G.R. No. L-43555. February 28, 1979
METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND EDMUNDO BACULI, RESPONDENTS.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of
the Workmen’s Compensation Commission affirming with modification the
referee’s award for disability under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as
amended.
Respondent claimant Edmundo Baculi was employed by petitioner
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System on September 17, 1953 with a
starting position of Leave Clerk. Thereafter, claimant was successively promoted as Clerk Computer, Legal
Researcher, Trial Attorney I, Trial Attorney II, Trial Attorney III and
concurrently Private Secretary to the General Manager, and finally as Special
Assistant. His last salary was
P12,044.00 per annum. As
Trial Attorney, he appeared as counsel for the petitioner in many cases
litigated in court, and in many occasions, he had to wade, across the streets
during floods. As early as 1953, he had
been afflicted with “Rheumatic Arthritis” or “Gouty
Arthritis” characterized by the swelling of the joints resulting in pains
to his lower extremeties which had caused temporary incapacity from work during
intermittent attacks. Claimant was
treated by Dr. Felix Monroy, Chief of the Medical Services of Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System, upon whose suggestion petitioner was
hospitalized several times. His medical
expenses were paid for by petitioner. The findings of Dr. Monroy were reflected in his Physician’s Report and
medical certificate.
Since 1953, Baculi’s ailment had not improved until he began to
limp, as a consequence of which he retired from the service on September 21,
1971, availing himself of the benefits provided for under R.A. 6234
reorganizing the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority. The Physician’s Report stated however that
Baculi’s retirement was due to illness. Following the day of his retirement, or on September 22, 1971, Baculi
filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of councilor of Quezon
City.
On December 21, 1971, respondent filed a Notice of Injury or
Sickness and Claim for Compensation for disability due to Gouty Arthritis
contracted during employment (Records, p. 299). The claim was controverted thru petitioner’s Employer’s Report of
Accident or Sickness dated April 7, 1972 (Records, p. 296). On October 5, 1973, respondent filed a
motion for ex-parte hearing of the claim on the ground of employer’s
failure to file notice of controversion on time. Petitioner opposed the motion but Acting Referee Tomas G.
Montesines issued an order on November 26, 1973 denying the motion for ex-parte
hearing and proceeded to schedule the hearing of the claim (Records, p. 270).
On April 3, 1974, Acting Referee Montesines issued a decision
dismissing the claim on the ground that the illness of claimant, although
proven to have supervened during the time of his employment, had not been shown
to have incapacitated him from work as evidenced by his filing of his
candidacy for councilor right after his retirement; and moreover, that at the
time the claim was filed, there was no more employer-employee relationship.
It appears, however, that copy of the decision of Acting Referee
Montesines was never served on claimant. The latter learned of the dismissal only through verbal inquiry. Hence, on May 15, 1975, claimant filed a
motion to lift the order of dismissal believing that said order was merely
interlocutory. The case was re-assigned
to Acting Referee Estratonico Añano who gave due course to the aforesaid
motion. The motion was heard at which
petitioner-employer was represented by Atty. Antonio M. Brillantes of the
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, who likewise manifested that he has
not received a copy of the decision. During this hearing, claimant maintained that the decision of April 3,
1974 is not in order as there was no formal reception of evidence adduced by the
parties. On August 15, 1975, Acting Referee
Añano issued an order setting aside the decision dismissing the claim and set
anew the hearing of the case in order that the basic issues in connection with
the claim can be properly ventilated (Annex “H”, Records, p. 60).
The claim was heard anew, during which petitioner’s counsel
lengthily cross-examined all the witnesses for the claimant. On September 16, 1975, while claimant was
offering his evidence, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
contesting the authority of Acting Referee Añano in issuing the order of August
15, 1975, arguing to the effect that the decision of a referee can be set aside
only by a superior officer, if not by the deciding referee himself, hence, it
is only Acting Referee Montesines who can hear the motion to lift the order of
dismissal (Annex “I”, Records, p. 64). On October 24, 1975, Acting Referee Añano denied the motion for
reconsideration after stressing that authority was vested in him when the case
was re-assigned to him for further proceedings (Annex “L”, Records,
p. 100).
After considering the evidence, Acting Referee Añano promulgated
his decision on November 9, 1975 awarding to claimant disability compensation,
stating as reasons that there was ample evidence to sustain the compensability
of claimant’s illness which petitioner employer failed to overcome by
substantial evidence. It was also ruled
that claimant’s filing of his certificate of candidacy had nothing to do with
his cessation from work and that petitioner failed to controvert the claim in
due time in spite of its knowledge of claimant’s ailment for which claimant had
taken leave of absence. The claimant
was therefore awarded the following benefits:
“Under Section 14 of the Act, claimant shall be entitled to
disability compensation benefits equivalent to 60% of his average weekly wage
which was P240.95 (P1,044.13 x 12 divided by 52 weeks). Sixty (60%) percent of P240.95 is P144.57
and for 208 weeks of temporary disability from September 22, 1971 to September
30, 1975 claimant shall be entitled to the sum of P31,070.56 but this amount is
reduced to P6,000.00, the maximum fixed by the Act;
Under Section 13 of the Act, he shall be entitled to such medical,
hospital services, supplies and appliances as the nature of his illness and
extent of his disability shall so require.
Atty. Juan Baligad claimant’s counsel, shall be entitled to
attorney’s fees of P300.00 pursuant to Section 31 of the Act.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment, is rendered in favor of
the claimant and ordering the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System:
1. To pay claimant, Atty. Edmundo A. Baculi, the
sun of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00) PESOS, as disability compensation benefits
under Section 14 of the Act;
2. To provide claimant with such medical,
surgical, hospital services, supplies and appliances as the nature of his
illness and extent of his disability shall so require;
3. To pay Atty. Juan Baligad the sum of P300.00
as attorney’s fees; and
4. To pay this Office the sum of P61.00 as
decision fees pursuant to Section 55 of the Act.”
Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the above decision. Not disposed to change his decision, Referee
Añano elevated the records of the case to the Commission for review. On March 30, 1976, the Commission rendered
its decision confirming the compensability of the claim, thus:
“On the first instance, respondent advanced the theory that
claimant did not suffer any disabling ailment during his employment with
respondent and more so, at the time of his retirement on September 21,
1971. In this connection, it is pointed
out that claimant had been performing his work continuously, thus earning one
promotion to the other. Furthermore, it
was argued that claimant could not have possibly contracted his ailment within
two months after his employment, meaning, he was already suffering from the
said ailment when he entered the service of respondent.
“We find no merit in respondent’s contentions, hence, we can
not subscribe to its theory. Definitely, this is a case of aggravation. The coverage of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, is not limited to
illnesses directly caused or contracted by employment, but also extends to
cases where the ailment is aggravated by or the result of such employment. The fact that claimant was already suffering
from a pre-existing ailment at the time of employment would not relieve respondent
from the liability to pay compensation mandated by law where it is shown that
the said ailment was aggravated by such employment, such as in this case. It is noteworthy in this regard that when
claimant entered the employ of respondent, he was not laboring under any
disability otherwise, he would have not been accepted for employment in the
first place. He might have been sick
already, yes, but the same was not yet pronounced. It may be stated also in passing that when an employer hires an
employee, he takes him with all the infirmities that the said employee is
suffering and that these infirmities should not be aggravated in the course of
employment, otherwise, liability to pay compensation under the law, attaches.
“The other point raised by respondent, however, is
well-taken. It appearing that claimant
did not suffer from any temporary total disability, he is not entitled to compensation
under Section 14 of the Act. He is
(not) precluded, however, from receiving the benefits for permanent partial
disability equivalent to a 30% non-scheduled disability rating as evaluated by
the Assistant Chief Compensation Rating Medical Officer. In this respect, therefore, the decision
appealed from, should be modified.
“Accordingly, claimant is entitled to compensation equivalent
to fifty (50%) percent of his average weekly wage of P239.31 (P12,444.00 ÷ 52)
which is P119.65 and for 84.4 weeks (30% of 208 weeks) equals P9,835.36 which
should be reduced to P6,000.00, the maximum compensation authorized by
law. Considering that this is an
appealed case, the award for attorney’s fees and administrative cost should
also be increased to conform with law.
“WHEREFORE, subject to the modification hereinabove indicated,
the decision under review should be, as it is hereby, AFFIRMED. Respondent Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System ordered:
1. To pay the claimant, thru this Commission,
the amount of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00) PESOS as compensation;
2. To pay claimant’s counsel, Mr. Juan Baligad,
the amount of SIX HUNDRED (P600.00) PESOS as attorney’s fee pursuant to Section
31 of the Act; and
3. To pay the Workmen’s Compensation Fund the
amount of SIXTY SIX (P66.00) PESOS as administrative cost including the P5.00
fee for this review pursuant to Section 55 of the Act.”
Petitioner now seeks a review of the foregoing judgment on the
basis of the following errors, to wit:
I. Respondent Commission erred in not considering
that Acting Referee Estratonico S. Añano acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction when he rendered his decision dated November 9, 1975.
II. Respondent Commission erred in holding that
claimant Edmundo Baculi is suffering from disabling illness.
Regarding the first assigned error, it is petitioner’s principal
contention that Acting Referee Estratonico Añano had no authority to take over
the case which was originally assigned to Acting Referee Tomas Montesines since
the former referee has not been granted formal authority by his superior officer
to act on the matter. Petitioner
submits that in so entertaining respondent’s Motion to Lift the Order of
Dismissal, Acting Referee Añano acted in excess or without authority since the
said motion should have been under the cognizance of Acting Referee Montesines
who was in control of the case. It adds
further that the hearing of the motion and the eventual setting aside of the
decision dismissing the claim is improper as petitioner had not been furnished
with a copy of the motion. The general
premise of the arguments is that all referees in the regional office are
co-equal and coordinate, each having concurrent jurisdiction to hear and
determine compensation cases without interference from the other.[1]
We hold petitioner’s contention untenable. While this Court maintains that in order to
insure judicial stability, the independence of the proceedings or judgment of a
court of competent jurisdiction shall not be interfered with by other courts of
concurrent jurisdiction,[2]
this rule need not necessarily be determinative of the propriety of the
proceedings in this case in view of the peculiar circumstances obtaining
whereby the intervention of Acting Referee Añano did not in reality constitute
an undue interference, but on the contrary, it was a constructive step to
satisfy the demands of due process. After all, the Workmen’s Compensation Commission is but an
administrative agency vested with quasi-judicial function whose duly designated
referees perform their duties under the direction and supervision of the
regional administrator or chief referee who may reassign the hearing of a
claim to another referee.
The records show that while there was no formal order of
re-assignment, the re-assignment to Referee Añano was noted in the handwritten
note of Acting Chief Referee Leonor Cayapas appearing at the left hand corner
of respondent’s Motion to Lift the Order of Dismissal.[3]
Such notation of the Acting Chief Referee reassigning the case to another
referee is sufficient and valid to vest the latter officer the proper authority
to hear and determine the claim for there is nothing in the Workmen’s
Compensation Act requiring such authorization to be issued in a formal order,
the authority of the superior officer not having been questioned and the act
was done in the regular performance of his duty. Under Section 48 of the Act, the hearing, investigation and
determination of any question or controversy in workmen’s compensation cases
shall be conducted without regard to technicalities, legal forms and technical
rules on evidence and strict procedural rules should not be resorted to in
order to defeat or suppress the substantial tights of the litigants.[4]
Petitioner’s first assigned error is therefore without merit.
The records bear that claimant was actually hospitalized several
times. The testimony of Dra. Anita
Gonong Alonzo, Chief of Medical Services, MWSS, is to the effect that claimant
was hospitalized from January 21 to 27, 1969 (Original records, p. 113). Certificates issued by the St. Luke’s Hospital
show that claimant was confined on January 21, 1969 under the service of Dr.
Homobono Calleja and was discharged on January 27, 1969; was also confined in
the same hospital on May 14, 1966 under the service of Dr. Emilia Cabigas and
discharged on May 17, 1966; and again confined on said hospital on June 21,
1969 under the care of Dr. Emmanuel Gatchalian and discharged on June 24, 1969
(Original records, pp. 215-217). Further, in a certificate dated September 15, 1975, claimant is shown
to have been confined at the Santo Tomas University Hospital from December 17
to 18, 1970 and that he paid hospitalization expenses in the amount of
P207.10. The medical record of claimant
also shows that he had been an outpatient of the MWSS clinic since 1953 when he
was diagnosed to be suffering from Rheumatoid Arthritis. Thereafter, he consulted the clinic several
times, particularly on February 20, 1959, September 16, 1959, February 28,
1961, November 1, 1961, April 12, 1961, June 13, 1961, August 26, 1963, January
27, 1964, and February, 1971 (supra, pp. 114, 255-256). Dra. Alonzo also testified that she
personally treated the claimant for the said ailment which was characterized by
the occurrence of pains in the lower extremeties aggravated by walking.[5]
The consistent ruling of this Court is that “once an illness, subject of a
compensation claim is shown to have supervened in the course of employment,
there arises in favor of the claimant the rebuttable presumption that the said
illness either arose out of or at least was aggravated by the nature of
claimant’s employment; and that consequently, the burden to show by substantial
evidence the contrary lies with the employer. The ultimate result of this principle is that the presumption
rebuttable at its inception becomes conclusive upon the failure of the employer
to destroy the same.[6]
In a number of cases, this Court had considered that rheumatic arthritis
although not characteristically occupational, is a disabling and compensable
ailment.[7]
We are not convinced that the mere filing of a certificate of
candidacy is the substantive kind of evidence acceptable to overthrow the state
of physical disability. It only
provided ground for petitioner to surmise that like any person entering the
political arena, respondent would have to engage in the usual hectic
campaigning for votes, an activity certainly not fitted for a disabled
man. The weakness of the conjecture, We
may add, lies on the singular emphasis on physical disability without regard
to the equally important and concurring factor of loss or diminution of earning
capacity. Aside from the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, there is no other proof to ascertain that respondent
thereafter actually engaged in political activities. In truth, respondent was not even elected.
It is not impossible nor improbable for an afflicted man, as
herein respondent, to engage in activities to keep with the normal and basic
functions of life, including, perhaps, a modest or limited effort to earn a
living. To deny him these would be a
denial of life itself. The law does not
require total state of incapacity alone as basis of compensability. It suffices that a person fit in some
respect as the claimant herein but suffers a degree of disability resulting in
the loss or diminution of an individual’s earning capacity he would still be
within the benevolent coverage of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The citation quoted in the case of Gonzales
v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission,[8]
penned by Justice Makasiar is authoritative, illustrating the proper balance
between the factors of physical disability and loss or diminution of earning
capacity as elements of a compensable disability, thus:
“Disability, as a basis for compensation, is the combination
of partial or total physical incapacity and of inability to work, or inability
to work with the same ease and competency as before the injury, or the loss,
total or partial of earning power from the injury (Corpus Juris, Section 535,
p. 813).
“Disability is used either in the medical or physical sense,
as evidenced by obvious loss of members or by medical testimony that the
claimant simply cannot make the necessary muscular movements and exertions; it
is also used to mean de facto inability to earn wages, as evidenced by
proof that claimant has not in fact earned anything.
“These medical and wage-loss aspects of disability may be more
clearly illustrated as follows: A
claimant may be, in a medical sense, utterly shattered and ruined, but may by
sheer determination and ingenuity contrive to make a living for himself;
conversely, a claimant may be able to work, in both his and doctor’s opinion,
but awareness of his injury may lead employers to refuse him employment.
“The problem of the administrators of the Act is the proper
balancing of these medical and wage-loss factors. An absolute insistence on medical disability in the abstract would
produce a denial of compensation in the latter case, although the wage loss is
as real and as directly traceable to the injury as in any other
instances. At the other extreme, an
insistence on wage loss as the test would deprive the claimant the former
illustration of an award, thus not only penalizing his laudable efforts to make
the best of his misfortune but also fostering the absurdity of pronouncing a
man non-disabled in spite of the unanimous contrary evidence of medical experts
and of common observation. (Larson, p. 3
vol. III).” (The Workmen’s Compensation, Act by Inton and Morabe, p. 709)
Finally, the records do not sustain the contention that the claim
was seasonably controverted. The notice
of claim dated December 3, 1971 was filed with the Regional Office on December
12, 1971. The only reliable record of
controversion is the Employer’s Report of Accident or Sickness dated April 7, 1972
which was filed only on April 14, 1972.[9]
Petitioner claims to have filed a similar employer’s report earlier on February
24, 1972, but the records do not show that this report was actually filed and
received by the Commission on said date. Hence, by mandate of Section 45 of the Act requiring the employer
controvert either on or before the fourteenth day of disability or within ten
days after he has acquired knowledge of the alleged accident, petitioner’s
failure to controvert the claim on time in effect constitutes a waiver of all
non jurisdictional defenses.[10]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the respondent Commission is
hereby affirmed, ordering petitioner Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System to pay:
(1) Claimant, Edmundo Baculi, the reduced amount
of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) as maximum compensation for a non-scheduled
permanent partial disability under Section 17 of the Act;
(2) Respondent’s counsel, Atty. Juan Baligad, the
amount of SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P600.00) as attorney’s fee pursuant to Section 31 of
the Act; and
(3) To the Workmen’s Compensation Fund, the
administrative fee pursuant to Section 55 of the Act.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
[1]
Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 267.
[2]
See Mas v. Dumara-og, 12 SCRA 34.
[3]
Annex “A”, p. 250.
[4]
Earnshaw Dock & Honolulu Iron Works v. Sortijas, 66 SCRA 566, 572
(1975).
[5]
Annex “M”, pp. 106-107.
[6]
Paraiso v. Herminia Castelo-Sotto, et al., L-42896, September 30,
1978. See Also: Santos v. WCC, 75 SCRA 365; Caling v.
WCC, 77 SCRA 309; Evangelista v. WCC, 77 SCRA 497; Romero v. WCC,
77 SCRA 482; Vda. de Flores v. WCC, 78 SCRA 17; Espino v. WCC, 78
SCRA 189; Dimaano v. WCC, 78 SCRA 506; De la Cruz v. WCC, 79 SCRA
96; Bautista v. WCC, 80 SCRA 313; Moraza v. WCC, 81 SCRA 306,
etc.
[7]
Dimaano v. WCC, fn 10, supra; Pros v. WCC, 73 SCRA 92;
Caparas v. WCC, 73 SCRA 221; Vda. de Pailagao v. WCC, L-43650,
June 30, 1978; Abordo v. WCC, L-43073, July 31, 1978; Lopez v. WCC,
L-43036, September 30, 1978; Bachiller, Sr. v. Republic of the
Philippines, L-43420, October 30, 1978.
[8]
81 SCRA 703 (1978); See also: Romero v. WCC, 77 SCRA 482.
[9]
Original Records, p. 296.
[10]
Despe v. WCC, 75 SCRA 350; Bihag v. WCC, 75 SCRA 357; Bael v.
WCC, 75 SCRA 181; Justo v. WCC, 75 SCRA 220; Delgado Brothers, Inc. v.
WCC, 75 SCRA 343; Vda. de Galang v. WCC, 76 SCRA 153; Buenaventura v.
WCC, 76 SCRA 485; Romero v. WCC, 77 SCRA 482; Evangelista v. WCC,
76 SCRA 497; Vda. de Flores v. WCC, 78 SCRA 17; Vda. de Yohanon v.
Balena and WCC, 78 SCRA 348; Cuyno, Jr. v. WCC, 78 SCRA 100; National
Housing Corporation v. WCC, 79 SCRA 281; Galindez v. WCC, 79 SCRA
331;. Ilingan v. WCC, 79 SCRA 345; Lopez v. WCC, 79 SCRA 551;
Roma v. WCC, 80 SCRA 170; Mulingtapang v. WCC, 80 SCRA 610.