PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ELRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND MERIDIAN ASSURANCE CORPORATION, DEFENDANTS, ELRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, DEFEN…

This appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals by the defendant
Elro Development Corporation from the adverse decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 6612, and subsequently certified to us
by the appellate court, there being no questions of fact involved.

The suit originated in the City Court of Manila, for the
collection of P4,973.54, with interest thereon at 9% per annum, the said sum
being the unpaid balance of a promissory note for P20,000 signed by the said
defendant in favor of the plaintiff.  The
City Court gave judgment for the latter and the defendant appealed to the Court
of First Instance.  The complaint, as
reproduced on appeal, incorporated by reference the promissory note sued upon,
and alleged the amount of partial payments made as well as the amount of the
balance sought to be recovered.  In the
answer of the defendant the due execution of the promissory note was not denied
under oath.  What the defendant did deny
was that it had made partial payments at all or that there was still a balance
of P4,973.54, “the truth of this matter being that no such amount is due
the plaintiff.” In fact, according to the trial court, the execution of
the said note was admitted, although counsel manifested that the receipts
evidencing payment on the principal indebtedness were in the possession of the
former lawyer.

When the case was called for trial on October 14, 1966 the
plaintiff submitted its evidence, all documentary, consisting of a duplicate
copy of the promissory note itself as well as a statement of the defendant’s
accounts and the written demand for payment upon him.  The documents, duly marked as exhibits, were
admitted by the Court, which there­upon gave the defendant five minutes to
present its own
evidence.  The defendant failed to
do so, and so the Court con­sidered the case submitted.  On October 28, 1966, decision was rendered
sentencing it to pay the amount demanded, plus attorney’s fees and costs.

On October 29, 1966 the defendant filed a motion for
reconsideration and/or objection to the plaintiff’s documentary exhibits, on
the ground that they had not been properly identified, since nobody testified
as to their exe­cution.  The motion was
denied by the Court in its order of November
5, 1966; hence the present appeal.

The defendant cites Rule 132, Section 21, which says that “before any private writing
may be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved.” Such proof, however,
was correctly dispensed with in this
case in view not only of the failure of the defendant to deny under oath the authenticity and due execution of the
promissory note sued upon,^[1]
copy of which was annexed to and incorporated in the complaint, but also of the
admission of those facts by the defendant’s counsel at
the pre-trial.

The next argument is that
although the promissory note was not denied, there was a denial of the outstanding balance
alleged in the complaint.  The answer
contains the following averment on this point: 
“Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations… to the
effect that defendant made partial payments and that there is a balance of P4,973.54 on the alleged principal
obligation of P20,000.00, the truth of the matter being that no such amount is due the plaintiff.” It is difficult to divine the meaning of
this denial.  If no partial payments had
been made and no amount was admitted as due the plaintiff, the thrust of the
averment would seem to be that there was no initial obligation incurred at all;
and yet the promissory note was not denied
under oath and was in fact subsequently admitted at the pre-trial.  On the other hand, if payments had
been made, either partial or total, they should have been alleged with
definiteness and evidence thereof duly presented.  Neither was done by the defendant.  The suggestion that it was not given its day
in court is clearly without basis, for it was afforded such opportunity after
the plaintiff had submitted its exhibits. 
Even in its motion for reconsideration, the defendant merely objected to
the admission of the said exhibits, but referred to no evidence of its own
which it could offer in defense.  Indeed,
as observed by the trial court, if the defendant had any receipts of payment in the possession of its former
counsel they would have been presented before the City Court, where the case
was tried and decided in the first instance.

The last point raised by
the defendant is that its motion for reconsideration and/or objection to the
plaintiff’s documentary evidence should have been resolved before the de­cision
was rendered.  That, of course, was not
possible, since the motion was filed one day after rendition of the decision;
and in any case was correctly denied by the court.

The decision appealed from is affirmed,
with double costs against the defendant-appellant.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano,
Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., and
Zaldivar, JJ., are on leave.

^[1]
“When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding
section, the genuineness and due
execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party,
under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the
facts.  x x x”