VINCENT CABARABAN & MCX MOTOR (PHILS.) INC., PETITIONERS, VS. AMRMR TRUCKING CORPORATION & FILIPINAS TRANSPORT INC., RESPONDENTS.
INTING, S. B., J.:[*]
dated May 22, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando
City, La Union, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 7786 entitled “AMRMR
TRUCKING CORPORATION and FILIPINAS TRANSPORT, INC., represented by
SHARON JOYCE A. GALVEZ, Plaintiff-Appellees vs. VINCENT T. CABARABAN and MCX MOTOR (PHILS.), INC., Defendant-Appellants” which affirmed in toto the earlier Decision[4]
dated July 6, 2011 rendered by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
San Fernando City, La Union, Branch II, in Civil Case No. 4483.
The Facts
Respondent Filipinas Transport, Inc. (“FTI”) is the registered
owner of the tanker truck with Plate No. AVG 360 while respondent AMRMR
Trucking Corporation (“AMRMR”) is the actual owner thereof as evidenced
by the Deed of Absolute Sale executed in its favor. Said tanker truck
was being used by respondent AMRMR in its business of transporting
diesel, gasoline, and other petroleum products.[5]
On the other hand, petitioner Vincent T. Cabaraban (“CABARABAN”) is a
mechanic and endurance rider under the employ of his co-petitioner MCX
Motor Philippines, Inc. (“MCX”).[6]
Sometime in October 23, 2007 at 5:30 o’clock in the afternoon,
the tanker truck owned by respondent AMRMR and driven by its duly
licensed driver, Elmer Lorenzo (“LORENZO”), was heading north to deliver
petroleum products in Bangar, La Union. The tanker truck was on the
eastern lane of the national highway and was being tailed by an MCX
motorcycle driven by petitioner Cabaraban. Upon passing the curve in
Brgy. Ar-arampang, Balaoan, La Union, the tanker was bumped from behind
by said motorcycle thus causing the latter to swerve and throwing off
the driver on the eastern lane of the highway. Lorenzo immediately
reported the incident to the Balaoan Police Station. Cabaraban’s
companions and co-employees, Alex Demaisip and Christophil Saoit,
however, removed the fallen MCX motorcycle in the eastern lane and
transferred it to the western lane before the policemen arrived. Lorenzo
allegedly tried to caution Cabaraban’s companions but they ignored him.
As a result of the mishap, the rear portion of the tanker truck was
damaged. Respondent AMRMR, being the actual owner, caused the repair of
the same which amounted to P5,100.00 as evidenced by Official Receipt
No. 155 dated November 3, 2007 issued by Amlang Motor Works.[7]
Petitioners, meanwhile, claimed that it was the tanker truck
which was at fault. They alleged that when petitioner Cabaraban was
about to overtake the slow-moving truck, the latter suddenly swerved to
the left. Accordingly, petitioner Cabaraban’s swift application of the
break did not help him as his motorcycle was side swept by the truck
causing him to stumble down on the road where he sustained physical
injury.[8] On the other hand,
petitioners denied having altered the crime scene but offered no
evidence to contradict the positive testimony of Lorenzo, which was duly
supported by proper documentations.[9]
After proper evaluation of the evidence presented by both parties, the court a quo rendered judgment in respondents’ favor, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by this Court in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants VINCENT T. CABARABAN and MCX MOTOR (PHILS.) INC. Accordingly, the latter is ordered to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff herein, AMRMR TRUCKING CORPORATION the following amounts, to wit:
- Php 5,100.00 as ACTUAL DAMAGES;
- Php 20,000.00 as ATTORNEY’S FEES; and
- Php 1,715.00 as COSTS OF THE SUIT.
SO ORDERED.”[10]
On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the above decision of the court a quo in its Decision dated March 21, 2012. Petitioners then moved for reconsideration[11] of the same but it was denied in an Order dated May 22, 2012. Hence, petitioners now come to Us in this Petition for Review[12].
The Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC VIS-À-VIS THE SET OF FACTS STATED IN THE
ASSAILED DECISION, ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE COURT A QUO’S FINDING THAT
PETITIONER CABARABAN WAS NEGLIGENT UNDER ARTICLE 2185 OF THE CIVIL CODE
AND IN ORDERING PETITIONERS CABARABAN AND MCX TO JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY
PAY DAMAGES TO RESPONDENT AMRMR.
The Court’s Ruling
We shall first resolve the petitioners’ contention that the
case should be outrightly dismissed for lack of cause of action.
According to petitioners, respondent AMRMR has no legal standing to file
the instant complaint for damages against them considering that it is
not the registered owner of the damaged tanker truck.
We
disagree. Basic in procedural law is the rule that every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.[13]
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit.[14] In Ralla vs. Ralla[15],
the Supreme Court defined interest as “material interest, an interest
in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest”. As a
general rule, one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in an action. In the
case at bar, it is evident that respondent AMRMR, being the actual owner
of the tanker truck as evidenced by Deed of Absolute Sale executed in
its favor, is the real party in interest who will be benefited or
injured by the judgment of the court in this case. Moreover, as
correctly found by the RTC, the amendment of the complaint already cured
the defect of the original complaint filed by respondent AMRMR.
Coming now to the merits of the case, We find no compelling
reason to disturb the lower courts’ factual conclusions as they are
consistent with the law and the evidence on record. Well-settled is the
rule that factual findings of the lower courts are not to be disturbed
on appeal and are entitled to great weight and respect.[16]
We note that the court a quo found that the
proximate cause of the accident was the gross recklessness and
imprudence of petitioner Cabaraban in driving the MCX motorcycle,
thereby creating the presumption of negligence on the part of his
employer, petitioner MCX, in supervising its employees. Under Article
2185 of the New Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at
the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. The
records show that petitioner Cabaraban violated two traffic rules under
the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. First, he did not have a driver’s license at the time of the mishap.[17] Second, he failed to maintain a safe speed to avoid the accident.[18] The court a quo
found out that petitioner Cabaraban was driving his motorcycle in a
very fast speed while in the curve portion of the highway and despite
the fact that it was raining at that time and the road was slippery.
These violations create the presumption that petitioner Cabaraban was
the one negligent and should therefore be responsible for the damages
caused by the accident. At any rate, even apart from statutory
regulations, a motorist is nevertheless expected to exercise ordinary
care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with all the
conditions encountered which will enable him to keep the vehicle under
control and, whenever necessary, to put the vehicle to a full stop to
avoid injury to others using the highway.[19]
Having established that petitioner Cabaraban was at fault, We
hold that petitioner MCX should be solidarily liable for the damages
caused by the former. Under Article 2180[20]
of the Civil Code, employers are liable for the damages caused by their
employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. The
liability arises due to the presumed negligence of the employers in
supervising their employees unless they prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Such
presumption, however, was not rebutted at all by petitioner MCX. As
aptly stated by the RTC, the petitioners failed to submit any evidence
in their behalf despite ample opportunity given to them. Instead, they
relied too much on the “Best Evidence Rule” which is obviously not
applicable in the present case. Verily, the Best Evidence Rule applies
only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When the evidence sought
to be introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence,
execution or delivery of the writing, without reference to its terms,
the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked. In such a case, secondary
evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the original.[21]
All told, the petitioners have not clearly demonstrated any
reversible error committed by the RTC in upholding the conclusions made
by the court a quo.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The assailed Decision dated March 21, 2012 and Order dated May 22, 2012
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando City, La Union,
Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 7786 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Reyes, Jr., (Chairperson) and Galapate-Laguilles[**], JJ., concur.
[*] Vice Justice Mario V. Lopez, who is on leave (Baguio Session) from May 5-9, 2014; Per Office Order No. 177-14-RDC.
[**] Vice Justice Socorro
B. Inting who is the acting Senior Member in view of the leave of
absence (Baguio Session) of Justice Mario V. Lopez from May 5-9, 2014;
Per Office Order No. 177-14-RDC.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-20
[2] Ibid, pp. 36-40
[3] Ibid, p. 50
[4] Ibid, pp. 24-34
[5] Ibid, p. 36
[6] Ibid, pp. 36, 39
[7] Ibid, p. 39
[8] Ibid, pp. 6-7
[9] Supra note 7.
[10] Rollo, p. 34
[11] Ibid, pp. 42-48
[12] Ibid, p. 10
ISSUE
- WHETHER OR NOT THE SAN FERNANDO CITY, LA UNION, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT IN CITIES AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE
PETITIONERS LIABLE FOR THE UNFOUNDED MONETARY CLAIMS OF RESPONDENT AMRMR
ON ACCOUNT OF THE ACCIDENT WITH ONLY THE RESPONDENT’S VEHICLE HAS TO
BLAME. - WHETHER OR NOT THE ABSENCE OF THE RESPONDENTS IN THE JUDICIAL
DISPUTE RESOLUTION CAN BE CONSIDERED AS FAILURE OF JDR WARRANTING THE
RE-RAFFLE OF THE CASE TO ANOTHER SALA, THUS, INAPPROPRIATELY FAVORING
THE PLAINTIFFS IN THEIR UNFOUNDED CLAIM FOR DAMAGES.
[13] Spouses Oco vs. Limbaring, G.R. No. 161298, January 31, 2006
[14] Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court
[15] G.R. No. 78646, July 23, 1991
[16] Tay Chun Suy vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93640, January 7, 1994
[17] Republic Act No. 4136, Chapter III—Operation of Motor Vehicle, Article I.—License to Drive Motor Vehicles:
Section 19. Duty to procure license. –
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Act, no person shall
operate any motor vehicle without first procuring a license to drive a
motor vehicle for the current year, nor while such license is
delinquent, invalid, suspended or revoked.The license shall be carried by the driver at all times when
operating a motor vehicle, and shall be shown and/or surrendered for
cause and upon demand to any person with authority under this Act to
confiscate the same.
[18] Republic Act No. 4136, Chapter IV—Traffic Rules, Article I.—Speed Limit and Keeping to the Right:
Section 35. Restriction as to speed. –
vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent
speed, not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due
regard for the traffic, the width of the highway, and of any other
condition then and there existing; and no person shall drive any motor
vehicle upon a highway at such a speed as to endanger the life, limb and
property of any person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to
bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead. x x
x x
[19] Filipinas Synthetic Fiber Corporation vs. De Los Santos, et al., G.R. No. 152033, March 16, 2011
[20] Article 2180 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons
for whom one is responsible.x x x
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business
or industry.
x x x
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when
the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
[21] Heirs of Prodon vs. Heirs of Alvarez and Clave, G.R. No. 170604, September 2, 2013