G.R. No. L-46732. May 05, 1979
MARIO Z. REYES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA AS PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MARSMAN AND CO., INC., AND E.G. VITO, RESPONDENTS.
SANTOS, J.:
Special civil action filed on August 24, 1977 for (1) certiorari
to annul and set aside the decision dated November 12, 1976 of the Office of
the President thru Deputy Executive Secretary Roberto V. Reyes, which granted
respondent Marsman and Co., leave to terminate
petitioner’s employment, and reversed the decision of the Secretary of Labor
dated August 22, 1974 ordering the reinstatement of petitioner with back wages,
from the date of his preventive suspension on January 17, 1974, and (2)
mandamus to compel the Office of the President to limit its review of the
decision of the Secretary of Labor solely on the basis of the evidence
presented and established during the hearing conducted at the mediation-fact
finding stage.
On October 7, 1977,
private respondents Marsman and Co., Inc. (henceforth
Company) and E.G. Vito filed their comment[1]
to which petitioner filed his reply on October
26, 1977.[2]
Respondent public official after extension, filed his comment on December 20, 1977.[3]
On February 1, 1978, We gave
due course to the petition, considered respondent’s comments as answers, and
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.[4]
The Solicitor General, in behalf of respondent public official, manifested on February 16, 1978 that he is adopting
the comment he filed as his memorandum.[5]
Petitioner, in turn, thru counsel, filed his memorandum on March 21, 1978.[6]
Private respondents, Company and E.G. Vito, also after extension, adopted their
comment filed on May 29, 1978
as their memorandum.[7]
Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision on June 9, 1978.
The following are the factual and procedural antecedents which
gave rise to this petition. Petitioner
Mario Z. Reyes is Credit and Collection Manager and Operations Coordinator of Marsman and Co., Inc.
On January 17, 1974,
the Company thru its Vice-President, E.G. Vito, herein private respondent,
suspended him indefinitely for “misappropriation of company funds.”
At that time, petitioner has been with the Company for seven years, six months
and twelve days.[8]
It appears that in December, 1973, the Company sponsored a sales
promotional contest to advertise its pondocillin
products. A certain Evangeline R. Tagulao, a nurse employed at Singer Industries Phil., Inc.,
won the first prize – a Volkswagen Beetle 1200.
However, Miss Tagulao chose to receive the
cash value of the car which was P24,000.00.
Accordingly, the Company issued PCIB Check No.
416234 dated December 19, 1973
for P24,000.00 in favor of Miss Tagulao. The check was delivered to Miss Tagulao by petitioner Reyes, accompanied by his co-employee
Victor Santos. Together, the three of
them went to a bank[9]
to cash the check.
On January 16, 1974,
the Company received two handwritten letters from Miss Tagulao:
First Letter
“January 16, 1974
Marsman
Co.
Leo Pharmaceutical Inc.
This is to certify that I only received
P20,000 from Mr. Mario Reyes, and I expect to receive the balance of P4,000.
(Sgd.) E.R. Tagulao
Evangeline R. Tagulao“
Second Letter
“January 16, 1974
Marsman Co.
Leo Pharmaceutical, Inc.
The following are the circumstances surrounding the handling of the
P20,000 to me:
Sometime December 20,
1973 Mr. Mario Reyes came to my clinic bringing the P24,000 check
supposedly the equivalent of 1 (1200 Beetle VW) which
I won in the pondocillin raffle.
From the clinic we proceeded to Rizal
Commercial Bank (sic) at Buendia to cash the
check. I was surprised when I received
only P20,000, but Mr. Reyes explained that the remaining P4,000 will go to the
consolation prizes. I didn’t complain at
that time thinking that what Mr. Reyes told me was true and I found out later
that the whole amount of P24,000 is due to me.
(Sgd.) E.R. Tagulao
Evangeline R. Tagulao“[10]
On the following day, January
17, 1974, respondent Company wrote to Miss Tagulao
attaching RCBC Check No. 1363018 for P4,000.00, and
inÂdicating that the said check was in lieu of the amount withheld by
petitioner Reyes. The Company thereafter
advised petitioner Reyes that he was being placed on suspension starting January 18, 1974. It also filed with National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) on January 21, 1974, an application
for clearance to terminate complainant’s services alleging that “(P)ending
further investigation and considering that this constitutes misappropriation of
company funds, and in accordance with existing policy as well as the applicable
rules and regulations, Mr. Reyes has been placed under preventive suspension
effective as of the close of office hours on January 17, 1974 pursuant to
Section 2 of NLRC Implementing Instructions No. 1
issued on November 9, 1972 and Presidential Decree No. 21 issued on October 14,
1972.” It added further that “the preventive suspension of Mr. Mario
Z. Reyes is necessary in order to prevent further violation of the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code and other statutes as well as the established
employment policies and reasonable company rules and regÂulations, said
violation being inimical to the interests of the company.”[11]
Toward the latter part of January 1974, the Company received two
letters from Miss Tagulao this time informing it that
she was returning the check for P4,000.00 because she “. . . actually received the full amount of P24,000.00 . .
.”[12]
One of the letters reads:
“January 24, 1974
Mr. E.G. Vito
Exec. Vice Pres.
Marsman and Co.
Inc.
Sir:
In all conscience now that I know the
truth and everything is clear to me, I’m voluntarily returning the check in the
amount of P4,000.00. I would like to
retract all the previous statement I have given.
I hope this statement of mine closes the
case and clear Mr. Mario Reyes of whatever charges.
I don’t expect to be bothered again about
this matter. I hope this closes the
case.
Yours truly,
(Sgd.) E.R. TAGULAO
EVANGELINE R. TAGULAO“[13]
On January 30, 1974,
petitioner Reyes filed with the NLRC an
“Opposition to Request for Clearance to Dismiss” which was docketed and
considered as a complaint for illegal dismissal.[14]
He alleged that “in spite of results of investigations tending to
exculpate him from the charges, he has been placed under harassing situations
to the prejudice of himself and his family . . . and prayed that respondent
Company be ordered “to immediately reinstate (him) to his former position
with full back salaries. . .”
The case was assigned to Mediator-Factfinder
Mirasol Corleto for
mediation and/or factfinding. After hearing, she submitted a “Mediation
Report”[15]
dated February 25, 1974 to
the NLRC wherein she found petitioner innocent of the
charge of misÂappropriation and recommended his reinstatement with backwages, thus:
x x
x
“FINDINGS:
In order to shed light to this case, Miss Tagulao
personally testified during the mediation stage and stated that without her
knowledge, the amount of P4,000 was taken by Mr. Victor Santos from the
envelope containing the cash prize. She
was at that time, personally indebted to Mr. Victor Santos of the sum of P4,000
for a diamond ring which she purchased on installment basis on November 15, 1973 as evidenced by
hereto attached promissory note. She
further testified that she did not have any intention of filing a complaint
against Mr. Mario Reyes were it not for the instigation and prodding of Mr.
Romeo Henson.
The other witness Mr. Victor Santos also testified to the fact that
he was the one who took the P4,000 as payment to him by Miss Tagulao for a diamond ring.
When Mr. Santos explained the whole thing and after he had issued a
receipt to Miss Tagulao for the P4,000, Miss Tagulao withdrew her complaint from Marsman
and returned the check to respondent Co.
It is crystal clear from the evidences and testimonies presented by
witnesses that complainant Mario Reyes was innocent of what had transpired to
the sum of P4,000 and he was just a victim of an honest mistake.
Respondent company does not have any right to suspend complainant
after Miss Tagulao had clarified the whole matter to
them.
Respondent does not have any sound basis to lose their trust and
confidence in complainant who had rendered service with the company for almost
8 years.
RECOMMENDATION:
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that
complainant be reinstated with backwages and request
for clearance of respondent be denied.”
The NLRC[16]
issued an Order[17]
dated February 4, 1974
adopting the “findings of Mediator?Factfinder
Mirasol Corleto dated 25 February 1974
(sic)”. Contrary to Corleto’s recommendation, however, the NLRC
ordered the Company to reinstate petitioner without backwages.
From the NLRC’s order, both parties
appealed to the Secretary, now Minister, of Labor. Respondent Company’s, “Motion for
Reconsideration”[18] dated
April 2, 1974, which was
denied, was considered as its appeal to the Minister of Labor. The Company based its appeal on the following
grounds:
“1. Vital evidences were disregarded, which if otherwise considered
would have substantially changed the nature of the Order.
“2. Assuming arguendo that substantial evidence on the whole had
been considered, the circumstances of the case do not warrant the relief
granted.”
Petitioner on the other hand, on April 8, 1974, appealed that portion
of the NLRC’s order which denied him backwages.[19]
The Minister of Labor’s “Decision”[20]
dated August 22, 1974
ordered the reinstatement of petitioner with backwages. Pertinent portion of the decision reads:
x x
x
“Based on the evidence, we hold complainant completely blameless
from the imputation and charges which were the bases for respondent’s
application for clearance to dismiss complainant. Consequently, loss of trust may not be
imputed to complainant. Also, the
grounds in support of complainant’s preventive suspension, namely: ‘to prevent further violation of the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code and other statutes as well as the
established employment policies and reasonable company rules and regulations’
would be gratuitious assertions devoid of factual
foundation. On this basis, complainant’s
prayer to modify the Commission’s Order to one of reinstatement with backwages deserves utmost consideration.”
The Minister of Labor decided in favor of petitioner on the
strength of the “diamond ring story” mentioned in Mediator-Factfinder Corleto’s Report
(supra), and sustained by the NLRC, thus:
“At the mediation-fact-findings stage, Miss Evangeline Tagulao declared that she did not know that Mr. Victor
Santos deducted the amount of P4,000 from the envelope containing her cash
prize. She further declared that at that
time she was indebted to Mr. Santos of the sum of P4,000 for a diamond ring she
purchased from him on installment basis on November 15, 1973 as evidenced by a promissory note she
executed in his favor. Further testimony
reveals that she filed the complaint against Mr. Mario Reyes because of the
instigation and prodding of Mr. Romeo Henson, Promotions Coordinator at Marsman & Company, Inc.
These facts were confirmed by Mr. Victor Santos who was presented
as witness for complainant and further admitted that he took the amount of
P4,000 from the envelope containing Miss Tagulao’s
cash prize as payment of the balance of the diamond ring he sold to her. It appears that after these circumstances
were explained to her, on the basis of which she issued a receipt for P4,000 as
full payment of the diamond ring by Mr. Victor Santos, Miss Evangeline Tagulao withdrew her complaint against complainant Mario
Reyes and returned the check for P4,000 which was earlier issued to her by
respondent company.
Despite these clarifications by both Miss Tagulao
and Mr. Santos of an apparent misunderstanding of which complainant was the
unsuspecting victim, respondents continued with their suspension of
complainant.”
Respondents Company and E.G. Vito filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[21]
dated September 2, 1974
alleging that -?
“1. The decision treated the evidence unfairly and with manifest
subjectivity in favor of complainant;
x x
x
“2. The consideration of complainants’ appeal has denied
respondents their right to due process; and
x x
x
“3. The reinstatement and backwages
ordered in the decision of August 22,
1974 is without legal basis.”
The Minister of Labor, Hon. Blas F. Ople, found the Motion for Reconsideration “lacking of
merit” and denied the same in an Order[22]
dated December 23, 1974.
A Second Motion for Reconsideration[23]
dated January 16, 1975
filed by respondents was again denied “(F)or lack of merit” in an
Order[24]
dated March 22, 1975.
Respondents then appealed to the Office of the President, praying
for the reversal of the Order of the Minister of Labor dated March 22, 1975 denying their motion
for reconsideration, on the following “extraordinary grounds”:[25]
“1. The Order is contrary to law and jurisprudence on the matter;
and
“2. The Order contains serious errors in the findings of facts
and would cause grave or irreparable damage and injury to the appellants.”
Anent the first ground, respondents
allege that reinstatement with payment of backwages
cannot be ordered “in the absence of a finding of unfair labor practice
(as in this case)”, and that mere loss of confidence will suffice for the
dismissal of a supervisory or managerial employee, such as petitioner in this
case. As to the second ground, the main
thrust of respondents’ argument is that it was clear error for the Minister of
Labor to hold petitioner Reyes “. . . blameless from the imputation and
charges . . .” by the mere fact “that the complaint and previous
statement of the winner, Evangeline Tagulao, had
already been withdrawn or retracted by her . . .” They allege that in
termination cases, direct and positive evidence of an employee’s guilt of the
charges, as required in criminal cases, need not be shown.
The Office of the President decided the appeal by a 1st Indorsement[26]
dated November 12, 1975. The decision was arrived at after additional
hearings were conducted by it on July 15, July 25 and October 22, 1975. It reversed the decision of the Minister of
Labor dated August 22, 1974 ordering the reinstatement of petitioner with backwages, having found Tagulao’s
“diamond ring story” implausible, thus:
“At the factfinding proceedings of February 18, 1974, Miss Tagulao for the first time stated the reason for her
retraction. According to her, she owed
Victor Santos (the promotions supervisor with whom she and the complainant
proceeded to the bank for the cashing of the prize money check) the balance of
P4,000 for a diamond ring which she purchased from the latter on installment
basis since November 15, 1973, as per a promissory note she executed in
his favor. She testified that she filed
the complaint against Mario Reyes because she was allegedly instigated by Romeo
Henson, production coordinator of the respondent. Received for all and whatever it is worth,
the promissory note allegedly executed by Tagulao in
Victor Santos’ favor sans the formalities ordinarily attendant to such
undertakings exists as a document the truth of which can never really be
ascertained except on the verbal testimony of the person supposedly its
author. The existence of this note,
however, was never revealed to the respondent at the time Miss Tagulao complained on January 16, 1974.
If as alleged by Miss Tagulao the P4,000
deducted from the prize money on the very day the check was cashed represented
payment of the promissory note, then Victor Santos, the supposed creditor,
could have simply asked for the P4,000 balance from her, the alleged debtor,
and just demanded a receipt for the payment of such amount, nothing more. Instead, in her letter-complaint against
Mario Reyes, Tagulao charged that she was made by the
complainant herein to believe that the P4,000 deducted from her prize money was
for consolation prizes. This
contradictory allegations of Tagulao puts her
credibility in serious doubt.
Moreover, a week or so had passed since the filing of her complaint
on January 16, 1975, up to her retraction on January 24, 1975, and within this
period, Miss Tagulao set up entirely different and
opposite explanations. So also, during
the entire period of time that passed from the encashment of the check in
December 1973 to the filing of the complaint on January 16, 1974, the P4,000 was not delivered to the
winner, Miss Evangeline Tagulao. This leads this office to gravely doubt the
integrity of her retraction and suspect that her letter of January 24, 1975 was, more than anything else,
made to exculpate the complainant-appellee. Under the circumstances, this Office is inclined
to hold that complainant’s guilt as complained has not been satisfactorily
erased.”
On the finding of the Minister of Labor that the complaint
against petitioner was due to “instigation and prodding of Mr. Romeo
Henson, Promotions Coordinator at Marsman and
Company, Inc.,”, the Office of the President made the following
observations:
“For his part, Romeo Henson, testifying on oath before this
Office on October 22, 1975,
disclosed that as promotions manager of the respondent, he had to see to the
proper and orderly disposition of awards in promotional contests, including
that in which the complainant was allegedly irregularly involved and in which
Evangeline Tagulao emerged winner.
Tipped off by one Romeo Real, promotions supervisor of the
pharmaceuticals division of the respondent, on alleged anomalies attending the
aforesaid contest, Henson accordingly proceeded to investigate the matter and
visited Tagulao at the latter’s residence. Whereupon he learned from the winner that she
received P20,000, the complainant having allegedly told her that the P4,000 was
allocated for consolation prizes. He
therefore informed her that she should have received P24,000, and that the
company shall forthwith remit to her the balance of P4,000, upon her proper
notice to the respondent. Thereafter Tagulao drafted a handwritten letter to the company which
Henson picked up at the winner’s office the following day.
Henson, who admitted being a ‘compadre‘
and a personal friend of the complainant, averred that both he and Tagulao never discussed anything beyond the winner’s desire
to have the balance of her prize money remitted to her by Marsman
& Company. He therefore expressed
surprise at Tagulao’s subsequent ‘retraction’. Further, he veheÂmently denied having prodded
or instigated Tagulao to file the complaint against
Mario Reyes, and that his only purpose was to help Miss Tagulao
recover the balance of the prize due her.
x x x
A circumspect consideration of the testimonies adduced in this case
leads this Office to believe the version of Henson than Tagulao’s. For in the natural course of things no amount
of prodding by Henson could have moved Tagulao to
make the complaint against anybody if she were not short-changed in the payment
of the prize. And if there really was a
private transaction between her and Victor Santos and/or Mario Reyes which
accounted for the withholding or non-remittance to her of the P4,000, it is
beyond comprehension why she would still file, as she did file, the complaint
in question.”
Finally, the Office of the President concluded:
“There is, therefore, basis for the respondent to claim that
it had lost confidence on the complainant employee, in the light of the fact
that the complainant-appellee deÂliberately withheld
the sum of P4,000 from Miss Tagulao, the latter
receiving only P20,000 from the original prize money of P24,000. The turnabout of events as manifested in Tagulao’s retraction fails to convince this Office of the
innocence of the complainant-appellee from the
irregularity. Verily, the complainÂant
has sufficiently given his employer, the respondent, ground for loss of
confidence.
x x x
“This Office (so) holds that the foregoing circumstances are
sufficient for the respondent employer to terminate (the services of) the
complainant employee. It is not wise
to tolerate the latter to remain in his position simply because of the questionable
retraction by the winner of the sales promotional contest because the breach of
trust has already been committed.
The interest not only of the respondent corporation, but of the public
itself is involved, since promotional contests such as the one involved herein
are advertised to the public at large. The
responÂdent was, therefore, justified in requesting the termination of the
services of its managerial employee, the complainant herein. The decision of the Secretary of Labor dated August 22, 1974, is
therefore hereby reversed, and the request for clearÂance to terminate
complainant’s employment is granted.” (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[27]
dated December 29, 1975 of
the decision of the Office of the President.
It was however denied for lack of merit by said Office thru Presidential
Assistant for Legal Affairs, Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora,
in a letter[28]
dated February 8, 1977. Hence this petition.
Petitioner alleges that the Office of the President acted without
or in excess of jurisÂdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned decision dated November 12,
1976 and the resolution dated February 8, 1977 denying his Motion for
Reconsideration, on the grounds that the Office of the President –
1.
Does not have any jurisdiction to entertain the
appeal; and
2.
Has no authority to conduct a new hearing on
appeal for the purpose of fishing new or additional evidence.
With respect to the first ground, petitioner argues that the
appeal of respondents does not fall under Section 13, Rule XIII of the Rules
and RegÂulations Implementing the Labor Code, infra, since the grounds
alleged in the said appeal are not those prescribed by the aforesaid provision.
Anent the second ground, petitioner insists that the Office of
the President “committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisÂdiction when, apart from reviewing the case on the basis of the evidence
on records, (it) went further by conducting a new hearing on appeal . . .”
Private respondents Marsman and Co. and
E.G. Vito on the other hand contend that —
“. . . The allegation of being contrary to law and jurisprudence is
really one such purely on questions of law which is therefore in keeping with
par. (b) of Sec. 13, Rule XIII and, the allegation that serious errors in the
findings of facts would definitely lead one to conclude as to prima facie
evidence of abuse of discretion and therefore substantially in keeping with
par. (a) of Sec. 13, Rule XIII.”
On the allegation that the Office of the President does not have
jurisdiction to conduct a new hearing on appeal, they maintain that a new
hearing was necessary because of “patent inconsisÂtencies” in the
case for the complainant which must be clarified so that the Office of the
President may render a “judicious decision.”
The Solicitor General[29]
postulates — similarly with the private respondents — that “serious errors
in the findings of facts” relied upon by respondents may be considered as
falling under “abuse of discretion” (par. [a], Sec. 13, Rule XIII)
whereas the averment that “the order is contrary to law and jurisprudence
on the matter” may be considered as a ground raising a question of law
(par. [b], Sec. 13, Rule XIII).
On the propriety/legality of the new hearings conducted by the
Office of the President, the Solicitor General maintains that “(T)here is
no law which prohibits the Office of the President from conducting additional
hearings in an appealed case.
Furthermore, it is by itself an administrative body and as such is
possessed with factfinding prerogatives, especially
so when the purpose thereof is necessary, nay indispensable, to the proper
adjudication of the case. In the case at
bar, public respondent found the evidence on record wanting in some important
factual aspects as to be able to determine whether or not petitioner’s
suspension and/or dismissal was justified.
Thus it could not be said that public respondent abused its discretion in
conducting additional hearings prompted as it was by its desire to render a
correct and just decision.”
From the foregoing discussions/arguments the following issues
emerge for Our resolution, i.e. –
1.
Whether or not the Office of the President has
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal of private respondents, under Rule XII,
Sec. 13 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code of the Philippines;
2.
Whether or not the Office of the President acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion
in conducting new hearings on appeal; and
3.
Whether or not petitioner’s dismissal on the
ground of loss of confidence is justified.
Now to resolve the foregoing in seriatim.
1. We perceive no difficulty
in sustaining respondents’ claim on the first issue. They relied in their appeal to the Office of
the President on the following:
“a) The Order is contrary to law and jurisprudence on the matter;
and
x x
x
“b) The Order contains serious errors in the findings of facts and
would cause grave or irreparable damage and injury to the appellants;”
whereas, the grounds provided under Rule
XIII, Section 13 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code, are:
“a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion;
“b) If made purely on questions of law; and
“c) If there is a showing that the national security or social and
economic stability is threatened.”
Petitioner’s allegation that the grounds relied upon are not
those provided for is more apparent than real.
For the truth is, as the Solicitor General and the private respondents
point out, the allegation that “(T)he order is contrary to law and
jurisprudence on the matter” raises a question of law and hence can be
subsumed under paragraph (b), aforequoted. Indeed when one alleges that an order is contrary
to law and jurisprudence, plain common sense dictates that the order is
being attacked on question of law.
Again, the second ground — that “the order contains serious
errors in the findings of facts and would cause grave or ireparable
damage and injury to appellants” — is in the final analysis tantamount to
alleging “abuse of discretion“, and may be subsumed under
paragraph (a), supra. Serious errors in
the findings of facts may not per se be equated with abuse of
discretion. Under Rule XIII, Section 7[30]
of the Rules and Regulations providing for appeals from the decision of the
Labor Arbiter or compulsory arbitrator to the NLRC,
“abuse of discretion” and “serious errors in the findings of
facts” are two separate and distinct grounds, i.e. (a) and (d)
thereof. In this case, however, a
careful perusal of private respondents’ appeal will show that they are raising
principally grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Minister in rendering
his decision. As previously stated, the
main thrust of respondents’ argument is that under the circumstances of the
case, the Minister made a palpably erroneous conÂclusion in holding that
petitioner did not commit a breach of respondents’ trust and confidence. This is tantamount to ascribing to him an
abuse of discretion.
In any event, the first ground, which raised a question of law,
already conferred jurisdiction in the Office of the President to entertain the
appeal.
2. Petitioner’s bare allegation that the Office of the President
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of
discretion in conducting a new hearing on appeal is devoid of merit. Firstly, if that were his belief, he should
not have taken part in the hearing, and testified therein.[31]
He should have taken proper legal steps to raise his objection at the earliest
opportunity. With his participation and
cooperation in said new hearing, he is now estopped
from complaining that the Office of the President conducted new hearings on
appeal. Secondly, petitioner can cite no
law or jurisprudence to support his argument.
For the truth is, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, “(T)here
is no law which prohibits the Office of the President from conducting
additional hearings in an appealed case”*
and that the said Office “is by itself an administrative body and as such
is possessed with fact finding prerogative, especially so when the purpose
thereof is necessary, nay indispensable, to the proper adjudication of the
case.” Further, the Solicitor General observed that the new hearing was
necessary because “public respondent found the evidence on record wanting
in some important factual aspects as to be able to determine whether or not
petitioner’s suspension and/or dismissal was justified.”
3. Is petitioner’s dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence
justified?
Loss of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an employee,
and proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee’s misconduct – apparÂently
demanded by the Minister of Labor – is not required to dismiss him on this
charge.[32]
It is sufficient if there is “some basis” for such loss of
confidence;[33]
or if the employer has reasonable grounds to believe, if not to entertain the
moral conviction that the employee concerned is responsible for the misconduct
and that the nature of his participation thereÂin rendered him absolutely
unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position.[34]
In the case at bar, it is an admitted fact that petitioner is a
managerial employee, one in whom respondent Company has given its complete
trust and confidence.[35]
He was, at the time of the anomaly, per his own claim, “concurrent Acting
Manager of Leo Pharmaceutical (a division of respondent Company) and Credit and
Collection Manager.”[36]
The Company, therefore, was justified in expecting that his actuations should
be above suspicion. Because of
petitioner’s involvement in the raffle anomaly, i.e., having withheld from the
winner Miss Tagulao, P4,000 of the P24,000 prize
money, which withholding he was not able to explain convincingly much less
disprove, “it is not”, in the words of the decision of the Office of
the President, “wise to tolerate the latter (petitioner) to remain in his
position . . . because the breach of trust has already been committed.”[37]
The petitioner would also pray that the writ of mandamus issue
against the Office of the President, directing said Office to confine its
review of the decision of the Minister of Labor solely on the evidence
presented and established during the hearing conducted at the mediation-factfinding stage.
Petitioner would, in effect, request this Court to prevent said Office
from considering the evidence presented at the hearings conducted by the said
Office, in its resolution of the appeal.
This petition also lacks merit.
In the first place, the office of the writ of mandamus is to direct
“any tribunal x x x,
board or person” to perform “an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station x x x.”[38]
In the instant case, there is no duty that the Office of the President
neglected to do which would warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus. Secondly, as has been observed earlier, the
petitioner did not take legal steps to prevent said hearings. On the contrary, he participated in the
same. He is therefore now estopped from questioning the said proceedings through a
request for the issuance of a writ of mandamus which, obviously, is not the
proper remedy.
WHEREFORE, let this Petition be as it is hereby
DISMISSED. The decision of the Office of
the President dated November 12, 1975
— granting respondent Company’s application for clearance to terminate
petitioner’s employment is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner. This
decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Antonio, (Acting Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and
Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, p. 108.
[2] Id.,
p. 121.
[3] Id.,
p. 135.
[4] Id.,
p. 185.
[5] Id.,
p. 187.
[6] Id.,
p. 195.
[7] Id.,
p. 224.
[8] Id.,
pp. 19 and 22, Petition, Annexes “A” & “B”.
[9] Evidence
is not clear as to what bank the check was cashed. In her letter of retraction, Tagulao says it is the Rizal
Commercial Bank at Buendia. Before Mediator-Factfinder
Mirasol Corleto of N.L.R.C. however, she says it is the PCI
Bank, Tayuman.
Victor Santos, however claims before the Mediator-Factfinder
that it is PCI Bank, Makati.
[10]
See Decision of the Office of the President, Annex “N”, Rollo, p. 78.
[11] Rollo, pp. 19-20, Petition, Annex “A”.
[12] Id.,
p. 27, Petition, Annex “D”.
[13] Id.,
p. 82, Petition, Annex “N”.
The other letter does not appear in any of the pleadings.
[14] Id.,
p. 22. The case was docketed as NLRC Case No. C-131-74 entitled “Mario Z. Reyes,
complainant vs. Marsman and Co. Inc. and E.G.
Vito, respondents.”
[15] Id.,
p. 23, Petition, Annex “C”.
[16]
Composed of Amado G. Inciong,
as Chairman, Diego P. Atienza and Ricardo C. Castro
as members.
[17] Rollo, p. 34, Petition, Annex “E”.
[18] Id.,
p. 36, Petition, Annex “F”.
[19] Id.,
p. 7, Petition, par. 9. Copy of the
appeal, however, does not appear in the petition’s annexes.
[20] Id.,
p. 51, Petition, Annex “G”.
[21] Id.,
p. 55, Petition, Annex “H”.
[22] Id.,
p. 64, Petition, Annex “I”.
[23] Id.,
p. 65, Petition, Annex “J”.
[24] Id.,
p. 72, Petition, Annex “L”.
[25] Id.,
p. 73, Petition, Annex “M”.
[26] Id.,
p. 78, Petition, Annex “N”.
[27] Id.,
p. 89, Petition, Annex “O”.
[28] Id.,
p. 99, Petition, Annex “P”.
[29]
Sol. Gen. Estelito P. Mendoza was assisted by
Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puion and Solicitor Ramon A. Barcelona.
[30]
Rule XIII, Sec. 7. “When to
appeal. – The aggrieved party may appeal
the decision of the Labor Arbiter or compulsory arbitrator to the National
Labor Relations Commission within ten (10) working days from receipt of the
decision on any of the following grounds:
(a)
If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of
discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter or compulsory arbitrator;
(b)
If the decision, order, or award was secured
through fraud or coercion, inÂcluding graft and corruption;
(c)
If made purely a question of law; and
(d)
If serious errors in the findings of facts
are raised which would cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the
appellant” (emphasis supplied).
[31]
See Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, Rollo,
pp. 91-92.
*
Under Sec. 2, Pres. Dec. No. 1367, effective May 1, 1978, amending Art. 223 of the Labor Code,
“(T)he decision of the Secretary of Labor shall be immediately executory: Provided,
that the President of the Philippines
may assume jurisdiction over any cases which he considers national interests
cases.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Pres. Dec. No. 1391, dated May 29,
1978 eliminates appeals from the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to the Minister of Labor, “but the President x x x may continue to exercise his
powers under P.D. No. 442, as amended.” Sec. 7
of the Rules Implementing Pres. Dec. No. 1391, effective September 15, 1978 provides that “(T)here
shall henceforth be no appeal from such decisions (of the Commission en banc)
to the Minister of Labor except as provided in P.D.
No. 1367 and its implementing rules concerning appeals to the Prime
Minister. The decisions of the
Commission en banc or any of its Divisions shall be final and executory.”
This is because the membership of
the NLRC has been increased by Pres. Dec. No. 1391, supra,
from 7 to 10, including the Minister of Labor, who acts as chairman.
[32]
See National Organization of Laborers and Employees vs. Roldan, L-6888, August 31, 1954, 95 Phil. 727; Phil.
Refining Co. vs. Garcia, L-2-871, Sept. 27, 1966, 18 SCRA
107; Gatmaitan vs. MRR,
L-19892, Sept. 25, 1977, 21 SCRA 191.
[33] Galsim vs. PNB, L-23921, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 293.
[34] Nevans vs. CIR, L-21510, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA
1321.
[35]
See “Second Motion for Reconsideration”, Rollo,
p. 65, and “Opposition to Second Motion for Reconsideration”, Rollo, p. 69.
[36]
See Opposition to Second Motion for Reconsideration, supra, at p.
70.
[37] Rollo, p. 87, Petition, Annex “N”; supra,
p. 18.
[38]
See Sec. 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court.