ELISEO ARANETA, JR., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

Should an accused who admittedly shot
the victim but is shown to have inflicted only a slight wound be held
accountable for the death of the victim due to a fatal wound caused by his
co-accused?  This is the focal issue
addressed to this Court in this case.

In an Information filed before the Circuit Criminal Court of
Manila, 6th Judicial District on May 14, 1973, Eliseo
Araneta, Jr. y Macute,
herein petitioner, Benjamin Bautista y
Mendoza, also a petitioner, Eden Ng y Dumantay and Joselito “Boy” Santiago were charged with murder
for the death of one Manuel Esteban, Jr. due to multiple gun shot wounds on
March 23, 1972.

After arraignment, with all the accused entering a plea of not
guilty, and the trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision
dated August 30, 1973, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1)      Finding accused Eliseo Araneta, Jr. y Macute and Benjamin Bautista y Mendoza guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of homicide and there being proved
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any aggravating
circumstance to offset the same, the court sentences each one of them to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal as maximum, to jointly and severally indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Manuel Esteban, Jr. the sum of P12,000.00 for the death
of the latter; the sum of P20,000.00 by way of moral damages; the sum of
P169,600.00 by way of consequential damages and to proportionately pay the
costs.

2)      Acquitting accused
Eden Ng y Dumantay and Joselito
Boy Santiago of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, with costs de oficio.  Their release is hereby ordered unless there
is valid ground for further detaining them.

The gun of Araneta (Exhibit
“P”) is hereby confiscated in favor of the State and ordered
delivered right away to the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

In the event that accused Araneta and
Bautista would appeal, an appeal bond of P14,800.00
for each of them is hereby fixed.

SO ORDERED.”^[1]

Eliseo Araneta,
Jr. and Benjamin Bautista appealed their conviction to the Court of Appeals.

On February 20, 1976,
the appellate court rendered its decision affirming the decision of the trial court with modification as to
the civil liability of petitioners for the loss of earning capacity of the
deceased by decreasing the same from the amount of P169,600.00
to only P43,200.00.^[2]

Eliseo Araneta,
Jr. and Benjamin Bautista filed separate petitions for review on certiorari
of the decision of the Court of Appeals which were consolidated
per resolution of this Court
dated September 6, 1976.

Petitioner Araneta, Jr. submits two legal issues for considerations to
wit:

“I.

ON THE BASIS OF THE
FACTS AND FINDINGS IN THE DECISION ITSELF, PETITIONER ARANETA CANNOT BE
CONVICTED OF HOMICIDE; BUT, AT MOST, ONLY OF SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES; and

II

ON THE BASIS OF THE
FACTS AND FINDINGS IN THE
DECISION ITSELF, PETITIONER ARANETA SHOULD BE ACQUITTED ON THE GROUND OF
SELF-DEFENSE AND/OR DEFENSE OF STRANGERS.”^[3]

Petitioner Bautista assigns the following errors:

“I

WHETHER
OR NOT THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT COURT ARE NOT CLEARLY CONTRARY TO LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE.

Il

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT
COURT IN ITS FINDINGS INDULGED IN SPECULATIONS,
SURMISES AND CONJECTURES TOTALLY UNCALLED FOR AND COMPLETELY UNWARRANTED BY THE
EVIDENCE, CONTRARY TO LAW.

III

WHETHER
OR NOT THE CONCLUSIONS OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT ARE
GROUNDED ON MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

IV

WHETHER
OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT AND THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT REJECTING THE CONFLICTING
STATEMENTS AND TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES.

V

WHETHER
OR NOT CIRCUMSTANCES OF WEIGHT AND INFLUENCE HAVE EITHER BEEN OVERLOOKED OR
MISINTERPRETED, WHICH OTHERWISE WILL LEAD TO ACQUITTAL.”^[4]

The facts of this case as found by both the trial court and the
appellate court on the basis of the evidence show the following:

At about a little past midnight of March 22, 1972, while the
victim Manuel Esteban, Jr. and his companions Jaime Roque,
Eduardo Saguil, Jesus Dizon
and Charles Go were having a drinking spree at the mezzanine floor of the Sands
Kitchenette, Rizal Avenue, Manila, a napkin container
was thrown to their table coming from a
group of three or four persons,
which included the petitioners.  The
victim approached the group of petitioner Araneta,
Jr. after which a heated argument ensued. 
Petitioner Bautista pushed the left shoulder of the victim
causing the latter to spin at which time, petitioner Araneta,
Jr. fired his gun with his left hand (his right hand is atrophied), hitting the
victim, who was then in a stooping position, at the back.  Having been shot, the victim drew his gun and
fired indiscriminately hitting Manuel de Guzman, a companion of petitioner Araneta, Jr. on his left thigh.  The bullet which wounded De Guzman hit the
wall and ricocheted, hitting one of the accused Eden Ng along his umbilical
cord.  Petitioner Bautista then held the
victim who was bent forward, on his
right wrist and poked a gun at him.  At
this point, petitioner Bautista suddenly fired his gun hitting the chest of the
victim.  Roque
and Saguil together with a bouncer from a nearby Soda
Fountain brought the victim to the Jose
Reyes Memorial Hospital
where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

We will first dispose of the second issue raised by petitioner Araneta, Jr. that he should be acquitted on the ground of
self-defense and/or defense of strangers.

The rule is well-settled   that
an indispensable requirement of self-defense and defense of strangers under paragraphs 1 and 3, respectively, of Article 11,
Revised Penal Code is unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.^[5]
This element is not present in the case at bar.

Petitioner Araneta would have Us believe that the unlawful aggression emanated from the
victim alleging that the latter was under heavy influence of liquor at the time
of the incident, that it was he who suddenly accosted their group because of
the napkin container thrown at his table and that he was the first to fire the
shot.

For unlawful aggression to be present in self-defense,
there must be an assault or at least a threatened assault of an immediate and
imminent kind on the person defending himself.^[6]
In this case, there was no actual physical assault on petitioner Araneta, Jr. or any member of his group.  Neither was it shown that the victim
exhibited an intimidating attitude that is offensive and positively strong,
showing the wrongful intent to cause an injury.^[7]
When the victim approached the group of Araneta, Jr.,
presumably to confront them as to
the napkin container thrown at their table, he was not yet brandishing his gun
as testified to by the prosecution witnesses. 
A mere threatening attitude on the part of the victim will not
constitute unlawful aggression.^[8]
If there was any unlawful aggression, it came from the group of petitioner Araneta, Jr. when Bautista pushed the victim’s shoulder
after which petitioner Araneta, Jr. fired the first
shot hitting the victim.  It was only at
this time when the victim drew his gun and fired indiscriminately.  These facts have been duly established by the
evidence for the prosecution.

Petitioner Araneta, as the accused,
must establish self-defense by clear and convincing evidence.^[9]
He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of
that of the prosecution, for even if it were weak, it could not be disbelieved
after he himself admitted shooting the victim.^[10]

There being no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim,
petitioner cannot claim the justifying circumstance of self-defense to absolve
him from criminal liability for inflicting injury upon the victim.  But for what crime should he be held liable –
homicide or slight physical injuries?

Per the post-mortem findings report prepared by Dr. Abelardo B. Lucero, Medico Legal Examiner, Manila
Metropolitan Police, the victim died of “shock and hemorrhage due to
multiple (2) gunshot wounds in the anterior and posterior chest lacerating the
diaphragm, liver, stomach and
spleen.”^[11] Dr. Lucero testified that wound no. 1
located at the anterior right chest is a contact wound because the muzzle of
the gun touched the skin of the body of the victim which is a fatal wound,
while wound No. 2 found at the back of the victim is a slight wound making it
possible for the victim to fire a gun even after sustaining such wound.  Per opinion of Dr. Lucero, wound Nos. 1 and 2
have been caused by bullets of different caliber, or at least by
different firearms, with wound No. 2 inflicted ahead of wound No. 1.  The trial court then ruled that wound No. 2
was caused by the gun of petitioner Araneta, Jr. who
was established to have fired first and that wound No. 1 was inflicted by
petitioner Bautista.

Petitioner Araneta, relying on this
finding of the trial court, now argues that wound No. 2 not being a fatal wound
but only a slight wound would not make him criminally liable for the death of
the victim.  He points out that had not
petitioner Bautista subsequently shot the victim during the scuffle for the gun
of the latter, the victim would not have died. 
He asserts that since there was no conspiracy established, the liability
of petitioner Araneta, Jr. should only be for the
crime of slight physical injuries.

The State through the Solicitor General in opposing the theory of
petitioner Araneta, Jr. argues that the denomination
of wound No. 2 as “slight” merely refers to the gunshot wound of
entry and that the medical findings show that the victim died due to shock and
hemorrhage caused by two gunshot wounds – wound No. 1 and wound No. 2.  The Solicitor General further contends that
since none of the wounds is “thru and thru” and therefore one cannot be the wound of entry while the
other the wound of exit, the conclusion becomes ineluctable that the two
gunshot wounds, one in front and one at the back caused the shock, hemorrhage
and the laceration of the internal organs.

Petitioner Araneta, Jr. retorts by
saying that the two (2) gunshot wounds are “thru and thru” thus
resulting in four wounds, two of entry and two of exit; thus, the “two (2)
gunshot wounds” which caused the shock and hemorrhage resulting in the
death of the victim refer to the wounds caused by gunshot No. 1 fired by
petitioner Bautista.

We agree with petitioner Araneta, Jr.

The postmortem findings report details the wounds sustained by the victim –

“POSTMORTEM FINDINGS

EXTERNAL FINDINGS:

(1)  
Gunshot wound of entry marked I measuring 1.5
cm. in diameter surrounded with powder burns located in the anterior right
chest, midclavicular line at the level of the 4th
cartilage, 51.6 inches from the heel. 
The bullet is directed obliquely downwards to the left at an angle of 45
degrees posteriorly and came out thru gunshot wound
of exit I-A measuring 0.8 cm. x
0.9 cm. located in the left lateral chest at the level of the 9th intercostal space 46 inches from the heel, post axillary line fracturing the right 4th cartilage lacerating
the diaphragm, stomach and spleen. 
(fatal)

(2)  
Gunshot wound of entry II measuring 0.5 x .0.8
cm. with collar contusion 56 inches from the heel, preceded by 4 cm. elongated
almost triangular reddish superficial abrasion measuring 0.2. cm. at its lowest and widening upwards to 0.5 cm. at its base,
located in the left posterior midlateral chest and
the bullet came out thru gunshot wound of exit II-A measuring 1 x 0.9 cm. located in
the lateral posterior left shoulder 59.5 inches from the heel.

The bullet was fired directed obliquely
upwards to the left at an angle of 35 degrees lacerating the skin and
subcutaneous tissues for a distance of 7 cm. and came out thru a rugged everted gunshot wound of exit II-A, 56 inches from the heel
(slight injury).

x x
x.”^[12]

We can clearly see that there were four gunshot wounds.  The gunshot fired by petitioner Bautista, produced gunshot wound of entry I located at
the anterior right chest with the bullet coming out thru gunshot wound of exit
I-A in the left lateral chest.  The
second gunshot fired by petitioner Araneta, Jr.
caused gunshot wound of entry II located in the left posterior midlateral chest with the bullet coming out thru gunshot
wound of exit II-A at the lateral posterior left shoulder.  The bullet fired from the gun of petitioner Araneta, Jr. only lacerated the skin and subcutaneous
tissues, thus, its classification by Dr. Lucero as a slight injury.            The bullet fired from the gun of
petitioner Bautista lacerated the diaphragm, liver,^[13]
stomach and spleen proving to be fatal to the victim.  There can be no other conclusion except that
the “two gunshot wounds” indicated under the cause of death refer to
the gunshot wounds of entry and exit located at the anterior right chest and
the left lateral chest, respectively, produced by the gunshot fired by petitioner
Bautista which lacerated the diaphragm, liver, stomach and spleen.

The nature of the wound inflicted by petitioner Araneta, Jr. having been settled as a slight injury, should he be held responsible
for the death of the victim?

There is no pretension that there was any conspiracy between the
petitioners.  There was no concerted
action pursuant to a common criminal design between the petitioners.^[14]
In the absence of conspiracy, each of the accused, herein petitioners, is
responsible only for the consequences of his own acts.^[15]

Thus, in a case where one accused inflicted the mortal wound by
stabbing the victim with a knife while the other two assailants merely hit the
victim with a bamboo on the left arm and the head, the former was held guilty of murder while the latter was
held liable only for lesiones leves or slight physical injuries.^[16]
In still another case where two
persons attacked a single victim,
one inflicting a fatal wound hacking the victim with a bolo almost amputating
the left arm completely, while the other also using a bolo struck the victim
just below the armpit causing a wound that would heal in ten (10) days, the one
who inflicted the mortal wound was convicted of murder while the other only of
less serious physical injuries.^[17]

The gunshot wound inflicted by petitioner Araneta,
Jr. was a slight wound which did not cause the death of the victim nor
materially contributed to it in order that he may be held liable for homicide.^[18]
His liability should therefore be limited to the slight injury he caused.  However,
the fact that petitioner Araneta, Jr.
inflicted a gunshot wound on the victim shows the intent to kill.  The use of a gun fired at another certainly
leads to no other conclusion than that
there is intent to kill.  He is therefore
liable for the crime of attempted homicide and not merely for slight physical
injury.

Anent the issues raised by
petitioner Bautista, We
note that they involve questions of fact, namely:  whether or not he shot the victim and whether
or not he was present at the inception of the shooting incident — which this
Court will not ordinarily
review.  Except in criminal cases in
which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua
or higher, appeals to the Supreme Court are not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, allowed only
on questions of law which must be distinctly set forth in the petition for review
on certiorari, and only when there are special and important reasons
therefore.^[19]

Petitioner invokes the exceptions that the findings of respondent
court is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures,^[20]
that the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts,^[21]
and that there was grave abuse of discretion^[22]
to justify a review of the findings of facts of respondent court.

Petitioner Bautista primarily decries the fact that the
respondent court as well as the trial court did not give weight to the negative
results of the paraffin test to which he was subjected to nine (9) hours after
the shooting and instead indulged in speculations, surmises and conjectures
when they concluded that “many things had happened between the shooting
and the time Bautista was subjected to paraffin test”^[23]
He contends that the supposition of the respondent court that the petitioner
being a policeman must be aware that gunpowder can be easily removed by washing
the hands with vinegar, or even with soap and water and knowing such must have
done so, was totally unfounded and unsupported by evidence.

However, an examination of the records reveals that there are
other circumstances upon which the respondent court based its conclusion that
petitioner Bautista fired his gun, thus –

“a)     The ballistics
results show that the gun of appellant Bautista was newly oiled.  Specifically the finding was that it has
“traces of thick oil.” Appellant Bautista failed to refute the prosecution
evidence that his gun at the time of his examination in the morning of March 23, 1972, was newly oiled.  Neither did he explain the presence of thick
oil in his gun.  His obvious purpose of
oiling his gun is to remove traces of gun powder.

“b)     The ballistics test itself shows that one
chamber in the gun of Bautista was found to have smoke rings.  Smoke rings, according to
the testimony of the ballistics expert, appears in the chamber of a
revolver whose bullet was fired.  Only
one chamber had smoke rings.  The other
five chambers do not have any.  This
shows that appellant Bautista fired only one shot which is in accordance with
the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution.  The lame explanation of Bautista that the
said smoke ring is attributable to the fact that in the month of February he
participated in quelling student demonstra­tions, fails to explain why, despite
the fact that his gun is newly oiled, said smoke ring was still present at that
time The obvious conclusion is that because he was racing against time,
Bautista forgot, in his desire to exculpate himself, to clean the inner chamber
of his service revolver.”^[24]

These circumstances are nevertheless of no moment because of the
positive identification of petitioner Bautista as the person who shot the
victim by the prosecution witness Eduardo Saguil.  Petitioner, however, discounts the testimony
of Saguil for the reason that he gave two (2) conflicting statements
– one before the Manila Metropolitan Police (MMP) given on March 23, 1972
wherein he failed to identify the person who fired the fatal shot and the other
before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on March 24, 1972 wherein he
identified petitioner as the assailant.

This apparent inconsistency in the statements of Saguil was satisfactorily explained at the trial during his
direct and cross examinations.  He
testified that he had no choice but to sign the sworn statements given before
the MMP because he was intimidated by the investigating officers who did not want
him to implicate petitioner Bautista as the person who shot the victim since
petitioner was their comrade.  In fact,
when he insisted that it was Bautista who shot the victim, the investigating
officer Rolando Atanacio stopped the taking down of
the statement and instead indicated therein that Saguil
refused to continue with the same.  It is
for this reason that Saguil together with another
prosecution witness Jaime Roque decided to proceed to
the NBI to give another sworn statement this time disclosing the whole truth.

Petitioner Bautista deplores the fact that the respondent court
chose to give full credence to the testimony of Roque
placing the former at the scene of the incident prior to the actual shooting
and disregarded his version that he merely responded to the crime scene as
police officer after he heard the shots coming from the Sands Kitchenette.

Roque affirmatively identified
petitioner Bautista as the person who, during the confrontation pushed the
victim on the shoulder making him spin. 
Petitioner Bautista on the other hand, alleged that he was in the
vicinity of the crime scene that night of March 22, 1972 because he conveyed
his compadre Arsenio
Sanchez whom he accidentally met to take a ride for La Loma.  However, Sanchez was never presented as a
witness to corroborate this claim of petitioner.  The trial court properly observed that the
non-presentation of Sanchez is an evidence wilfully suppressed which if presented will be adverse to
Bautista.^[25]

Petitioner Bautista also capitalizes
on the failure of Roque to identify him and his
co-accused in his sworn statement given before the NBI on March 24, 1972. 
This failure is explained by the fact that at the start he did not know
their names, but merely recognized their faces. 
It was only when the pictures of the accused were shown that he came to
know of their names.

We sustain the trial court’s conclusion on the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses Saguil and Roque,^[26]
as it is in a better position to
decide the question, having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and
observed their behavior and manner of testifying.^[27]
The impressions of the court a quo on this matter is binding upon Us unless there appears a grave abuse of discretion or an
obvious misapprehension of facts.^[28]
The trial court noted that “no evil or bad motive was shown to have
existed before the incident which would prompt Roque
and Saguil to testify in the manner they did if such
were not the fact.”^[29] The absence of evidence as to an improper
motive actuating the principal witnesses of the prosecution strongly tends
to sustain no improper motive existed
and their testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.^[30] Hence, the positive testimony of the
prosecution witnesses that he was at the crime scene at the inception of the
incident and pointing to him as the person who confronted and last shot the
victim together with all the attendant circumstances cannot be overcome by the
mere denials of petitioner Bautista.^[31]

As We uphold the factual findings of the
respondent court, We therefore rule that petitioner should be held liable for
the death of the victim by inflicting the fatal wound upon him.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 20, 1976 affirming with modification the decision of the trial court
dated August 20, 1973 is hereby AFFIRMED as to the conviction of Benjamin
Bautista y Mendoza for homicide, and MODIFIED as regards Eliseo
Araneta, Jr. y Macute, who
is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted
homicide penalized under Article 249 in relation with Article 51 of the Revised
Penal Code, and considering the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
without any other attendant circumstances, petitioner Araneta, Jr. is imposed the
penalty of imprisonment for ten (10) months of prision correccional.

The civil indemnity for the death of Manuel Esteban, Jr. is
hereby increased from P12,000.00 to P30,000.00 in line
with prevailing jurisprudence.

Benjamin Bautista is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the
damages as herein modified.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Acting C.J., (Chairman),
Cruz, Griño-Aquino, and
Medialdea, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Pages 33 to 102, Rollo –
G.R. No. L43745, Penned by Judge Manuel Pamaran.

^[2]
Pages 24 to 41, Rollo – G.R.
No. L-43527, Associate Justice Vicente G. Ericta, ponente.  Concurred in by Associate
Justices Luis B. Reyes and Pacifico P. de Castro.

^[3]
Pages 2 & 3, Rollo –
G.R. No. 43527.

^[4]
Page 13, Rollo, G.R. No.
L-43745.

^[5]
People vs. Yuman, 61 Phil. 786 (1935); People vs. Apolinario,
58 Phil. 586 (1933)

^[6]
People vs. Pasco, Jr., 137
SCRA 137 (1985); People vs. Crisostomo 108
SCRA 288 (1981); People vs. Alconga and Bracamonte, 78 Phil. 366 (1947).

^[7]
U.S. vs. Guy-Sayco, 13 Phil. 292
(1906).

^[8]
People vs. Pasco, Jr., supra.

^[9]
People vs. Urbistondo, 132 SCRA 268 (1984);
People vs. Plandez, 132 SCRA 69 (1984); People
vs. Dofilez, 130 SCRA 603 (1984); People vs. Libardo, 127 SCRA 541 (1984); People vs. Talaboc, Jr., 30 SCRA 87 (1969);

^[10]
People vs. Crisostomo, supra, People vs. Urbistondo,
supra; People vs. Dofilez, supra;
People vs. Talaboc, Jr., Supra;
People vs. Ansoyon, 75 Phil. 772 (1946).

^[11]
Exhibit D.

^[12]
Ibid.

^[13]
Indicated in the Morgue Form, Exhibit B.

^[14]
People vs. Abarintos, 81
Phil. 238 (1948); People vs. Tamayo, et al.,
44 Phil. 38 (1922).

^[15]
People vs. Bautista, 30 SCRA 158 (1969); People vs.
Tividad 20 SCRA 549 (1967); People vs. Portugueza, 20 SCRA 901 (1967).

^[16]
People vs. Tividad, Supra.

^[17]
People vs. Portugueza, supra.

^[18]
U.S. vs. Abiog and Abiog,
37 Phil. 137 (1917).

^[19]
Balde vs.
Court of Appeals, 150 SCRA 365 (1987).

^[20]
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 514 (1984);
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 117 SCRA 346 (1982); Joaquin vs.
Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 (1953).

^[21]
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, supra;
Director of Lands, supra.

^[22]
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, supra; Buyco vs. People 95 Phil. 453 (1954); Director of
Lands vs. Court of Appeals, supra.

^[23]
Page 15, Decision of the Court of Appeals.

^[24]
Pages 15-16, Decision of the Court of Appeals.

^[25]
Rule 131, Sec. 5(e), Rules of Court.

^[26]
People vs. Ganduma, 160 SCRA
799 (1988); People vs. Alison, 122 SCRA 9 (1982); People vs.
Chavez, 121 SCRA 806 (1983); People vs. Salameda,
111 SCRA 405 (1982); People vs. Lacson, 102
SCRA 457 (1981).

^[27]
People vs. Ancheta, 148 SCRA
178 (1987); People vs. Cabiling,
74 SCRA 288 (1976).

^[28]
People vs. Ancheta, supra.

^[29]
Page 57, Decision of the Circuit Criminal Court, page
89 Rollo – G.R. No. L-43745.

^[30]
People vs. Angeles, 92 SCRA 432 (1979); People vs.
Mercado, 38 SCRA 168 (1971); People vs. Amiscua,
37 SCRA 813 (1971).

^[31]
People vs. Parilla, 144 SCRA
454 (1986); People vs. Canada,
144 SCRA 121 (1986); People vs. Chavez, 117 SCRA 221 (1982).