NATIONAL WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE AUTHORITY, PETITIONER, VS. NWSA CONSOLIDATED LABOR UNIONS NOW KAISAHAN KAPATIRAN NG MANGGAGAWA AT KAWANI SA NAWASA (PAFLU) AND COURT OF INDUSTRI…

Petitioner seeks a review of the order of the Court of Industrial
Relations dated December 8, 1961, in CIR Case No. 27-IPA, and of its resolution
en banc of July 17, 1962, denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

Respondent NWSA Consolidated Labor Unions, later on renamed
Kaisahan Kapatiran ng mga Manggagawa at Kawani sa
NAWASA, had a collective bargaining agreement with petitioner, effective for a
period of three years from October 1,
1956.  Before expiry date the
union submitted to petitioner a number of proposals concerning its
renewal.  Protracted controversies and
negotiations for settlement were generated as a result.  Conciliation efforts by the Department of
Labor proved unavailing; the union declared a strike on October 28, 1959 and again on December 8, 1959 and the President
certified the dispute to the Industrial Court
which issued a return-to-work order on December
9, 1959.

In the meantime, or on November 13, 1959, the Union filed with
said court a petition against NWSA, containing a set of demands, such as annual
wage increases, additional commissions of bill collectors, strike-duration pay,
check-­off of union dues, christmas bonus, continuance of benefits then already
existing and extensions of the effectivity of the collective bargaining
agreement during the pendency of the case.

On December 8, 1961 the lower Court issued an order denying all
the demands except the following:  (1)
increase of comission of bill collectors by P.02 per bill collected over and
above the old rate; (2) continuance of existing benefits including meal
allowance, for overtime service; (3) Christmas bonus for the year 1961; (4)
check-off of union dues.

Petitioner moved to reconsider insofar as the first three items
were concerned and, failing therein, filed the instant proceeding for
review.  The case was thereafter
submitted for decision without briefs or memoranda, but only upon the petition
itself and the answer thereto or the Industrials Court
as respondent.

(1) On the question of increase in the commissions of bill
collectors in the sum of P.02 per bill collected over and above the old rate,
petitioner submits that com­missions are already deemed included in the
adjustment of salaries of employees pursuant to the WAPCO salary standard­ization
plan.  The point was not entertained by
the court below, which held that commissions are not so included, citing the
rule laid down by WAPCO that pending implementation of its pay plan the current
(previous) salary should con­tinue to be received, and that “previous
salary” means “all pecuniary emoluments received by the employees but
excluding commissions, overtime pay, travel allowances, subsistence
quarters, laundry, clothing, and uniform allowances.”

Petitioner on its part, points out that the aforequoted rule should
be applied only for purposes of fixing and adjusting salaries, and that once
the salary of an employee has been fixed and adjusted no other amount maybe
received by him.  Thus, it is pointed
out, the WAPCO rules also provide that “any food, lodging or other thing
or service provided to any employees shall have its value established by the
Budget Commission, and such value maybe deducted from the salary.”

We are not convinced that this particular rule cited by petitioner
applies to commissions given to its bill collectors.  Commissions do not fall in any of the
categories therein mentioned, namely, food, lodging or other thing or service.
Commissions are not grants in kind or in service, but sums of money given to
compensate the employees con­cerned, in this case bill collectors, for the
special nature of their work.  Unlike a
member of the office personnel, for instance, or even an ordinary manual
laborer, either of whom puts into his job a certain number of hours of work and
performs a quantum of beneficial service measurable thereby, for which a
commensurate compensation may be fixed, a bill, collector may be on the road
the whole day and yet show nothing for his efforts.  When he calls on a customer to collect, the
latter has any number of reasons to put off payment, and the collector may have
to come back again and again.  Some
reward in the form of com­missions would not only compensate him fairly for his
trouble but also provide a proper incentive for him to persist until the bill
is actually collected.

2.  The members of respondent
union were enjoying certain benefits, including meal allowance for overtime
service, under their collective bargaining agreement with petitioner which
expired in October 1959.  The continuance
of these benefits was included in the order of respondent Court “at the
old rates before the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 24 of the
President.”  It is admitted by both
parties, and respondent Court so stated, that the collective bargaining
agreement may no longer be relied upon as basis for the definition of the
rights of the employees in this regard. 
The parties did try to negotiate but arrived at no agreement.  The Court, however, ordered the continuance
of “existing benefits, including meal allowance for overtime
service,” by virtue of the following provision in the draft of agreement
proposed by petitioner:

“RIGHTS TO EXISTING BENEFITS.  – Unless otherwise specified herein, it is
understood and agreed that all existing benefits being enjoyed by the employees
and laborers prior to the effectivity of this agreement shall remain in force
and form part of this Agreement, except in cases where such benefits are
curtailed, suspended or suppressed as a disciplinary measure for misfeasance or
nonfeasance in office, and subject to the provisions of existing law on the
matter.”

The phrase “subject to the provisions of existing law on the
matter” seems to have been overlooked or mis­interpreted by respondent
Court.  For Memorandum Circular No. 24 of
the President, issued on January 1, 1959, specifically enjoins all heads of
Departments etc., in­cluding Government-owned and/or controlled corporations,
that “payment of meal allowance for overtime service except in meritorious
cases, shall not be allowed.” in the present case the general rule laid
down in this circular is applicable, and in order to be considered as an
exception thereto the grant of meal allowance must be justified as a
meritorious case.  No such justification
is revealed by the record.  The meal
allowance should therefore be excluded from whatever
benefits may continue to be enjoyed under the order sought to be reviewed.

(3) Petitioner disputes the grant of Christmas bonus for the year
1961 and points out that it is purely an act of liberality which may he
withheld, considering that the collective bargaining agreement of 1956 under
which the employees enjoyed such benefits had already expired.  This is true enough, as a matter of law.  But this Court has held that “even if a
bonus is not demand­able for not forming part of the wage, salary or
compensation of the employee, the same may nevertheless be granted on equitable
considerations,” (Heacock Co. vs. National Labor Union, et al., 95 Phil.
553, 559); and that the Court of Industrial Relations, “according to the
law of its creation may make an award for the purpose of settling and
preventing further disputes.” Respondent Court stated the following
considerations, which we be­lieve justify the award:

“There is no question that the respondent’s employees and
laborers have been enjoying the benefit of christmas
bonus.  It is not denied that even during
the operation of the corporation under the defunct Metro­politan Water District
and since its administration and operation by the respondent Authority, the employees
and laborers have been continuously given such benefit.  And even while this case was pending them
NWSA granted Christmas bonus in December, 1960.”

In view of the foregoing, the orders of respondent Court
dated December 8, 1961 and July 17, 1962, subject of this
petition for review, are affirmed except with respect to the grant of meal
allowance for overtime service, which is hereby eliminated.  No pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Bengzon, J., did not take part.