G.R. No. L-26826. August 29, 1969
BALDOMERO S. LUQUE, PETITIONER, VS. JUDGE UNION C. KAYANAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH IV OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON PROVINCE AND LUCENA CITY, RE…
SANCHEZ, J.:
Upon the averment that respondent judge is without authority and
is disqualified to act, petitioner comes to this Court on prohibition and
mandamus to stop the judge, presiding over Branch IV, Court of First Instance
of Quezon, from taking cognizance of, and to require
him to return to Branch IV of the same court, Civil Case 4871,[1]
in which petitioner, a member of the Bar, is one of the defendants and
cross-defendants. And this, because
petitioner’s original petition for the same purpose was thwarted by the Court
of Appeals.
To better understand this case, it is necessary to narrate in
some detail the events that transpired between petitioner Baldomero
S. Luque and respondent Judge Union C. Kayanan that spawned the legal controversy now before us.
Judge Union C. Kayanan’s oath of office
described his position as “Judge, CFI of Quezon Prov.
and Lucena City – Branch IV, with Station at Calauag.”
On August 13, 1965, by
Administrative Order 268, he was authorized “in addition to his regular
duties, to hold court in Lucena
City, effective September 1, 1965, or as soon
thereafter as practicable, for the purpose of trying all kinds of cases and to
enter judgments therein.” By virtue of this order, Judge Kayanan proceeded to hold court sessions in Lucena City
on September 21, 1965 in
addition to his duty to attend to cases filed at Calauag,
Quezon. On December 1, 1965, Administrative
Order 425 came out with the same authority, i.e., “to hold
court in Lucena
City, effective December 1, 1965, or as soon
thereafter as practicable, for the purpose of trying all kinds of cases and to
enter judgments therein.” All these administrative orders had for their
source of authority Section 56 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.[2]
Turning back to the case before us, on April 15, 1948, Civil Case 4871 was commenced in
the Court of First Instance of Quezon by Bibiano Ilao, Natalio
A. Enriquez and Susana Enriquez against Florencio Ona, Baldomero Luque (petitioner herein), Andrea Africano,
Enriqueta Castillo, and Romeo, Adelaida,
Clarito, all surnamed Baldeo. Plaintiffs therein sought to set aside the
April 17, 1944 decision in Civil Cases 6 and 26 of the Court of First Instance
of Quezon approving the parties’ April 15, 1944
compromise agreement which allegedly was procured thru duress and
intimidation, and questioned Luque’s attorneys’ fees
as counsel for Sinforoso Ona
in said cases. Enriqueta Castillo, in the same Civil
Case 4871, filed a cross-claim against petitioner Baldomero
Luque and others.
By notice of hearing dated October 7, 1965, Civil Case 4871 was set for trial on November 5, 1965 before Branch
I of the Court of First Instance of Quezon at Lucena City,
presided over by Judge Gabriel Valero.
It was on November 5, 1965
that Judge Kayanan first took cognizance of said
Civil Case 4871. According to plaintiffs’
attorney in the case below,[3]
on November 5, 1965, at 8:30 in the morning, he found that Civil Case
4871 “was not included in the calendar of
cases scheduled for Branch I”; that “he looked up the calendar
of the other sala“, and finding his case there,
he thus appeared therein. The
“other sala” is that of Judge Kayanan. Defendant
and cross-defendant Baldomero S. Luque
(petitioner herein) was absent therein.
Going by petitioner’s version, he was at Branch I “where he should
be”; after he was informed by Judge Gabriel Valero hearing cases at Branch
I that Civil Case 4871 was in Branch IV, he proceeded to said branch but was
informed by a clerk that
respondent Judge Kayanan had already left for Manila.
Respondent judge’s order of November 5 was prefaced by the
following words: “When this case was called today for hearing, neither
the counsel for the defendants and cross-claimant as well as counsel for the
cross-defendant appeared.” That order reset the hearing for December 1, 1965 at 8:30 in the morning. Petitioner submits to be inaccurate that part
of the order that says that he
did not appear. Because, so he says, he
was there in court, although at Branch I.
The next pertinent order by respondent judge was made on January 31, 1966, which set the case
for hearing on February 28, 1966. This last mentioned date was admittedly
erroneous because the parties agreed on January
31, 1966 to reset the hearing for March 8.
At the start of the hearing on February 28, 1966, petitioner was present, the other parties absent. Counsel for plaintiffs came 20 minutes late;
he got wind of the hearing on that date after he left the other sala attending to another case. He thought all along that the case was to be
heard on March 8. Another order of the
same date (February 28) reset the case for March 8, as originally scheduled.
Before the March 8 hearing, petitioner sent by registered mail on
March 3 (received by the court on March 7) a motion for postponement. He did not appear on March 8. This prompted the court to order the
resetting of the hearing to March 23; but the court also directed petitioner Baldomero S. Luque and another
attorney for defendants in “twenty-four (24) hours upon receipt hereof, to
explain why they should not be cited for contempt.”
Petitioner again decries that this order is wrong because his
explanation in writing was already made in his motion for postponement; and
that furthermore since his motion for postponement was dated May 3, not May 7
as stated in the order, said motion was not in violation of the three-day rule. Be that as it may, the explanation in
writing thereafter made by petitioner was considered satisfactory by respondent
judge.
On March 18, 1966,
petitioner lodged a motion to dismiss the case upon the ground of estoppel. Respondent judge on April 12, 1966 denied this motion for the reason
that estoppel is not one of the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the Rules of Court.
On April 11, 1966,
petitioner moved to disqualify respondent judge from the case, alleging that:
“Judge Union C. Kayanan doctored the
records of this case in that he suppressed the TRUE and GENUINE proceedings had
in open Court on February 28, 1966 (1) that the undersigned defendant moved to
dismiss this case; (2) that this case was set
for hearing on March 21, 1966; and (3) that the undersigned defendant was
ordered to make his motion to dismiss in writing and to set it for hearing
also on March 21, 1966.
He also doctored the records by issuing an Order defending the plaintiffs,
and in which it is stated that it was given in open Court although it can no
longer be legally done, because after the case was called and the parties have
left, as this case was already
called and I had already left, the Court can no longer legally issue any order
in open Court.
The said doctorings of the records of
this case are serious. If they were done in the past days, then they may be
done again in the coining days, unless Judge Kayanan
is disqualified to continue to hear and to act on this case.
The Order about those TRUE and GENUINE proceedings was not issued
by Judge Kayanan. In other words, they were doctored
by suppressing them. When I was in Court
on March 23, 1966, for a
hearing of this case, I looked at the records, and I found that there was none.
But the records were again doctored, by the issuance of an UNTRUE
and an UNGENUINE Order dated February 28, 1966, copy of which I received on
March 15, 1966, in which the plaintiffs were defended and which stated it was given in open Court, although
after a case was already called and the parties had left, the Court can
no longer legally issue an order in open Court.
In this case, on that date, this case had already been called and I had already left after a TRUE and GENUINE
order was issued in open Court.
Why? Instead, Judge Kayanan issued the aforequoted
UNTRUE and UNGENUINE Order of February
28, 1966 in defense of the plaintiffs and their attorney.
So, it is conclusive that there are gross ERRORS in the Order of March 8, 1966. Probably they were due either to gross
incompetence or that they were deliberately made so that there could be a basis
for requiring me to explain within 24 hours why I should not be cited for
contempt.
But considering that more anomalies followed, there is now reason
to believe that the anomalies committed are intentional.
The foregoing series of anomalies show the evident bias and
partiality of Judge Union C. Kayanan in favor of the
plaintiffs and against me, which will prevent him from resolving the questions
in this case with impartiality and solely on the merits.“
On April 12, 1966, petitioner was again ordered by respondent
judge to explain why he should not be cited for contempt of court for
“using clearly insolent, disrespectful, and contemptuous language therein,
which insinuations or imputations are highly derogatory and served nothing but
to discredit the judge presiding this Court in an attempt to secure his
disqualification, considering that they have no basis in truth and in fact and
palpably unwarranted, in violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics and
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.” Petitioner’s explanation was filed on April 21, 1966.
On April 26, 1966, respondent judge declared the explanation to
be unsatisfactory, adjudged petitioner in direct contempt, and sentenced the
latter to pay a fine of P100 “to be remitted to the Clerk of Court not
later than May 3, 1966”, the next scheduled hearing of the case, or upon
failure or refusal to pay, to five (5) days imprisonment in the provincial
jail. A copy of this order does not
appear to have been received by petitioner before May 3, 1966.
On April 30, 1966,
petitioner registered with this Court a petition for impeachment of respondent
judge.[4]
On June 27, 1966, this
Court dismissed the same for lack of merit.
In the meantime, at the hearing of May 3, 1966, respondent judge asked petitioner to withdraw
his pleading moving for respondent judge’s disqualification. Petitioner refused. Thereupon, the judge asked if petitioner was
going to pay the fine or not. Petitioner
informed the court that he had not received copy of any order sentencing him
for contempt and that he had a right to move for reconsideration after receipt
of a copy of such order. It was at this
juncture that the judge verbally ordered a guard to commit petitioner to jail
(according to respondent judge, he instructed the guard to detain petitioner
merely at the Office of the Warden).
Petitioner was restrained of his liberty for two hours from 10:00
o’clock a.m. to 12:00 o’clock p.m., at which time the judge reconsidered his
verbal order of commitment and set petitioner free with the following order:
“Acting on the oral manifestation of defendant Atty. Baldomero
S. Luque to the effect that up to this date he has
not received the Order of this Court dated April 26, 1966, the Order of his
Commitment to the Provincial Jail at Lucena City is
hereby held in abeyance until after said defendant shall have received a copy
thereof and given a chance to explain why the said Order shall not be carried
out.”
The petition to disqualify respondent judge was denied by the
latter on the same day, May 3, 1966,
as follows: “It appearing that there is neither a legal nor moral ground
to disqualify the Presiding Judge of this Court in hearing this case, the
Petition to disqualify the trial Judge by defendant Baldomero
S. Luque is hereby denied. Reset the hearing of this
case on June 7, 1966.”
On July 26, 1966, following a series of pleadings, respondent
judge signed an order which in part reads:
“x x x
The defendant, Atty. Baldomero Luque insists that the Presiding Judge of this Court should
not try this case for which he requests that he be given one (1) month from
today within which to file his Petition of either Certiorari or Prohibition,
so that he again requests for postponement, which is not objected to by the
other counsel, if only to settle this issue once and for all and to afford said
defendant all conceivable remedies he may choose to take advantage of. Unless said defendant secures a restraining
order from the Supreme Court, the trial shall proceed definitely on September 6
and 9, 1966, at 9 A.M. and the Court
will not countenance any further postponement.
x x x.”
Petitioner next went to the Court of Appeals with a petition for
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction,[5]
praying, inter alia, for the return of
Civil. Case 4871 to Branch I of the Quezon Court of First Instance. On September
9, 1966, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Petitioner’s move to reconsider was thwarted
by the Court of Appeals’ resolution of October
10, 1966. The Court of
Appeals, through a reasoned resolution of October 26, 1966, denied petitioner’s second motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner then came to this Court on November 14, 1966 on appeal by certiorari with a
prayer for preliminary injunction. We
gave due course on November 17, 1966
and directed the issuance of a preliminary injunction upon a P1,000-bond.
Having received the foregoing resolution on November 22, 1966,
petitioner on the same day telegraphed respondent judge asking that the case be
held in abeyance because this Court gave due course to his petition and that he
was filing the injunction bond the day following.
Notwithstanding the receipt of the foregoing telegram, on November 23, 1966 respondent judge
denied postponement and directed that trial on the merits proceed.
As it turned out, respondent judge cancelled the succeeding
hearings he set for the case after receiving the preliminary injunction of
this Court.
We treat the case before us as an original petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus. Enough averments there are in the petition and the
return to do so.[6]
1. This case presents an unedifying picture of animosity,
hostility and bad blood between petitioner, a lawyer and party defendant and
cross-defendant, and respondent, a judge.
From the events that occurred in the court below, we gather the impression that the
courtroom had been converted into an arena of recriminations between the
two. Opprobious
language has been employed by both.
It is the duty of both counsel and judge to maintain, not to
destroy, the high esteem and regard for courts.
Any act on the part of one or the other that tends to undermine the
people’s respect for, and confidence in, the administration of justice is to
be avoided. And this, even if both may
have to restrain pride from taking the better part of their system. To be expected then of petitioner and
respondent is a sense of shared responsibility, a crucial factor in the
administration of justice. And yet lack
thereof is painfully apparent in the record of this case. It would appear that both petitioner and
respondent were seized by a kind of ennui which immobilizes the sense of proportion of men trapped in
situations where emotion runs loose.
2. A lawyer is an officer
of the court. Canon I of the Canons of
Professional Ethics enjoins him “to maintain towards the Courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial
office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.” When a lawyer
goes past respectful
disagreement with the judge and enters into the forbidden area of uncontrolled
criticism, he trenches upon this canon.
Let us look into the language employed by petitioner. Petitioner, in his motion to disqualify
respondent judge, charged that the latter had “suppressed the true and
genuine proceedings” and had “doctored the records” in reference
to what took place in court on February 28, 1966; that the other order of March
8, 1966 was either due to gross incompetence or deliberately made as a basis for requiring
him to explain within 24 hours why he should not be cited for contempt.
Suppression of the true and genuine proceedings is a charge
serious enough. Doctoring is no less grave.
The word “doctored” connotes a deliberate act to conceal the
truth. But then, the mere omission in
the order of February 28 of the facts that petitioner moved to dismiss the
case, that petitioner was ordered to make his motion to dismiss in writing, and
that the motion was set for hearing on March
21, 1966, in our opinion, are not serious enough to warrant the use
of the word “doctored”. As
thus explained by respondent judge, there was a mere mistake; there was no
purpose to mislead. Petitioner could
have suffered exasperation at respondent’s order to show cause
why he should not be held in contempt of court for failure to appear at the
trial of March 8. We do say that a
lawyer may be under a trying ordeal; he may have a grievance. But he should not
give vent to his feelings by employing in a pleading language which is
crude. Refinement in language is a trait
ideal in the relations between man and man, between lawyer and judge. Undignified language rarely escapes reproof
from courts of justice. It would
accordingly be but a demonstration of lack of discipline and self-restraint for
a lawyer to characterize a judge’s actions with some such words as
“doctored”, “fabrications” or “distortion of
truth”.[7]
A lawyer must at all times comport himself with respect to
judicial officers. This is so necessary
to the orderly administration of justice.
The person of the judge is immaterial.
While a “lawyer possesses the privilege of standing up for his
rights even in the face of a hostile court”,[8]
he should not be given to intemperate outbursts which only tend to promote
distrust in the administration of justice.
Failure of respect is failure of duty.
Petitioner’s conduct deserves reprobation.
3. Neither has respondent placed
himself on a higher plane.
The judge has been displaying impatience and anger at petitioner. Petitioner claims that when he refused to pay
the fine for contempt of court, the judge angrily barked at a guard to commit
him to jail; that at one instance, respondent judge irately told him, “I
will have you disbarred”;[9]
that at the July 26 hearing, respondent judge would not give him leeway to
speak in court, interrupting him and continuing to say things against him in a
derisive tone and in a humiliating and abusive manner; that respondent judge
even said: “Why
don’t you want me to hear and decide this case? Just because you are older you want to impose
your will on this Court”;[10]
that after the judge became tired of talking, the judge told petitioner, who
was not given a chance to speak fully: “That is enough, sit down”, and
strongly banged the gavel.[11]
These are not seriously disputed.
Really, from the manner respondent judge answered the petition
before us, it would seem that he has lost his composure, has been emotionally
unstrung. He had not been sparing in his
language either. The members of this
Court feel that as befits his exalted position, a District Judge is expected to
measure his words. The following from
page 5 of respondent’s answer before this Court is quite revealing:
“x x x For
the poor taste of Petitioner to deduce that we have ‘doctored’ the records just
for a simple mistake in the date of hearing, which is sometimes inevitable and not our
own making, is sheer deviltry and plain cussedness,[12]
nay, a display of little, if not lack of respect to the authority on the
bench. x x x.”
Timely to be recalled here is the following from Ysasi vs. Hon. Jose F. Fernandez,
viz: “We prefer to think that restraint
still is a trait desirable in those who dispense justice.”[13]
Petitioner and respondent judge are really at loggerheads with
each other; hostility runs deep. This
situation is, indeed, unfortunate. But
it is in this context that we now view the position of respondent judge in this
case.
While it is true that upon the facts thus far recited,
and under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court,[14]
respondent judge may not be legally disqualified from hearing Civil Case 4871,
still it may not be amiss to repeat what we have said not so long ago in Pimentel
vs. Salanga (1967), 21 SCRA 160,
167-168, as follows:
“All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good
occasion as any to draw attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a
situation where their capacity to try and decide a case fairly and judiciously
comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited from
sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he
might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against
a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a
state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way
that the people’s faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect
on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind
the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted
the scales of justice against him. That
passion on the part of a judge may be generated because of serious charges of
misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel, is not altogether
remote. He is a man, subject to the
frailties of other men. He should,
therefore, exercise great care and caution before making up his mind to act or
withdraw from a suit where that party or counsel is involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself where
that case could be heard by another judge and where no appreciable prejudice
would be occasioned to others involved therein.
On the result of his decision to sit or not to sit may depend to a great
extent the all-important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to
voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his motives or fairness might
be seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and
substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of the law who forestalls
miscarriage of justice.”
Very recently, on May 6,
1969, in Buenaventura vs. Benedicto,
Administrative Case 137, we resolved the following:
“Upon consideration of the motion for reconsideration praying
that the resolution of this Court of January 29, 1969 be reconsidered and that
respondent judge be ordered to inhibit himself from hearing Civil Case No. 300
of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, and considering that the issues in said Civil Case
No. 300 apparently are the same as those in Criminal Case No. 420, respondent’s
actuations in which is the subject of the present administrative case, and
while technically, respondent judge may not be compelled to inhibit himself
from sitting in the trial of Civil Case No. 300 upon the provisions of Section
1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court; but that nonetheless having in mind that a
litigant is
entitled to nothing less than the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge and that
whatever action may be taken by the respondent judge in said Civil Case No. 300
may be subject to interpretation not conducive to faith
in courts of justice: the Court RESOLVED to express
its view that the ends of justice will be better subserved if respondent judge should inhibit himself
from hearing Civil. Case No. 300 aforesaid.”[15]
All suitors, we must say, are entitled to nothing short of the
cold neutrality of an independent, wholly-free, disinterested and impartial
tribunal.[16]
It has been said that “next in importance to the duty of rendering a
righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no
suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge.” [17]
Let it not be said that the administration of justice in this country suffers
from too many human imperfections. To
our mind, respondent judge should inhibit himself since it has become apparent
that his further continuance in Case 4871 would not be in the best interests of
justice, which he is bound to serve.
4. But consideration of
the petition herein does not end here.
There is the order of respondent judge of November 23, 1966 – issued after the herein
petition was lodged with this Court.
Said order came about thus: On November 17, 1966, this Court gave
due course to the present petition, directed that a cease-and-desist order issue upon a P1,000-bond. Notice of this resolution reached petitioner
only on November 22. That same day,
November 22, petitioner wired respondent judge informing the latter that the
herein petition was given due course and that he would file the necessary
injunction bond the following day. That
telegram reads: “Respectfully reiterate motion hold abeyance hearing Case
No. 4871, Ilaw et al. vs. Ona,
et al. Stop Supreme Court gave due course petition certiorari G.R. No. L-26826
Stop injunction bond filed tomorrow. Baldomero S. Luque,
Defendant.” It will be recalled that respondent judge received the
telegram on November 23.
He held sessions on that day.
When he received that telegram from petitioner, caution should have
suggested to respondent to first ascertain from this Court as to whether or not
the petition herein was really given due course and injunction granted if he
doubted the veracity of the telegram.
But he did not. Right away, he
disbelieved petitioner.
Here is what respondent judge in part said in his order of November 23, 1966:
“After hearing the views of counsel for the plaintiffs and for
other defendants as well as cross-claimant in connection with the Petition for
Certiorari filed by defendant Atty. Baldomero S. Luque before the
Supreme Court on November 14, 1966, as well as his pleading entitled ‘Special
Appearance to Move for Holding Hearing in Abeyance’, received on November 22,
1966, coupled with the telegram he sent which we received only today
reiterating his motion to hold in abeyance again the hearing of this case on the
alleged ground that the Supreme Court gave due course to the petition without
furnishing us a copy of the order, the Court is of the considered opinion that
in order to protect the interests of all concerned who are desirous to
terminate this case as soon as practicable since it has been pending way back
in April, 1948, and to assert the dignity of the Court, we are constrained to
proceed to the trial on the merits after several postponements at the behest of
defendant Atty. Luque, evidently intended as dilatory
tactics. We share the view of all
counsel that the petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court without
including the Court of Appeals as co-respondent is patently irregular, and we
have grave doubts whether the Supreme Court, with due respect, will give this
petition due course. At any rate, since
there is no restraining order from a higher court, as previously understood,
and if only to appear consistent to our repeated orders that we shall not countenance
any further postponement, there is no course of action left for us to take but
to proceed to trial in the exercise of our discretion. x x
x.”
This order of November 23 is plainly indicative of the judge’s
frame of mind. It is evidence that
petitioner has not merely fallen in his disfavor; respondent judge had by then
formed a hardened idea that petitioner is incapable of telling the truth. Respondent judge should have taken stock of
the fact that petitioner, besides being an attorney, is also a
party defendant and cross–defendant in Civil Case
4871. The fate of that case mainly
hinges upon whether or not the compromise agreement entered into in Civil Cases
Nos. 6 and 26 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
were obtained through duress and intimidation.
It is quite reasonable to assume that the petitioner as defendant in the
case before respondent judge would take the stand. For, counsel had a hand in that compromise
agreement. Respondent, too, must meet
the evidence against him on the cross-complaint. Is it far-fetched then to say that if Case
4871 is to be heard before respondent judge, there is a great probability that
His Honor would not give petitioner’s testimony the credit that normally should
be given to it?
The factual setting of the present case goes beyond that in Pimentel
vs. Salanga, supra. There, petitioner, counsel in a number of
cases, sought the judge’s disqualification in said cases, because counsel was
complainant in an administrative case against respondent judge upon averments
of “serious misconduct, inefficiency in office, partiality, ignorance of
the law and incompetence.”[18]
Here, complainant is not merely an attorney but also a defendant and
cross-defendant. In Pimentel,
“[n]o act or conduct of his (respondent judge) would show arbitrariness or
prejudice.”[19]
There, whether or not petitioner’s clients would get a fair trial was still in
the speculative stage. Here, the case
went farther. Respondent’s prejudice
against a suitor has concretely manifested itself. The animosity between respondent judge and
petitioner, a party to the case below, had developed through a long period of
time, become patent in the order of November
23, 1966, and is even evident in this case before this Court. By now, it is quite difficult to take out of
petitioner’s mind the impression that he cannot get a fair trial from
respondent judge.
In the circumstances presented, we are constrained to state that
respondent’s taking cognizance of said case does not square with our sense of
justice. It is to be stressed once again
that parties have a right to have their cases tried fairly by an impartial
tribunal.
It is because of all of these that we rule that it would be a
grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent judge to further take
cognizance of Civil Case 4871.
5. But another reason as
potent exists why respondent judge should not be insulated from the charge of
abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of Case 4871. It is that respondent judge got hold of that
case under circumstances which were far from regular.
Of course, it must be conceded that respondent judge of Branch IV
had authority to hold court in Lucena
City for the purpose of trying all
kinds of cases and entering judgments therein.
But the fact is that Case 4871 had been previously assigned and
belonged to Branch I. Precisely, the
formal notice to the parties for the hearing scheduled for November 5, 1965, in plain terms, states that
“the above-entitled case will be heard in the 1st Branch of
this Court.”[20]
But when the case came up for hearing on November 5, 1965, this Case 4871 no longer appeared in
the calendar of cases corresponding to Branch I. We are confronted by information put forward
by petitioner in his reply to respondent’s answer, dated December 24, 1966
(which was made complete on January 4, 1967), that on November 5, 1965,
“Judge Valero did not fail to report, but on the contrary, he reported
early on November 5, 1965 in his Branch I in Lucena
City and he called up a high pile of
cases that day.”[21]
He appended as Annex A to his printed memorandum filed on February 8, 1967, a certification coming from
Deputy Clerk Pedro B. Zara that “Hon. Gabriel V.
Valero held Court sessions on November
5, 1965 at the City of Lucena,
Capital of this province.” In the face of these averments, we find
respondent judge standing mute. He has
made no effort to deny that Judge Gabriel Valero was in Lucena City
on November 5, 1965 hearing
cases for Branch I. He had two
opportunities to deny the same before us, after petitioner twice – once in
petitioner’s said reply and then on pages 24-25 of his printed memorandum –
represented this point of fact. The
judge waived his right to oral argument and to the submission of his
memorandum. That he did not refute the
proffered fact just mentioned we consider very significant.
We have to give due credence to petitioner’s assertion of fact
not only because it is unrebutted on record and
supported by an official certification, but also because it is corroborated by
the narration of facts given by the attorney for the other side – the
plaintiffs – in the case below. It will
be recalled that, as earlier stated, plaintiffs’ attorney carne to court that
day – November 5, 1965 – and found that Case 4871 was not included in the list
of cases to be heard by Branch I but was included in the calendar of “the
other sala“.
Implicit from the foregoing is that on November 5 there was a list of
cases for Branch I which did not include Case 4871, as should be the
case, for Case 4871 properly belonged to Branch I.
Upon the other hand, the explanation given by respondent judge
does not appear to be reasonable. It is
contrary to the facts. It surely is not
in keeping with the sound administration of justice for a judge of a branch of
a court to take for himself a case belonging to another branch of the same
court without justifiable reason therefor. Such a procedure breeds confusion. It could even be suspect. It opens up a charge such as here presented
that respondent has demonstrated “unusual interest” in this case and
refused to return it to Branch I inspite of
petitioner’s move for the purpose.[22]
One important judicial norm is that “[a] judge’s official
conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety.”[23]
A creed to which a judge is hidebound is, in the words of the preamble of the
Canons of Professional Ethics, that: “The future of the Republic, to a
great extent, depends upon our maintenance of Justice pure and unsullied.”
In the factual environment just presented, we hold that respondent
judge also committed a grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of Civil
Case No. 4871 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon. He should,
therefore, be prohibited from hearing the same.
For the reasons given –
(1) the writs of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus are hereby granted;
(2) the proceedings taken by respondent
judge in Civil Case 4871 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
are hereby declared null and void;
(3) respondent judge is hereby directed
to refrain from taking cognizance of said Civil Case 4871;
(4) the preliminary injunction
heretofore issued by this Court is hereby made permanent;
(5) respondent judge is hereby directed
to return Civil Case 4871 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
to Branch I; and
(6) we admonish petitioner, Atty. aldomero S. Luque, for his use of
improper language with a warning that repetition thereof will be dealt with
accordingly; and we direct that copy of this decision be attached to his record
in this Court, as a member of the Bar.
No costs allowed.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Reyes and Zaldivar, on official
leave.
[1]
Entitled “Bibiano Ilao, et al., Plaintiffs, versus Florencio
Ona, et al., Defendants.”
[2]
“SEC. 56. Special terms of court,–
Mien so directed by the Department Head, District Judges shall hold special
terms of court at any time or in any municipality in their respective district
for the transactions of any judicial business.”
[3]
See: Rollo, p. 78.
[4]
Administrative Case 103.
[5]
CA-G.R. No. 37984-R, entitled “Baldomero S. Luque, Petitioner, versus Judge Union C. Kayanan, Presiding Judge of CFI-Quezon
Province Br. IV, Respondent.”
[6]
See: Concurring Opinion of Mr. Justice Barredo
in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo, L-30570, July 29, 1969
[7]
Petitioner’s printed memorandum, pp. 33, 43.
[8]
Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, 731.
[9]
Rollo, p. 107; petitioner’s printed memorandum, p. 29.
[10]
Petitioner’s printed memorandum, pp. 25-26.
[11]
Id., p. 28.
[12]
Emphasis supplied.
[13]
26 SCRA 393, 409.
[14]
“SECTION 1. Disqualification
of judges. -No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any
case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related
to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil
law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or
counsel, or in which he has presided
in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review,
without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and
entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his
sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other than those mentioned above.”
[15]
Emphasis supplied.
[16]
See: 30A Am. Jur., p. 56; In re Kelley, 35 Phil. 944, 951; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, supra, at p. 727.
[17]
30A Am. Jur., p. 56.
[18]
At p. 162.
[19]
At p. 167.
[20]
Rollo, p. 32; emphasis supplied.
[21]
See: Rollo, p. 116; emphasis
supplied?
[22]
Petitioner’s printed memorandum, pp. 27, 40, 42, 48.
[23]
Section 3, Canons of Judicial Ethic.