arraignment is deemed a waiver of them.

On the third issue, the Court held that certiorari will definitely not lie. The essence of the remedy is to keep in check a tribunal, board, or officer acting without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and the Court found no such lack or excess correctable by certiorari. In prosecuting the cases and in denying the demurrer and the motion for reconsideration, the trial court acted judiciously within the bounds of the law and jurisprudence.

Doctrine

First, the requirement of a certification against forum shopping under Administrative Circular Number 04-94 applies only to the civil complaints and initiatory pleadings enumerated therein. It does not apply to criminal complaints or informations.

Second, even where the civil action is deemed included in the criminal action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense, the proceeding remains criminal in nature. The inclusion of the civil liability does not convert the criminal case into a civil one.

Third, the exclusion of criminal complaints from the circular does not violate the equal protection clause, because substantial distinctions exist between civil and criminal actions, and a classification based on valid and reasonable standards is permissible.

Fourth, the failure of the accused to raise objections to the proceedings prior to arraignment is deemed a waiver of those objections.

Fifth, certiorari lies only where a tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Where the trial court acts within the bounds of the law, the remedy will not prosper.

Disposition

The petition was denied, and the assailed orders of the trial court were left standing.

Remember This

The line worth memorizing is that the certificate against forum shopping covers civil complaints only, and a criminal information never needs one, because even with the civil liability included, the proceeding remains criminal in nature. Examiners use this case to test the scope of Administrative Circular Number 04-94, the civil-versus-criminal distinction under the Rules of Court, and the requisites of certiorari under Rule 65.